Punjab-Haryana High Court
Akashdeep Singh Badhan @ Munna vs National Investigation Agency on 1 April, 2026
Author: Anoop Chitkara
Bench: Anoop Chitkara
CRA-D-1731-2025 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRA-D-1731-2025
JUDGEMENT JUDGEMENT OPERATIVE PART UPLOADED ON
RESERVED ON PRONOUNCED PRONOUNCED OR
ON FULL
10.03.2026 01.04.2026 FULL PRONOUNCED 01.04.2026
Akashdeep Singh Badhan @ Munna ...Appellant
Versus
National Investigation Agency ...Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUKHVINDER KAUR
Present: Mr. Arpan Sabharwal, Advocate
for the appellant.
Mr. Sukhdeep Singh Sandhu, Special Public Prosecutor
for the respondent-NIA.
Mr. Akshay Kumar, AAG, Punjab.
****
ANOOP CHITKARA, J.
RC No. Dated Police Station Section
30/2020/ 05.09.2020 City Moga 120-B r/w 109, 124-A, 153-B, 201,
NIA/DLI 204, 212, 121, 121-A, 153-A IPC
and Sections 10, 13 of UAP(P) Act
and Section 2 of POITNH Act
In FIR 14.08.2020 City Moga 120-B r/w 109, 124-A, 153-B, 201,
No.136 204, 212, 121, 121-A, 153-A IPC
and Sections 10, 13 of UAP(P) Act
and Section 2 of POITNH Act
Bail Application number before the Sessions CIS No.BA/3909/2025
Court CNR No.PBSA01010831-2025
Date of Decision 08.12.2025
1. Aggrieved by the dismissal of regular bail by the Special Judge, NIA, SAS Nagar,
Mohali (Punjab) vide order dated 08.12.2025, the appellant had come up before this Court
by filing the present appeal under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act,
2008.
2. Per paragraph 14 of the appeal, the accused has the following criminal antecedents:
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CRA-D-1731-2025 -2-Sr. No. FIR No. Date Offenses Police Station
1 228 28.06.2022 42 & 52A of Prisons City Faridkot
Act
3. The appellant’s counsel submits that the appellant would have no objection
whatsoever to any stringent conditions that this Court may impose, including that if the
appellant repeats the offense or commits any non-bailable offense which provides for a
sentence of imprisonment for more than seven years, the State may file an application to
revoke this bail before the concerned Court having jurisdiction over this FIR, which shall
have the authority to cancel this bail, and to which the appellant shall have no objection.
Counsel for the appellant further submits that he shall not use his right of speech and
expression beyond what is permitted under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
4. The State’s counsel opposes the bail.
5. Facts of the case are being taken from the reply dated 04.02.2026, filed by the
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Chief Investigating Officer, National Investigation
Agency, in the present appeal, which reads as under:-
“1. That, on 14.08.2020 at about 0800 hrs, two miscreants entered the
administrative complex of DC Office, Moga and went on the top floor of the
said office and hoisted one saffron/yellowish colour flag having written
“KHALISTAN” on this flag, on fixed iron pole. After a few minutes, they
returned to the ground floor and moved towards the Indian National Flag
hoisted in the premises of DC Office Complex, Moga. They cut the rope of
Indian National Flag due to which the Indian Flag fell down after which
they moved towards the outer gate of the DC Complex while dragging the
Indian National Flag with a rope. A case FIR no. 0136/2020 dt. 14-08-2020
was registered at Police Station City Moga,
2. That the Central Government on receiving information opined that this
offence fall in the category of scheduled offence hence the Government of
India, Ministry of Home Affairs, issued order vide F.No. 11011/57/2020/NIA
dated 04.09.2020, directing NIA to take up the investigation of FIR No.
136/2020. Hence NIA re-registered this FIR as RC-30/2020/NIA/DLI under
sections 121, 121A, 124A, 153A, 153B of Indian Penal Code and Section 2
of Prevention of Insults to National Honors Act 1972 and took up
investigation.
3. That, during investigation it came forth that ‘Sikhs for Justice’, which has
been declared as an Unlawful Association by the Government of India vide
notification no. 8.0.2469 (E) dated 10th July 2019, has played a cardinal
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CRA-D-1731-2025 -3-role in breeding and spreading the tentacles of unlawful activities and
terrorist acts in Punjab and are responsible for the secessionist activities
that gripped Punjab thus causing unrest in Punjab. The main handler and
controller of this outfit is Gurpatwant Singh Pannun (A-5), who has been
declared a terrorist by Government of India vide notification no. 8.0.2170
(E) dated 1st July 2020. By launching a systematic and sustained campaign
they use to mobilize the Sikh community all over the world, including India,
and incite them to start a mass agitation against the Government of India
with an intention to secure secession of the State of Punjab from the Union
of India and to declare Punjab as a separate and independent Sikh nation
viz. Khalistan. In furtherance of deep-rooted conspiracy Pannu (A-5) use to
misusing cyberspace to radicalise youth and to instigate them to undertake
terrorist crimes. He use to post material to provoke Sikh Youth which
resulted in exploiting Sikh sentiments with the aid of inciting and
provocative speeches regarding creation of independent state of Khalistan.”
6. The allegations against the appellant are mentioned in para 4 of the reply, which
reads as under:-
“4. ROLE OF APPELLANT/ACCUSED AKASHDEEP SINGH (A-3):
(1) That A-1 started watching these And also sent a link on A-2’s mobile
through WhatsApp resulting in motivating to A-2 for watching the said
videos/channel related to SFJ, REFERENDUM 2020 and US Media
International. A-2 also started watching the videos/channel.
Appellant/accused (A-3) is cousin brother of (A-2) and use to stay at the
house of A-2. A-1 & A-2 motivated appellant/accused A-3 for watching the
videos of SFJ. On being motivated Appellant/accused A-3 also filled the
voter registration for Referendum 2020 with the assistance of A-1 & A-2.
(ii) That, Investigation has revealed that on 10-11 August 2020, Pannu A-5
uploaded a video on social media YouTube and insisted the residents of
Punjab and Haryana to hoist Khalistani Flag and announced $125,000
dollar award for any Indian youth who will hoist the Khalistani flag at Red
Fort, Delhi and $2500 dollar to the person who will hoist the Khalistani flag
at any government office.
(iii) That after repeatedly watching the video of A-5, and announcing of
reward, accused A-1 & A-2 conspired to hoist the Khalistani flag on
Government Building in Moga, Punjab. They arranged /prepared the
Khalistan flag and in furtherance of conspiracy A-1 & A-2 motivated
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Accused/Appellant A-3 to join them and record the video while they will be
hoisting the Khalistani Flag at DC office Moga. Appellant/Accused A-3
agreed and conspired with A-1 & A-2 for commission of said offence.
(iv) That on 14.08.2020 in furtherance of conspiracy, A-2 &
appellant/accused A-3 left for DC office Moga on the motorcycle of
appellant/accused A-3 in morning. Similarly A-1 also left for DC office
Complex, Moga on his own motorcycle. A-1, A-2 & appellant/accused A-3
reached at DC office. Appellant/accused A-3 was directed by A-1 to take
position near fly over located near Nestle Dairy to capture the video of
hoisting of Khalistani flag at DC office. Thereafter, A-1 & A-2 entered into
DC office complex Moga and went up to the top floor of DC office and
hoisted a Kesari/Yellow colour flag on which KHANDA was printed and
KHALISTAN was written on it. Thereafter A-1 & A-2 came down and move
towards the flag post in the premises of DC Office Complex, Moga where
Indian National Flag was hoisted. On reaching there, they cut the rope of
the Indian National Flag due to which the National flag fell down, it was
further dragged by the accused A-1 & A-2 while running towards the main
gate.
After fleeing from there on the way, A-1 talked on mobile with A-6 and told
(A-6) about hoisting of Khalistani Flag at DC Office Complex, Moga and
possession of Indian National Flag. A-6 directed A-1 to tear the Indian
National flag (Jhande ko Pharo) and make a video. Accordingly, on
direction of A-6, accused A-1 & A-2 tore the Indian National flag by using
white colour cutter and also insulted the National flag by putting their feet
on it. While abusing the Indian National Flag, A-1 & A-2 also shouted the
slogan “Khalistan Zindabad Khalistan Zindabad” and Inderjit Singh (A-1)
recorded a video of it. The rope, cutter along with teared Indian National
Flag (tri-colour) was concealed by them in a vacant plot under the plants
and the same have been recovered on 01.09.2020 by Punjab Police u/s 27 of
Indian Evidence Act.
(v) That after tearing/insulting and making a video of the Indian National
Flag A-1 & A-2 returned back to the house of A-2. A-2 called to
appellant/accused A-3 and after some time appellant /accused A-3 joined
them at the house of A-2, then A-2 transferred the video which was recorded
by appellant/accused A-3 to his mobile regarding hoisting of Khalistani flag,
and then A-2 further transferred video to A-1 on his mobile phone who
further forwarded it to A-6 via Whatsapp.
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(vi) During investigation, from the social media data of mobile phone of
appellant/accused A-3 photos/ thumbnail photos, Khalistani propaganda
videos were retrieved showing a form of registration in Referendum-2020
for voting in the favour of making a separate state of Khalistani is revealed.
Voter registration form for voting to make a separate state in the name of
Khalistan by in Referendum 2020 by SFJ was also found. Investigation has
revealed that appellant/accused A-3 was fully motivated/ radicalized by the
ideology of SFJ and voted for Referendum-2020 and was member of SFJ.”
7. As per the custody certificate dated 10.03.2026, the custody of the appellant in this
case is 5 years 06 months & 10 days.
8. In Angela Harish Sontakke v. State of Maharashtra, SLP (CRL)-6888-2015, decided
on May 04, 2016, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[2]. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. Charges have
been framed against the accused appellant under Sections 10, 13, 17, 18,
18A, 18B, 20, 21, 38, 39 and 40(2) of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967, amended 2008 and Sections 387, 419, 465, 467,
468, 471 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Undoubtedly, the charges are serious but the seriousness of the charges
will have to be balanced with certain other facts like the period of
custody suffered and the likely period within which the trial can be
expected to be completed.
[3]. The accused appellant has been in custody since April, 2011 i.e. for
over five years. The trial is yet to commence in as much as the learned
State Counsel has submitted that the 9th of May, 2016 is the first date
fixed for the trial. There are over 200 witnesses proposed to be examined.
The accused appellant is a lady. She has also been acquitted of similar
charges leveled against her in other cases. Taking into account all the
aforesaid facts we are of the view that the accused appellant should be
admitted to bail.
9. In UOI v. KA Najeeb, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 443; 2021-INSC-50, Feb 01, 2021, a three-
Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[3]. The prosecution case in brief is that one Professor TJ Joseph while
framing the Malayalam question paper for the second semester B.Com.
examination at the Newman College, Thodupuzha, had included a
question which was considered objectionable against a particular religion
by certain sections of society. The respondent in association with other
members of the Popular Front of India (PFI), decided to avenge this
purported act of blasphemy. On 04.07.2010 at about 8AM, a group of
people with a common object, attacked the victim-professor while he was
returning home with his mother and sister after attending Sunday mass at
a local Church. Over the course of the attack, members of the PFI
forcefully intercepted the victim’s car, restrained him and chopped off his
right palm with choppers, knives, and a small axe. Country-made bombs
were also hurled at bystanders to create panic and terror in their minds
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and to prevent them from coming to the aid of the victim. An FIR was
consequently lodged against the attackers by the victim-professor’s wife
under Sections 143, 147, 148, 120-B, 341, 427, 323, 324, 326, 506(H),
307, 149 of IPC; and Section 3 of Explosive Substances Act.
[4]. It emerged over the course of investigation that the attack was part of
a larger conspiracy involving meticulous pre-planning, numerous failed
attempts and use of dangerous weapons. Accordingly, several dozen
persons including the present respondent were arraigned by the police. It
was alleged that the respondent was one of the main conspirators and the
provisions contained in Sections 153A, 201, 202, 212 of IPC, along with
Section 16, 18, 18-B, 19 and 20 of the UAPA were also thus invoked
against him. However, owing to him being untraceable, the respondent
was declared an absconder and his trial was split up from the rest of his
co-conspirators. The co-accused of the respondent were tried and most of
them were found guilty by the Special Court, NIA vide order dated
30.04.2015 and were awarded cumulative sentence ranging between two
and eight-years’ rigorous imprisonment.
[18]. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like
Section 43-D (5) of UAPA per-se does not oust the ability of
Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of
the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a Statue as well as
the powers exercisable under Constitutional Jurisdiction can be well
harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, Courts are
expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the
rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of
trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of
incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the
prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the
possibility of provisions like Section 43-D (5) of UAPA being used as
the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional
right to speedy trial.
[19]. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact that the
charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a serious threat to
societal harmony. Had it been a case at the threshold, we would have
outrightly turned down the respondent’s prayer. However, keeping in
mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and the
unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High Court
appears to have been left with no other option except to grant bail. An
attempt has been made to strike a balance between the appellant’s right to
lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt
and simultaneously the respondent’s rights guaranteed under Part III of
our Constitution have been well protected.
[20]. Yet another reason which persuades us to enlarge the Respondent
on bail is that Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA is comparatively less
stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS. Unlike the NDPS where the
competent Court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused is not
guilty and that he is unlikely to commit another offence while on bail;
there is no such pre-condition under the UAPA. Instead, Section 43-D (5)
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of UAPA merely provides another possible ground for the competent
Court to refuse bail, in addition to the well-settled considerations like
gravity of the offence, possibility of tampering with evidence,
influencing the witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by
absconsion etc.
[21]. In light of the above discussion, we are not inclined to interfere with
the impugned order. However, we feel that besides the conditions to be
imposed by the trial Court while releasing the respondent, it would
serve the best interest of justice and the society-at-large to impose some
additional conditions that the respondent shall mark his presence every
week on Monday at 10 AM at the local police station and inform in
writing that he is not involved in any other new crime. The respondent
shall also refrain from participating in any activity which might enrage
communal sentiments. In case the respondent is found to have violated
any of his bail conditions or attempted to have tampered the evidence,
influence witnesses, or hamper the trial in any other way, then the
Special Court shall be at liberty to cancel his bail forthwith. The appeal is
accordingly dismissed subject to above- stated directions.
10. In Thawaha Fasal v. UOI, [2021] 8 S.C.R. 797, Oct 28, 2021, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court holds,
[4]. On 1st November 2019, the complainant who is the Sub-Inspector of
Police attached to Pantheerankavu Police Station in Kozhikode city in
Kerala found that the accused nos.1 to 3 were standing in suspicious
circumstances in front of Medicare Laboratory in Kozhikode city. After
seeing the police vehicle, the accused no. 3 ran away. However, the
accused nos.1 and 2 were apprehended. The accused no.1 was carrying a
shoulder bag and the accused no.2 was carrying a red plastic file. Nine
items were seized from the shoulder bag of the accused no.1. From the
red plastic file of the accused no.2, two items were seized. The First
Information Report was registered on the same day under Sections 20, 38
and 39 of the 1967 Act alleging that the accused nos. 1 and 2 were the
members of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) [for short “CPI
(Maoist)”] which is a terrorist organisation within the meaning of Clause
(m) of Section 2 of the 1967 Act which is listed at Item No. 34 in the
First Schedule to the 1967 Act. By the order dated 18th April 2020, the
Government of India granted sanction in exercise of powers under
Section 45 of the 1967 Act to prosecute the accused no.1 for offences
punishable under Sections 38 and 39 of the 1967 Act. Under the same
order, a sanction to prosecute the accused no.2 for the offences
punishable under Sections 13, 38 and 39 of the 1967 Act was granted. As
can be seen from the order dated 18th April 2020, NIA had
recommended for grant of sanction under the aforesaid Sections. It is
pointed out across the Bar by Shri S.V. Raju, the learned Additional
Solicitor General of India (ASG) that the case is fixed for framing of
charge. However, it was also pointed out across the Bar that a report from
the Forensic Science Laboratory is not yet received.
[33]. Thus, as far as the accused no.1 is concerned, it can be said he was
found in possession of soft and hard copies of various materials
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concerning CPI (Maoist). He was seen present in a gathering which was a
part of the protest arranged by an organisation which is allegedly having
link with CPI (Maoist). As regards the accused no.2, minutes of the
meeting of various committees of CPI (Maoist) were found. Certain
banners/posters were found in the custody of the accused no.2 for which
the offence under Section 13 has been applied of indulging in unlawful
activities. As stated earlier, sub-section (5) of Section 43D is not
applicable to the offence under Section 13.
[34]. Now the question is whether on the basis of the materials forming
part of the charge sheet, there are reasonable grounds for believing that
accusation of commission of offences under Sections 38 and 39 against
the accused nos.1 and 2 is true. As held earlier, mere association with a
terrorist organisation is not sufficient to attract Section 38 and mere
support given to a terrorist organisation is not sufficient to attract Section
39. The association and the support have to be with intention of
furthering the activities of a terrorist organisation. In a given case, such
intention can be inferred from the overt acts or acts of active participation
of the accused in the activities of a terrorist organization which are borne
out from the materials forming a part of charge sheet. At formative young
age, the accused nos.1 and 2 might have been fascinated by what is
propagated by CPI (Maoist). Therefore, they may be in possession of
various documents/books concerning CPI (Maoist) in soft or hard form.
Apart from the allegation that certain photographs showing that the
accused participated in a protest/gathering organised by an organisation
allegedly linked with CPI (Maoist), prima facie there is no material in the
charge sheet to project active participation of the accused nos.1 and 2 in
the activities of CPI (Maoist) from which even an inference can be drawn
that there was an intention on their part of furthering the activities or
terrorist acts of the terrorist organisation. An allegation is made that they
were found in the company of the accused no.3 on 30th November, 2019.
That itself may not be sufficient to infer the presence of intention. But
that is not sufficient at this stage to draw an inference of presence of
intention on their part which is an ingredient of Sections 38 and 39 of the
1967 Act. Apart from the fact that overt acts on their part for showing the
presence of the required intention or state of mind are not borne out from
the charge sheet, prima facie, their constant association or support of the
organization for a long period of time is not borne out from the charge
sheet.
[39]. It is true that without recording a satisfaction as contemplated by
sub-section (5) of Section 43D, the order granting bail to the accused
no.1 could not have been confirmed by the High Court. However, we
have examined the material against both the accused in the context of
sub-section (5) of Section 43D. Taking the materials forming part of the
charge sheet as it is, the accusation against both the accused of the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 38 and 39 does not
appear to be prima facie true.
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11. In Ashim @ Asim Kumar Haranath Bhattacharya @ Asim Harinath Bhattacharya
@ Aseem Kumar Bhattacharya v. National Investigation Agency, Dec 01, 2021, [2021] 9
S.C.R. 607 607, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[6]. The appellant was arrested on 6th July, 2012 on the basis of a
production warrant sent to Nagpur Central Jail, Maharashtra. The
appellant was in jail earlier in connection with another case(FIR No.
28/2007 dated 11th May, 2007) in which he was acquitted by the
competent Court of jurisdiction by a judgment dated 15th February,
2014.
[7]. It has come on record that there are 298 prosecution witnesses in the
calendar of witnesses as referred to in the charge sheet but it has been
stated in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent that the prosecution
in all likelihood may examine only 100 to 105 prosecution witnesses.
[8]. The charges against the accused appellant are undoubtedly serious
but the charges will have to be balanced with certain other factors like the
period of incarceration which the appellant has undergone and the
likelihood period within which the trial can be expected to be finally
concluded. That apart, the appellant is 74 years of age.
[9]. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposed the appeal
filed by the accused appellant seeking post arrest bail and submits that
the delay is in no manner be attributable to the prosecution and this Court
may direct the trial Court to take up the case on day-to-day basis and
conclude the trial at the earliest.
[10]. That the requirement of law as being envisaged under Section 19 of
the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter being referred
to as “Act 2008”) mandates that the trial under the Act of any offence by
a Special Court shall be held on day-to-day basis on all working days and
have precedence over the trial of any other case and Special Courts are to
be designated for such an offence by the Central Government in
consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court as contemplated
under Section 11 of the Act 2008 but the ground realities are totally
different as in the instant case, after the charge-sheets came to be filed
way back in 2012, the charges have been framed after 7 years of filing of
the charge-sheet on 20th June, 2019.
[11]. We have to balance the nature of crime in reference to which the
appellant is facing a trial. At the same time, the period of incarceration
which has been suffered and the likely period within which the trial can
be expected to be completed, as is informed to this Court that the
statement of PW-1/de-facto complainant has still not been completed and
there are 298 prosecution witnesses in the calendar of witness although
the respondent has stated in its counter affidavit that it may examine only
100 to 105 witnesses but indeed may take its own time to conclude the
trial. This fact certainly cannot be ignored that the appellant is in custody
since 6th July, 2012 and has completed nine and half years of
incarceration as an undertrial prisoner.
[12]. This Court has consistently observed in its numerous judgments that
the liberty guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution would cover within
its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to
justice and a speedy trial is imperative and the undertrials cannot
indefinitely be detained pending trial. Once it is obvious that a timely
trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for
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a significant period of time, the Courts would ordinarily be obligated to
enlarge him on bail.
[13]. Deprivation of personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial is not
consistent with Article 21 of the Constitution of India. While deprivation
of personal liberty for some period may not be avoidable, period of
deprivation pending trial/appeal cannot be unduly long. At the same time,
timely delivery of justice is part of human rights and denial of speedy
justice is a threat to public confidence in the administration of justice.
[15]. In the above circumstances, we are of the view that the appellant
accused has made out a case for grant of post-arrest bail pending trial.
12. In Jahir Hak v. State of Rajasthan, [2022] 3 S.C.R. 101, Apr 11, 2022, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court holds,
[10] No doubt, in the said case, as pointed out by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the State, the Court was dealing with an order
passed by the High Court granting bail, whereas, in this case, the
converse is true, that is, the impugned order is one rejecting the
application for bail. The fact remains that the appellant has been in
custody as an undertrial prisoner for a period of nearly 8 years already.
The appellant, it may be noted, is charged with offences, some of which
are punishable with a minimum punishment of 10 years and the sentence
may extend to imprisonment for life. Learned counsel for the appellant
also points out that one of the co-accused namely Shri Aadil Ansari has
been released on bail on 30.09.2020 by this Court. No doubt, in this
regard, we keep in mind the submission of the State that the role
attributed to the said accused is different.
[11] The condition in Section 43D(5) of the Act of 1967 has been
understood to be less stringent than the provisions contained in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, as already noticed by us.
We would think that in the nature of the case against the appellant, the
evidence which has already unfolded and above all, the long period of
incarceration that the appellant has already undergone, time has arrived
when the appellant be enlarged on bail. We bear in mind the fact that the
prosecution seeks to examine as many as 109 witnesses of which only 6
witnesses have been fully examined so far. Accordingly, we allow the
appeal, set aside the impugned order and direct that the appellant shall be
released on bail subject to such conditions as shall be fixed by the trial
Court.
13. In Ramjan Gani Palani v. NIA, [2022] 4 S.C.R. 1050, Apr 27, 2022, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court holds,
[9]. We have perused the impugned order and carefully considering the
arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties, duly recorded in
paras 8 and 9 of the impugned judgment and are of the prima facie view
that there is sufficient material on record to deny the discretionary relief
of bail to the petitioner. Much is sought to be made of the five Ghol fish
netted by the petitioner and his crew members over five days of
remaining on the high seas by referring to the high market value of the
prize catch. The petitioner would be entitled to justify his presence in the
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fishing boat, at the scene of crime which is sought to be described as a
sheer coincidence during the trial. The explanation offered by the
petitioner of having responded to the call “Mohammed-Mohammed-
Ramzan-Ramzan” on Channel No.8, instead of Channel No.16 which is
the specifically earmarked channel for communication with fishermen
and for Ship-to-Ship contact, would also be available to him at that stage.
But at the threshold, this appears to be a case where the petitioner has
been fishing in troubled waters and as per the respondent No.1/NIA, has
got caught in his own net.
14. In Yedala Subba Rao and Anr. v. UOI, 2023-INSC-382, Apr 17, 2023, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court holds,
[21]. We have examined material relied upon against the appellants in
paragraph 5 of the additional affidavit of the respondent as well as the
chargesheet. Taking the material against the appellants as it is and
without considering the defence of the appellants, we are unable to form
an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusations against the appellants of commission of offence under the
UAPA are prime facie true. Hence, the embargo on the grant of bail
under proviso to subsection (5) of Section 43D will not apply in this case.
We, however, make it clear that the findings recorded in this Judgment
are only prima facie observations recorded for the limited purposes of
examining the case in the light of the proviso to subsection (5) of Section
43D of the UAPA. The trial shall be conducted uninfluenced by these
observations.
[22]. As narrated earlier, the appellants are in custody for four and half
years. The charge has not been framed and the prosecution proposes to
examine more than 140 witnesses. Some of the accused are absconding.
Thus, there is no possibility of the trial commencing in the near future.
15. In Vernon v. State of Maharashtra [2023] 10 S.C.R. 867; 2023 INSC 655, July 28,
2023, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[43]. In the case of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) [National
Investigation Agency -vs- Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC
1]reference was made to the judgment of Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal
-vs- State of Tamil Nadu [(2005) 2 SCC 13) in which, citing two earlier
decisions of this court in the cases of State -vs- Jagjit Singh (AIR 1962
SC 253) and Gurcharan Singh -vs- State of (UT of Delhi) [(1978) 1 SCC
118), the factors for granting bail under normal circumstances were
discussed. It was held that the nature and seriousness of the offences, the
character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being
secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tempered
with; the larger interest of the public or the State would be relevant
factors for granting or rejecting bail. Juxtaposing the appellants’ case
founded on Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India with the
aforesaid allegations and considering the fact that almost five years have
lapsed since they were taken into custody, we are satisfied that the
appellants have made out a case for granting bail. Allegations against
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them no doubt are serious, but for that reason alone bail cannot be denied
to them. While dealing with the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the
1967 Act, we have referred to the materials available against them at this
stage. These materials cannot justify continued detention of the
appellants, pending final outcome of the case under the others provisions
of the 1860 Code and the 1967 Act.
16. In Pradeep Rameshwar Sharma v. NIA, 2023-INSC-755, CRA No. 2505 of 2023,
Aug 23, 2023, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[6]. The case of the prosecution put forth is that the appellant who is a
retired police officer, in connivance with Sachin Waze another senior
police officer had planted gelatin sticks in a Scorpio Vehicle near the
residence of a prominent businessman. In that regard, apart from
referring to the role of Sachin Waze who is alleged to have also
conspired with Mansukh Hiren to park this Scorpio Vehicle, the
allegation is also that the appellant had a role with Sachin Waze in the
murder of Mansukh Hiren. It is in that background, the charge as alleged
is made against the appellant herein.
[10]. In that regard, as already referred to, the appellant was arrested as
far back as 17.06.2021 and has been in custody throughout, except for the
brief period when this Court had released him on interim bail so as to
attend to the medical treatment of his wife. In so far as the appellant is
concerned, he has been interrogated and a charge sheet has been filed.
Since all witnesses out of more than 300 witnesses named are to be
examined and, in that regard, further investigation under Section 173(8)
is pending, and a supplementary charge sheet would be filed, the process
will not conclude in the near future. In so far as the role alleged against
the appellant, as already noted by the High Court the charge sheet does
not disclose that the appellant was involved in the conspiracy of planting
gelatin sticks in the Scorpio vehicle. As per the charge, the appellant is
stated to have conspired with Sachin Waze and others to eliminate
Mansukh Hiren which is a matter of circumstantial evidence to be proved
by the prosecution.
17. In Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab & Another, SLP (Criminal) No.10047 of
2023, 2024-INSC-92, February 07, 2024, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[18]. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-Ã -vis ordinary penal
offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted
phrase – ‘bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ – unless circumstances
justify otherwise – does not find any place while dealing with bail
applications under UAP Act. The ‘exercise’ of the general power to grant
bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form of the
words used in proviso to Section 43D (5)– ‘shall not be released’ in
contrast with the form of the words as found in Section 437(1) CrPC –
‘may be released’ – suggests the intention of the Legislature to make bail,
the exception and jail, the rule.
[19]. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task on hand. In
dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the courts are merely
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examining if there is justification to reject bail. The ‘justifications’ must
be searched from the case diary and the final report submitted before the
Special Court. The legislature has prescribed a low, ‘prima facie’
standard, as a measure of the degree of satisfaction, to be recorded by
Court when scrutinising the justifications [materials on record]. This
standard can be contrasted with the standard of ‘strong suspicion’, which
is used by Courts while hearing applications for ‘discharge’. In fact, the
Supreme Court in Zahoor Ali Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] has noticed this
difference, where it said:
“In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the
Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is
lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for
considering a discharge application or framing of charges in
relation to offences under the 1967 Act.”
[20]. In this background, the test for rejection of bail is quite plain. Bail
must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the public prosecutor and
after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a
conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail
is not satisfied – that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail
application in accordance with the ‘tripod test’ (flight risk, influencing
witnesses, tampering with evidence). This position is made clear by Sub-
section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on
granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the
restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for
the time being in force on grant of bail.
[21]. On a textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP Act, the inquiry that a
bail court must undertake while deciding bail applications under the UAP
Act can be summarised in the form of a twin-prong test :
1) Whether the test for rejection of the bail is satisfied?
1.1 Examine if, prima facie, the alleged ‘accusations’ make out an
offence under Chapter IV or VI of the UAP Act
1.2 Such examination should be limited to case diary and final
report submitted under Section 173 CrPC;
2) Whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail in light of
the general principles relating to grant of bail under Section 439
CrPC (‘tripod test’)? On a consideration of various factors such as
nature of offence, length of punishment (if convicted), age,
character, status of accused etc., the Courts must ask itself :
2.1 Whether the accused is a flight risk?
2.2. Whether there is apprehension of the accused tampering with
the evidence?
2.3 Whether there is apprehension of accused influencing
witnesses?
22. The question of entering the ‘second test’ of the inquiry will not
arise if the ‘first test’ is satisfied. And merely because the first test
is satisfied, that does not mean however that the accused is
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automatically entitled to bail. The accused will have to show that
he successfully passes the ‘tripod test’.
[32]. The Appellant’s counsel has relied upon the case of KA Najeeb
(supra) [(2021) 3 SCC 713] to back its contention that the appellant has
been in jail for last five years which is contrary to law laid down in the
said case. While this argument may appear compelling at first glance, it
lacks depth and substance. In KA Najeeb‘s case this court was
confronted with a circumstance wherein except the respondent-accused,
other co-accused had already undergone trial and were sentenced to
imprisonment of not exceeding eight years therefore this court’s decision
to consider bail was grounded in the anticipation of the impending
sentence that the respondent accused might face upon conviction and
since the respondent-accused had already served portion of the maximum
imprisonment i.e., more than five years, this court took it as a factor
influencing its assessment to grant bail. Further, in KA Najeeb‘s case the
trial of the respondent-accused was severed from the other co-accused
owing to his absconding and he was traced back in 2015 and was being
separately tried thereafter and the NIA had filed a long list of witnesses
that were left to be examined with reference to the said accused therefore
this court was of the view of unlikelihood of completion of trial in near
future. However, in the present case the trial is already under way and 22
witnesses including the protected witnesses have been examined. As
already discussed, the material available on record indicates the
involvement of the appellant in furtherance of terrorist activities backed
by members of banned terrorist organization involving exchange of large
quantum of money through different channels which needs to be
deciphered and therefore in such a scenario if the appellant is released on
bail there is every likelihood that he will influence the key witnesses of
the case which might hamper the process of justice. Therefore, mere
delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant
case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid
argument on the behalf the appellant cannot be accepted.
[33]. Hence, we are of the considered view that the material on record
prima facie indicates the complicity of the accused as a part of the
conspiracy since he was knowingly facilitating the commission of a
preparatory act towards the commission of terrorist act under section 18
of the UAP Act.
[34]. For the aforementioned reasons the bail application of the Appellant
is rejected and consequently the appeal fails…
18. In Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, [2024] 7 Digital SCR 992;
2024-INSC-645, July 03, 2024, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[8]. Having regard to the aforesaid, we wonder by what period of time,
the trial will ultimately conclude. Howsoever serious a crime may be, an
accused has a right to speedy trial as enshrined under the Constitution of
India.
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[9]. Over a period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have
forgotten a very well settled principle of law that bail is not to be
withheld as a punishment.
[18]. Criminals are not born out but made. The human potential in
everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond
redemption. This humanist fundamental is often missed when dealing
with delinquents, juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint has a past and
every sinner a future. When a crime is committed, a variety of factors is
responsible for making the offender commit the crime. Those factors may
be social and economic, may be, the result of value erosion or parental
neglect; may be, because of the stress of circumstances, or the
manifestation of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted with
indigence or other privations.
[19]. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned
has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an
accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not
oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is
serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of
the crime.
[20]. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused; not a
convict. The over-arching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an
accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed
aside lightly, howsoever stringent the penal law may be.
[21]. We are convinced that the manner in which the prosecuting agency
as well as the Court have proceeded, the right of the accused to have a
speedy trial could be said to have been infringed thereby violating Article
21 of the Constitution.
[22]. In view of the aforesaid, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.
The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside.
[23]. The appellant is ordered to be released on bail subject to the terms
and conditions which the trial court may deem fit to impose. However,
we on our own would impose the condition that the appellant shall not
leave the limits of Mumbai city and shall mark his presence at the
concerned NIA office or police station once every fifteen days. Any other
condition which the trial court may deem fit to impose, it may do so in
accordance with law.
19. In Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of U.P., [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1054; 2024 INSC 534, July
18, 2024, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[5]. First Information Report (FIR) was lodged against the appellant by
the informant Inspector Tej Bahadur Singh under Sections 121A, 489B
and 489C of IPC. It came to be registered as Crime No. 01 of 2015.
Informant stated that fake Indian currency notes of the denomination of
Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 500, totalling a sum of Rs. 26,03,500.00, were
recovered from the possession of the appellant on 22.02.2015 at about
09:10 PM from the Indo-Nepal border. He was apprehended by a
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constable of the ATS team and brought to the ATS Headquarter. In the
course of investigation, the appellant disclosed his name as Sheikh Javed
Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari, resident of Narayani Parsa,
Belwa, Nepal. In addition to the fake Indian currency notes, one
Nepalese driving licence of the appellant and one Nepalese citizenship
certificate also of the appellant were recovered besides two mobile
phones. According to the police, appellant had confessed that he was
engaged in the illegal trade of supplying counterfeit Indian currency
notes in Nepal. The appellant was arrested on 23.02.2015.
[32]. This Court has, time and again, emphasized that right to life and
personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is
overarching and sacrosanct. A constitutional court cannot be restrained
from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory
provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused-
undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been
infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the
way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever
stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of
constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part.
In the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline
to grant bail. But it would be very wrong to say that under a particular
statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of
our constitutional jurisprudence. In any view of the matter, K.A. Najeeb
(supra) being rendered by a three Judge Bench is binding on a Bench of
two Judges like us.
[33]. Thus, having regard to the discussions made above, we are of the
considered view that continued incarceration of the appellant cannot be
justified. We are, therefore, inclined to grant bail to the appellant.
[34]. Consequently, we pass the following order: –
(i) The impugned order dated 03.04.2023 of the High Court is set
aside and quashed;
(ii) Appellant is directed to be released on bail subject to fulfilment of the
following conditions: –
(a) Trial court shall impound the passport and/or citizenship document(s)
of the appellant. If those are in the custody of the prosecution, those shall
be handed over to the trial court.
(b) Appellant shall not leave the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court;
he shall furnish his address to the trial court.
(c) He shall appear before the trial court on each and every date of the
trial.
(d) In addition to the above, the appellant shall mark his attendance
before the police station which the trial court may indicate once in every
fortnight till conclusion of the trial.
(e) He shall not tamper with the evidence and shall not threaten the
witnesses.
(iii) If there is any violation of the bail conditions as above, it would be
open to the prosecution to move the trial court for cancellation of bail.
20. In Jalaluddin Khan v. UOI [2024] 8 S.C.R. 633; 2024-INSC-604, Aug 23, 2024, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
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[19]. Therefore, on plain reading of the charge sheet, it is not possible to
record a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the accusation against the appellant of commission of offences
punishable under the UAPA is prima facie true. We have taken the
charge sheet and the statement of witness Z as they are without
conducting a mini-trial. Looking at what we have held earlier, it is
impossible to record a prima facie finding that there were reasonable
grounds for believing that the accusation against the appellant of
commission of offences under the UAPA was prima facie true. No
antecedents of the appellant have been brought on record.
[20]. The upshot of the above discussion is that there was no reason to
reject the bail application filed by the appellant.
21. In Athar Parwez v. UOI, [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1093; 2024-INSC-995, Dec 17, 2024, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[19]. Long incarceration and unlikely likelihood of trial being completed
in near future has also been taken as a ground for exercising its
constitutional role by the Constitutional Courts to grant bail on violation
of Article 21 of the onstitution of India which guarantees trial to be
concluded within a reasonable time. Gross delay in conclusion of the trial
would justify such invocation leading to a conclusion of violation of Part
III the Constitution of India, which may be taken as a ground to release
an undertrial on bail…
[31]. It is thus apparent that the first test as has been laid down by the
various judgments of this Court referred to above, stands satisfied
relating to Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA, 1967…
[32]. The Appellant was arrested on 12.07.2022. He has undergone
custody for more than two years and four months. Chargesheet was filed
on 07.01.2023 but till date charges have not been framed which is an
admitted position. There are 40 accused and 354 witnesses cited by the
prosecution to be examined. There can be no doubt that the trial is not
likely to complete soon, and as has been laid down by various judgments
of this Court as has been referred to above, the Appellant cannot be
allowed to languish in jail indefinitely and that too without a trial. If such
an approach is allowed Article 21 of the Constitution of India would
stand violated….
22. In Harpreet Singh Talwar v. State of Gujarat, [2025] 6 S.C.R. 291; 2025 INSC 662,
May 13, 2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[25]. Having given our anxious consideration to the submissions
advanced by both sides and upon careful perusal of the material on
record, we are of the view that the Appellant has not been able to make
out a case for grant of regular bail at this stage.
[26]. We say so for the reason that despite no direct recovery of
contraband effected from the Appellant, the Prosecution’s case is that he
played a coordinating and enabling role in facilitating the import of
narcotics concealed as talc through M/s Magent India–which he
allegedly controlled through a proxy. The consignment, although not
seized with heroin, shares structural and logistical similarities with those
where heroin was ultimately found.
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[27]. The charge against the Appellant must also be evaluated in light of
the broader matrix of facts, including
(i) his alleged meetings in Dubai with a principal foreign accused;
(ii) the transfer of documents through intermediaries for the
clearance of a flagged consignment;
(iii) efforts to retrospectively fabricate invoices and assign
responsibility to others;
(iv) the use of multiple firms allegedly connected to him to
obfuscate the true nature of the transactions; and
(v) his telephonic calls to certain co-conspirators.
These aspects, supported by the statements of protected witnesses and
circumstantial linkages, currently meet the threshold of prima facie
satisfaction regarding the Appellant’s complicity.
[28]. This Court is cognizant of the fact that no heroin or narcotic
substances were directly recovered from the consignment linked to the
Appellant. However, the investigative narrative does not rest solely on
physical recovery but proceeds on the basis of conspiracy and
facilitation. In such cases, the absence of direct seizure is not dispositive,
particularly where there exists a pattern of covert coordination, fictitious
entities, and barter-based compensation–features which, according to
the prosecution, mark the smuggling architecture employed in the present
matter.
[29]. The Appellant faces serious charges, which allegedly carry grave
societal ramifications, including the facilitation of cross-border drug
trafficking–an offence with well-documented links to organised crime
and public health degradation. The seizure in the connected consignment
is part of what the Prosecution claims to be the largest heroin bust in
Indian history, valued at over INR 21,000 crores. The scale and
sophistication of the operation, involving foreign syndicates, shell firms,
medical visas, and false documentation, elevates this case far beyond
routine NDPS violations.
[30]. This Court also cannot ignore the fact that multiple key witnesses
still remain to be examined, and the trial while underway, will take time
in completion. Out of 24 most vulnerable or material witnesses, two have
died, and two others are untraceable. One of the deceased witnesses, a
retired Customs Officer, was found dead on the very day he was
scheduled to record his statement under Section 164 CrPC. The risk of
witness tampering or elimination–whether directly attributable to the
Appellant or not–is a real and present concern that militates against the
grant of bail at this stage.
[31]. Moreover, the Appellant’s criminal antecedents, though not
involving prior accusations under the NDPS Act, include multiple DRI
and customs proceedings involving smuggling of cigarettes,
undervaluation of imports, and alleged complicity in corruption offences.
These antecedents are relevant only for the limited purpose of evaluating
the Appellant’s propensity to interfere with the process of justice if
enlarged on bail.
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[32]. NIA has also highlighted that several accused remain absconding,
including the primary foreign conspirators. In that context, the
Appellant’s foreign travel, overseas connections, and financial capacity
cannot be overlooked in evaluating the possibility of flight risk. These
are not speculative concerns but flow directly from the Appellant’s prior
conduct and profile.
[33]. We are conscious of the settled principle that pre-trial incarceration
should not translate into punitive detention. The Appellant has been in
custody since 24.08.2022, and while we do not find that this duration
alone warrants bail under the present circumstances, the Appellant shall
remain at liberty to renew his prayer for bail after a period of six months,
or upon substantial advancement in the trial, whichever is earlier. Such a
course would allow the Prosecution to complete the examination of its
core witnesses while preserving the accused’s right to seek release at a
later and more appropriate stage.
[34]. Before parting with this matter, we deem it necessary to clarify that,
at this stage, it would be premature and speculative to extend the
allegations against the Appellant to the domain of terror financing. While
the prosecution has invoked provisions of the UAPA and has broadly
linked the smuggling enterprise to trans-national syndicates with
suspected affiliations, there is no compelling reason to currently link the
Appellant and proscribed terrorist organisations, either within or outside
the country. The evidentiary foundation to sustain such a grave allegation
must be clear and compelling–something that, can be seen only after a
substantial portion of evidence is led by both the parties.
[35]. In light of the foregoing discussion, and without expressing any
opinion on the merits of the case, we dismiss the instant appeal with the
following directions:
i. We are not inclined to enlarge the Appellant on regular bail at
this stage. He shall be at liberty to renew his plea for regular bail
after a period of 6 months, or at a stage where the ongoing trial has
progressed substantially;
ii. The NIA is directed to submit to the Special Court an additional
list of witnesses who, in its assessment, are sensitive or material,
inasmuch as their testimony may have a direct bearing on the role
of the Appellant or other co-accused in the ongoing trial and
connected investigation;
iii. The Special Court is directed to list the matter twice in a month
and record the statements of Prosecution witnesses on a continuous
and uninterrupted basis; and
iv. If the Presiding Officer of the Special Court has not been posted
thus far, we request the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court of
Gujarat to do the needful within a week.
23. In CBI v. Dayamoy Mahato (2025) Criminal Appeal No. 5400-5401 Of 2025, 2025-
INSC-1418, Dec 11, 2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
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[21.3]. Lastly, when it comes to the sum total of circumstances not
being considered, we are not particularly impressed by that ground. It is
a matter of record that an earlier application for bail, about a decade ago
in the year 2016, had been rejected with the High Court recording that
examination of the remaining witnesses should be completed within a
year. If in 2022, the Court finds that despite such direction and also the
passage of nearly six years, the same could not be achieved, it cannot be
said to have not considered the case in its proper light. Second, the trial
being at an advanced stage is also not something that can be, in this
case, a ground to send the respondent-accused behind bars. The trial is
of the year 2010, and as we stand at the end of 2025, still 28 witnesses
are to be examined. We may note the glacial pace at which the trial has
proceeded cannot justify the incarceration of the accused, particularly
when they have already been in prison for a dozen years, and once out,
have not given the authorities reason to seek urgent cancellation, or
even stay on the impugned judgment when this Court issued notice, or
even anytime thereafter.
[22]. In spite of these grave circumstances as discussed in Para 21.1, the
High Court granted bail which, we are of the view, it ought not to have.
It is clear that the alleged acts of the accused were to register opposition
to the manner in which an internal security situation was dealt with by
the forces of the State. While the Constitution permits the members of
the public, be at whichever group/section of society they belong to, to
oppose, within the permits of the law a stand taken by the State- such
acts of barbarity cannot be excused. Even more so when unsuspecting
humans are given the most horrific, painful deaths. In view of the
discussion made above that the rights of an individual are always
subservient to the nation’s interest, the High Court fell in error in
granting bail. It is a well-established position however that this Court
does not interfere against the grant of bail unless circumstances
warranting such an exercise of power are plainly present in a given set
of circumstances. In view of the discussion made in Paras 21.2 and 21.3
we are of the view that interfering with the liberty of the accused, at this
stage, particularly when nothing else holds against them, would not be
justified. At the cost of repetition, we may state that the appellant could
not bring to our notice subsequent development which would justify
this interference as serving any fruitful purpose.
24. In the light of the Judicial Precedents of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India,
considering the nature of allegations against the appellant and keeping in mind the stage of
trial, and the pre-trial custody, we are of the considered opinion that further pre-trial
incarceration would cause grave injustice to the appellant.
25. Further, the appellant, through his counsel, undertakes not to indulge in any Anti-
India activity and also that he would not cross the limits of his speech and expression
beyond what is permitted under Article 19 of the Constitution of India and considering the
entire facts and the pre-trial custody, which on the face of it, is excessive for the purpose of
pre-trial custody and the undertaking given by the appellant through counsel, we are of the
considered opinion that his further custody is not required.
ANJU RANI
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CRA-D-1731-2025 -21-
26. Without commenting on the case’s merits, in the facts and circumstances unique and
peculiar to this case, and for the reasons mentioned above, the appellant makes a case for
bail.
27. Given the above, provided the appellant is not required in any other case, the
appellant shall be released on bail in the FIR captioned above, subject to furnishing bonds
of Rs. 1 lac to the satisfaction of the concerned trial Court and due to unavailability before
any nearest Chief Judicial Magistrate or Duty Magistrate/ Ilaqa Magistrate.
28. In Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Dtrial Court concernedn 05, 2026, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[434]. The appellants granted bail shall be released subject to the
following conditions, which are imposed not as matters of form, but as
substantive safeguards in the interest of national security, public order,
and the integrity of the trial process.
i. Each of the appellants shall execute a personal bond in the sum of
₹2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs only) with two local sureties of the like
sum to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.
ii. The appellants shall remain within the National Capital Territory of
Delhi and shall not leave its territorial limits without prior permission of
the Trial Court. Any request for travel shall disclose reasons and such
prayer/request shall be considered by the Trial Court strictly on its merits
iii. The appellants shall surrender their passports, if any, before the Trial
Court. Where no passport exists, an affidavit to that effect shall be filed.
We direct the respondent to intimate all the immigration authorities in the
country not to permit their exit from the country in any manner
whatsoever, without express permission from the Trial Court.
iv. The appellants shall furnish their current residential addresses, contact
numbers, and e-mail addresses to the Investigating Officer as well as to
the Trial Court. The appellants shall not change their place of residence
or contact particulars without giving at least seven days’ prior written
intimation to the Investigating Officer and the Trial Court.
v. Each of the appellants, namely Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-
ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan, and Shadab Ahmed, shall personally
appear twice a week, that is on Monday and Thursday between 10:00
a.m. and 12:00 noon, before the Station House Officer, Police Station
Crime Branch, Delhi Police, Office of the Commissioner of Police,
Police Headquarters, Jai Singh Marg, New Delhi – 110001 and mark
their attendance. The Station House Officer shall maintain a separate
register of attendance in respect of each of these appellants and shall
furnish a monthly compliance report to the Trial Court, which shall be
placed on the main record of the case.
vi. The abovenamed appellants shall not directly or indirectly contact,
influence, intimidate or attempt to contact any witness or any person
ANJU RANI
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CRA-D-1731-2025 -22-
connected with the proceedings, nor shall they associate with or
participate in the activities of any group or organization linked to the
subject matter of the present FIR/ final report.
vii. The appellants shall not make or publish or disseminate any
information, statement, article or post whether in print, electronic or
social media concerning the present case or its
participants till conclusion of the trial.
viii. The appellants shall not participate in any programme or address or
attend any gathering, rally or meeting, whether physically or virtually till
conclusion of the trial.
ix. The appellants shall not circulate any post either in electronic form or
physical form or circulate any hand bills, posters, banners, etc in any
form whatsoever.
x. The appellants shall fully cooperate with the trial and shall appear on
every date of hearing unless exempted for reasons to be recorded by the
Trial Court to its satisfaction and they shall
not exhibit any conduct that has the effect of delaying the proceedings.
xi. The appellants shall maintain peace and good behaviour throughout
and in the event of any offence committed during the pendency of the
trial, the prosecution would be at liberty to seek for revocation of the bail
granted by filing such application before the Trial Court and in the event
of such application being filed the Trial Court shall consider it on its own
merits.
[435]. In case of breach of any of the afore-stated conditions imposed or
in the event of appellants having misused the liberty granted, it shall be
open to the Trial Court to cancel the bail which would be necessarily
after affording opportunity of hearing to the appellants.
29. The Appellants shall abide by all the above conditions as were ordered by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Gulfisha Fatima supra, before the police station
concerned in the present case.
30. In addition to the above conditions, the Appellant shall also abide by the following
additional conditions, wherever these do not overlap with the conditions mentioned in
Gulfisha Fatima supra. It is clarified that the conditions mentioned in Gulfisha Fatima
supra are to be preferred over the following conditions imposed by this Court.
31. The appellant shall abide by all statutory bond conditions and appear before the
concerned Court(s) on all dates. The appellant shall not tamper with the evidence,
influence, browbeat, pressurize, induce, threaten, or promise, directly or indirectly, any
witnesses, Police officials, or any other person acquainted with the facts and circumstances
of the case or dissuade them from disclosing such facts to the Police or the Court.
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32. The appellant shall not seek any unnecessary adjournment, and if he does so, the
State shall have the right to apply for cancellation of bail.
33. The appellant shall mention his current address, phone number, e-mail, if any, and
present address, native address, and in case of change, he shall inform the SHO of the
police station concerned through a registered letter by mentioning the case number.
Additionally, he shall also inform the concerned Court before whom the bonds were
furnished.
34. Given the background of allegations against the appellant, it becomes paramount to
protect the members of society as well as the integrity of the country, and incapacitating the
accused would be one of the primary options until the filing of the closure report,
discharge, or acquittal. Consequently, it would be appropriate to restrict the possession of
firearms. This restriction is being imposed based on the preponderance of evidence of
probability and not of evidence of certainty, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt; and as such, it
is not to be construed as an intermediate sanction. Given the nature of the allegations and
the other circumstances peculiar to this case, the appellant shall surrender all weapons,
firearms, and ammunition, if any, along with the arms license, to the concerned authority
within fifteen days of release from prison and inform the Investigator of compliance.
However, subject to the Indian Arms Act, 1959, the appellant shall be entitled to renew and
take it back in case of acquittal in this case, provided that this is otherwise permissible
under the concerned rules. Restricting firearms would instill confidence in society; it would
also restrain the accused from influencing the witnesses and repeating the offense.
35. The conditions mentioned above imposed by this court are to endeavor to reform
and ensure that the accused does not repeat the offense. In Mohammed Zubair v. State of
NCT of Delhi, 2022:INSC:735 [Para 28], Writ Petition (Criminal) No 279 of 2022, Para 29,
decided on July 20, 2022, A Three-Judge bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court holds that “The
bail conditions imposed by the Court must not only have a nexus to the purpose that they
seek to serve but must also be proportional to the purpose of imposing them. The courts,
while imposing bail conditions must balance the liberty of the accused and the necessity of
a fair trial. While doing so, conditions that would result in the deprivation of rights and
liberties must be eschewed.”
36. In Md. Tajiur Rahaman v. The State of West Bengal, decided on 08-Nov-2024, SLP
(Crl) 12225-2024, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds in Para 7, “It goes without saying that if
the petitioner is found involved in such like offence in future, the concession of bail granted
to him today will liable to be withdrawn and the petitioner is bound to face the necessary
consequences.”
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CRA-D-1731-2025 -24-
37. This bail is conditional, with the foundational condition being that if the appellant
repeats the offense or commits any non-bailable offense which provides for a sentence of
imprisonment for more than three years, the State shall file an application to revoke this
bail before the trial Court having jurisdiction over this FIR, which shall have the authority
to cancel this bail, and as per their discretion, they may cancel this bail.
38. Any observation made hereinabove is tentative and is not an expression of opinion
on the case’s merits, and it shall have no bearing on the trial or on the case of the co-
accused, and the trial Court shall not advert to these comments.
39. It is clarified that this bail order shall not be considered as a blanket bail order in
any other matter and is only limited to granting bail in the FIR mentioned above.
40. In Amit Rana v. State of Haryana, CRM-18469-2025 [in CRA-D-123-2020, decided
on 05.08.2025], a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in paragraph 13,
holds that “To ensure that every person in judicial custody who has been granted bail or
whose sentence has been suspended gets back their liberty without any delay, it is
appropriate that whenever the bail order or the orders of suspension of sentence are not
immediately sent by the Registry, computer systems, or Public Prosecutor, then in such a
situation, to facilitate the immediate restoration of the liberty granted by any Court, the
downloaded copies of all such orders, subject to verification, must be accepted by the Court
before whom the bail bonds are furnished.”
41. Given the above, the impugned order is set aside and appeal is allowed in terms
mentioned above. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(ANOOP CHITKARA)
JUDGE
(SUKHVINDER KAUR)
JUDGE
01.04.2026
Anju rani
Whether speaking/reasoned YES
Whether reportable NO
ANJU RANI
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