Chattisgarh High Court
Ajay Pratap Singh vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 15 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:17150-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 673 of 2026
1 - Ajay Pratap Singh S/o Dilip Singh, Aged About 31 Years, R/o- Avika
Vihar Colony Simga, Police Station Simga District Balodabazar (C.G.)
2 - Dilip Singh Thakur S/o Late Jhumuk Singh Thakur Aged About 68
Years R/o- Avika Vihar Colony Simga, Police Station Simga District
Balodabazar (C.G.)
3 - Pushpa Bai Thakur W/o Dilip Singh Thakur Aged About 60 Years
R/o- Avika Vihar Colony Simga, Police Station Simga District
Balodabazar (C.G.)
4 - Deepika Singh Thakur W/o Rakesh Singh Thakur, Aged About 37
Years R/o Tifra P.S. Sirgitti, Dist. Bilaspur (C.G.)
5 - Nandani Rajput W/o Late Pukhraj Rajput Aged About 38 Years R/o
Laxman Nagar Police Station- Gudhiyari District Raipur C.G.
6 - Rakesh Singh Thakur S/o Ramesh Singh Thakur, Aged About 36
Years R/o- Tifra P.S. Sirgiti, Dist. Bilaspur C.G.
... Petitioners
versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Bemetara, District
Bemetara C.G.
Digitally signed by
MOHAMMED
AADIL KHAN
Date: 2026.04.20
2 - Smt. Nikita Singh W/o Ajay Pratap Singh, Aged About 25 Years, R/o
18:28:41 +0530
2
At Present- Village- Kawardha Road Bahera Bhavesh Rajput Dhaba
Thana Bemetara, Dist. Bemetara C.G.
... Respondents
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioners : Ms. Madhunisha Singh, Advocate.
For Respondent : Ms. Anusha Naik, Deputy Govt.
No.1/State Advocate
For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Arvind Prasad, Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J.
15-04-2026
1. Vide order dated 10.03.2026 this Court referred the matter for
mediation. As per the report dated 17.03.2026, the petitioner No.1 has
deposited Rs.50,000/- with the Mediation Center and as per the report
of Mediation Center dated 10.04.2026, the case/matter is not settled
due to absence of the complainant.
2. Heard Ms. Madhunisha Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners.
Also heard Ms. Anusha Naik, Deputy Govt. Advocate for respondent
No.1/State and Mr. Arvind Prasad, learned counsel for respondent No.2.
3. The present petition has been filed seeking the following relief(s) –
“A. That the Hon’ble High Court may kindly be pleased to allow this
petition and Kindly be pleased to quash the chargesheet bearing no
438/2025 dated 21.09.2025 (Annexure P/1) under Section 85 and
3(5) of B.N.S 2023 in FIR No 358/2025 Dated 03/06/2025 filed by
P.S- Bemetra Chhattisgarh Filed against the Petitioners.
3B. That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash order
dated 10.10.2025 (Annexure P/2) taking cognizance of the Final
Report No. 438/2025 dated 21.09.2025. (Annexure P/2)
C. That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash order
dated 28.01.2026 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class
Bemetra, District- Bemetra the framing of charge vide impugned
order framing Charge under Section 85 and 3(5) of the B.N.S 2023
against petitioners (Annexure P/3)
D. That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash
consequential criminal proceedings initiated in criminal case no.
6241/2025 pending before Judicial Magistrate First Class
Chhattisgarh against the Bemetra ,District- Bemetra against the
petitioners for the offence under section 85 and 3(5) of the B.N.S
2023 in exercise of powers under section 528 of the BNSS, in the
interest of Justice.
E. Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper
may also kindly be granted to the Petitioners, in the interest of
Justice.”
4. The facts of the case in nutshell is that, the marriage between
petitioner No 1. and respondent No.2 was solemnized on 12.05.2017 at
District Bemetara according to Hindu customs and rituals. After the
marriage the complainant started residing in her matrimonial home
along with the accused persons (petitioners). The couple was blessed
with a daughter on 19.08.2018. On 03.06.2025 respondent No.2 filed a
complaint alleging therein that the petitioners subjected her to physical
and mental cruelty and demanded money, gold and vehicle in the name
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of dowry. Based on the complaint dated 03.06.2025, FIR No. 358/2025
was registered at Police Station- Bemetara under Section 85, 3(5) of
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. After completion of investigation, the
police field a chargesheet bearing No. 438/2025 dated 21.09.2025
before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bemetara. The learned
magistrate took cognizance of the offences and subsequently framed
charges against the petitioners vide order dated 28.01.2026 and
presently Criminal Case No.6241/2025 is pending against the
petitioners before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bemetara.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that even if the
allegations in the impugned FIR and charge-sheet are accepted in their
entirety, they do not disclose the essential ingredients of Section 85, 3
(5) BNS. At the most the case reflects ordinary matrimonial discord and
temperamental incompatibility and it does not amount to cruelty. The
contents of the FIR disclose continued cohabitation, repeated
reconciliations and voluntary resumption of marital life over several
years, such admitted facts completely negate any allegation of
continuous, grave or proximate cruelty required to attract criminal
liability. The allegations are vague and omnibus, neither the FIR nor the
impugned charge sheet discloses such ingredients which are essential
for the offence alleged. The allegations in the FIR and the charge sheet
filed against the petitioners is manifestly attended with mala fide and
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the petitioners. It has been further argued that petitioner No.4 is a
married woman who got married in the year 2012 and has been residing
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with her husband in Bilaspur, C.G. since 2012. After the marriage of the
petitioner No.1, she has never visited her parents’ home even once.
Further, petitioner No.3 is suffering from paralysis on which the
complainant says that she will not serve her mother-in-law and that she
wants to live separate. There is no proximate incident preceding
registration of the FIR and such stale and remote allegations cannot be
revived to invoke criminal proceeding. The allegations are bald and
inherently improbable. The order taking cognizance is wholly illegal and
has been passed in a mechanical manner without recording any prima
facie satisfaction regarding the ingredients of the alleged offence. Thus,
the prosecution discloses a case of ordinary matrimonial discord being
given a criminal colour after an ordinate delay, amounting to abuse of
process and causing grave prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore, the
petition may be allowed and the impugned FIR, charge-sheet and all
consequential proceedings of the criminal case be quashed.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the petition and
submits that the FIR in question was registered on the basis of a written
complaint made by respondent No.2 alleging cruelty by the petitioners.
It is submitted that upon receipt of the complaint, the police conducted
investigation in accordance with law and, after recording statements of
the complainant and other witnesses and collecting relevant material,
found a prima facie case to be made out against the petitioners.
Consequently, the charge-sheet was filed before the learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class Bemetara. Learned State counsel would further
submit that the allegations levelled in the FIR and the charge-sheet
6
disclose the commission of cognizable offence under Sections 85,
3(5)of BNS, which require appreciation of evidence and determination
of disputed questions of fact, and the same cannot be adjudicated in
proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C./Section 528 of BNSS. It is
further submitted that the defence raised by the petitioners, are matter
which may be examined by the trial Court during trial and do not, by
themselves, constitute a ground for quashment of the criminal
proceedings at the threshold and submitted that the petition is liable to
be dismissed.
7. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective
parties and perused the documents appended with the petition.
8. At the outset, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of
interference in charge-sheet filed by the police against accused in
extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC/528 of the
BNSS.
9. In the matter of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special
Judicial Magistrate and others, 1998 (5) SCC 749 the Supreme Court
has held that the accused can approach the High Court either under
Section 482 of the CrPC/528 of BNSS or under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India to have the proceeding quashed against him when
the complaint does not make out any case against him.
10. The Supreme Court in the mater of State of Haryana and others
v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 laid down the
principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under
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Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information
report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice. In paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down
the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the
Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC/528 of BNSS should be exercised,
which are as under: –
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise
of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the
8accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code
9or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that
the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should
be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection
and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court
will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that
the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an
arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its
whim or caprice.”
11. The principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal‘s case (supra) has
been followed recently by the Supreme Court in the matters of Google
India Private Limited v. Visaka Industries, (2020) 4 SCC 162, Ahmad
Ali Quraishi and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another,
2020) 13 SCC 435 and Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of
Maharashtra and others, (2019) 18 SCC 191. The Supreme Court in
10
Google India Private Limited (supra), explained the scope of dictum of
Bhajan Lal‘s case (supra) that the power of quashing a criminal
proceeding be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and
“that too in the rarest of rare cases” as indicated in paragraph 103
therein of the report.
12. Having noticed the scope of interference by this Court in the
petition relating to quashment of FIR/charge-sheet, reverting to the facts
of the present case, it is quite vivid that in the impugned charge-sheet,
the petitioners have been charged for offence under Sections 85, 3(5) of
BNS.
13. Chapter XXA of the IPC deals with offence of cruelty by husband
or relatives of husband. Section 498A of the IPC defines the offence of
cruelty as under:-
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty.–Whoever, being the
husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,
subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.–For the purpose of this section, “cruelty”
means–
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause
grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether
mental or physical) of the woman; or
b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
11
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her
to meet any unlawful demand for any property or
valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any
person related to her to meet such demand.”
14. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that in
order to establish offence under Section 498-A of the IPC/85 of BNS,
the prosecution must establish-
(i) That, woman must be married;
(ii) She has been subjected to cruelty or harassment
and
(iii) Such cruelty or harassment must have been
shown either by husband of the woman or by relative
of her husband.
15. The word ‘cruelty’ within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC
has been explained in Explanation appended to Section 498A of the
IPC. It consists of two clauses namely clause (a) and clause (b). To
attract Section 498A of the IPC/ 85 of BNS, it must be established that
cruelty or harassment to the wife to coerce her or cause bodily injury to
herself or to commit suicide or the harassment was to compel her to
fulfill illegal demand for dowry. It is not every type of harassment or
cruelty that would attract Section 498A of the IPC/85 of BNS.
Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC contemplates harassment of
woman to coerce or any relation of her to meet any unlawful demand for
any property or valuable security. The complainant if wants to come
within the ambit of Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC, she can
succeed if it is proved that there was an unlawful demand by the
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husband or any of his relatives with respect to money or of some
valuable security.
16. The Supreme Court in the matter of Priya Vrat Singh and others
v. Shyam Ji Sahai, (2008) 8 SCC 232 considered the issue of delay in
lodging the complaint as well as role that has been ascribed to the
accused therein and quashed the complaint holding the delay of two
years in lodging FIR to be fatal and further held that no role has been
ascribed to the petitioner/accused therein. It was observed as under:-
“8. Further it is pointed out that the allegation of alleged demand for dowry
was made for the first time in December, 1994. In the complaint filed, the
allegation is that the dowry torture was made some times in 1992. It has not
been explained as to why for more than two years no action was taken.
9. Further, it appears that in the complaint petition apart from the husband,
the mother of the husband, the subsequently married wife, husband’s
mother’s sister, husband’s brother in law and Sunita’s father were impleaded
as party. No role has been specifically ascribed to anybody except the
husband and that too of a dowry demand in February 1993 when the
complaint was filed on 6.12.1994 i.e. nearly after 22 months. It is to be noted
that in spite of service of notice, none has appeared on behalf of Respondent
No.1.”
17. Similarly, in the matter of Sunder Babu and others v. State of
Tamil Nadu, (2009) 14 SCC 244 delay in filing complaint against
accused therein was taken note of by their Lordships of the Supreme
Court holding the case to be covered by Category Seven of para-102
highlighted in Bhajan Lal‘s case (supra), the prosecution for offence
under Section 498A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition
13
Act was quashed.
18. Similarly, in the matter of Geeta Mehrotra (supra), the Supreme
Court held that casual reference to the family member of the husband in
FIR as co-accused particularly when there is no specific allegation and
complaint did not disclose their active involvement. It was held that
cognizance of matter against them for offence under Sections 498-A,
323, 504 and 506 of the IPC would not be justified as cognizance would
result in abuse of judicial process.
19. In the matter of K. Subba Rao and others v. State of Telangana
represented by its Secretary, Department of Home and others, 15
(2018) 14 SCC 452 their Lordships of the Supreme Court delineated the
duty of the criminal Courts while proceeding against relatives of victim’s
husband and held that the Court should be careful in proceeding
against distant relatives in crime pertaining to matrimonial disputes and
dowry deaths and further held that relatives of husband should not be
roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations, unless specific instances
of their involvement in offences are made out.
20. In the matter of Rashmi Chopra (supra) it has been held by their
Lordships of the Supreme Court relying upon the principle of law laid
down in Bhajan Lal‘s case (supra) that criminal proceedings can be
allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed and
further held that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot
be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or
harassment and the High Court should not hesitate in exercising the
14
jurisdiction to quash the proceedings if the proceedings deserve to be
quashed in line of parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in
Bhajan Lal‘s case (supra) and further held that in absence of specific
allegation regarding anyone of the accused except common and
general allegations against everyone, no offence under Section 498A
IPC is made out and quashed the charges for offence under Section
498A of the IPC being covered by category seven as enumerated in
Bhajan Lal‘s case (supra) by holding as under:-
“24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint
pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act.
A perusal of the complaint indicates that the
allegations against the appellants for offence under
Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general
and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of
any incident has been mentioned in the complaint.
The complaint having been filed after proceeding for
divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of
Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce
was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the
divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the
Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the
allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the
events and facts and circumstances of the case leads
us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A
and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter
blast to divorce petition proceeding in State of
Michigan by Nayan Chopra.
15
25. There being no specific allegation regarding any
one of the applicants except common general
allegation against everyone i.e. “they started
harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding
additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that all
relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother,
brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s
sister have been roped in clearly indicate that
application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with
a view to harass the applicants…..”
21. Having noticed the legal position governing the quashment of FIR
and charge-sheet, the question that arises for consideration is, whether
taking the allegations made in FIR No. 358/2025 and the charge sheet
at their face value, any prima facie offence under Sections 85, 3(5) of
BNS (498A, 34 of the Indian Penal Code) is made out against the
petitioners.
22. It is the case of the prosecution that the marriage of respondent
No.2 was solemnized with petitioner Ajay Pratap Singh (petitioner No.1)
on 12.05.2017 as per Hindu rites and rituals, and that soon thereafter
she was subjected to cruelty, harassment and demand of money by the
petitioner No.1 and her in-laws. On the basis of her written complaint,
FIR No.358/2025 was registered at Police Station Bemetara, District
Bemetara and after completion of investigation, the police filed charge-
sheet for the aforesaid offence against the petitioners.
23. However, a careful examination of the FIR and the statements
forming part of the charge sheet reveals that the allegations made by
16
respondent No.2 are general, omnibus and lacking in specific
particulars regarding dates, instances, or overt acts attributable to the
petitioners. The later allegations made in the FIR reflect substantial
improvements and embellishments inconsistent with her earlier version.
Except broad and vague assertions that the petitioners ill-treated her
and reiteration of adverse situations between the parties, no specific
allegation is made against the petitioners to constitute cruelty within the
meaning of Section 85, 3(5) of BNS.
24. Considering the submissions of learned counsel for the parties
and the material placed on record, particularly the nature of allegations
in the FIR and charge sheet, which are bald, omnibus and inherently
inconsistent, this Court is of the considered opinion that no prima facie
offence under Section 85, 3(5) of BNS is made out against the
petitioners. The allegations do not disclose any specific conduct
amounting to cruelty as defined under Section 85, 3(5) of BNS (Section
498-A, 34 of the IPC), nor do they disclose any unlawful demand of
dowry so as to satisfy Explanation (b). The prosecution appears to be
covered by Category 1, 3 and 7 of paragraph 102 of Bhajan Lal
(supra), being based on vague assertions, improvements, and
indications of mala fide arising out of matrimonial discord and
disagreement. Accordingly, continuation of criminal proceedings would
amount to abuse of the process of law.
25. As a natural consequence of the above analysis, the impugned
FIR bearing No. 358/2025 registered at Police Station- Bemetara,
District – Bemetara, (C.G.) on 03.06.2025 for offence under Sections 85,
17
3(5) of BNS, charge-sheet No.438/2025 dated 21.09.2025, order taking
cognizance dated 10.10.2025, order dated 28.01.2026 framing charge
against the petitioners and all consequential proceedings in Criminal
Case No.6241/2025 pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Bemetara (C.G.) against petitioners are hereby quashed. The petition is
accordingly allowed.
26. The petitioner No.1 is entitled for refund of the amount deposited
by him before the Mediation Center of this Court in compliance of the
order dated 10.03.2026.
27. No order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/- Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Aadil
