Allahabad High Court
Akhtar Ali vs State Of U.P. And 2 Others on 23 February, 2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Reserved A.F.R. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD WRIT - A No. - 14138 of 2022 Akhtar Ali ..Petitioner(s) Versus State of U.P. and others ..Respondent(s) Counsel for Petitioners(s) : Mr. Anwar Hussain, Advocate Counsel for Respondent(s): Mr. Sharad Chandra Upadhaya, Standing Counsel for respondent nos. 1 and 2 Mr. Pankaj Srivastava, Advocate for respondent no. 3 Court No. - 44 HONBLE J.J. MUNIR, J.
1. This writ petition is directed against an order of the Nagar Ayukt, Nagar Nigam Meerut dated 27.06.2019, dismissing the petitioner, a Clerk, from service, after holding disciplinary proceedings. Also under challenge is the order of the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, dismissing the petitioner’s appeal against the last mentioned order of the Nagar Ayukt, and affirming his dismissal from service.
2. The petitioner was employed as a Senior Clerk in the service of the Nagar Nigam Meerut. A complaint was laid against him by a former Corporator, Ajay Gupta, on 16.08.2017, relating to allegations of corruption and embezzlement, as it appears. The complaint, somehow, was taken cognizance of by the Commissioner of the Division, who constituted a three Member Committee to inquire into the matter. Apparently, the aforesaid inquiry, that was directed by the Commissioner, was a preliminary inquiry. Pending this inquiry, a First Information Report (FIR) was lodged against the petitioner, giving rise to Case Crime No.34 of 2018, under Section 409 IPC, Police Station Dehli Gate, District Meerut. Apart from the FIR, that was lodged by the Nagar Swasthya Adhikari on 20.02.2018, the petitioner was suspended pending inquiry vide order dated 08.03.2018, on ground that he was not cooperating with the inquiry undertaken under orders of the Divisional Commissioner. The inquiry apparently bears reference to the preliminary inquiry that was then afoot under directions of the Commissioner of the Division.
3. Upon suspension from service, a regular inquiry was initiated against the petitioner and the Chief Finance and Accounts Officer, Nagar Nigam, Meerut was appointed the Inquiry Officer. The petitioner was issued a charge-sheet dated 11.07.2018. According to the petitioner, the charge-sheet did not mention evidence by which the charges were proposed to be proved nor the witnesses. It is averred that the charge-sheet has not been drawn up in accordance with Rule 31 of the Uttar Pradesh Mahapalika Service Rules, 1962 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1962’). Upon receipt of the charge-sheet, the petitioner vide letters dated 20.07.2018, 31.07.2018, 20.08.2018 and 29.08.2018 requested the Inquiry Officer for provision of documents, so that he could submit a reply to the charge-sheet. However, the documents in support of the charges were never supplied. Deprived of this opportunity, the petitioner submitted a reply dated 24.09.2018, answering the charge-sheet dated 11.07.2018. Objection in the reply as to validity of the charge-sheet was also taken in that, that it was issued without prior approval of the Nagar Ayukt.
4. Next, the Nagar Ayukt issued a second charge-sheet dated 01.11.2018. On the basis of whatever materials were collected by the Commissioner of the Division in the preliminary inquiry held under his directions, this charge-sheet imputed to the petitioner, causing the Nagar Nigam a loss to the tune of Rs.14,89,600/-. He was asked to submit his reply to the charge-sheet dated 01.11.2018 (for short, ‘the second charge-sheet) within three days. This charge-sheet too, according to the petitioner, was not drawn up in compliance with Rule 31 of the Rules of 1962. The petitioner vide letters dated 06.11.2018 and 11.12.2018 asked for the provision of a copy of the inquiry report, which apparently refers to the preliminary inquiry report that the Commissioner secured through the Committee set up by him.
5. It is the petitioner’s case that instead of providing a copy of the preliminary inquiry report, he was furnished a gist of the said report vide letter dated 22.12.2018. The petitioner vide letter dated 08.01.2019 asked for the furnishing of a complete copy of the preliminary inquiry report dated 16.02.2018, but to no avail. Deprived of the particulars of the charge against him, which was based on the preliminary inquiry report, the petitioner submitted, as he says, a reply to the second charge-sheet on 04.02.2019. In his reply, it was asserted that the charge-sheet had been issued without annexing a copy of the preliminary inquiry report or evidence in support of the charge, sought to be relied upon by the respondents. The charge-sheet was, therefore, assailed as illegal. Time and again, it was also asserted by the petitioner that there was no mention in the charge-sheet that he had a right to cross-examine witnesses and produce witnesses in his defence. There are other objections of technical detail raised to the two charge-sheets, but we need not mention them.
6. Suffice it to say that the petitioner denied the charges. It is the petitioner’s case that the inquiry that was held did not intimate to the petitioner any date, time and venue of inquiry and the Inquiry Officer proceeded in violation of principles of natural justice. There is an assertion to this effect in paragraph No.33 of the writ petition. It is pleaded in paragraph No.35 of the writ petition that the Inquiry Officer did not adhere to Rule 31 of the Rules of 1962, which prescribes a detailed procedure, in case a major penalty is in contemplation, to be followed by the Inquiry Officer when disciplinary proceedings are taken against a servant of the Mahapalika. This procedure requires, apart from serving the charge-sheet drawn up in the manner prescribed, opportunity to be provided to the delinquent employee to examine and cross-examine witnesses. But, no such procedure was followed.
7. It is also averred in paragraph No.37 of the writ petition that Rule 32 of the Rules of 1962 was observed in breach by the respondent Mahapalika in that, that a copy of the inquiry report along with the show cause notice was not served upon the petitioner before final orders in the disciplinary matter, dismissing him from service, were made. The petitioner was dismissed from service, on the basis of the Inquiry Officer’s report, by the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 27.06.2019. The petitioner challenged this order through a departmental appeal dated 12.07.2019 under Rule 35 of the Rules of 1962 before the Commissioner of the Division. The appeal remained pending and the petitioner had to move this Court by means of Writ-A No.15517 of 2021 in order to seek a direction to the Commissioner to decide his appeal expeditiously. The directions were issued in the aforesaid writ petition vide order dated 02.11.2021. The order of this Court was served upon the Divisional Commissioner by registered post on 20.11.2021. Those directions to decide the appeal were not complied with by the Commissioner. This compelled the petitioner to move an application for contempt, being Contempt Application (Civil) No.1539 of 2022, where this Court granted a further time of three months to the Commissioner to comply with the order dated 02.11.2021 passed in Writ-A No.15517 of 2021.
8. It is averred in paragraph No.31 of the writ petition that the Commissioner, after the order dated 24.03.2022 made in the contempt application, proceeded to reject the petitioners appeal in haste vide order dated 23.05.2022.
9. Aggrieved by the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority, this writ petition has been instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution.
10. The parties having exchanged affidavits, the writ petition was admitted to hearing on 12.12.2024. Later on, after hearing parties, judgment was reserved.
11. Heard Mr. Anwar Hussain, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sharad Chandra Upadhyay, learned Standing Counsel, appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Mr. Pankaj Srivastava, learned Counsel, appearing for respondent No. 3.
12. The petitioner has been punished with the imposition of a major penalty dismissal from service after holding disciplinary proceedings. The foremost question to be seen is if the procedure, in holding the inquiry as well as the entirety of disciplinary proceedings culminating in the order of dismissal from service impugned, is one that is in accordance with the rules, and, above all, in accordance with the rules of natural justice applicable to proceedings that are involved here.
13. The service conditions of the petitioner, who is an employee of the Mahapalika, not covered by Rule 11 of the Rules of 1962, are governed by the said rules. Rules 31 and 32 of the Rules of 1962 read:
31. Procedure for disciplinary proceedings.-(1) No order (other than an order based on facts which have led to his conviction on a criminal charge) of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank (which includes reduction to a lower post or time-scale or to a lower stage in a time-scale but excludes the reversion to a lower post of a person who is officiating in a higher post), shall be passed on any servant of the Mahapalika unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of a definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged and which shall be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged servant of the facts and circumstances against him. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires or if the authority concerned so directs an oral enquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegations as are not admitted. At that inquiry such oral evidence will be heard as the inquiring officer considers necessary. The person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish provided that the officer conducting the inquiry may for sufficient reason to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness. Neither the Mahapalika nor the servants of the Mahapalika shall be entitled to be represented by a counsel. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. The officer conducting the enquiry may also separately from these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged servant.
(2) This rule shall not apply where the person concerned has absconded or where it is for other reasons impracticable to communicate with him. All or any of the provisions of the rule may for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing be waived, where there is difficulty in observing exactly the requirements of the rule and those requirements can in the opinion of the inquiring officer be waived without injustice to the person charged.
(3) This rule shall also not apply where it is proposed to terminate the employment of either a temporary servant, or of a probationer whether during or at the end of the period of probation. In such cases a simple notice of termination, which in the case of temporary servant, must conform to the conditions of his service, will be sufficient.
32. (1) After an inquiry against a servant has been completed and after the punishing authority has arrived at provisional conclusions in regard to the penalty to be imposed, the servant charged shall, if penalty proposed is dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, be supplied with a copy of the proceedings prepared under Rule 31 excluding the recommendations, if any, in regard to punishment made by the officer conducting the inquiry and asked to show cause by a particular date, which affords him reasonable time, why the proposed penalty should not be imposed on him.
Provided that if for sufficient reasons the punishing authority disagrees with any part or whole of the proceedings prepared under Rule 31 the point or points of such disagreement, together with a brief statement of the grounds thereof, shall also be communicated to the officer or servant charged along with the copy of the proceedings under Rule 31.
(2) Every order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank shall be in writing and shall specify the charge or charges brought, the defence, if any, and the reasons for the order.
14. Here, two charge-sheets were issued to the petitioner on the basis of which disciplinary proceedings were drawn. The first charge-sheet dated 11.07.2018 must be quoted for every word of it:
“कार्यालय मुख्य वित्त एवं लेखाधिकारी,
नगर निगम, मेरठ।
पत्रांक:- 97/लेखा विभाग/18 दिनांक:- 11-07-2018 श्री अख्तर अली लिपिक (निलम्बित) सम्बद्ध केन्द्रीय कार्यालय, नगर निगम, मेरठ।
वित्तीय वर्ष 2011-12 से वित्तीय वर्ष 2015-16 तक स्वास्थ्य विभाग में चूना सहित विभिन्न सामग्रियों के क्रय में बरती गई अनियमितता एवं भ्रष्टाचार के सम्बन्ध में मण्डलायुक्त महोदय के निर्देशन में चल रही जांच के दौरान सम्बन्धित पत्रावलियों व अन्य अभिलेखों को उपलब्ध नहीं कराया गया जबकि आप आलोच्य अवधि में स्टोर लिपिक के पद पर कार्यरत थे। अतः जांच में सहयोग न करने तथा पत्रावलियों व अभिलेखों को उपलब्ध न कराये जाने के कारण नगर आयुक्त महोदय के आदेश संख्या 1032/आ०लि०-न०आ०-कैम्प/18 दिनांक 08 मार्च, 2018 के द्वारा आपको निलम्बित करते केन्द्रीय कार्यालय से सम्बद्ध किया गया है। उक्त निलम्बन आदेश में अरोप-पत्र निर्गत कर जांच करने हेतु अधोहस्ताक्षरी को जांच अधिकारी नामित किया गया है।
अतः उक्त के क्रम में निर्देशित किया जाता है कि आप अपने ऊपर लगे आरोपों के सम्बन्ध में निम्नांकित बिन्दुओं के सम्बन्ध में अपनी सुस्पष्ट एवं तथ्यात्मक आख्या एक सप्ताह के अन्दर अधोहस्ताक्षरी को उपलब्ध कराना सुनिश्चित करें :-
1. मा० आयुक्त, मेरठ मण्डल, मेरठ द्वारा करायी जा रही जांच में सहयोग न करने।
2. जांच से सम्बन्धित पत्रावलियों/अभिलेखों को प्रस्तुत न करने।
3. अनुशासनहीनता बरतते हुए बिना अधोहस्ताक्षरी की अनुमति के दिनांक 19.02.2018 से मुख्यालय छोड़ने व अनियमित रूप से अवकाश पर रहने।
4. बिना अनुमति मा० न्यायालय में वाद योजित करने।
उपरोक्त बिन्दुओं के सम्बन्ध में सुस्पष्ट एवं तथ्यात्मक आख्या उपलब्ध न कराने पर यह समझा जायेगा कि आपको इन आरोपों के सम्बन्ध में कुछ नहीं कहना है और जिन आरोपों में आपको निलम्बित किया गया है वो आपको स्वीकार हैं, यह मानते हुए अधोहस्ताक्षरी द्वारा आपके आरोपों की पुष्टि करते हुए जांच आख्या नियुक्ति अधिकारी/नगर आयुक्त महोदय को प्रेषित कर दी जायेगी जिसका उत्तरदायित्व आपका होगा।
मुख्य वित्त एवं लेखाधिकारी
नगर निगम, मेरठ।
प्रतिलिपि:- नगर आयुक्त महोदय को अवलोकनार्थ प्रेषित।
मुख्य वित्त एवं लेखाधिकारी
नगर निगम, मेरठ।”
(emphasis by Court)
15. Likewise, the second charge-sheet dated 01.11.2018 is also required to be quoted:
“रजिस्टर्ड
कार्यालय नगर आयुक्त,
नगर निगम, मेरठ।
पत्रांक:- 668/ आ०लि०-न०आ०/2018 दिनांक:- 01-11-2018 आरोप पत्र - 2 श्री अख्तर अली लिपिक (निलम्बित) सम्बद्ध केन्द्रीय कार्यालय, नगर निगम, मेरठ।
आपके द्वारा नगर निगम के स्वास्थ्य विभाग में स्टोर लिपिक के पद पर तैनात अवधि वर्ष 2011-12 से वर्ष 2015-16 तक क्रय की गई चूना, मैलाथियाँन तथा अन्य सामग्रियों के क्रय व भण्डारण प्रक्रिया में बरती गयी वित्तीय अनियमितताओं की जांच मा० मण्डलायुक्त महोदय, मेरठ मण्डल, मेरठ के द्वारा, श्री अजय गुप्ता निवासी सागर विला, आनन्दपुरी, मेरठ के शिकायती पत्र दिनांक 16.08.2017 के क्रम में की गई। जांच में यह पाया गया है कि “आलोच्य अवधि में आपके द्वारा बरती गई वित्तीय अनियमितताओं के कारण नगर निगम, मेरठ को न्यूनतम 1489600/- रू० की वित्तीय क्षति हुई है।”
उक्त के क्रम में तीन दिवस के अन्दर साक्ष्य सहित अपना पक्ष प्रस्तुत करें कि “आपके द्वारा की गई वित्तीय अनियमिताओं के लिए अनुशासनात्मक कार्यवाही करते हुए अंकन 1489600/- रु० की वसूली आपसे, क्यों न कर ली जाये।” साक्ष्य के रूप में जांच आख्या की छाया प्रति इस पत्र के साथ प्रेषित है।
नगर आयुक्त,
नगर निगम, मेरठ।
प्रतिलिपि :- मा० आयुक्त महोदया, मेरठ मण्डल, मेरठ को अवलोकनार्थ प्रेषित।
ह० अपठनीय
नगर आयुक्त,
नगर निगम, मेरठ।”
16. A look at Rule 31 of the Rules of 1962 shows that it is mandatory in the holding of disciplinary proceedings that the grounds upon which it is proposed to take action, be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges, which have to be so clear and precise so as to give sufficient indication to the employee of the facts and circumstances appearing against him. The rule, under reference, embodies nothing more than the requirements of natural justice and procedure salutary. A charge, after all, need not be in a particular form so far as disciplinary proceedings or for that matter, any administrative proceedings are concerned as distinguished from proceedings in a Court of law. But, it is essential that the charge must convey imputations on the foot of which action is proposed to be taken in terms that are intelligible enough for the employee to understand all the necessary particulars of the allegations sufficiently, in order to enable him to effectively answer the charge.
17. A look at the first charge-sheet would show that the four charges, mentioned in the first charge-sheet, are mere labels of the charges without the substance of imputations being there. It is not mentioned as to which of the records the petitioner did not make available to the inquiry officers holding the preliminary inquiry under orders of the Divisional Commissioner. There is a vague allegation that the petitioner did not make available files and documents relating to the inquiry being undertaken. Likewise, there is the first charge that the petitioner did not cooperate with the inquiry undertaken under orders of the Divisional Commissioner; in what precise manner and by what acts or omissions, when and where, is not specified. In the absence of these, what, where and when about the charges, the charges are hollow incantations with no answerable substance to them.
18. The third charge mentioned in the first charge-sheet dated 11.07.2018 carries somewhat of the necessary particulars saying that from 19.02.2018 to an unspecified date the petitioner left headquarters without permission or seeking leave of the Nagar Ayukt. Again, even if this were regarded as a charge, which could be answered and inquired into, it is one of the four charges and certainly not grave enough to invite the imposition of a major penalty. The major penalty would have been imposed on the other charges based on findings of the inquiry officer.
19. The first of the two charges, we have already shown to be in terms that cannot lead us to a conclusion that those are answerable charges and, therefore, valid.
20. The fourth charge is absolutely illegal; in fact, contumacious. The charge says that the petitioner instituted an action before this Court without permission of the Nagar Ayukt. Elsewhere, it has come that the proceedings instituted by the petitioner were before this Court and it was a writ petition challenging an FIR that the respondents had lodged against him.
21. Now, if it were held that an employee must seek permission from his employer, before approaching us in our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, it would shake the very foundations of the rule of law. In fact, this kind of insistence, by the employer, is an act which prejudices and interferes with the due course of judicial proceedings, competently brought by any citizen, including an employee against his employer or an Authority of the State which constitutes criminal contempt within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. A reference, in this context, may be made to a Bench decision of this Court in Shankar Lal Sharma v. M.S. Bisht, AIR 1956 All 160, where the facts and holding read:
1. Sri Shankar Lal Sharma, an employee in the Public Works Department of the Uttar Pradesh, moved in this Court an application for the grant of a writ against Sri M.S. Bisht, Chief Engineer, P.W.D., U.P., Lucknow, praying for a direction to the opposite party to forward to the Public Service Commission, U.P. his application for employment in some higher post, which he had sent to the said Commission through the opposite party. While the writ petition was pending in this Court Sri M.S. Bisht purporting to act in accordance with certain directions contained in Government Order No. O-3237/II-B-32-52, dated December 24, 1952, asked for an explanation from Sri Shankar Lal as to why he had submitted a writ application in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) Lucknow. It was clearly an attempt to hold out a threat of departmental action against an employee of the Government, who had approached the High Court for what he considered to be the protection of his rights under the Constitution. This matter was brought to the notice of the Court by a petition filed by Sri Shankar Lal and thereupon a notice was issued to Sri N.S. Bisht to show cause why action should not be taken against him for contempt of court.
2. Sri M.S. Bisht has filed an application explaining the circumstances under which he took the action complained of and disclaiming all intention of intimidating the applicant. He has tendered an unqualified apology to this Court. With his application he has appended a copy of the Government order.
3. There is no doubt that if any kind of threat or any action which may amount to such threat is held out to a person, who has approached the civil courts for a redress of such grievances as he may consider that he has, with a view to induce him to forego the assistance of the civil courts, the action amounts to a contempt of court. It is a clear interference with the right of every citizen who claims redress from the civil courts for any grievance that he may have. No kind of Government order in this respect can excuse such an action. It is true that the order of the Government to which reference is made does contain some passages from which it may be inferred that if any person approaches the civil courts, he may in certain circumstances, be called upon to submit an explanation. We are not satisfied that in the present case those conditions were fulfilled, but in any case even if they were that would be no justification for an action to be taken and we cannot allow any impediment to be placed in the way of a citizen seeking redress from the courts of law.
22. In Pratap Singh and another v. Gurbaksh Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1172, it was held by the Supreme Court (Raghubar Dayal, J. dissenting):
9. Assuming that the circular letter contained certain executive instructions, what then is the position? It should perhaps be made clear at the very outset that the question before us is not so much the validity of the circular letter in the abstract, but the propriety of the action taken against the respondent on the basis of the circular letter at a time when his suit was awaiting decision in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge at Amritsar. It must not, however, be assumed that we are holding the circular letter to be valid in the sense that compliance with it will, in no circumstances, amount to contempt of court. We do not come to any such conclusion. The argument before us is that the circular letter did not impose an absolute ban on a government servant seeking redress of his grievances arising out of his employment or service conditions in a court of law; it is submitted that all that it did was to ask government servants to exhaust first the normal official channels of redress before proceeding to a court of law. The emphasis, it is stated, is on propriety and discipline in the conduct of a government servant; and it has been submitted that judged from that point of view, the circular letter cannot be said to constitute an interference with the course of justice in any court of law. Theoretically and in the abstract, this may be true; and if the circular letter merely lays down that ordinarily a government servant should exhaust his departmental remedies before going to a court of law, no objection can be taken to it. Speaking generally, a government servant does not ordinarily go to court, unless and until he fails to get what he considers to be justice from the departmental authorities. But we have to consider in this case a somewhat different problem, namely, the action taken against the respondent during a pending litigation, as though going to a court of law before exhausting departmental remedies must in all cases be visited with punishment.
10. What, after all, is contempt of court? To speak generally, contempt of court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during the litigation. (Oswald’s Contempt of Court, 3rd Edn., p. 6). We are concerned in the present case with the second part, namely, to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant during the litigation. In the case under our consideration the respondent had instituted a suit in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar, in respect of his grievance that a certain sum of money was being illegally deducted from his salary. On behalf of the respondent it was alleged that he had no further departmental remedies to exhaust, inasmuch as the order by which a part of his salary was being deducted was a final order made by the Punjab Government after considering the respondent’s explanation. On behalf of the appellants it has been contended that the respondent had still a further remedy by way of an appeal to the Governor. That is a matter with which we are not really concerned, as it relates to the question whether the respondent had or had not violated the terms of the circular letter. We are concerned with the action that was taken against the respondent on the footing, right or wrong, that he had violated the instructions of the circular letter. His suit was pending in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar. When the summons in the suit was served on the Government, the Under-Secretary to the Government, drew the attention of one of the appellants to the circular letter and asked the latter to intimate to the Government what action he proposed to take against the respondent. Appellant Pratap Singh then forwarded the memorandum of the Under-Secretary to the Conservator of Forests, South Circle, and in his forwarding endorsement Pratap Singh directed that the respondent should be proceeded with in accordance with the instructions in the circular letter and that a copy of the proceedings recorded and orders passed should be forwarded to him. It appears, therefore, that appellant Pratap Singh was not merely content with forwarding the memorandum of the Under-Secretary. He directed his subordinate officer to take action against the respondent. In accordance with that direction a proceeding was drawn up against the respondent and the appellant Bachan Singh was asked to enquire into it. The appellant Bachan Singh then drew up a charge-sheet and in that charge-sheet it was stated that the respondent had gone to a court of law before exhausting all his departmental remedies. What would be the effect of these proceedings on the suit which was pending in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar? From the practical point of view, the institution of the proceedings at a time when the suit in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar, was pending could only be to put pressure on the respondent to withdraw his suit, or face the consequences of disciplinary action. This, in our opinion, undoubtedly amounted to contempt of court. There are many ways of obstructing the court and any conduct by which the course of justice is perverted, either by a party or a stranger, is a contempt; thus the use of threats, by letter or otherwise, to a party while his suit is pending; or abusing a party in letters to persons likely to be witnesses in the cause, have been held to be contempts. (Oswald’s Contempt of Court, 3rd Edn., p. 87). The question is not whether the action in fact interfered, but whether it had a tendency to interfere with the due course of justice. The action taken in this case against the respondent by way of a proceeding against him can, in our opinion, have only one tendency, namely, the tendency to coerce the respondent and force him to withdraw his suit or otherwise not press it. If that be the clear and unmistakable tendency of the proceedings taken against the respondent, then there can be no doubt that in law the appellants have been guilty of contempt of court, even though they were merely carrying out the instructions contained in the circular letter.
11. We have been referred to a large number of decisions dealing with various aspects of contempt of court. We consider it unnecessary to refer to them all, because it is clear to us that any conduct which interferes with or prejudices parties litigant during the litigation is undoubtedly contempt of court. There is, however, one decision which is very much in point and to which we must refer. In Shankar Lal Sharma v. M.S. Bisht in very similar circumstances it was held by the Allahabad High Court that if any kind of threat or any action which may amount to a threat is held out to a person who has approached the civil courts for a redress of his grievances, with a view to induce him to forego the assistance of the civil courts, the action amounts to a contempt of court. In that case also an employee of the Public Works Department of Uttar Pradesh moved the High Court for the grant of a writ. While the writ petition was pending in the High Court the Chief Engineer, PWD., U.P., purporting to act in accordance with certain directions contained in a circular letter asked for an explanation from the employee as to why he has submitted a writ application to the High Court. The learned Judges expressed the view that there was no doubt that the action taken by the Chief Engineer in accordance with the instructions contained in the circular letter amounted to a threat with a view to induce the employee to forego the assistance of the civil courts. An unqualified apology having been tendered in the case, no further action was taken. On behalf of the appellants reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in S.S. Roy v. State of Orissa. That was a case in which a First Class Magistrate misconceiving his powers and exercising a jurisdiction not vested in him by law and without any justifying circumstances made an order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by which a civil court peon was restrained from executing a warrant of arrest issued by an Additional Munsif in connection with the execution of a money decree; the Magistrate was not influenced by any extraneous consideration or dishonest motive in making the order and it was held that the Magistrate was not guilty of contempt of the Court of the Additional Munsif, because there was nothing to suggest any wilful culpability on his part. We are unable to agree with the learned advocate for the appellants that the principle of that decision should apply to the present case. The appellants in the instant case were not judicial officers who misconceived their powers. They were no doubt carrying out executive instructions given by their employer, but they carried out those instructions at a time when a civil suit was pending and they carried out the instructions in such a manner as to exert pressure on the respondent to withdraw the suit. That is the finding at which the High Court arrived and on that finding the appellants were clearly guilty of contempt of court. The decision in Webster v. Bakewell Rural District Council on which also learned advocate for the appellants relied is not in point. That was a case in which the yearly tenant of a cottage and land, adjoining a highway and forming part of a settled estate, issued a writ against the local authority for an injunction to restrain an alleged trespass on his land; the solicitor of the tenant for life wrote to the local authority with a view to arrange the matter and at the same time wrote to the tenant that the tenant for life required him to withdraw the writ, and that, if he did not comply, his tenancy would be determined. It was held that the solicitor had not committed a contempt of court. The decision proceeded on the footing that the tenant for life had the right to turn out the yearly tenant and there was nothing to prevent the tenant for life, who was the landlord, from exercising his legal rights if he did so honestly to protect the rights he had in the property.
12. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the appellants were guilty of contempt of the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar and in awarding the sentence the High Court correctly took into consideration the circumstance that the appellants were merely carrying out the instructions contained in the circular letter. Though that circumstance does not afford a defence to the charge, it is undoubtedly a consideration relevant to the sentence.
23. A charge that holds the act of instituting of a writ petition before this Court challenging an FIR, as appears from other material to be the case, apart from constituting criminal contempt of Court, a matter with which we are now not concerned, would render the charge void and non-est. Something that is done, if it is against the law, to an extent that it would constitute criminal contempt of Court, must not be done at all. A charge of this kind must, therefore, neither be permitted to be framed nor inquired into in departmental proceedings. We, therefore, hold that charge no. 4, in the first charge-sheet dated 11.0७.2018, is not only fit to be quashed but never to be framed against the petitioner on the basis of which a departmental inquiry may be held.
24. So far as the second charge-sheet goes, though it mentions that the preliminary inquiry, held by the Divisional Commissioner into financial irregularities during the period of the petitioners posting from 2011-12 to 2015-16, found that the purchase of lime, malathion and other materials, as well as their storage, caused during that period financial loss to the Mahapalika to the tune of Rs. 14,89,600/-, there is not the slightest mention of the basic imputations, in what manner, where and when the loss was caused so as to afford the petitioner sufficient notice to answer this charge-sheet as well. We, therefore, find and hold that the charge-sheet dated 01.11.2018 lacks essential imputations that could enable the petitioner to answer the second charge-sheet, carrying as it does, a serious charge. We, therefore, hold that this charge-sheet, too, is vitiated.
25. That apart, what we find is that though subject to the petitioners demand Rule 31 incorporates the necessity for the Establishment to lead oral evidence in support of the charge before it can be proved against an employee, who is to likely to be awarded a major penalty.
26. It is a salutary principle governing inquiries against employees whose tenure is protected by statute that in a case where a major penalty may be imposed, the inquiry officer or Tribunal must fix a date, time and venue for holding the inquiry and intimate the Establishment as well as the employee of the date, time and place so fixed. At the appointed date, time and venue, the inquiry officer must not assume the role of an officer of the Establishment, even if he is one, but don the mantle of an impartial arbiter. He must require the Establishment, in the first instance, to prove the charge or charges against the employee carried in the charge-sheet by leading evidence, both documentary and oral, with a right to the employee to cross-examine the Establishments witnesses. If the Establishment are able to discharge their burden, the employee is to be called upon to enter defence and produce both documentary and oral evidence in support, if he so chooses. If he produces witnesses, the Establishments presenting officer can cross-examine the employees witnesses. If the employee does not produce any evidence, the Establishments burden, to prove the charges in the first instance, cannot be relieved. In this regard reference may be made to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772, Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and others, (2009) 2 SCC 570, State of Uttaranchal and others v. Kharak Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 236 and the Bench decisions of this Court in State of U.P. and another v. Kishori Lal and another, 2018 (9) ADJ 397 (DB) (LB), Smt. Karuna Jaiswal v. State of U.P., 2018 (9) ADJ 107 (DB) (LB) and State of U.P. v. Aditya Prasad Srivastava and another, 2017 (2) ADJ 554 (DB) (LB).
27. In the present case, it is averred in paragraph no. 33 that the inquiry proceedings were held without intimation of date, time and place for holding the inquiry.
28. It is further averred in paragraph no. 35 that the procedure envisaged for the holding of an inquiry, in a matter where a major penalty may be imposed regarding examination of witnesses and cross-examination by the other side, have not been followed. There is vague denial of these assertions in paragraphs nos. 66 and 68 of the counter affidavit without specifically saying that a date, time and place was indeed fixed and evidence led by the Establishment to prove the charges with opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the Establishments witnesses.
29. A perusal of the inquiry report dated 17.06.2019, submitted by the Inquiry Officer in this case, shows to its face, that the Inquiry Officer virtually took sides with the Establishment and assumed everything said in the charge-sheet to be proof of itself. The inquiry officer also relied upon the findings of the preliminary inquiry ordered by the Commissioner of the Division, in proof of the charges, which could never have been done.
30. A reading of the slipshod inquiry report dated 17.06.2019 submitted by the Chief Finance and Accounts Officer, Mahapalika, Meerut shows that the officer had no idea about the manner in which a departmental inquiry into charges, where a major penalty may ensue, has to be held. This would be apparent from the following findings of the inquiry officer carried in his report dated 17.06.2019:
चूंकि श्री अख्तर के उक्त आख्या में आरोप बिन्दु के प्रतिउत्तर में कोई जवाब नही दिया गया। अतः अधोहस्ताक्षरी द्वारा पुनः पत्रांक 132 दिनांक 21.08.2018 के द्वारा आरोप पत्र दिनांक 11.07.2018 को बिन्दुवार आख्या प्रस्तुत करने के लिए नोटिस दिया गया जिसके क्रम में पुनः श्री अख्तर द्वारा पत्र दिनांक 20.08.2018 एवं दिनांक 29.08.2018 के द्वारा माननीय उच्च न्यायालय के आदेश तथा महापालिका नियमावली की धारा 31 का उल्लेख करते हुए उक्त सूचनाएं मांगी जा रही है जबकि श्री अख्तर अली आलोच्य अवधि में स्वयं नगर निगम, मेरठ के स्वास्थ्य अनुभाग विभाग में स्टोर कीपर/लिपिक के पद पर कार्यरत थे। उनके द्वारा विभिन्न पत्रों के माध्यम से मांगी जा रही समस्त सूचनायें इनके कार्य व कार्यकाल से सम्बन्धित है। किन्तु जांच अधिकारी को भ्रमित करने व जांच में सहयोग न करने की मंशा से श्री अख्तर अली द्वारा निरन्तर जांच बिन्दु से इतर अन्य बिन्दुओं पर सूचनायें मांगी जा रही है तथा अनुशासनिक कार्यवाही से सम्बन्धित अनेक शासनादेशों व नियमों का उल्लेख करते हुए जांच को प्रभावित करने का प्रयास किया जा रहा है। अवगत ही हैं कि नगर निगम में आलोच्य वर्ष 2011-12 से 2015-16 तक स्वास्थ्य विभाग में क्रय किये गये चूना, मैलाथियान व अन्य सामग्रियों के क्रय व रख-रखाव में की गई अनियमितताओं की जांच मण्डलायुक्त महोदय, मेरठ मण्डल, मेरठ के द्वारा की जा रही थी। चूंकि जांच के दायरे में लिये गये सम्पूर्ण अवधि में श्री अख्तर अली ही स्टोर लिपिक के पद पर तैनात थे। अतः जांच के समय मण्डलायुक्त महोदय को श्री अख्तर अली द्वारा सम्बन्धित अभिलेख उपलब्ध न कराये जाने तथा अभिलेखों को गायब करने के आरोप में दिनांक 19.12.2018 को थाना देहली गेट में प्रथम सूचना रिपोर्ट (एफ०आई०आर०) दर्ज करायी गई जिसके विरूद्ध श्री अख्तर अली द्वारा माच० उच्च न्यायालय में रिट याचिका संख्या 5174/2018 योजित की गई, जिसे मा० उच्च न्यायालय द्वारा दिनांक 28.02.2018 को खारिज कर दिया गया। इसी बीच मण्डलायुक्त महोदय के निर्देश पर जांच कर रहे अपर आयुक्त, मेरठ मण्डल, मेरठ द्वारा प्रश्नगत प्रकरण में श्री अख्तर अली को प्राकृतिक न्याय व नियमों के परिपेक्ष्य में पूर्ण सुनवाई का अवसर देते हुए जांच कार्यवाही पूर्ण की गई जिसे मण्डलायुक्त महोदय द्वारा पत्र संख्या 5036 दिनांक 18.09.2018 के द्वारा कार्यालय नगर निगम, मेरठ को इस निर्देश के साथ प्रेषित किया गया कि जांच में पाये गये दोषी लिपिक श्री अख्तर अली पर कार्यवाही सुनिश्चित करें चूंकि मण्डलायुक्त महोदय की जांच एक उच्चस्तरीय समिति की जांच थी जिसमें श्री अख्तर अली को पर्याप्त सुनवाई का अवसर दिये जाने के उपरान्त आरोपों की पुष्टि की गई है। अतः इस सन्दर्भ में नियुक्ति प्राधिकारी होने के कारण आपके माध्यम से पत्र संख्या 668 दिनांक 01.11.2018 के द्वारा श्री अख्तर अली को मण्डलायुक्त महोदय, मेरठ मण्डल, मेरठ के द्वारा करायी गई जांच की जांच आख्या की प्रति के साथ आरोप पत्र-2 निर्गत कराया गया ताकि श्री अख्तर अली पर मण्डलायुक्त महोदय की जांच में पुष्ट हुए आरोप के आधार पर अंकन रू० 14,89,600/- की वसूली एवं वित्तीय अनियमितताओं को बरतने के कारण अनुशासनिक कार्यवाही के पूर्व इन्हें अपने बचाव पक्ष में एक और अवसर प्रदान किया जा सके। किन्तु श्री अख्तर अली द्वारा एक माह व्यतीत हो जाने के उपरान्त भी कोई जबाब नहीं दिया गया। अतः पुनः दिनांक 01.12.2018 को श्री अख्तर अली को अपना पक्ष प्रस्तुत करने के लिए पुनः निर्देशित किया गया। श्री अख्तर अली द्वारा अपने पत्र दिनांक 04.02.2019 के माध्यम से अरोप पत्र संख्या-2 का जो स्पष्टीकरण प्रस्तुत किया गया, वह तथ्यहीन है तथा उनके द्वारा अपने पक्ष में ऐसा कोई अभिलेखीय साक्ष्य प्रस्तुत नहीं किया गया जिससे आरोपित विन्दुओं का खण्डन होता हो।
उपर्युक्त विवेचना से स्पष्ट है कि श्री अख्तर अली द्वारा आरोप पत्र संख्या-1 के माध्यम से 4 आरोप बिन्दुओं तथा मण्डलायुक्त महोदय मेरठ मण्डल, मेरठ की जांच में श्री अख्तर अली को वित्तीय अनियमिततओं तथा नगर निगम को अंकन 14,89,600/- रूपये की वित्तीय क्षति का दोषी पाये जाने के आधार पर जारी आरोप पत्र संख्या-2 के माध्यम से लगाये गये अरोपों का दोषी पाया जाना सिद्ध होता है।
31. The findings of the inquiry officer are based upon a procedure that is far from one that is essential to be followed in a disciplinary inquiry involving the likely imposition of a major penalty. In fact, the inquiry report is no report at all and the findings there no more than a blanket acceptance of the Establishments case, with no evidence offered by them at the inquiry or opportunity to the petitioner to rebut it.
32. The impugned orders passed by the Nagar Ayukt and the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, in appeal, overlook these essential flaws in procedure which vitiate the departmental inquiry held as these go to the root of the matter. Also, we hold that one of the charges in the first charge-sheet, that is to say, the charge, regarding the institution of proceedings before this Court, without permission of the respondents, is manifestly illegal, void and a nullity. Upon remand even if the respondents deem it fit to take fresh disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, the aforesaid charge or a charge to the aforesaid effect, howsoever worded, shall not be framed or inquired into by the respondents. Of course, on the other charges, it would be open to the respondents to take fresh proceedings, if they so elect, after issuing a properly drawn up charge-sheet carrying sufficient and intelligible particulars of the charges or imputations that may enable the petitioner to understand and answer the same effectively.
33. In the event of the respondents electing to pursue fresh disciplinary proceedings, after the issue of a charge-sheet conforming to the law, the inquiry shall be held afresh strictly, in accordance with the procedure indicated in the body of this judgment relating to inquiries where a major penalty may be imposed.
34. In the circumstances of the case, not only the impugned orders, with the aforesaid liberty, are fit to be quashed and the petitioner reinstated in service but, the charge-sheets as well, again with the liberty indicated. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders dated 29.06.2019 passed by the Nagar Ayukt, Nagar Nigam, Meerut and the impugned appellate order dated 23.05.2022 passed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut are hereby quashed. The charge-sheet dated 11.07.2018 as well as the one dated 01.11.2018, both issued by the Nagar Ayukt, Nagar Nigam, Meerut, are hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be reinstated in service forthwith and paid his current salary, in the same manner as any other employee of the Nigam.
35. It will be open to the respondents to pursue fresh disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, if they so elect, in the manner indicated in this judgment. If the respondents elect to pursue fresh proceedings against the petitioner, his entitlement to receive arrears of salary shall abide by the result of those proceedings. In the event no fresh proceedings are elected to be taken, the petitioner shall be entitled to 50% of his emoluments for the period that he has remained out of service, together with 6% simple interest from the date of this order until payment of arrears.
36. There shall be no order as to costs.
(J.J. Munir, J.)
February 23, 2026
Anoop/Prashant D.