Telangana High Court
Adduri Rajendar vs The State Of Telangana on 7 April, 2026
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 34738 of 2024
07th April, 2026
Between:
1. Adduri Rajender S/o Veeranna, and others
... Petitioners
AND
1. The State of Telangana, and others
... Respondents
ORDER:
The case of the petitioners, precisely as per the writ affidavit, is that
they are small and marginal farmers dependent on their lands for
livelihood, and they first became aware of the proposed acquisition only in
March 2023, when a public award enquiry notice was placed in the Gram
Panchayat office. Following this notice, survey teams began marking their
lands, and despite approaching authorities for clarification, no copies of
earlier notifications were furnished. As survey activities intensified during
April and May 2023, allegedly damaging standing crops, some petitioners
approached this Court in W.P. No. 13384 of 2023. At that stage, they were
informed that mandatory environmental clearance had not been obtained.
Taking this into account, the Court granted an interim stay on
dispossession in May 2023. Subsequently, during the pendency of that
case, the authorities secured environmental clearance in July 2023 and
moved an application to vacate the stay. It was only through counter
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affidavits filed in that proceeding that the petitioners discovered the
existence of multiple 3A and 3D notifications, allegedly published in
newspapers such as “Mana Telangana” and “The Hindu,” which, according
to the petitioners, had negligible circulation in their locality and were never
displayed in the Gram Panchayat.
1.1. It is contended that the earlier writ petition was disposed of
with a direction to the authorities not to interfere with the possession
without initiating proper acquisition proceedings and paying
compensation. The petitioners believed that fresh proceedings would be
initiated in compliance with this direction, however, the authorities
proceeded to pass awards under Section 3G(1) on 20.01.2024 and
14.03.2024 without issuing fresh notices or granting an opportunity for
objections or personal hearing. Notices regarding these awards were served
only in April 2024, and even then, copies of the award proceedings were
not supplied. The petitioners state that copies were obtained with great
difficulty only in October 2024, after which time was required to gather
documents and seek legal advice before approaching the Court again.
Throughout this period, the petitioners and others submitted
representations raising concerns about the project and the acquisition
process, but no responses were received. Meanwhile, authorities allegedly
continued efforts to take possession and pressured landowners to accept
compensation.
1.2. The petitioners assert that multiple 3A notifications dated
10.03.2021 and 21.04.2022 were issued for the same stretch without
adequate land descriptions or owner details, violating Section 3A(2). He
further alleges that publication in newspapers with little or no local
circulation defeated the purpose of Section 3A(3), and that no Grama
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Sabha or local notification was conducted, undermining transparency and
natural justice. The petitioners claim that 3D notifications dated
22.02.2022 and 07.10.2022 were issued without affording any opportunity
to file objections, and that even after this Court’s earlier order, no fresh
opportunity or hearing was provided.He argues that the authorities acted
unfairly in publishing notices.While a Section 3G notice was displayed in
the Gram Panchayat office, the earlier 3A notifications were not published
locally. It is also stated that only one Section 3G(3) notice for the first set
of notifications was published locally, whereas the second notification was
not made available and was discovered only later through an RTI request.
1.3. The petitioners mainly argue that the authorities failed to
properly decide compensation and rehabilitation (R&R) benefits as
required under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and the Removal of Difficulties
Order dated 28.08.2015. It is stated that compensation under Sections 3G
and 3H includes not only the land value but also rehabilitation benefits.
However, no R&R award was passed, making the awards incomplete and
legally invalid. They further argue that the authorities cannot take
possession of the land until both compensation and R&R benefits are fully
decided and given to the petitioners.
1.4. The petitioners contend that the notifications were not
properly published, they were not given real opportunity to file objections
or opportunity of being heard, and the awards themselves are defective.
They also claim that authorities are now pressuring them to accept
compensation and give up their land, while contractors are already entering
their fields and disturbing standing crops.
1.5. The petitioners therefore seek a writ of mandamus to declare
the entire acquisition process as void, including the 3A notifications dated
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02.03.2021 and 19.04.2022, the 3D notifications dated 22.02.2022 and
07.10.2022, the awards passed under Section 3G(1) on 20.01.2024 and
14.03.2024, and the consequential award notices issued on 16.04.2024, by
contending that these actions violate statutory provisions under the
National Highways Act, 1956 read with the RFCTLARR (Removal of
Difficulties) Order dated 28.08.2015, as well as constitutional guarantees
under Articles 14, 19, 21, and 300A.
2. A counter affidavit is filed by respondent No.3-Revenue Divisional
Officer, Bhupalpally, on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1, 2, and 4. It is
contended that the entire land acquisition process for the Mancherial-
Warangal Greenfield National Highway NH-163G was conducted strictly
in accordance with the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956 and
the applicable provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
2.1. It is contended that the acquisition process originated with the
issuance of a Gazette notification bearing No. 3099 dated 27.08.2019, by
which the Revenue Divisional Officer, Bhupalpally, was designated as the
Competent Authority for Land Acquisition for the stretch from Km. 63.779
to Km. 88.418. Thereafter, a Section 3A notification was published,
including in newspapers on 25.03.2021, triggering the statutory period of
21 days for filing objections, which lasted until 14.04.2021. The
respondent emphasizes that several interested persons did file objections
within this stipulated period, which were duly considered under Section
3C; however, the petitioners failed to submit any objections within this
legally prescribed timeframe. Consequently, the authorities proceeded to
issue the Section 3D declaration, which was published on 22.02.2022,
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thereby vesting the land absolutely in the Central Government as per
Section 3D(2).
2.2. It is contended that during the preparation of sub-division
records following the first Section 3D notification, it was discovered that
certain extents of land had been inadvertently omitted from the initial
Section 3A notification. To rectify this omission, additional Section 3A
notifications were issued only with respect to the missing extents and
without any overlap with previously notified land. These additional
notifications led to corresponding Section 3D and Section 3G processes, all
of which, were carried out in full compliance with statutory requirements.
The respondent also details that final declarations under Section 3D were
published in the Gazette of India on 28.02.2023 and again on 23.08.2023
for additional extents, and were simultaneously published in newspapers
such as “Mana Telangana” and “The Hindu,” in accordance with Section
3A(3) of the Act.
2.3. It is stated that environmental clearance was duly granted by
the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of
India, on 05.07.2023, and that this clearance was published in “Mana
Telangana” on 25.08.2023. Following completion of all statutory steps,
awards were passed under Section 3G(1) through proceedings dated
20.01.2024 and 14.03.2024, with compensation determined in accordance
with Sections 26 to 30 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. The respondent
asserts that compensation amounts, including 100% solatium, 12%
additional market value from the date of 3A notification to the date of
award, and a multiplication factor of 1.5 for rural lands, were duly
calculated and deposited in the CALA account for disbursement. Notices
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under Section 3E were issued to the petitioners to receive compensation,
but the petitioners allegedly failed to appear and collect the same.
2.4. It is stated thatpublication requests for notifications under
Sections 3A, 3D, and 3G were made at the instance of the Project Director,
NHAI, Project Implementation Unit, Warangal, and that all such
notifications were consistently published in the same two newspapers, as
required by law. It is stated that any discrepancies in names or ownership
details identified in Section 3D notifications are corrected at the stage of
award determination through speaking orders after verification of original
documents, ensuring that rightful claimants receive compensation under
Section 3G.
2.5. In response to the allegation of lack of notice and opportunity,
the respondent asserts that the statutory mechanism under Section 3A and
3C was fully complied with, and that the petitioners’ failure to file
objections within the 21-day period cannot invalidate the proceedings.
Further, the claim of inadequate publication is refuted by emphasizing that
the law only requires publication in two newspapers, including one
vernacular, and does not mandate publication in local panchayat offices.
Further, the allegation of multiple / overlapping notifications is denied by
contending that additional 3A notifications were issued solely to cover
previously omitted extents.
2.6. In response to the allegation of no opportunity for hearing, it
is contended by the respondentsthat hearings were available under Section
3C and were availed by other landowners,therebythere is no procedural
unfairness. It is contended that the awards were passed in accordance with
Section 3G and the compensation framework of the RFCTLARR Act,
2013.
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2.7. With regard to the claim of Rehabilitation and Resettlement
(R&R) benefits, it is contended that the Second and Third Schedules of the
RFCTLARR Act apply only in cases involving large-scale displacement,
such as hydroelectric or industrial township projects, and are not applicable
to linear infrastructure projects like national highways. Therefore, he
contends that the petitioners’ demand for R&R benefits is legally
untenable.
2.8. In response to the allegation of interference with possession
and cultivation, it is contended that under Section 3B of the Act, authorized
personnel are legally entitled to enter land for survey and related purposes
after issuance of a Section 3A notification, and that there is no damage to
crops or unlawful interference. He further emphasizes that once a Section
3D declaration is published, the land vests absolutely in the Central
Government free from encumbrances.
2.9. It is contended that the out of 615 affected landowners, only a
few have raised objections, and the petitioners approached the Court with
an intention to stall the acquisition process rather than to seek the statutory
grievance redressal mechanism through arbitration.
3. A counter affidavit is filed by respondent No.7-Project Director of
NHAI on behalf of respondents No. 6 and 7, essentially contending that the
entire land acquisition process for the four-lane Greenfield National
Highway NH-163G is lawful, procedurally sound, and fully compliant with
the National Highways Act, 1956 and the applicable provisions of the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013. It is contended that the NHAI initiated the
Greenfield highway project from Mancherial to Warangal covering the
stretch from Km. 63.779 to Km. 88.418 across 14 villages in Jayashankar
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Bhupalapally District, including Mogullapally. A formal requisition for
land acquisition was submitted under Section 3A(1) of the National
Highways Act, 1956, following which the Competent Authority for Land
Acquisition (CALA), namely the Revenue Divisional Officer, Bhupalpally,
was duly empowered to carry out acquisition proceedings. The first
Section 3A notification was issued vide S.O. No. 1016(E) dated
02.03.2021, and its substance was published in “Mana Telangana” (Telugu)
and “The Hindu” (English) on 25.03.2021, granting a statutory period of
21 days for filing objections. It is stated that no objections were received
from the petitioners within this period as mandated under Section 3C,
leading to the issuance of the Section 3D declaration vide S.O. No. 814(E)
dated 22.02.2022, which legally vested the land in the Central
Government.
3.1. Subsequently, an additional Section 3A notification was
issued vide S.O. No. 1869(E) dated 19.04.2022 to cover certain additional
extents of land, and its substance was published on 08.05.2022 in the same
newspapers, again allowing 21 days for objections. Once again, no
objections were received, and a corresponding Section 3D notification was
issued vide S.O. No. 4780(E) dated 07.10.2022. It is stated that upon
publication of these Section 3D notifications, the acquired lands vested
absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. In
parallel, environmental clearance for the project was granted by the
Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change on 05.07.2023,
thereby satisfying all statutory environmental requirements.
3.2. It is stated that a public notice under Section 3G(3) was issued
in “Mana Telangana” and “The Hindu” on 28.02.2023, calling upon all
interested persons to appear before the Competent Authority on 28.03.2023
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during office hours and submit their claims along with documentary proof
of title. Following this process, and after conducting due enquiry, the
Competent Authority passed awards on 20.01.2024 and 14.03.2024. These
awards, according to the respondents, were passed after considering all
objections received, granting opportunity of hearing, and determining
compensation strictly in accordance with Sections 26 to 30 of the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013. The compensation included statutory benefits such
as 100% solatium, 12% additional market value from the date of 3A
notification to the date of award, and a multiplication factor of 1.5 for rural
lands. The determined compensation amounts were deposited with the
competent authority as required under law.
3.3. With regard to the documentary and procedural evidence, the
respondents rely on the sequence of statutory notifications (S.O. No.
1016(E) dated 02.03.2021, S.O. No. 814(E) dated 22.02.2022, S.O. No.
1869(E) dated 19.04.2022, and S.O. No. 4780(E) dated 07.10.2022), the
newspaper publications dated 25.03.2021 and 08.05.2022, the Section
3G(3) public notice dated 28.02.2023 calling landowners to appear on
28.03.2023, the environmental clearance dated 05.07.2023 issued by the
competent Ministry, and the award proceedings dated 20.01.2024 and
14.03.2024. Each of these, they argue, demonstrates strict adherence to
statutory requirements and procedural fairness.
3.4. The respondents categorically deny that there was any lack of
notice or opportunity to submit objections. It is contended that the statutory
framework under Sections 3A and 3C was fully complied with and that the
petitioners’ failure to submit objections within the 21-day window cannot
invalidate the acquisition process. They refute the claim of inadequate
publication by emphasizing that publication in two newspapers, including
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one vernacular, satisfies the legal requirement, and deny that there is any
obligation to publish notifications in local panchayat offices. It is stated
that the second 3A notification dated 19.04.2022 was issued solely to
include missing extents and did not overlap with earlier notifications.
3.5. The respondents contend that the awards dated 20.01.2024
and 14.03.2024 were passed only after due enquiry under Section 3G and
after providing opportunity to all stakeholders. It is contended that the
order in W.P. No. 13384 of 2023 did not stipulate fresh acquisition
proceedings,instead the order directs to follow due process and pay
compensation, which has been fully complied with.
3.6. In response to the claim of Rehabilitation and Resettlement
(R&R) benefits under the Second and Third Schedules of the RFCTLARR
Act, 2013, it is contended that such benefits apply only to “displaced
families” as defined under Section 3(k), meaning those who are relocated
and resettled. It is contended that in the present case, only small extents of
land have been acquired, and the petitioners have neither been relocated
nor displaced, and no certification of displacement has been issued by the
Competent Authority, and therefore it is contended that the petitionersare
not entitled to R&R benefits. They further clarify that while certain
compensation provisions under Sections 26 to 30 of the RFCTLARR Act
apply, the broader R&R framework does not extend to linear infrastructure
projects like highways unless actual displacement occurs. They also
emphasize that the Third Schedule is intended for large-scale projects such
as hydel or industrial townships and is wholly inapplicable to national
highways, and therefore the petitioners are not entitled to R&R benefits. It
is contended that the petitioners have failed to substantiate their claim of
being affected families or suffering displacement, and that such factual
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determinations cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction without concrete
proof. It is contended that the petitioners have an alternative statutory
remedy of arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act, 1956 and a writ
petition is not maintainable.
4. A reply affidavit is filed by the petitioners, in response to the counter
affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent. It is contended in the reply affidavit
that although the petitioners had submitted objections and representations,
the respondents failed to produce any record to show that their objections
were considered. It is stated that no personal hearing was ever conducted
and no proceedings regarding adjudication of objections were
communicated, thereby violating statutory requirements and principles of
natural justice.
4.1. It is contended that declarations under Section 3D were issued
in 2022 and even in 2023 also, but the environmental clearance was
obtained only on 05.07.2023, thereby rendering the entire acquisition
process invalid, as prior environmental clearance has not been obtained.
4.2. The petitionerscontend that even as per the respondents,
certain extents were “inadvertently missed” not once but twice, which
itself demonstrates lack of due diligence in planning, survey, and
notification. It is contended that this resulted in inaccurate disclosure of
land details, depriving landowners of a meaningful opportunity to
understand the acquisition and submit their objections.
4.3. On the issue of compensation and Rehabilitation and
Resettlement (R&R), it is contended that respondent authorities themselves
admitted that compensation isto be determined under the RFCTLARR Act,
2013, but they simultaneously deny applicability of R&R provisions. It is
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contended that under the Removal of Difficulties Order dated 28.08.2015,
both compensation and R&R provisions–including those under the
Second Schedule–are applicable to acquisitions under the National
Highways Act.
4.4. The petitioners also rebut the respondent’s claim that errors in
names or details in notifications can be corrected at the award stage. It is
contended that such errors in Section 3A and 3D notifications themselves
deprive actual landowners of their statutory right to make objections and
seek hearing, making the entire process fundamentally flawed. Similarly,
he challenges the legality of issuing a second Section 3A notification on
19.04.2022 after a Section 3D declaration dated 22.02.2022.
4.5. Further, the petitionerscontend that the respondent authorities
have taken contradictory stand with regard to objections. It is stated that,
on the one hand, the respondent claims that some landowners filed
objections within the 21-day period from 25.03.2021 to 14.04.2021and, on
the other hand, the respondent makes a contrary claim that no objections
were received before issuing the Section 3D declaration.It is stated that
common objections were filed within time, however, no orders were
passed on them.
4.6. The petitioners highlights that the respondent chose to offer
“no comments” on certain serious allegations, particularly regarding
procedural lapses in publication and award enquiry, and argues that such
silence amounts to admission. He further disputes the claim that
compensation was properly determined under Sections 26 to 30 of the
RFCTLARR Act, asserting that there was no revision of market value prior
to the Section 3A notification, no adherence to procedures under Sections
16 to 18 and 23, and no valuation of structures before passing the awards.
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He also alleges that notices under Section 3E for taking possession were
issued prematurely, without completing the mandatory steps of lawful
determination.
4.7. In response to the respondents’ contention that R&R
provisions are not applicable, the petitionerscontend that their claim is
specifically limited to the Second Schedule and not the Third Schedule,
and that the respondents have failed to properly address this distinction.It
is contended that the Removal of Difficulties Order, 2015 extends
compensation and R&R provisions of the 2013 Act to acquisitions under
the National Highways Act.
5. Heard Mr. Ch. Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners;
learned Standing Counsel for NHAI, learned Standing Counsel for
CALA,and Mr. B. Narasimha Sarma, learned Additional Solicitor General
of India. Perused the record.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the petitioners had
earlier approached this Court in W.P. No. 13384 of 2023 on the ground that
no environmental clearance had been obtained for the project, and though
certain petitioners, particularly petitioners Nos. 5, 6, and 9, were included
in the additional notifications issued under Sections 3A and 3D, they were
deprived of a meaningful opportunity to file objections. The said writ
petition was disposed of with a clear direction that the respondents shall
not interfere with the petitioners’ lands without initiating proper land
acquisition proceedings.
6.1. It is contended that the petitioners believed that fresh
acquisition proceedings would be initiated in compliance with the order of
this Court in W.P. No. 13384 of 2023, however, the Competent Authority
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for Land Acquisition proceeded to pass awards under Section 3G of the
National Highways Act, 1956. Learned counsel contends that no effective
opportunity was given to the petitioners to submit their objections to the
Section 3A notifications, thereby violating principles of natural justice. It is
further contended that multiple notifications under Sections 3A and 3D
were issued in respect of the same lands without clarity, and that the
notifications lacked essential particulars such as survey number-wise and
landowner-wise details.
6.2. Learned counsel also submits that despite the pendency of
disputes, the respondents have been interfering with the petitioners’
possession and cultivation activities, even though standing crops exist on
the subject lands. It is contended that compensation as well as
Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) benefits ought to have been
determined strictly in accordance with Sections 21 to 30 and Sections 16 to
18, 23, and 31 of the 2013 Act, and not under Section 3G of the NH Act.
6.3. It is contended that the expressions “amount” and
“compensation” under Sections 3G and 3H of the NH Act must be
interpreted to include not only the value of land and structures but also the
rehabilitation entitlements of affected families. While conceding that the
petitioners may not be displaced so as to require resettlement, learned
counsel asserts that they nevertheless qualify as “affected families” and are
entitled to rehabilitation benefits. It is argued that possession of land
cannot be taken unless complete compensation, including valuation of
trees and structures, and determination of rehabilitation entitlements are
finalized and paid, which has not been done in the present case.
6.4. Learned counsel challenges the validity of the award
proceedings on the ground that compensation for structures and trees has
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not been determined, thereby rendering both the awards and consequential
notices under Section 3E unsustainable in law. It is submitted that the
Competent Authority ought to have followed the procedure prescribed
under the RFCTLARR Act by issuing notice under Section 21, conducting
enquiry under Section 23, and following the process under Sections 16 to
18 for identification of beneficiaries and preparation of a Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Scheme, instead of mechanically invoking Section 3G of
the NH Act.
6.5. It is contended that the petitioners had made several
representations expressing their unwillingness to part with their lands and
pointing out the illegality in the acquisition process, including improper
determination of compensation. Despite this, the authorities, in the months
of June and July 2025, allegedly entered the petitioners’ lands with police
force, marked the lands, and threatened them not to continue cultivation,
even though standing crops existed.
7. Learned counsel for the petitionersrelies on:
4) Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai 4;
1
W.P. No. 11486 of 2024 (Telangana High Court)
2
(2024) 10 SCC 533
3
(2021) 14 SCC 703
4
(2005) 7 SCC 627
5
W.P. No. 23939 of 2013 (Telangana High Court)
6
W.A. No. 676 of 2023 (Telangana High Court)
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8) Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao 8;
9) National Highways Authority of India v. P. Nagaraju alias
Cheluvaiah 9;
10)Ranivr Singh v. National Highways Authority of India 10;
11) Union of India v. Shiv Raj 11;
12) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh 12
7.1. In Akkala Chandrakala (supra), this Courtconsidered a
dispute over land acquisition for the development of National Highway
765DG. The petitioners, whose homes were being acquired, sought
Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) benefits under the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, while government authorities argued that such
benefits were not applicable to the road-widening project under the
National Highways Act, 1956. This Court, by interim order dated
12.11.2024, rejected the authorities’ prayer to vacate an earlier stay order
and indicated that highway acquisitions remain subject to modern R&R
protections, and granted status quo until final hearing, while allowing
authorities to begin the formal process of determining and awarding R&R
compensation.
7.2. In Bimal Kumar Shah (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
broadened the understanding of the constitutional right to property under
Article 300-A of the Constitution of India by stating that lawful land
acquisition requires more than just public purpose and compensation. The
Supreme Court identified seven essential procedural sub-rights–including
7
Neutral Citation No. 2023:AHC:240588 – DB (Allahabad High Court)
8
(1973) 1 SCC 500
9
(2022) 15 SCC 1
10
2023 SCC OnLine All 5276
11
(2014) 6 SCC 564
12
1963 SCC OnLine SC 23
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the right to notice, the right to be heard, and the right to a reasoned
decision–along with requirements for an efficient process and fair
rehabilitation. Ruling against the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, the
Supreme Court held that any State action that ignores these safeguards is
invalid.
7.3. In B.K. Ravichandra (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
clarified the limits of Government power over private property. The
Supreme Court held that although the right to property is no longer a
fundamental right, it remains a constitutional safeguard under Article 300-
A of the Constitution of India, protecting both physical land and intangible
assets, and the government cannot occupy private land indefinitely without
proper legal authority, as prolonged possession amounts to unlawful
deprivation of property. Emphasizing the rule of law, the Court rejected
any notion that the State can act with “royal prerogative” and insisted that
all State actions must be backed by clear statutory authority. As a result,
the Court ordered the return of land that had been held by the government
for over thirty years and directed that fair compensation be paid to the
rightful owners.
7.4. In Darius Shapur Chenai (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court examined the procedural safeguards required under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 during the acquisition of private property. The
Supreme Court focused on whether the State had genuinely considered the
landowner’s objections as required under Section 5-A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. It held that the right to object and be heard under
Section 5-A is a significant safeguard–comparable in importance to a
fundamental right–and must involve a real and careful consideration by
the government rather than a mere formality. The Court further ruled that
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when such decisions are challenged, the government must produce its
records to demonstrate that a fair decision-making process was followed.
Since the State failed to provide adequate evidence or a proper counter-
affidavit, the Court upheld the quashing of the acquisition, reinforcing that
laws allowing the taking of private property must be strictly interpreted to
prevent arbitrary state action.
7.5. In K. Ramachandram(supra), this Courtexamined whether
the government had followed the required statutory procedures while
attempting to acquire the petitioner’s land; and held that although the
preliminary notification remained valid because it had been properly
extended, the later declaration was unlawful due to the authorities’ failure
to prepare and publish mandatory rehabilitation and resettlement schemes
under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Finding that these
procedural safeguards are essential to protect the landowner’s rights, the
declaration was quashed with a direction to the government to strictly
comply with the Act if it wishes to proceed with the acquisition, while also
encouraging both parties to pursue an amicable settlement through land
exchange or fair monetary compensation.
7.6. In Madi Satyavati v. State of Telangana 13, the Division
Bench of this Court dealt with a matter pertaining to land acquisition for a
railway project; and held that not only the mother, but also her three
daughters, qualify as an affected family under Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013; and modified a prior order to ensure that rehabilitation benefits
are determined for the daughters in addition to the mother’s solatium and
13
W.A. No. 676 of 2023 (Telangana High Court)
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allowed the appellants to seek a formal reference if they are dissatisfied
with the final monetary compensation, reinforcing that the rights of all
affected family members must be recognized in land acquisition cases.
7.7. In Manorama Devi (supra), the Allahabad High Court
adjudicated a petition filed by Manorma Devi against the National
Highway Authority of India. The Allahabad High Court addressed her
claim for rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, which she had not
received despite being compensated for her land. The Court observed that
her grievance aligned with previous cases under the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, where affected landowners were entitled to
additional support. It directed the authorities to prepare a formal proposal
within six months to provide the petitioner with entitlements for housing,
employment, and relocation as outlined in the Second Schedule of the Act,
and granted legal relief consistent with earlier, similar judgments.
7.8. In Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court examined whether the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act
violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India by allowing the State to
acquire property at lower compensation rates than standard national laws.
The Supreme Court held that the Government cannot justify paying
different amounts for similar lands based solely on which authority
conducts the acquisition or the stated public purpose. Emphasizing the
principle of equal protection, the judgment affirmed that landowners are
entitled to consistent, market-value compensation regardless of the
acquiring body, and dismissed the appeal, ruling that discriminatory
treatment in compensation or statutory bonuses is unconstitutional.
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7.9. In P. Nagaraju alias Cheluvaiah (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court addressed the determination of fair compensation and
clarified the role of Courts in reviewing arbitral awards under Section 34
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court held that
an arbitrator’s failure to provide adequate and intelligible reasoning for
compensation constitutes a ground of “patent illegality,” justifying judicial
intervention. Emphasizing equitable treatment for landowners, including
solatium and interest, the ruling aligned compensation practices with
constitutional protections and remanded the matter for recalculation of the
property’s market value using proper evidence and updated guideline rates.
7.10. In Ranivr Singh (supra), the Allahabad High Court
addressed petitions by displaced families who claimed that the National
Highway Authority of India had failed to provide mandatory rehabilitation
and resettlement benefits under the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013. The Court held that the status of affected families must be properly
assessed, rejecting the authorities’ contention that linear road projects
cause minimal disruption. It directed the competent authority to conduct a
thorough inquiry and submit a resettlement proposal to the District
Collector, ensuring that eligible landowners receive entitlements such as
housing units, employment opportunities, or relocation allowances as part
of their compensation.
7.11. In Shiv Raj (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Courtconsidered
the validity of land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894. The Supreme Court highlighted procedural lapses, including
violations of natural justice where objections were heard by one official
but the final report was issued by another without a fresh hearing. It also
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examined the impact of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 on older
cases where the government delayed possession or failed to provide
compensation for over five years.
7.12. InSinghara Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
addressed the admissibility of oral testimony regarding a defendant’s
confession, arising from a Second-Class Magistrate’s failure to follow
procedures under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
8. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the National Highways
Authority of India (NHAI) submits that the acquisition proceedings and the
determination of compensation have been carried out strictly in accordance
with law, and that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in the present
writ petition. At the outset, it is contended that adequate and lawful
compensation has been awarded to all affected landowners. The Competent
Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA) passed awards dated 20.01.2024
and 14.03.2024, granting compensation in accordance with the National
Highways Act, 1956 read with the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. It is stated that
these awards were passed after conducting due enquiry, considering
objections, and providing opportunity to all concerned parties.
8.1. Learned Standing Counsel further submits that the
compensation amounts determined under the said awards have already
been deposited with the competent authority as required under the NH Act,
1956. It is stated that in certain cases, some landowners did not attend the
enjoyment survey or award enquiry and failed to produce title documents,
due to which the CALA proceeded to determine compensation based on
available records such as the enjoyment statements. Subsequently, some
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landowners came forward with title documents and claims. It is also
pointed out that while some of the petitioners have accepted and received
the compensation, others have chosen not to receive the same, and
therefore cannot now turn around and challenge the process itself.
8.2. Referring to the earlier proceedings in W.P. No. 13384 of
2023 and W.P. No. 13383 of 2023, learned Standing Counsel submits that
this Court had only directed the authorities not to interfere with possession
without following due process and payment of compensation; and the
respondents have fully complied with this direction by following the
statutory procedure and determining compensation. The contention of the
petitioners that fresh acquisition proceedings ought to have been initiated
is a misinterpretation of the Court’s order.
8.3. It is submitted that the petitionershave an efficacious
alternative remedy under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act, 1956, whereby any
aggrieved party may approach the Arbitrator-cum-District Collector for
redressal of grievances relating to compensation. Further, under Section
3G(6), the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 apply,
and any challenge to the arbitral award lies before the District Court under
Section 34 of the said Act. In view of this statutory mechanism, it is argued
that the present writ petition is not maintainable.
8.4. Learned Standing Counsel contends that the petitioners do not
fall within the definition of a “displaced family” under Section 3(k) of the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013, as they have neither been relocated nor resettled. It
is further contended that the petitioners have failed to produce any
documentary evidence to establish loss of livelihood, loss of residence, or
displacement so as to qualify as “affected families” under Section 3(c) of
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the Act. In fact, only a portion of the petitioners’ lands has been acquired,
thereby negating any claim of deprivation of livelihood.
8.5. Learned Standing Counsel further contends that, even
otherwise, the claims for R&R benefits require cogent evidence
demonstrating that the compensation awarded is grossly inadequate to
enable rehabilitation, and in the instant case the petitioners have failed to
establish that the compensation awarded is grossly inadequate to enable
rehabilitation. It is contended that where substantial compensation has
been awarded, landowners are capable of acquiring alternative land or
assets, thereby mitigating any alleged hardship. It is further submitted that
if the petitioners intended to claim such benefits, they ought to have
specifically raised these claims before the competent authority during the
objection stage, which they failed to do. It is contended that entitlement to
R&R benefits requires a certification by the competent authority that the
family has been displaced or dislocated, which is absent in the present
case. Learned Standing Counsel submits that the provisions of the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013 are not automatically applicable to acquisitions
under the NH Act, 1956 unless specifically extended by notification under
Section 105 of the 2013 Act. In the absence of such extension covering
social impact assessment and R&R provisions, there was no requirement
for the NHAI to undertake such exercises in the present acquisition.
Further, as only a part of the petitioners’ land has been acquired and they
have not been dislocated, the claim of the petitionersfor rehabilitation and
resettlement benefits is misconceived.
8.6. Learned Standing Counsel submits that the present project is a
public infrastructure project of national importance, and if the petitioners
are aggrieved by the quantum of compensation or any alleged deficiency
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therein, they have a statutory remedy under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act,
1956, and such grievances cannot form the basis to challenge the
acquisition proceedings themselves. It is therefore contended that the
acquisition has been carried out strictly in accordance with due process of
law, and adequate compensation has been determined and made available,
and that `no case for R&R benefits is made out, and the writ petition is
liable to be dismissed both on merits and on the ground of availability of
alternative remedy.
9. Learned counsel appearing for the Competent Authority for Land
Acquisition (CALA) submits that the acquisition proceedings have been
conducted strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the
National Highways Act, 1956 and the applicable provisions of the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
9.1. It is contended that during the preparation of sub-division
records with reference to the first declaration under Section 3D, it was
noticed that certain extents of land had been inadvertently omitted from the
earlier Section 3A notification. In order to rectify this omission, an
additional Section 3A notification was issued, strictly limited to the
missing extents and without any overlap with the previously notified lands.
It is submitted that such action was undertaken only to ensure
completeness and accuracy in the acquisition process and does not vitiate
the proceedings.
9.2. Learned counsel further submits that in W.P. No. 13384 of
2023, this Court had directed the respondents not to interfere with the
possession of the petitioners’ lands without following due process and
payment of compensation. In compliance with the said directions, the
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CALA proceeded to determine compensation and passed awards dated
20.01.2024 and 14.03.2024, thereby fulfilling the requirement of law
before taking further steps in the acquisition.
9.3. It is also contended that the petitioners failed to avail the
statutory opportunity to file objections to the Section 3A notifications.
Despite publication of the notifications and availability of the objection
mechanism under the Act, no objections were submitted by the petitioners
within the prescribed time, and therefore, they cannot now challenge the
acquisition on the ground of lack of opportunity.
9.4. Learned counsel submits that all statutory notifications were
duly published in accordance with Section 3A(3) of the National Highways
Act, 1956, namely in two local newspapers, one of which was in the
vernacular language. Thus, the requirement of publication and notice
stands fully complied with.
9.5. With regard to compensation, it is submitted that the awards
dated 20.01.2024 and 14.03.2024 were passed after due enquiry,
determining compensation in accordance with Sections 26 to 30 of the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013, which govern the principles for assessment of
market value and related benefits. Therefore, the contention that
compensation has not been properly determined is untenable.
9.6. Learned counsel finally submits that out of a total of 615 land
losers affected by the acquisition, only the present petitioners have
approached this Court, raising objections with an intention to stall the
acquisition process, and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
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10. Learned Additional Solicitor General relies on several judgments in
support of his contention that a writ remedy is not maintainable in the
instant case; particularly on Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of
Maharashtra14 and contends that the Courts have to weigh the public
interest vis-Ã -vis the private interest while exercising the power and there
are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong, and
that quashing of acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress.
10.1. He also relies on Nerajala Nageswara Rao v. Union of
India 15, to contend that alternative remedy harsh one should not be
resorted in public purpose projects and larger public purpose prevails over
individual interest. He also relies on N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar
Jain16, to contend that construction of road is an infrastructure project and
keeping in view the intent of the legislature that infrastructure projects
should not be stayed, the High Court would have been well advised to hold
its hand to stay the construction of the infrastructure project.
10.2. He also relies on Bluepark Seafoods (P) Ltd v. District
Collector17 and contends that in case of acquisition for benefit of general
public, the landowner can stake claim for reasonable compensation and
nothing beyond that. Relying on NHAI v. Sayedabad Tea Company
Ltd 18, it is contended that National Highways Act is a special enactment
and a comprehensive code which provides an inbuilt mechanism for
initiating acquisition until culmination of the proceedings in determining
the compensation and its adjudication by arbitrator under Section 3-G(5) of
the NH Act.
14
1997 (1) SCC 134
15
2017 SCC Online Hyd 250
16
2022 (6) SCC 127
17
2011 SCC OnLine AP 267
18
(2020) 15 SCC 161
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10.3. He also relies on the judgment of the High Court of
Karnataka, at Bengaluru, in W.P.No.10103 of 2020 (LA-RES) and
batch, dated 19.07.2022, and contends that in the said case, the High
Court of Karnataka has set aside the awards passed by the CALA and
directed the authority to redetermine the compensation afresh, and if the
parties are aggrieved by the fresh awards passed by the CALA, the parties
can approach the arbitrator.
10.4. He also relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
M/s Tirupati Developers v. The Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar
Haveli19, and contends that the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed the
Collector to give one opportunity to the appellant therein to submit its
objections, followed by personal hearing and thereafter pass appropriate
award after holding inquiry under Section 23 of the RTCTLARR Act, and
therefore similar dispensation may be shown in the present writ petition as
well in view of similarity of facts.
11. Having considered the respective contentions and perused the
record, it may be noted that the grievance of the petitioners essentially is
that multiple notifications under Sections 3A and 3D of the National
Highways Act were issued with incomplete information, inadequate
publication, and without providing proper landowner-wise details, maps, or
an effective opportunity to file objections with regard to the acquisition of
their agricultural lands for the proposed four-lane National Highway-163G,
and that their objections were not properly considered. It is also contended
that the authorities proceeded with the declaration and award process even
before obtaining environmental clearance, issued additional notifications
19
Civil Appeal No.4952 of 2023, dated August 7, 2023
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without informing the affected landowners, and passed incomplete
compensation awards without determining compensation for structures and
trees, and without granting rehabilitation and resettlement benefits as
required under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and the Removal of Difficulties
Order, 2015. They also allegedenial of statutory entitlements, and attempts
by the authorities to forcibly take possession of their lands without paying
lawful compensation, thereby threatening their livelihood as small and
marginal farmers. It is also their grievance that the compensation cannot be
confined only to the land on the mere ground that the land is an
agricultural extent, and that compensation should also be granted for the
structures existing on the land, and rehabilitation and resettlement benefits
should be extended to the petitioners.
11.1. On the contrary, the essential contention of the respondents
(NHAI and CALA authorities) is that the acquisition of the petitioners’
land for the construction of the four-lane National Highway-163G
(Mancherial-Warangal Greenfield Corridor) has been carried out strictly in
accordance with the procedure prescribed under the National Highways
Act, 1956 and the applicable provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, and
that all statutory steps–issuance of notifications under Sections 3A and
3D, consideration of objections under Section 3C, conduct of enquiry, and
passing of compensation awards under Section 3G–were duly followed.
According to them, adequate opportunity was given to the landowners, and
compensation has been determined and deposited as per law.It is also their
contention that the entire village or villages have not been acquired,
requiring the villagers, along with their houses, cattle, and livelihood, to be
shifted/relocated to an alternative location, or re-establish the village at
some other place entirely; but only such extent of land(s) that is under
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alignment would go into the highway project, and only such limited
extents of land(s) were acquired, and therefore there cannot be any
contentions of displacement of persons requiring rehabilitation and
resettlement under the RFCTLARR Act because they are not “displaced
families”. It is contended that any grievance regarding compensation must
be pursued through the statutory remedy of arbitration under Section 3G(5)
of the National Highways Act rather than through a writ petition, and the
petitioners’ allegations are unfounded. They further contend that the
interim order restraining the project may be vacated since it delays a
project of national importance and public interest.
12. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the project concerns the laying
of a four-lane National Highway (Mancherial-Warangal Greenfield
Corridor), and that land acquisition has been undertaken for the said
highway. In land acquisition for a National Highway of this nature,
connecting highways across States, the acquisition process or the laying of
the highway per se cannot be stalled indefinitely by taking recourse to the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Ultimately, the sole grievance that
can be agitated by the aggrieved persons is confined to the compensatory
benefits in lieu of the lands acquired, which is pecuniary in nature.
12.1 Further, the petitioners’ grievance with regard to entitlement
to compensation for structures, trees, standing crops, or even alternative
rehabilitation/resettlement benefits is also justiciable, provided such
structures are legally permitted, and the CALA has certified that the
structures/crops, etc., have been affected in the land acquisition process, in
a way that resettlement and rehabilitation is necessary.
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12.2 Be that as it may, in land acquisition for a public purpose,
unless there are proven malafides, neither is the acquisition liable to be set
aside, nor can the opinion of experts–either with regard to the alignment
of the highway or with regard to the determination of factual aspects such
as the extent of land acquired and the monetary compensation payable–be
substituted by exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226.
13. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Kushala Shetty 20, wherein it
was held as follows:
“24. Here, it will be apposite to mention that NHAI is a
professionally managed statutory body having expertise in the
field of development and maintenance of National Highways. The
projects involving construction of new highways and widening
and development of the existing highways, which are vital for
development of infrastructure in the country, are entrusted to
experts in the field of highways. It comprises of persons having
vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway development
and maintenance. NHAI prepares and implements projects relating
to development and maintenance of National Highways after
thorough study by experts in different fields. Detailed project
reports are prepared keeping in view the relevant factors including
intensity of heavy vehicular traffic and larger public interest. The
Courts are not at all equipped to decide upon the viability and
feasibility of the particular project and whether the particular
alignment would subserve the larger public interest. In such
matters, the scope of judicial review is very limited. The Court can
nullify the acquisition of land and, in rarest of rare cases, the
particular project, if it is found to be ex facie contrary to the
mandate of law or tainted due to mala fides.”
20
(2011) 12 SCC 69
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14. Further, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble
Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.774 of 2024, dated
07.08.2024, which is an appeal filed challenging a Notification for laying a
national highway. The Hon’ble Division Bench, by referring to various
precedent judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, more particularly
Kushala Shetty (supra), held as follows:
“12. In view of aforesaid enunciation of law, it is evident that the
projects involving construction of new highways and widening
and development of existing highways are vital for development of
infrastructure of the country. The projects have been entrusted to
the experts in the field of highways and it comprises of persons
having vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway
development and maintenance. The NHAI is implementing the
project relating to development and maintenance after thorough
study by experts.
13. It is pertinent to note that in pursuance of the notification
issued under the Act, award has already been passed on
10.05.2022 and petitioners No.8 and 11 in W.P.No.24150 of 2021
have even received the compensation. The project is virtually
complete except for a small stretch.”
15. In this connection, it is to be noted that under Section 3G of the
National Highways Act, determination of compensation is entrusted to the
Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA). Significantly, Section
3G(5) expressly provides that where the amount determined by the
Competent Authority is not acceptable to either of the parties, the matter
shall, on application, be referred to the Arbitrator appointed by the Central
Government–ordinarily the District Collector. Thus, the statute itself
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creates a complete adjudicatory mechanism for redressal of disputes
relating to compensation.
16. Further, once the Arbitrator renders an award under Section 3G(5) of
the National Highways Act, 1956, such award is governed by the
provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; and the persons
aggrieved by the arbitral award has a further statutory remedy under
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the competent
Civil Court.
17. Though the existence of an alternative remedy is not a bar to
invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226, its invocation
comes with the rider that there should be exceptional circumstances,
warranting invocation under Article 226 bypassing the statutory remedy. In
this context, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks 21, wherein
the Supreme Court held as follows:
“15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having
regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not
to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon
itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and
efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally
exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been
consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least
three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed
for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where
there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or21
1998 (8) SCC 1
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the vires of an Act is challenged.”
18. In the instant writ petition, this Court does not find any violation of
fundamental rights per se, or any violation of the principles of natural
justice, or any jurisdictional error on the part of the respondent authorities;
nor does the writ petition challenge the vires of the Act passed by the
competent authority. Further, it is the specific unrebutted contention of the
respondents, borne out by the record, that out of 615 affected persons, only
the present petitioners are challenging the acquisition with the claim of
compensation for structures, trees, etc., and also rehabilitation and
resettlement benefits. Further, despite there being certain delay in
obtaining environmental clearance, the very acquisition notifications
cannot be set aside, as the issuance of notifications and their publication in
Mana Telangana (Telugu) and The Hindu (English) newspapers, and
considering of objections are prima facie not in dispute. The contention of
the petitioners that the newspapers have little circulation and the
petitioners were not aware cannot be countenanced, as primarily they
submitted their objections.
19. Though the petitioners contend that they are entitled to certain
rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, it cannot be disputed that the
competent authority should have certified that the affected landowner has
been displaced. Furthermore, the petitioners have a two-step statutory
remedy, one under the National Highways Act, 1956 and, if still aggrieved,
the second under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and therefore
the petitioners are not remediless.
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20. In light of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kushala
Shetty (supra), and Whirlpool Corporation (supra), and also the
judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench in W.A. No.774 of 2024, dated
07.08.2024, this Court does not find any exceptional circumstances to
entertain the writ petitionbypassing the statutory mechanism provided
under the National Highways Act, 1956 and the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.
21. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of, relegating the
petitioners to avail the statutory remedy under Section 3G(5) of the
National Highways Act, 1956 and thereafter, if necessary, under Section 34
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. No costs. Interim order dated
10.12.2024 stands vacated. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall
stand closed.
________________________________
JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
07th April, 2026
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