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HomeHigh CourtCalcutta High Court (Appellete Side)Aimuddin Sheikh & Anr vs The State Of West Bengal on 18...

Aimuddin Sheikh & Anr vs The State Of West Bengal on 18 February, 2026

Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Aimuddin Sheikh & Anr vs The State Of West Bengal on 18 February, 2026

Author: Rajasekhar Mantha

Bench: Rajasekhar Mantha

                                                                       2026:CHC-AS:286-DB
Form No. J(1)
                    IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Present :

The Hon'ble Justice Rajasekhar Mantha
                   And
The Hon'ble Justice Ajay Kumar Gupta

                           C.R.A. 480 of 2012
                         Aimuddin Sheikh & Anr.
                                  Versus
                         The State of West Bengal

For the Appellant        :     Mr. Arindam Jana,
                               Mr. Sumanta Das,
                               Mr. Yuvraj Chatterjee,
                               Mr. Saikat Guin,
                               Mr. Akash Sarkar.


For the State            :     Mrs. Faria Hossain, ld. A.P.P.,
                               Mr. Anand Keshari.


Hearing concluded on     :     February 13, 2026.

Judgment on              :     February 18, 2026.


Rajasekhar Mantha, J.:

1. The subject appeal is directed against judgment and order of

conviction dated 16.07.2012 passed by the Additional District and

Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Nadia in Sessions Trial No. IX (II) of 2012

arising out of Sessions Case No. 26 (2) of 2012. The appellants were

convicted and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of

Rs.10,000/- for offences punishable under Sections 302, 326 read with

Section 34 of the IPC.

2

2026:CHC-AS:286-DB

THE PROSECUTION CASE AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD

2. The appellants and victims were related to each other as brothers. The

appellants and victims are 4 out of 6 brothers and 2 sisters. Raham

Box Sk was their father. He had divided his properties equally amongst

the 6 brothers. After the brothers received the property by way of

registered instrument from their father, a dispute cropped up between

them as to who would feed their parents.

3. In view of the reluctance and difference of opinion between the

appellants and the victims, a meeting was called by one of the

brothers namely Kalimuddin Sk at the house of the said father. In

course of the meeting, there was a heated exchange between the

appellants and the victims Ainuddin Sk and Shukur Ali Sk. The

appellants are stated to have left the place of occurrence and returned

back within 3 minutes with sharp cutting weapons which included a

Bhojali, Hasua and a rod and a stick mounted with a metal fork. They

assaulted the deceased victim Ainuddin Sk and Kalimuddin Sk.

4. To prevent the assault on the victims, the wife of Ainuddin and his

mother are stated to have intervened. The mother was struck on the

head with a hasua. Upon a hue and cry being raised by the wife of

Ainuddin, PW 2 Hosai Bibi, the local villagers from a nearby mosque

immediately rushed to the place of occurrence.

5. The appellants fled from the scene. Ainuddin and Kalimuddin were

taken to Katwa Hospital where Ainuddin was declared brought dead.

Kalimuddin, however, recovered after a few days.
3

6. The police are stated to have received information about the incident2026:CHC-AS:286-DB

late in the night of the fateful day over the telephone. No GD entry

was however recorded by the police on receipt of this information.

7. It is only after Ainuddin died, that PW 1 Mohiruddin Sk,hisfather-in-

law, who came to the place of occurrence on being informed over the

telephone by his daughter Hosai Bibi, filed a formal complaint with

the Kaligunj PS. The complaint was scribed by PW 3 allegedly on the

instructions of PW 1. It is surprising to note that none of family

members from the side of the appellants or the victims lodged any

complaint with the police.

8. Kaligunj PS registered the FIR no. 214 of 2011 dated 13.04.2011 at

about 03:05 PM under Section 326, 307, 302 read with Section 34

against Alimuddin Sk, Asish Sk and Shukur Ali Sk. Shukur was the

son of appellant no. 1 Alimuddin Sk.

9. Charges were framed against Aimuddin Sk and Shukur Ali Sk the two

appellants herein under Section 326, 307 and 302 of the IPC. The

other FIR named accused went absconding even before the charge

sheet was filed.

10. It appears from the deposition of the PW 13, the Investigating

Officer, that the statement of PW 2 under 164 of the CrPC was

recorded two months after the incident. The statement of PW 5 Bakul

Sk, the son of the deceased was not recorded under Section 164 of

the CrPC.

ANALYSIS OF THIS COURT
4

11. There are some discrepancies between the witnesses for the2026:CHC-AS:286-DB

prosecution as regards the exact place of occurrence. PW 1 and 3

stated that the PO was the house of the father of the victim. Whereas

PW 2 and 5 stated that the PO was the house of Kalimuddin, the

victim who recovered from injures. The aforesaid discrepancies can

however be discounted since the father’s residence is also treated as

the son’s residence or his children’ residence in general.

12. The appellants and victims received immovable properties from

their father just few days before the incident. The house where the

crime took place was one of such immovable properties. There is no

evidence on record to suggest that the appellant and victims had any

self-acquired properties, or the PO was a self-acquired property of the

appellant and the victims. The obvious inference therefore is that on

that fateful day, the appellants and victim assembled for a settlement

at the house which once belonged to their father. It was thus natural

for the prosecution’s witnesses to have a difference of opinion on who

should be called the owner of the house, where the crime took place.

13. The evidence of PW 1 is rather curious, in that he chose to

participate in inquest and post mortem of the victim who was is his

son-in-law before lodging of the complaint.

14. PW 2 and PW 5 are the star witnesses of the prosecution.

15. PW 2 Hosai Bibi was present when the assault occurred. She

stated under Section 164 before the Magistrate that she went to the

place of occurrence along with her husband. She also stated that she
5

was standing next to her husband when the appellants suddenly2026:CHC-AS:286-DB

assaulted the victims including her deceased husband.

16. However in course of her examination during trial, she deposed

that the accused persons upon failure of the talks of settlement as

regards who would feed their parents went out from the place of

occurrence and came back within 3 minutes and committed the

murderous assault on the victims. Her statement under Section 164

of the CrPC does not mention the factum of the appellants leaving the

place of occurrence and coming back within 3 minutes with weapons.

17. Apart from the aforesaid inconsistency, the rest of her evidence in

course of trial is consistent with her statement recorded under

Section 164 of the CrPC. She clearly deposed that appellant Aimuddin

Sk assaulted the deceased victim with a hasua as did Ashish Sk and

Shukur Ali Sk, sons of the appellant no.1, with a hasua and bhojali

respectively. Alimuddin is also stated to have assaulted the victim

deceased and taken his life with a bhujali. The rest of her evidence is

consistent with the prosecution case.

18. PW 3 was Khokon Sk, the scribe of the complaint to the Kaligunj

PS. He was the uncle of the appellants. He was clearly therefore trying

to shield and safeguard the appellants. He turned hostile. He denied

that he had written the complaint on the instructions of PW 1. He

further stated that the deceased victim was pushed by PW 9,

Kalimuddin the injured witness, and the deceased victim fell on a boti

(an instrument is used in all kitchens in India for cutting vegetables)

and sustained injuries on his body.

6

19. PW 5 Bakul Sk, parroted the evidence of PW 2 in verbatim. He has2026:CHC-AS:286-DB

deposed that he was present at the place and time of occurrence. His

presence is confirmed by the statement of PW 2 under Section 164 of

the CrPC. There is however no mention of the presence of PW 5 at the

place and time of occurrence by PW 2 in course of his deposition in

the trial.

20. PW 7 was Dr. Bhaskar Jyoti Barman who examined both the

victims at Katwa Hospital. He also performed postmortem on the

deceased victim.

21. The injuries on the deceased victim noted by the PW 7 are as

follows:

‘1. Cut injury 2″ x ½” on the left side neck.

2. Blunt trauma injury along 3rd rib measuring about 2″ x
6″ on the right Side of chest.

3. Cut injury measuring 2″ x 1″ over the scalp.

4. Lacerated injury on the right lung beneath the blunt
trauma.’

22. Curiously none of the weapons allegedly seized by the IO were

produced before the medical officer for opinion or before the Trial Court.

23. PW 8 was Dr. Tapas Sarkar who examined the surviving victim

Kalimuddin Sk PW 9. The bed head tickets of either the deceased victim

or Kalimuddin were not produced by the IO in course of trial nor

collected in course of investigation.

24. PW 9 Kalimuddin, the injured witness could have been the star

witness of the prosecution very strangely turned hostile. He however
7

confirmed the incident in some detail in course of cross-examination by2026:CHC-AS:286-DB

the prosecution under Section 154 of the CrPC.

25. PW 13 was Ratan Chakraborty, the IO. He denied that any of the

witnesses that he examined under Section 161 had ever narrated the

events or named the accused in course of his investigation. The entire

evidence of PW 2 and PW 5 therefore came out for the first time in course

of the trial.

26. Despite the aforesaid discrepancies referred to hereinabove and the

lapses on the part of the IO, this Court based on the medical evidence

and the evidence of PW 2 is of the clear view that the incident of assault

by the appellant on the deceased victim and PW 9 has in fact occurred at

the date and time mentioned.

27. Indeed, it is true that the prosecution could have examined the

villagers who took the victims on a motor rickshaw van to the Katwa

Hospital and the mother of the victim who was allegedly injured in the

course of the assault. The evidence of PW 2 and the medical evidence

indicate the participation of the 4 accused persons in the murderous

assault on the victims.

28. The evidence of PW 5 however cannot be entirely believed since the

IO had stated he was informed by PW 5 in course of the investigation

that the latter was returning from the mosque after attending a feast

thrown by a villager. PW 5 however has denied having attended any

such feast.Apart from the statement of PW2 under Section 164 of the

CrPC there is no other evidence to suggest that PW 5 was present at the

time of the place of occurrence.

8

29. As already stated hereinabove the evidence of PW 2 and the PW 7,2026:CHC-AS:286-DB

the post mortem doctor, established the occurrence of the assault by the

4 accused persons on the 2 victims one of whom has died.

30. The evidence on record has clearly established that the appellants

and victims assembled on that fateful day at the house, which originally

belonged to their father, and was subsequently transferred either to the

deceased victim or the surviving victim. They assembled to decide as to

who will feed their parents. They could not arrive at a common

arrangement. Settlement talks failed, hence ensued an assault on the

said victims by the appellants.

WHETHER THE PRESENT CASE FALLS UNDER SECTION 300 OR 304 OF THE
IPC.

31. The question that comes for consideration before this Court as to

whether the crime that has occurred resulting in the death of

Ainuddin and grievous injuries to PW 9 Kalimuddin his brother,

would fall under Section 302.

32. The intention of the appellants has to be ascertained in the

backdrop of the event that made them assemble together on that

fateful day. The appellants and the victim were to decide who would

feed their parents. The appellants proposed that all of them should

feed their parents by turns. The victims disagreed with the said

proposal. This was the trigger for the said incident.

33. The appellants left the PO. They, however, came back just within 3

minutes. In this regard, PW 2 has stated before the Magistrate that

the appellants assaulted the victims just after the failure of settlement

talks.

9

34. The appellants were not carrying weapons when they arrived at the2026:CHC-AS:286-DB

PO to take part in the settlement talks. The weapons allegedly used by

the appellants are normally found in every rural Indian house-hold.

They by their very nature are not murderous. Thus, any

premeditation on part of the appellants stands clearly ruled out.

35. The prosecution has not run the case there was premeditation

between the appellants to kill the victims. That is why the surviving

victim, PW 9, did not die. He subsequently recovered. In Narayan

Yadav Versus State Of Chhattisgarh reported in 2025 INSC 927

it was held as follows:-

40. Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC applies in the
absence of any premeditation. This is very clear from the
words used in the provision itself.It contemplates that
the sudden fight must occur in the heat of passion, or
upon a sudden quarrel….

36. The provocation for the assault was the demand of the

appellants from the victims that the latter shall relinquish the

property received from their father, if the victims are not willing

feed their parents by turn or at all. This was undoubtedly the

trigger for the enragement of the accused persons including the

appellants. In Narayan Yadav(supra), it was held as follows:-

41. A “sudden fight” implies mutual provocation and the
exchange of blows on both sides. In such cases, the homicide
committed is clearly not attributable to unilateral provocation,
nor can the entire blame be placed on one side….. There is no
prior deliberation or intention to fight; the fight breaks out
suddenly, and both parties are more or less to blame. One
party may have initiated it, but had the other not aggravated
the situation by their own conduct, it may not have escalated
to such a serious level. In such scenarios, there is mutual
provocation and aggravation, making it difficult to determine
the precise share of blame attributable to each participant.

The protection of Exception 4 may be invoked if death is
10

caused: (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) 2026:CHC-AS:286-DB

without the offender having taken undue advantage or
acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must
have been with the deceased.

37. The 3 minute time gap between the departure of the appellants

and their arrival at the PO is not enough for cooling down the nerves.

The said short time gap cannot impute the appellants with the motive

to kill the victim. The said period is too short for a cold-blooded

decision to murder a person. The said time is not adequate for a

decision making process to start on and formation of a premeditation

to commit the murder. In Narayan Yadav (Supra), it was held as

follows:-

42. To bring a case within Exception 4, all the ingredients
mentioned therein must be satisfied. It is important to note that the
term “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC is
not defined in the IPC. A fight necessarily involves two parties –

it takes two to make a fight. The heat of passion requires that
there must be no time for the passions to cool, and in such
case, the parties may have worked themselves into a fury due
to a prior verbal altercation. A fight is a combat between two
and more persons, whether with or without weapons. It is not
possible to enunciate any general rule as to what constitutes
a “sudden quarrel”. This is a question of fact, and whether a
quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the
proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4,
it is not enough to show that there was a sudden quarrel and
no premeditation. It must also be shown that the offender did not
take undue advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner. The
expression “undue advantage” as used in the provision means
“unfair advantage”

38. The location of the injuries on the person of the victim is relevant

to ascertain the intention of the accused. In Kunhimuhammed@

Kunheethu … Versus The State Of Kerala, reported in 2024 INSC

937, it was held as follows:-

25.8 ….However, intent can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the
act, including the nature and location of the injuries inflicted, the weapon used,
11

and the actions of the appellant during the incident. The injuries were2026:CHC-AS:286-DB
concentrated on the vital parts of the deceased’s body, such as the chest and
ribs, which house critical organs like the heart and lungs. The deliberate
targeting of these areas indicates a clear intent to cause harm that could lead to
death…………The decision to carry and use such a weapon during the scuffle
reflects a readiness to escalate violence beyond a mere physical altercation….

39. The deceased victim has suffered 4 injuries on his person. The

injuries were, inter alia, to the organs of some importance namely

scalp and right lung. The intensity of the said injuries was, however

not murderous in view of PW 7, the post mortem doctor, having

deposed that the deceased victim may have survived if he had been

brought to the hospital early.

40. Each accused including the appellants inflicted one assault each

resulting in 4 injuries suffered by the deceased victim. The surviving

victim also faced the said assault. He, however, survived.

41. The Prosecution was duty bound to establish the distinguishing

feature in the assault mounted against the surviving victim as

opposed to the deceased victim. The surviving and deceased victim

found themselves in the similar situation. However, while the former

survived, the latter died. Both suffered injuries; the latter succumbed

to them but not the former.

42. Clearly therefore, the deceased victim and surviving victim did not

receive similar injuries. The said dissimilar treatment could not be

pre-mediated since both the victims were assaulted at once. The said

dissimilarity creates a doubt in mind of this Court as to whether the

appellants at all intended to kill the victims.

43. The intention of the appellants could not have been to kill one and

injure the other. The Prosecution was, therefore, specifically required
12

to prove that the appellants intended to kill only the deceased victim2026:CHC-AS:286-DB

and leave the surviving one.

44. This Court is therefore of the view that the crime committed by the

accused persons including the appellants would fall under the first

part of Section 304 of the IPC. The punishment therefore is prescribed

as ranging between 10 years and life imprisonment.

45. Admittedly the appellants and the victims are blood brothers. The

dispute was within the family. The issue was whether the appellant’s

victims would feed their parents for the days on which their turn

would come amongst the 6 siblings. The injured and surviving victim,

one of the brothers of the appellants, turned hostile.

Conclusion

46. Having regard to the fact that the dispute in question was between

brothers and not premeditated, this Court is of the view that the

appellants must be sentenced to the extent of the incarceration

already suffered by them, i.e. 14 years. The appellants are thus held

convicted under Section 304‘ part I for a period of 14 years and/or to

the extent that they have already suffered incarceration.

47. The appellants are hereby held convicted under Section 304‘s part

I for a period of 14 years and/or to the extent that they have already

suffered incarceration. The fine imposed on the appellants shall also

stand set aside.

48. The conviction of the appellants under Section 302 and other

sections shall stand set aside. The appellants shall now be set at

liberty unless they wanted in connection with any other offense and
13

upon execution of a bond upon execution of a bond to the satisfaction2026:CHC-AS:286-DB

of the Learned Trial Court, which shall remain in force for a period of

six months under Section 437A of the Code of Criminal Procedure

corresponding to Section 481 of the BNSS, 2023.

49. CRA 480 of 2012 is, therefore, is allowed in part and disposed of.

50. There shall be no order as to costs.

51. Let a copy of this judgment be sent down to the Court below for

information and necessary action

52. Let the T.C.R. be returned to the Court below at once.

53. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be

supplied to the parties as early as possible upon completion of all

requisite formalities.

(Rajasekhar Mantha, J.)
I agree.

(Ajay Kumar Gupta, J.)



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