Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Abdul Karim vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jd:9159) on 19 February, 2026
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2026:RJ-JD:9159]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 258/2026
Abdul Karim S/o Resham Khan, Aged About 35 Years, Panasar,
Police Station, Bhaniyana, Dist. Jaisalmer
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
2. Meena W/o Babulal, Aged About 22 Years, R/o Rawatsar,
Sadar Barmer, Dist. Barmer,raj. Currently R/o Mfc 976,ps
Bhaniyana, Jaisalmer
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Shahbaz Khan
For Respondent(s) : Mr. NS Chandawat, Dy.G.A.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Order
19/02/2026
1. The instant revision petition has been preferred under
Section 438 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 read with Section 442 BNSS, assailing the legality,
propriety and correctness of the order dated 14.11.2025
passed by the learned District Judge, Pokaran, District
Jaisalmer, in Sessions Case No. 34/2025 (State v. Ishaq &
Ors.), whereby charges have been framed against the
petitioners under Sections 191(2), 121(1) or 121(1)/190,
132 or 132/190, 131 or 131/190, 263(b) or 263(b)/190,
61(2)(a) and 111(2)(b) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023.
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2. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are that on
14.04.2025, Respondent No. 2 lodged an FIR alleging that at
about 05:59 AM she, along with the SHO and other police
personnel, proceeded to arrest wanted accused persons in
FIR No. 21/2025 registered under Sections 115(2), 126(2),
117(2), 109(1) and 189(2) of the BNS. At about 06:10 AM,
upon reaching the house of Imamdeen at Pannasar, two
persons allegedly fled on seeing the police vehicle. The
complainant and Constable Aaidan Ram chased and
apprehended one of them, who disclosed his identity as
Umar Faruk alias Hajur, a wanted accused in the aforesaid
FIR. It was further alleged that when the police attempted to
arrest him, several persons including Ishaq Khan, his wife
Naju, Salim, Imamdeen, Zarina and others came out from
nearby houses and obstructed the police in discharge of their
official duties. It was also alleged that Abdul Karim alias
Karim Khan arrived at the spot in a black Thar vehicle along
with three ladies and instigated the mob to attack the police.
During the commotion, Abdul Karim allegedly pushed the
complainant, snatched her mobile phone when she
attempted to record the incident, threw it on the ground, and
facilitated the escape of Umar Faruk and other accused
persons.
3. On the basis of these allegations, FIR No. 33/2025 was
registered at Police Station Bhaniyana against various
persons including the present petitioner, and investigation
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was commenced, pursuant to which the petitioner was
arrested. The petitioner was subsequently enlarged on bail
by the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur in S.B. CRLMB
Application No. 10088/2025 vide order dated 18.09.2025.
Thereafter, a charge-sheet was filed before the learned
ACJM, Pokaran, who took cognizance and committed the
case to the learned Additional District Judge, Pokaran. Vide
order dated 14.11.2025 passed in Sessions Case No.
34/2025 (State v. Ishaq & Ors.), charges were framed
against the petitioner under Sections 191(2), 121(1) or
121(1)/190, 132 or 132/190, 131 or 131/190, 263(b) or
263(b)/190, 61(2)(a) and 111(2)(b) of the BNS. Aggrieved
by the said order dated 14.11.2025, the present Revision
Petition has been preferred.
4. Heard learned counsel present for the parties and gone
through the materials available on record.
5. The case was lodged at the instance of information supplied
by a police officer, who himself is the complainant in the
present matter. In view thereof, learned Public Prosecutor is
directed to accept the notice. He accepts the same and
submitted the oral arguments.
6. The grievance of the petitioners is that the impugned order
dated 14.11.2025 has been passed in a highly mechanical
and cursory manner. A bare perusal of the order-sheet
reveals that after recording the presence of the learned
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Public Prosecutor and counsel for the accused, the learned
trial court merely noted that arguments on charge were
heard, a prima facie case was found, charges were framed,
read over and explained to the accused, who denied the
same and claimed trial, followed by issuance of process for
summoning prosecution witnesses. The order does not
disclose any application of judicial mind to the material
collected during investigation or to the essential ingredients
of the offences alleged under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
7. It is trite law that at the stage of framing of charge, the
Court is not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of
evidence or hold a mini-trial. However, it is equally well
settled that the Court must apply its judicial mind to the
material placed before it and must satisfy itself that the basic
ingredients constituting the alleged offences are prima facie
made out against the accused. Mechanical framing of
charges merely because a charge-sheet has been filed is
impermissible in law.
8. In the present case, the impugned order does not reflect any
consideration of the specific role attributed to each of the
petitioners in the FIR or the statements recorded during
investigation. The order is conspicuously silent as to which
material persuaded the learned trial court to form an opinion
that offences under Sections 191(2), 121(1), 132, 131,
263(b), 61(2)(a) and 111(2)(b) of the BNS, either
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independently or with the aid of Section 190 BNS, are prima
facie made out. There is no discussion whatsoever regarding
the statutory ingredients of the said provisions or their nexus
with the alleged acts attributed to the petitioners.
9. This Court finds that the controversy raised in the present
revision petition stands squarely covered by the judgment
rendered by this Court in Reema v. State of Rajasthan,
S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 581/2025, decided
on 22.01.2026, wherein it was held that though a detailed
order is not mandated at the stage of framing of charge, the
order must nonetheless reflect conscious application of
judicial mind and cannot be cryptic or non-speaking.
“9. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that this Court,
in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 1675/2025 , an
earlier matter involving analogous facts and
circumstances, had occasion to examine the legality of an
order framing charge, wherein detailed observations were
made regarding the scope of judicial scrutiny at the stage
of framing of charge, the requirement of meaningful
application of mind, and the impermissibility of mechanical
framing of charges.
10. The said order is being reproduced hereunder for
ready reference:
1. By way of filing the instant revision petition, the petitioner
calls in question the order dated 06.11.2025 passed by the
learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 1,
Udaipur, in Special Sessions Case No. 46/2025 (State v.
Ganpatlal Sharma & Anr.), arising out of FIR No. 157/2024,
CPS ACB Jaipur, whereby charges have been framed against
the petitioner under Section 07 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018) and Section
61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, despite gross violation
of the mandatory provisions of Sections 230, 249, 250(1) and
250(2) of the BNSS, resulting in serious miscarriage of justice
and infringement of the petitioner’s fundamental rights
guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
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India, rendering the impugned order illegal, arbitrary and
unsustainable in law.
2. The brief facts of the present are that the petitioner is
Accused No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as “A-1”) in the
Sessions Case titled State v. Ganpat Lal Sharma & Anr.,
arising out of FIR No. 157/2024 registered at Central Police
Station (CPS), Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB). Upon
completion of investigation, Charge-sheet No. 221/2025 was
filed against the petitioner for the offence punishable under
Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as
amended up to 2018) and Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita. The present Criminal Revision Petition is
directed against the order dated 06.11.2025, whereby
charges have been framed against the petitioner in blatant
violation of Sections 230, 249, 250(1), 250(2) and 252(1) of
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) and Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The charge-sheet was
submitted on 21.08.2025 before the learned Special Judge,
Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 1, Udaipur, by Respondent
No. 2, the Additional Superintendent of Police, ACB, Special
Unit, Udaipur.
3. Thereafter, the matter was placed before the learned Special
Judge on 17.09.2025, and on the same day, cognizance of
the alleged offence was taken, as reflected in the order sheet
dated 17.09.2025.
4. Subsequently, on 06.11.2025, the learned Special Judge
proceeded to take a decision to frame charges against the
petitioner. The order sheet dated 06.11.2025 records that
after hearing arguments on charge and perusal of the record,
a prima facie case under Section 7 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act and Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 was found to be made out, and charges were
accordingly framed, read over and explained to the accused,
who pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Directions were
further issued for summoning prosecution witnesses and for
leading prosecution evidence.
5. That the present S.B. Criminal Revision Petition is confined to
assailing the order dated 06.11.2025, whereby the decision to
frame charges and the consequent framing of charges against
the petitioner were undertaken, despite non-compliance with
the mandatory statutory safeguards contained in Sections
230, 249, 250(1), 250(2) and 252(1) of the BNSS, thereby
resulting in grave prejudice to the petitioner and causing
violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
6. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone
through the materials available on record.
OBSERVATIONS
A. Scope of Judicial Scrutiny at the Stage of Framing of
Charge
7. At the outset, it is necessary to recapitulate the well-settled
contours governing judicial scrutiny at the stage of framing of
charge. The Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Sections 250 (Discharge) and 251 (Framing of charge) of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), is neither
expected to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence
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nor to weigh the probative value of the material as would be
done after a full-fledged trial. Equally, the Court is not to act
as a mere conduit for endorsing the opinion of the
investigating agency.
8. The seminal judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr., AIR
1979 SC 366, authoritatively lays down that while framing
charge, the Judge has the undoubted power to sift and weigh
the material for the limited purpose of finding out whether a
prima facie case exists. The Court is duty-bound to apply its
judicial mind to the broad probabilities of the case, the total
effect of the material placed on record, and to ascertain
whether the accusation is not frivolous. The expression
“ground for presuming” does not imply proof beyond
reasonable doubt but nevertheless requires existence of
legally admissible material capable of supporting the essential
ingredients of the alleged offence.
9. At the same time, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanti
Bhadra Shah & Anr. v. State of West Bengal, (2000) 1
SCC 722, clarified that framing of charge does not require a
detailed or elaborate order akin to a judgment of acquittal or
discharge, the order must nonetheless reflect conscious
application of mind. The Court is not obliged to write lengthy
reasons while framing charges; however, it must demonstrate
that it has examined whether the basic ingredients of the
offence are disclosed from the material on record. Thus, the
law strikes a delicate balance: brevity is permissible,
mechanical endorsement is not.
B. Mandatory Nature of Procedural Safeguards under BNSS
10. The BNSS consciously preserves and strengthens procedural
safeguards at the pre-trial stage, recognising that deprivation
of liberty commences not merely upon conviction but from
the moment the criminal process is set in motion. Sections
230 (Supply to accused of copy of police report and other
documents), 249 (Opening case for prosecution), 250
(Discharge) and 251 (Framing of charge) of the BNSS are not
empty formalities; they are statutory manifestations of the
constitutional guarantee of a fair procedure under Articles 14
and 21 of the Constitution of India.
11.The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that where
a statute prescribes a particular procedure, it must be
followed in that manner or not at all. Procedural compliance is
not a matter of convenience but of jurisdiction.
C. Non-Compliance with Section 230 BNSS – Supply of
Documents
12.Section 230 of the BNSS mandates that in cases instituted on
a police report, the Court shall, without delay, and in no case
beyond fourteen days, furnish to the accused copies of all
documents forwarded with the police report under Section
193(6) BNSS.
13. From the record, it emerges that although the order sheet
dated 17.09.2025 records that copies of the charge-sheet
“along with CD” were supplied, there is prima facie substance
in the grievance that all documents forming part of the police
report were not furnished, and that the supply was effected
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through the investigating agency without judicial verification
or grant of reasonable time to the accused to ascertain
completeness.
14. More importantly, where the prosecution case substantially
rests upon electronic evidence, compliance with Section 230
BNSS assumes heightened significance. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in P. Gopalakrishnan @ Dileep v. State of Kerala,
(2020) 9 SCC 161, has categorically held that the original
memory card constitutes a document, and the accused is
entitled to receive its authenticated clone copy prepared in
accordance with law. Supply of an uncertified CD, not
prepared through hash-value authentication, does not fulfil
the statutory mandate.
15.The furnishing of incomplete or legally unrecognised copies
strikes at the very root of the accused’s right to effectively
invoke the remedy of discharge under Section 250 BNSS.
D. Failure to Conduct Prosecutorial Opening under Section
249 BNSS
16.Section 249 BNSS obligates the Public Prosecutor to “open
the case” by describing the charge and stating by what
evidence the prosecution proposes to establish guilt. The
phrase “shall open” is peremptory and admits of no
discretion.
17.The record of proceedings dated 06.11.2025 does not reflect
that any such prosecutorial opening was undertaken. Absence
of this statutory exercise deprives the Court of an informed
basis to assess whether the materials relied upon correspond
to the essential ingredients of the offence alleged. Framing of
charge without such prosecutorial articulation reduces the
judicial exercise to a formal endorsement of the charge-
sheet, which the law expressly prohibits.
E. Curtailment of the Right to Seek Discharge under Section
250 BNSS
18.For ready reference section 250 BNSS is reproduced herein
below-
Section 250 Discharge
(1) The accused may prefer an application for discharge
within a period of sixty days from the date of commitment of
the case under section 232.
(2) If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the
submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf,
the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the
accused and record his reasons for so doing.
19.Section 250(1) BNSS confers upon the accused a valuable
right to prefer an application for discharge within sixty days
from the date of commitment. In cases under the Prevention
of Corruption Act, where the Special Judge takes cognizance
directly, the date of cognizance effectively marks the
commencement of this statutory period.
20.Learned counsel for the accused-petitioner, namely Mr. C.S.
Kotwani, Ms. Preeti Sharma and Mr. Manoj Chaudhary,
vehemently urged that the defence was in the process of
preparing an application for discharge and had unequivocally
expressed its intention to avail the statutory remedy under
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Section 250 BNSS. It was submitted that despite such clear
inclination, the learned court proceeded to frame charges
without granting reasonable and adequate time to the
accused to exercise the liberty expressly conferred by law.
21. Although Section 250(1) BNSS provides a discretion to the
accused to prefer an application for discharge within sixty
days, the grant of such statutory period cannot be termed as
unreasonable or dilatory, as the same flows directly from the
legislative mandate. While it may be correct that in every
case the court is not denuded of power to consider the
question of discharge only upon the formal filing of an
application by the accused, yet where the accused manifests
a clear and bona fide intention to invoke the remedy of
discharge, the court is duty-bound to afford a meaningful
opportunity to do so. Denial of such opportunity, particularly
when the statute itself prescribes a specific time frame,
amounts to rendering the statutory right illusory and defeats
the very object of Section 250(2) BNSS, which obligates
judicial consideration of the sufficiency of grounds before
proceeding to frame charges.
22.In the present case, charges came to be framed on the 50th
day from the date of cognizance, thereby truncating the
statutory window available to the accused.
23.Further, Section 250(2) BNSS mandates the Court to consider
the record and hear the submissions of the accused even
where no formal discharge application is filed, and to record
reasons for declining discharge. The impugned order does not
reflect such consideration or reasoning.
F. Mechanical Framing of Charge and Absence of Meaningful
Judicial Application of Mind
24. The impugned order dated 06.11.2025, when examined on
the anvil of the statutory framework and the settled principles
governing framing of charge, discloses a manifest deficiency
in judicial reasoning and application of mind. The order sheet
merely records, in a highly cursory and omnibus manner, that
arguments on charge were heard, the record was perused,
and a prima facie case under Section 7 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018) and Section
61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita was found to be made
out. Beyond this ritualistic recital, the order is conspicuously
silent as to what material, what circumstances, or what
factual substratum weighed with the learned Trial Court in
forming such an opinion.
25. It is no doubt correct that at the stage of framing of charge,
the Court is not expected to write a detailed or elaborate
order as would be warranted at the stage of discharge or final
adjudication. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanti Bhadra
Shah & Anr. v. State of West Bengal (2000) 1 SCC 722
has clarified that framing of charge does not require a
reasoned order akin to a judgment. However, the said
principle cannot be misconstrued to legitimise a mechanical
or non-speaking exercise, devoid of even minimal articulation
of judicial satisfaction. Brevity is permissible; opacity is not.
26. The distinction between a brief order and a mechanical order
is well recognised in criminal jurisprudence. Even while
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framing charges, the Court must indicate, albeit succinctly,
that it has adverted to the material on record and that such
material, if taken at face value, discloses the existence of
the essential ingredients of the offence alleged for
which charges has to be framed. A mere reproduction of
statutory sections or a bare assertion that an offence is
“prima facie made out” does not fulfil this requirement.
27. This requirement assumes greater significance in prosecutions
under the Prevention of Corruption Act post the 2018
amendment. The legislative transformation of Section 7 has
introduced the element of “improper or dishonest
performance of public duty” as a sine qua non. Therefore,
even at the threshold stage, the Court is expected to advert,
howsoever briefly to the existence of material indicating
demand or acceptance of undue advantage in connection with
such improper or dishonest performance. In the absence of
even a skeletal reference to such material, the order betrays
a presumption rather than a judicial satisfaction.
28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Prafulla
Kumar Samal & Anr., AIR 1979 SC 366, has categorically
held that the Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution. The Court must consider the
broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence
and documents produced, and any basic infirmities apparent
on the face of the record. The impugned order, however,
reflects no such exercise and instead appears to have
proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the filing of a
charge-sheet ipso facto warrants framing of charge.
29. Further, the expression “arguments on charge heard”
recorded in the order sheet, without even a fleeting reference
to the nature of such arguments or the reasons for their
rejection, renders the exercise under Sections 250 and 251 of
the BNSS illusory. Such recording, unaccompanied by any
demonstrable consideration, amounts to an empty formality,
which has been consistently deprecated by constitutional
courts. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kranti Associates
Pvt. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan (2010) 9 SCC 496 has
held that “rubber-stamp reasons” or pretence of reasoning
cannot be equated with a valid judicial decision-making
process.
30. This Court, in H.G. Grover v. State of Rajasthan (S.B.
Criminal Revision Petition No. 1356/2022), has
reiterated that although meticulous appreciation of evidence
is not required at the stage of framing of charge, the Trial
Court must nonetheless satisfy itself that the material on
record discloses the essential ingredients of the offence and
must reflect such satisfaction in the order. The absence of
such reflection renders the order vulnerable to judicial
correction.
31. Thus, the impugned order dated 06.11.2025, viewed
holistically, suffers from procedural superficiality and lack of
discernible judicial reasoning. It does not demonstrate that
the learned Trial Court applied its independent judicial mind
to the statutory ingredients of the offences alleged, nor does
it indicate how the material on record satisfies the threshold
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of “ground for presuming” as contemplated under Section 251
BNSS. Such an order, though brief, crosses the impermissible
line into mechanical adjudication and therefore cannot be
sustained in law.
32.At this juncture, it is of crucial significance to underscore that
Section 250 BNSS expressly enables the accused to avail a
statutory period of sixty days to prefer an application for
discharge. The provision is not merely directory but confers a
substantive procedural right upon the accused to invoke
judicial scrutiny of the sufficiency of grounds before being
compelled to face a full-fledged trial. Once the defence,
through its counsel, categorically conveys its intention to
exercise such right, the Court is obligated to facilitate and
receive such application, rather than foreclose the statutory
remedy by prematurely proceeding to frame charges.
33.This Court is conscious of the fact that the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita is a relatively new procedural code, and
situations may arise where the accused expressly seeks to
avail the entire statutory window of sixty days for moving an
application for discharge. Such procedural contingencies are
inherent in the legislative scheme and may, in future, warrant
authoritative pronouncement by constitutional courts.
34.However, since the precise contours of such situations do not
presently fall for exhaustive adjudication, this Court refrains
from making any broader or final comment on the issue.
Nonetheless, so long as the statutory provision stands on the
statute book, adherence thereto is not optional but
mandatory. It is incumbent upon the Court, at the very least,
to examine whether the mandate of Section 250 BNSS has
been complied with in letter and spirit. The failure to do so,
particularly in the face of an expressed intent by the accused
to invoke the said provision, vitiates the procedural fairness
of the proceedings and strikes at the root of the statutory
safeguard envisaged by the legislature.
G. Nature of Present Observations and Consequential
Directions
35. It is clarified, with utmost circumspection, that the foregoing
discussion is purely academic and procedural in nature. This
Court has consciously refrained from expressing any opinion
on whether the material on record ultimately warrants
framing of charge against the petitioner or not. The merits of
the prosecution case are left completely open to be left upon
the learned trial court to adjudge whether charges are liable
to be framed or not.
36.In view of the cumulative procedural infirmities noticed
hereinabove, the impugned order dated 06.11.2025 cannot
be sustained. The matter deserves to be remanded to the
learned Special Judge for fresh consideration.
37. Accordingly, the instant revision petition is allowed in part
and the impugned order dated 06.11.2025 is set aside. The
matter is remitted with directions that:
â–ª the learned Trial Court shall afford adequate opportunity to
both parties;
â–ª the petitioner shall be granted ten days’ further time, if so
advised, to move an application for discharge;
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order strictly in accordance with law, keeping in view the
statutory scheme of the BNSS and the settled legal position.
38. The learned Trial Court shall remain entirely free and
uninfluenced by any observation made herein and shall
decide the matter independently on the basis of the material
available on record and the submissions advanced before it.
11. A careful comparison of the facts of the present case
with those considered in the aforesaid order reveals that
the present case is squarely covered by the principles laid
down therein.
12. In the present matter also, the impugned order dated
18.03.2025 reflects a mechanical exercise of jurisdiction.
The learned Trial Court has merely recorded that
arguments on charge were heard and, upon perusal of the
record, found sufficient grounds to frame charge under
Section 302 IPC, without even minimal indication as to
what material or circumstances weighed with it for forming
such opinion.
13. It is trite law that though a detailed appreciation of
evidence is not required at the stage of framing of charge,
the Court is nonetheless obliged to apply its judicial mind
to the material on record and satisfy itself that the
essential ingredients of the alleged offence are prima facie
disclosed. A cryptic and omnibus order, bereft of
discernible reasoning, falls foul of the settled principles
governing framing of charge.
14. In the present case, the impugned order does not
reflect consideration of the peculiar factual backdrop,
including the role attributed to the petitioner in the FIR,
her consistent version in the Parcha Bayan and statement
under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and the circumstances under
which the investigating agency reversed the role of the
parties while filing the charge-sheet. The order, therefore,
gives an impression of having been passed as a matter of
routine, rather than as a result of an informed judicial
exercise.
15. The infirmity noticed is not merely cosmetic but goes
to the root of the matter, as the framing of charge marks a
serious stage in criminal proceedings, carrying grave
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consequences for the liberty and reputation of an accused.
Such an order must withstand the minimal requirement of
judicial scrutiny.
16. This Court is conscious of the fact that it is not
required, at this stage, to enter into the merits of the
prosecution case or to weigh the probative value of the
evidence. Accordingly, this Court refrains from expressing
any opinion on whether a charge under Section 302 IPC is
ultimately made out or not. All such issues are left open to
be examined by the learned Trial Court.”
10. In Reema (supra), this Court deprecated the practice of
framing charges in a routine and mechanical manner and
observed that such an approach militates against procedural
fairness, especially when the framing of charge has serious
civil consequences affecting the liberty and reputation of the
accused.
11. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the
present case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
impugned order dated 14.11.2025 suffers from non-
application of judicial mind and is a cryptic, non-speaking
order, which cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.
Consequently, the instant revision petition is partly allowed.
The impugned order dated 14.11.2025 passed by the
learned District Judge, Pokaran, District Jaisalmer, in
Sessions Case No. 34/2025 (State v. Ishaq & Ors.) is hereby
set aside.
12. The matter is remanded back to the learned trial Court
for fresh consideration of the question of framing of charge.
The learned trial Court shall afford due opportunity of
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[2026:RJ-JD:9159] (14 of 14) [CRLR-258/2026]
hearing to both the prosecution and the accused and
thereafter pass a reasoned and appropriate order strictly in
accordance with law, keeping in view the material available
on record and the statutory ingredients of the offences
alleged.
13. It is clarified that the learned trial Court shall decide
the matter independently and uninfluenced by any
observation made herein. Nothing stated in the present
order shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the
merits of the case.
14. The stay petition, if any, also stands disposed of.
(FARJAND ALI),J
8-Samvedana/-
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