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Home______________________________________ vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 19 March, 2026

______________________________________ vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 19 March, 2026

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Himachal Pradesh High Court

______________________________________ vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 19 March, 2026

      IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

                                              Cr. MP(M) No. 287 of 2026.
                                              Reserved on: 12.03.2026
                                              Date of Decision: 19.03.2026.
    ______________________________________
    Revat Ram                                                                    ...Petitioner
                                           Versus

    State of Himachal Pradesh                                                    ...Respondent


    Coram
    Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
    Whether approved for reporting?1 No.

    For the Petitioner                :         Ms Ruchika Khachi, Advocate, vice
                                                Mr Sandeep Datta, Advocate.
    For the Respondent                :         Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Addl. A.G.


    Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for

seeking regular bail in FIR No. 204 of 2025, dated 22.09.2025,

SPONSORED

registered for the commission of offences punishable under

Sections 20, 25, and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), at Police Station Sundernagar,

District Mandi, H.P.

1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2

2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the

police had set up a nakka at Pungh Fourlane on 22.09.2025. They

stopped a car bearing registration No. UP-16AX-2143, in which

five people were travelling. The police searched the vehicle and

recovered a backpack containing 1.74 kilograms of charas. The

police arrested the occupants of the vehicles and seized the

charas. The petitioner was not apprehended from the spot, and

no contraband was recovered from his possession. He was named

by the co-accused during the interrogation, who claimed that he

had transferred ₹ 50,000/- to the petitioner’s account for

purchasing charas. The police arrested the petitioner on

04.11.2025. The disclosure statement made by the co-accused to

the police is inadmissible in evidence. There is no other evidence

against the petitioner. The investigation is complete, and the

petitioner’s custody is not required. No fruitful purpose would be

served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner

would abide by all the terms and conditions that the Court may

impose. Hence, the petition.

3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report

asserting that the police party had set up a nakka at Pungh four-

lane and were checking the vehicles on 22.09.2025. They
3

intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. UP16AX-2143. The

driver and occupants of the vehicle got frightened after seeing the

police. The police associated Kuldeep Kumar and Mukesh Kumar

as independent witnesses. The police inquired about the names

of the occupants of the vehicle. The driver identified himself as

Devayas Patel. The person sitting beside him identified himself as

Nakul Mittal, and the persons sitting in the rear seat identified

themselves as Arnav Chauhan, Saksham Bharti and Rohit Kumar.

The police searched the vehicle and recovered a carry bag

containing 1.74 kilograms of charas. The police seized the charas

and arrested the occupants of the vehicle. The charas was sent to

SFSL, Junga, and as per the report of analysis, it was confirmed to

be a sample of charas. The occupants revealed during

interrogation that they had handed over ₹5000/- each to Kashin

Kashyap, who had also accompanied the accused on his

motorcycle. They identified the room where they had stayed in

Kullu. The bank details showed that an amount of ₹50,000/- was

transferred from the account of Kashin’s mother to the

petitioner’s bank account. The petitioner’s bank account details

showed a receipt of ₹50,000/-. The police arrested the petitioner,

who confirmed the sale of charas. The charas was meant for the
4

sale to students. The investigation is complete, and the charge

sheet has been filed. Hence, the status report.

4. I have heard Ms Ruchika Khachi, Advocate, learned

vice counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria,

learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

5. Ms Ruchika Khachi, Advocate, learned vice counsel for

the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he

was falsely implicated based on the statement made by the co-

accused, which is inadmissible in evidence. The investigation is

complete, and the charge sheet has been filed. No fruitful purpose

would be served by keeping the petitioner in custody. Hence, she

prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be

released on bail.

6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate

General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner

had sold the charas to the co-accused. The charas was meant for

sale to students. Charas is adversely affecting society, and no

leniency should be shown to the petitioner. Hence, he prayed that

the present petition be dismissed.

5

7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.

8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC

314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:

(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail

56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under
trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.

8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.

[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”

(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern
Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
6

thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)

57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of
the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court
dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself)
as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused
and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie
evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)

58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
7

judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always
be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant
of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic
considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is
the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail,
though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the
matter.” (emphasis supplied)

59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.

60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order granting
bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought
to have guided the Court’s decision to grant bail have also
been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
8

circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx

62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :

(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857)
of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as
follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima
facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
9

grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by
reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the
vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration
must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the
criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature
of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the
offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis
supplied)

9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.

Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC

261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the

gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests

otherwise. It was observed at page 308:

2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail,
except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing
from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating
other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or
intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who
seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not
intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.

3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.

So also, the heinousness of the crime….”

10. The present petition has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

11. Perusal of the status report shows that the petitioner

was not found in the vehicle from which the recovery was made.

The police connected the petitioner to the commission of the
10

crime on the basis of a statement made by the co-accused, a

confession made by him and the financial transaction between

him and Kashin Kashyap. It was laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of

Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 361: 2019 SCC OnLine

SC 588 that a statement made by co-accused during the

investigation is hit by Section 162 of Cr.P.C. and cannot be used as

a piece of evidence. It was also held that the confession made by

an accused is inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian

Evidence Act. It was observed at page 568: –

44. Such a person, viz., the person who is named in the FIR,
and therefore, the accused in the eye of the law, can indeed
be questioned, and the statement is taken by the police
officer. A confession that is made to a police officer would
be inadmissible, having regard to Section 25 of the
Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated under Section
24
of the Evidence Act, would also be inadmissible. A
confession, unless it fulfils the test laid down in Pakala
Narayana Swami [Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor
,
1939 SCC OnLine PC 1 : (1938-39) 66 IA 66: AIR 1939 PC 47]
and as accepted by this Court, may still be used as an
admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This,
however, is subject to the bar of admissibility of a
statement under Section 161 CrPC. Therefore, even if a
statement contains an admission, the statement being one
under Section 161, it would immediately attract the bar
under Section 162 CrPC.”

11

12. Similarly, it was held in Surinder Kumar Khanna vs

Intelligence Officer Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 2018 (8) SCC

271 that a confession made by an accused cannot be taken as a

substantive piece of evidence against another co-accused and can

only be utilised to lend assurance to the other evidence. The

Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently held in Tofan Singh Versus

State of Tamil Nadu 2021 (4) SCC 1 that a confession made to a

police officer during the investigation is hit by Section 25 of the

Indian Evidence Act and is not saved by the provisions of Section

67 of the NDPS Act. Therefore, no advantage can be derived by the

prosecution from the confessional statement made by the

petitioner or the co-accused implicating the petitioner.

13 A similar situation arose before this Court in Dinesh

Kumar @ Billa Versus State of H.P. 2020 Cri. L.J. 4564, and it was

held that a confession of the co-accused and the phone calls are

not sufficient to deny bail to a person.

14. It was laid down by this Court in Saina Devi vs State of

Himachal Pradesh 2022 Law Suit (HP) 211 that where the police

have no material except the call details record and the disclosure
12

statement of the co-accused, the petitioner cannot be kept in

custody. It was observed: –

“[16] In the facts of the instant case, the prosecution, for
implicating the petitioner, relies upon firstly the
confessional statement made by accused Dabe Ram and
secondly the CDR details of calls exchanged between the
petitioner and the wife of co-accused Dabe Ram. Taking
into consideration the evidence with respect to the
availability of CDR details involving the phone number of
the petitioner and the mobile phone number of the wife of
co-accused Dabe Ram, this Court had considered the
existence of a prima facie case against the petitioner and
had rejected the bail application as not satisfying the
conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

[17] Since the existence of CDR details of accused person(s)
has not been considered as a circumstance sufficient to
hold a prima facie case against the accused person(s), in
Pallulabid Ahmad’s case (supra), this Court is of the view
that petitioner has made out a case for maintainability of
his successive bail application as also for grant of bail in his
favour.

[18] Except for the existence of CDRs and the disclosure
statement of the co-accused, no other material appears to
have been collected against the petitioner. The disclosure
made by the co-accused cannot be read against the
petitioner as per the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Tofan Singh Vs State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 4 SCC 1.
Further, on the basis of the aforesaid elucidation, the
petitioner is also entitled to the benefit of bail.

15. A similar view was taken by this Court in Dabe Ram vs.

State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 1894 of 2023, decided on 01.09.2023,

Parvesh Saini vs State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 2355 of 2023, decided on
13

06.10.2023 and Relu Ram vs. State of H.P. Cr.MP(M) No. 1061 of

2023, decided on 15.05.2023,

16. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be detained in

custody based on a statement made by the co-accused or the

confession made by him, as they are not legally admissible.

17. The police have relied upon the financial transaction

between Kashin Kashyap and the petitioner; this is not sufficient.

It was laid down by the Kerala High Court in Amal E vs State of

Kerala 2023:KER:39393 that financial transactions are not

sufficient to connect the accused with the commission of crime. It

was observed:

“From the perusal of the case records, it can be seen that,
apart from the aforesaid transactions, there is nothing to
show the involvement of the petitione₹ It is true that the
documents indicate the monetary transactions between
the petitioners and some of the accused persons, but the
question that arises is whether the said transactions were
in connection with the sale of Narcotic drugs. To establish
the same, apart from the confession statements of the
accused, there is nothing. However, as it is an aspect to be
established during the trial, I do not intend to enter into
any finding at this stage, but the said aspect is sufficient to
record the satisfaction of the conditions contemplated
under section 37 of the NDPS Act, as the lack of such
materials evokes a reasonable doubt as to the involvement
of the petitioner.”

14

18. The investigation is complete, and no fruitful purpose

would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody.

19. In view of the above, there is insufficient material on

record to connect the petitioner with the commission of crime.

Hence, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is

ordered to be released on bail, subject to his furnishing bail bonds

in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount to

the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the

petitioner will abide by the following conditions: –

(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will
he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever.
(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every
hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments.
(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a
continuous period of seven days without furnishing the
address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the
Police Station concerned and the Trial Court.
(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the
Court; and
(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social
media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide
by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court
through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of
any change in the mobile number or social media
accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court
within five days from the date of the change.

15

20. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of

any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file

a petition for cancellation of the bail.

21. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of

this order be sent to the District Jail Superintendent, Mandi, District

Mandi, H.P. and the learned Trial Court through FASTER.

22. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the

disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on

the case’s merits.


                                           (Rakesh Kainthla)
                                                Judge
19 March, 2026
      (jai)
                                                  Digitally signed
                                                  by JAI
                           JAI                    PRAKASH
                           PRAKASH                Date:
                                                  2026.03.19
                                                  10:38:07 +0530
 



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