Chattisgarh High Court
A. K. Banjare vs Union Of India on 16 April, 2026
1
NAFR
VISHAKHA
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
BEOHAR
Digitally signed WPS No. 1803 of 2023
by VISHAKHA
BEOHAR
Order Reserved on 17.03.2026
Order Delivered on 16.04.2026
1 - A. K. Banjare S/o Shri Lakeshwar Banjare Aged About 47
Years R/o Ward No. 45, Hemu Nagar, Police Station Torva
Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Union Of India Through Secretary, Ministry Of Railway
Department, New Delhi, District : New Delhi, Delhi
2 - Director General Railway Police Force, Headquarter,
Chankyapuri, New Delhi Pin-110003, District : New Delhi, Delhi
3 - Inspector General Cum C S C/ R P F S E C Railway Bilaspur,
District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
4 - Deputy Inspector General Cum C S C /r P F, S E C Railway
Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
5 - Senior Divisional Security Commissioner Railway Police
Force, S E C Railway Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
2
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from the Case Information System)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Petitioner :- Mrs. Renu Kochar, Advocate
For Respondents:- Mr. Ramakant Mishra, DSG
————————————————————————————–
SB- Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
CAV Order
1. By way of this petition, the Petitioner invokes the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court seeking issuance
of an appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the illegal,
arbitrary and unjust action of the Respondent Authorities,
whereby the Petitioner has been subjected to double punishment
for the same alleged misconduct in violation of Article 20(2) of
the Constitution of India, and consequently prays for
reinstatement in service with immediate effect along with all
consequential benefits.
2. That, the brief chronology of relevant facts and events
leading to the filing of the present petition are that on
03.12.2012, a charge sheet was issued against the petitioner
and a departmental enquiry was initiated against him. Thereafter,
the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of
punishment came to be rejected on 14.08.2014. Subsequently,
upon completion of the imposed punishment, the petitioner was
3
restored to his substantive rank of Head Constable on
27.07.2016. However, in a separate criminal proceeding, the
petitioner was convicted on 28.12.2021. Consequent thereto, an
order of dismissal from service was passed against the petitioner
on 14.01.2022. Being aggrieved by the said order of dismissal,
the petitioner preferred an appeal, which came to be rejected on
25.04.2022. Thereafter, the revision preferred by the petitioner
was also dismissed on 27.07.2022.
3. The petitioner in the present writ petition has prayed for
following reliefs:-
“10.1 That the Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to issue writ in the nature of certiorari
and quash order dated 14.01.2022 (Annexure
P/1), 25.04.2022 (Annexure P/2) and
27.07.2022 (Annexure P/3).
10.2 That the Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to issue writ in the nature of
mandamus directing respondent authorities
petitioner with all to reinstate the
consequential benefits with interest.
10.3 That the Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to issue writ in the nature of
mandamus directing respondent authorities to
pay full salary from the date of dismissal till
re-instatement in the interest of justice.
4
10.4 That this Hon’ble court may be further
pleased to pass any other consequential and
other orders/ writs which this Hon’ble court
deems just and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case.”
4. Facts of the case are that the Petitioner was appointed as
Constable in RPF in the year 1999 and was subsequently
promoted to the post of Head Constable. While posted at RPF
Post/Bilaspur, a complaint was lodged on 29.09.2012 at Police
Station Anuppur by one Aradhna Singh alleging demand of
money for providing employment, pursuant to which Crime No.
238/2012 under Sections 420 and 34 IPC was registered against
the Petitioner and others. On account of said involvement, a
departmental enquiry under Rule 153 of the RPF Rules, 1987
was initiated and charge-sheet dated 03.12.2012 was issued.
Upon conclusion of enquiry, the charges were held proved and
the Petitioner was punished by reduction in rank from Head
Constable to Constable for a period of two years along with
reduction of pay by two stages with cumulative effect vide order
dated 17.05.2014, which was affirmed in appeal on 14.08.2014.
The Petitioner duly underwent the said punishment and was
reinstated to the post of Head Constable on completion of
penalty period vide order dated 27.07.2016. Subsequently, in the
criminal case, the learned Sessions Court, Anuppur, by judgment
5
dated 28.12.2021, convicted the Petitioner and sentenced him to
rigorous imprisonment for three years along with fine, against
which the Petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No. 458/2022
before the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh, wherein the
sentence has been suspended till final disposal of the appeal.
Thereafter, solely on the basis of said conviction, the
Respondent Authorities, by invoking provisions of the RPF
Rules, 1987, dismissed the Petitioner from service vide order
dated 14.01.2022. The appeal preferred by the Petitioner against
dismissal was rejected on 25.04.2022 on the ground that the
departmental and criminal proceedings were distinct, and the
revision preferred thereafter was also dismissed on 27.07.2022,
thereby subjecting the Petitioner to double punishment for the
same alleged misconduct, which is illegal and unsustainable in
law.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order
of dismissal is wholly illegal, arbitrary and unsustainable in the
eyes of law. The learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Anuppur,
in Criminal Case No. 233/2012, has awarded sentence of three
years’ rigorous imprisonment along with fine of Rs. 12,000/-.
However, the learned trial Court itself suspended the sentence
for a limited period, and thereafter, the Hon’ble High Court of
Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, in Criminal Appeal No. 458 of
6
2022, was pleased to extend the suspension of sentence vide
order dated 28.01.2022 and further orders, thereby rendering the
conviction non-operative for all practical purposes till disposal of
the appeal. Hence, the very foundation of the dismissal order
stands vitiated. It is further submitted that for the same alleged
incident dated 29.09.2012, the Petitioner was already subjected
to a full-fledged departmental enquiry under the RPF Rules,
1987, wherein, after due process, punishment was imposed vide
order dated 17.05.2014 by reducing the Petitioner in rank and
pay. The said punishment attained finality after dismissal of
appeal and was duly undergone by the Petitioner, who was
subsequently restored to his original post on completion of the
penalty period. Thus, the Respondents, having once exercised
their disciplinary jurisdiction and imposed punishment for the
same set of allegations, were precluded from initiating a second
round of punishment on the same cause of action. It is submitted
that the subsequent dismissal of the Petitioner from service
solely on the basis of conviction in the very same matter
amounts to double punishment, which is expressly barred under
Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India, as well as the settled
principles of service jurisprudence. The protection against double
jeopardy is further reinforced under the provisions of the RPF
Act, 1957, which clearly stipulate that no person shall be
7
punished twice for the same offence. It is also submitted that the
disciplinary authority, having earlier acted as appellate authority
in the same matter vide order dated 14.08.2014, could not have
again exercised jurisdiction to impose a fresh and harsher
penalty, which is impermissible under the RPF Act, 1957 and the
RPF Rules, 1987. The impugned action is thus vitiated by lack of
jurisdiction as well as violation of statutory provisions. Further,
the impugned dismissal order has been passed without adhering
to the mandatory procedural safeguards and without affording
proper opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner. The reliance
placed on Rules 161 and 162 of the RPF Rules, 1987 to
dispense with enquiry is wholly misplaced, especially when a
detailed enquiry had already been conducted earlier on the same
allegations and punishment had been imposed. It is further
submitted that once departmental proceedings were initiated and
concluded despite pendency of criminal proceedings, and
punishment was imposed, the Respondents cannot now take
advantage of the subsequent conviction to impose an additional
penalty. Such action is contrary to fairness, equity and settled
legal principles. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances,
it is submitted that the impugned order of dismissal dated
14.01.2022, as well as the orders passed in appeal and revision,
are liable to be quashed, and the Petitioner is entitled to
8
reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the
present writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be
dismissed, as the petitioner has not suffered any violation of
legal or fundamental rights. It is submitted that the petitioner was
subjected to departmental proceedings in the year 2012 for
misconduct relating to damaging the reputation of the Force
under the RPF Rules, 1987, for which a penalty was imposed
after due enquiry and procedure. It is further submitted that the
subsequent dismissal of the petitioner from service vide order
dated 14.01.2022 is based on his conviction by a competent
criminal Court in Criminal Case No. 238/2012, and the said
action has been taken strictly in accordance with Rule 161(1)
read with Rule 162(2) of the RPF Rules, 1987. It is contended
that the departmental punishment and the dismissal on account
of conviction are distinct and operate in different fields, and
therefore do not amount to double punishment. It is further
submitted that the appeal and revision preferred by the petitioner
have been duly considered and rejected by the competent
authorities by passing reasoned orders. Hence, the impugned
action being legal, justified and in consonance with the
applicable rules governing an armed force of the Union, does not
warrant interference by this Hon’ble Court.
9
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.
8. It is not in dispute that pursuant to the departmental enquiry
initiated against the petitioner, a regular enquiry was conducted
in accordance with the prescribed procedure, wherein full
opportunity of defence was extended to the petitioner. Upon
conclusion of the enquiry, the disciplinary authority, after
recording findings on the charges proved against the petitioner,
imposed the punishment of dismissal from service vide order
dated 14.01.2022, which thereafter came to be affirmed by the
appellate authority vide order dated 25.04.2022.
9. The principal submission advanced on behalf of the
petitioner is that since he has already been convicted in the
criminal case arising out of the same incident, the imposition of
departmental punishment amounts to double jeopardy and is hit
by Section 17 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957, which
provides that no person shall be punished twice for the same
offence.
10. For the sake of convenience, Section Section 17 of the
Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 is quoted hereinbelow:-
“[17. Penalties for neglect of duty, etc. –(1)
Without prejudice to the provisions contained
10in section 9, every enrolled member of the
Force who shall be guilty of any violation of
duty or wilful breach or neglect of any rule or
lawful order made by a superior officer, or
who shall withdraw from duties of his office
without permission, or who, being absent on
leave, fails, without reasonable cause, to
report himself for duty on the expiration of the
leave, or who engages himself without
authority for any employment other than his
duty as an enrolled member of the Force, or
who shall be guilty of cowardice may be
taken into Force custody and shall, on
conviction, be punished with imprisonment
which may extend to one year.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1973), an offence punishable under this
section shall be cognizable and non-bailable.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1973), the Central Government may invest
Assistant Inspector-General, Senior
Commandant or Commandant with the
powers of a Magistrate of any class for the
purpose of inquiring into or trying any offence
committed by an enrolled member of the
Force and punishable under this Act, or any
offence committed by an enrolled member of
the Force against the person or property of
11another member of the Force:
Provided that–
(i) when the offender is on leave or absent
from duty; or
(ii) when the offence is not connected with the
offender’s duties as an enrolled member of
the Force; or
(iii) when it is a petty offence even if
connected with the offender’s duties as an
enrolled member of the Force; or
(iv) when, for reasons to be recorded in
writing, it is not practicable for the
Commandant invested with the powers of a
Magistrate to inquire into or try the offence,the offence may, if the prescribed authority
within the limits of whose jurisdiction the
offence has been committed so requires, be
inquired into or tried by an ordinary criminal
court having jurisdiction in the matter.
(4) Nothing contained in this section shall be
construed to prevent any enrolled member of
the Force from being prosecuted under any
other law for any offence made punishable by
that law, or for being liable under any such
law to any other or higher penalty or
punishment than is provided for such offence
by this section:
12
Provided that no person shall be punished
twice for the same offence.]”
11. The aforesaid submission deserves rejection at the
threshold, as the legal position on the issue is no longer res
integra. It is a settled proposition of law that criminal proceedings
and departmental proceedings operate in entirely distinct fields,
are governed by different standards of proof, and serve different
purposes. Criminal prosecution is initiated for an offence against
society and requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, whereas
departmental proceedings are intended to maintain service
discipline and are decided on the principle of preponderance of
probabilities.
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in State of Rajasthan
v. B.K. Meena 1996 (6) SCC 417 held that there is no legal bar
for simultaneous continuation of criminal proceedings and
departmental enquiry, as both are independent and distinct. It
was observed that even where facts overlap, the object of both
proceedings remains fundamentally different. Relevant para is
quoted hereinbelow:-
“14. It would be evident from the above
decisions that each of them starts with the
indisputable proposition that there is no legal
bar for both proceedings to go on
simultaneously and then say that in certain
13situations, it may not be ‘desirable’, ‘advisable’
or ‘appropriate’ to proceed with the disciplinary
enquiry when a criminal case is pending on
identical charges. The staying of disciplinary
proceedings, it is emphasised, is a matter to be
determined having regard to the facts and
circumstances of a given case and that no hard
and fast rules can be enunciated in that behalf.
The only ground suggested in the above
decisions as constituting a valid ground for
staying the disciplinary proceedings is that “the
defence of the employee in the criminal case
may not be prejudiced”. This ground has,
however, been hedged in by providing further
that this may be done in cases of grave nature
involving questions of fact and law. In our
respectful opinion, it means that not only the
charges must be grave but that the case must
involve complicated questions of law and fact.
Moreover, ‘advisability’, ‘desirability’ or
‘propriety’, as the case may be, has to be
determined in each case taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances of
the case. The ground indicated in D.C.M.
[(1960) 3 SCR 227 : AIR 1960 SC 806 : (1960)
1 LLJ 520] and Tata Oil Mills [(1964) 7 SCR 555
: AIR 1965 SC 155 : (1964) 2 LLJ 113] is also
not an invariable rule. It is only a factor which
will go into the scales while judging the
advisability or desirability of staying the
disciplinary proceedings. One of the contending
14considerations is that the disciplinary enquiry
cannot be — and should not be — delayed
unduly. So far as criminal cases are concerned,
it is well known that they drag on endlessly
where high officials or persons holding high
public offices are involved. They get bogged
down on one or the other ground. They hardly
ever reach a prompt conclusion. That is the
reality in spite of repeated advice and
admonitions from this Court and the High
Courts. If a criminal case is unduly delayed that
may itself be a good ground for going ahead
with the disciplinary enquiry even where the
disciplinary proceedings are held over at an
earlier stage. The interests of administration
and good government demand that these
proceedings are concluded expeditiously. It
must be remembered that interests of
administration demand that undesirable
elements are thrown out and any charge of
misdemeanour is enquired into promptly. The
disciplinary proceedings are meant not really to
punish the guilty but to keep the administrative
machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad
elements. The interest of the delinquent officer
also lies in a prompt conclusion of the
disciplinary proceedings. If he is not guilty of
the charges, his honour should be vindicated at
the earliest possible moment and if he is guilty,
he should be dealt with promptly according to
law. It is not also in the interest of
15administration that persons accused of serious
misdemeanour should be continued in office
indefinitely, i.e., for long periods awaiting the
result of criminal proceedings. It is not in the
interest of administration. It only serves the
interest of the guilty and dishonest. While it is
not possible to enumerate the various factors,
for and against the stay of disciplinary
proceedings, we found it necessary to
emphasise some of the important
considerations in view of the fact that very often
the disciplinary proceedings are being stayed
for long periods pending criminal proceedings.
Stay of disciplinary proceedings cannot be, and
should not be, a matter of course. All the
relevant factors, for and against, should be
weighed and a decision taken keeping in view
the various principles laid down in the decisions
referred to above.”
13. Similarly, in Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport
Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya (1997 ) 2 SCC 699, the
Supreme Court categorically held that acquittal or conviction in a
criminal case does not automatically govern the outcome of
departmental proceedings because the standard of evidence in
service jurisprudence is materially different from that required in
criminal law. Relevant para is quoted hereinbelow:-
“8. We are in respectful agreement with the
above view. The purpose of departmental
16enquiry and of prosecution are two different
and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution
is launched for an offence for violation of a
duty, the offender owes to the society or for
breach of which law has provided that the
offender shall make satisfaction to the public.
So crime is an act of commission in violation
of law or of omission of public duty. The
departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline
in the service and efficiency of public service.
It would, therefore, be expedient that the
disciplinary proceedings are conducted and
completed as expeditiously as possible. It is
not, therefore, desirable to lay down any
guidelines as inflexible rules in which the
departmental proceedings may or may not be
stayed pending trial in criminal case against
the delinquent officer. Each case requires to
be considered in the backdrop of its own facts
and circumstances. There would be no bar to
proceed simultaneously with departmental
enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the
charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature
involving complicated questions of fact and
law. Offence generally implies infringement of
public (sic duty), as distinguished from mere
private rights punishable under criminal law.
When trial for criminal offence is conducted it
should be in accordance with proof of the
offence as per the evidence defined under the
provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is
17the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry
in a departmental proceedings relates to
conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent
officer to punish him for his misconduct
defined under the relevant statutory rules or
law. That the strict standard of proof or
applicability of the Evidence Act stands
excluded is a settled legal position. The
enquiry in the departmental proceedings
relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer
and proof in that behalf is not as high as in an
offence in criminal charge. It is seen that
invariably the departmental enquiry has to be
conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate
efficiency in public administration and the
criminal trial will take its own course. The
nature of evidence in criminal trial is entirely
different from the departmental proceedings.
In the former, prosecution is to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt on the touchstone
of human conduct. The standard of proof in
the departmental proceedings is not the same
as of the criminal trial. The evidence also is
different from the standard point of the
Evidence Act. The evidence required in the
departmental enquiry is not regulated by the
Evidence Act. Under these circumstances,
what is required to be seen is whether the
departmental enquiry would seriously
prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the
trial in a criminal case. It is always a question
18of fact to be considered in each case
depending on its own facts and
circumstances. In this case, we have seen
that the charge is failure to anticipate the
accident and prevention thereof. It has nothing
to do with the culpability of the offence under
Sections 304-A and 338, IPC. Under these
circumstances, the High Court was not right in
staying the proceedings.”
14. In the present case, the record reflects that the charges
framed against the petitioner in the departmental enquiry were
independently examined on the basis of oral and documentary
evidence, and the disciplinary authority arrived at a finding that
the misconduct stood proved. Therefore, merely because the
petitioner has faced criminal prosecution would not render the
departmental punishment illegal.
15. The argument regarding double punishment under Section
17 of the RPF Act is misconceived for the reason that the
punishment imposed in criminal proceedings and disciplinary
punishment imposed by the employer do not constitute
punishment for the same offence in the same legal sense.
Criminal conviction results in penal consequences under criminal
law, whereas departmental punishment is a service
consequence arising from misconduct affecting institutional
discipline.
19
16. In Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur (1972) 2 SCR 218 ,
the Supreme Court held that disciplinary action is not barred
merely because criminal proceedings have also arisen from the
same facts, since misconduct under service law and offence
under penal law are conceptually distinct. Relevant para is
quoted hereinbelow:-
“15. A finding cannot be characterised as
perverse or unsupported by any relevant
materials if it is a reasonable inference from
proved facts. Now what are the proved facts:
Nand Kumar as representative of Ram Sarup
Mam Chand and Mam Chand and Company of
Calcutta filed five applications for licences to
set-up steel re-rolling mills on 14th June, 1956.
On 25th June, 1956, a cheque drawn in favour
of P.S. Sundaram was given to the respondent
by Nand Kumar for Rs 2500; the cheque was
endorsed and the amount credited in the
account of the respondent. When the
respondent borrowed the amount in question
from Nand Kumar, he was not working in the
Industries Act Section. Nand Kumar knew that
the respondent was working in the Steel &
Cement Section of the Ministry and the
applications for the grant of licences for setting
up the steel plant re-rolling mills would go to
that section. Even if the applications were to be
20dealt with at the initial stage by the Industries
Act Section the respondent at least was
expected to know that in due course the
section in which he was working had to deal
with the same. This is borne out by the fact
that in July 1956 copies of the applications
were actually sent to the Steel & Cement
Section where the respondent was working. If
he, therefore, borrowed money from Nand
Kumar a few days earlier it seems rather clear
that he placed himself under pecuniary
obligation to a person who was likely to have
official dealings with him. The words “likely to
have official dealings” take within their ambit
the possibility of future dealings between the
officer concerned and the person from whom
he borrowed money. A disciplinary proceeding
is not a criminal trial. The standard proof
required is that of preponderance of probability
and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely
to have official dealings with the respondent
was one which a reasonable person would
draw from the proved facts of the case, the
High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over
a decision based on it. Where there are some
relevant materials which the authority has
accepted and which materials may reasonably
support the conclusion that the officer is guilty,
it is not the function of the High Court
exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to
21review the materials and to arrive at an
independent finding on the materials. If the
enquiry has been properly held the question of
adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot
be canvaased before the High Court (see State
of Andhra Pradesh v.S. Sree Rama Rao) [AIR
1963 SC 1723 : (1964) 3 SCR 25 at 33 :
(1964) 2 LLJ 150] . No doubt there was no
separate finding on the question whether Nand
Kumar was a person likely to have official
dealings with the respondent by the Inquiring
Officer or the President. But we think that such
a finding was implied when they said that
Charge No. 3 has been proved. The only
question was whether the proved facts of the
case would warrant such an inference. Tested
in the light of the standard of proof necessary
to enter a finding of this nature, we are
satisfied that on the material facts proved the
inference and the implied finding that Nand
Kumar was a person likely to have official
dealings with the respondent were
reasonable.”
17. The further submission that since sentence awarded in the
criminal appeal has been suspended, departmental punishment
should also await final adjudication, also cannot be accepted.
Suspension of sentence only postpones execution of sentence
and does not obliterate either the conviction or the misconduct
already established in departmental proceedings.
22
18. In Deputy Director of Collegiate Education v. S. Nagoor
Meera 1995 SCC (3) 377, the Supreme Court held that once
conviction is recorded, disciplinary authority is competent to
proceed in accordance with service rules, and mere suspension
of sentence does not wipe out the conviction unless the
conviction itself is stayed.
19. In the present case, even otherwise, the punishment
imposed is not solely founded upon criminal conviction but upon
independent findings recorded in departmental enquiry.
Therefore, pendency of criminal appeal or suspension of
sentence has no bearing upon validity of disciplinary
punishment.
20. It is also relevant to note that departmental punishment
imposed upon the petitioner cannot be construed as second
punishment for the same offence because the disciplinary
authority has acted within the service jurisprudence framework to
preserve discipline in the force. The doctrine of double jeopardy
embodied in Article 20(2) of the Constitution applies only where
prosecution and punishment are both under criminal law, and not
where one consequence is disciplinary in nature.
21. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya AIR 2011 SC 1931, the Supreme Court reiterated that
23
findings in departmental enquiry remain valid notwithstanding
criminal proceedings, unless departmental findings are shown to
be perverse or unsupported by evidence.
22. The plea of double punishment raised by the petitioner is
liable to be rejected in view of the settled principle that
departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings operate in
distinct spheres. The Supreme Court of India in T. Manjunath v.
State of Karnataka, 2025 INSC 1356, reiterated that even when
both proceedings arise out of the same incident, disciplinary
action is founded on service misconduct whereas criminal
prosecution concerns an offence against society, both being
governed by different standards of proof; consequently, service
consequences following conviction cannot be treated as double
jeopardy. The relevant para of the said judgment is as under:-
“32. The possibility of the criminal case still
resulting into conviction, irrespective of the
factum of the witnesses turning hostile being a
realistic possibility, we feel that there is no
merit behind the argument of Shri Kamat that
exoneration in the departmental proceeding
should lead to automatic discharge in the
criminal case. Hence, the said argument
advanced on behalf of the accused-appellant,
placing reliance on Ashoo Surendranath
Tewari (supra), has no merit and is rejected.”
24
23. In the case at hand, no perversity, procedural illegality, or
violation of natural justice has been demonstrated in the conduct
of departmental enquiry. The disciplinary authority as well as
appellate authority have passed reasoned orders after due
consideration of the material available on record.
24. Accordingly, considering the aforesaid settled legal
position, this Court is of the opinion that no interference is
warranted in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The departmental
punishment imposed upon the petitioner does not suffer from
any legal infirmity.
25. Consequently, the petition being devoid of merit deserves
to be and is accordingly dismissed.
26. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Vishakha