Patna High Court
Sunita Devi vs The State Of Bihar And Ors on 20 July, 2026
Author: Chandra Shekhar Jha
Bench: Chandra Shekhar Jha
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS No.1493 of 2019
Arising Out of PS. Case No.-1669 Year-2015 Thana- PURNIA COMPLAINT CASE District-
Purnia
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Sunita Devi Baiju Yadav @ Binod Yadav Resident of Navtolia Pipra
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State Of Bihar
2. Rana Yadav late Sukhdev Yadav resident of Navytolia Pipra
3. Babli Yadav @ Bablu Yadav Rana Yadav Bihar
4. Pappu Yadav Rana Yadav resident of Navytolia Pipra
... ... Opposite Party/s
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Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Ajit Kumar Singh, Adv
For the Opposite Party/s : Sri. Ganesh Prasad Singh, APP
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA SHEKHAR JHA
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 20-07-2026
Heard the parties.
2. The present application has been filed for quashing
the order dated 15.09.2018, passed by learned Sessions Judge,
Purnea in Cr. Rev. No. 103/2018, CIS No. 103/2018 by which
revision petition of the petitioner was dismissed and order dated
08.06.2018
was affirmed as passed by learned CJM, Purnea in
Complaint Case No. 1669/2015, whereby learned CJM, Purnea has
dismissed the complaint petition.
3. The brief facts of the case is that the petitioner has
filed a complaint case bearing No. 1669/2018 in the court of learned
CJM, Purnea alleging that on 18.05.2015 at about 11:00 PM O.P. No.
2 committed rape upon the complainant by pointing dagger, while
her husband had gone to see his maize crops in nearby field. After
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hearing the hue and cry fellow villagers and complainant’s husband
came at the place of occurrence and apprehended O.P. No. 2, but in
the meantime accused no. 3 and 4 along with other 5-6 unknown
accused persons came to the house of the complainant and assaulted
her, her husband and villagers and by threatening and showing arms
rescued O.P. No. 2.
4. After dismissal of the complaint petition of the petitioners
under Section 203 of the Cr.P.C. a revision was filed against the
aforesaid order, which was registered before the Sessions Judge
Purnea as Cr. Rev. No. 103/2018, which was also dismissed. It
appears from the revisional order that it is not a perverse order which
requires interference of this Court to secure the ends of justice,
exercising power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
5. Entertaining of this quashing petition is also amounts to
second revision, which is not permissible under law. This court relied
upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through
Kailash Verma Vs. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation and
Another, [(2005) 2 SCC 571].
6. It would be apposite to reproduce para-5 of the Kailash
Verma Case (supra), which is as under:-
5. It may also be noticed that this Court in Rajathi v. C. Ganesan,
[(1999) 6 SCC 326] said that the power under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code has to be exercised sparingly and such
power shall not be utilised as a substitute for second revision.
Ordinarily, when a revision has been barred under Section 397(3) of
the Code, the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take
recourse to revision before the High Court under Section 397(1) of the
Criminal Procedure Code as it is prohibited under Section 397(3)
thereof. However, the High Court can entertain a petition under
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Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code when there is serious
miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the court or when
mandatory provisions of law are not complied with and when the High
Court feels that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct
the mistake committed by the revisional court.
7. This court also relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court as available through Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Another
Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate & Others, [(1998) 5 SCC 749],
where it would be further apposite to reproduce para-29 of the Pepsi
Foods Ltd. & Another Case (supra), which is as under:-
“29. No doubt the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any
stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but
that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the
Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against him when
the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he
must undergo the agony of a criminal trial. It was submitted
before us on behalf of the State that in case we find that the High
Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction the matter should be
remanded back to it to consider if the complaint and the evidence
on record did not make out any case against the appellants. If,
however, we refer to the impugned judgment of the High Court it
has come to the conclusion, though without referring to any
material on record, that “in the present case it cannot be said at
this stage that the allegations in the complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent man can
ever reach a just conclusion that there exists no sufficient ground
for proceedings against the accused”. We do not think that the
High Court was correct in coming to such a conclusion and in
coming to that it has also foreclosed the matter for the Magistrate
as well, as the Magistrate will not give any different conclusion
on an application filed under Section 245 of the Code. The High
Court says that the appellants could very well appear before the
court and move an application under Section 245(2) of the Code
and that the Magistrate could discharge them if he found the
charge to be groundless and at the same time it has itself returned
the finding that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding
against the appellants. If we now refer to the facts of the case
before us it is clear to us that not only that allegation against the
appellants do not make out any case for an offence under Section
7 of the Act and also that there is no basis for the complainant to
make such allegations. The allegations in the complaint merely
show that the appellants have given their brand name to
“Residency Foods and Beverages Ltd.” for bottling the beverage
“Lehar Pepsi”. The complaint does not show what is the role of
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be adulterated. The only allegation is that the appellants are the
manufacturers of bottle. There is no averment as to how the
complainant could say so and also if the appellants manufactured
the alleged bottle or its contents. His sole information is from
A.K. Jain who is impleaded as Accused 3. The preliminary
evidence on which the first respondent relied in issuing summons
to the appellants also does not show as to how it could be said
that the appellants are manufacturers of either the bottle or the
beverage or both. There is another aspect of the matter. The
Central Government in the exercise of their powers under Section
3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 made the Fruit
Products Order, 1955 (for short “the Fruit Order”). It is not
disputed that the beverage in question is a “fruit product” within
the meaning of clause (2)(b) of the Fruit Order and that for the
manufacture thereof certain licence is required. The Fruit Order
defines the manufacturer and also sets out as to what the
manufacturer is required to do in regard to the packaging,
marking and labelling of containers of fruit products. One of such
requirements is that when a bottle is used in packing any fruit
products, it shall be so sealed that it cannot be opened without
destroying the licence number and the special identification mark
of the manufacturer to be displayed on the top or neck of the
bottle. The licence number of the manufacturer shall also be
exhibited prominently on the side label on such bottle [clause (8)
(1)(b)]. Admittedly, the name of the first appellant is not
mentioned as a manufacturer on the top cap of the bottle. It is not
necessary to refer in detail to other requirements of the Fruit
Order and the consequences of infringement of the Order and to
the penalty to which the manufacturer would be exposed under
the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. We may,
however, note that in Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) v. Union of
India? an argument was raised that the Fruit Order was invalid
because its provision indicated that it was an Order which could
have been appropriately issued under the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954. This Court negatived this plea and said
that the Fruit Order was validly issued under the Essential
Commodities Act. What we find in the present case is that there
was nothing on record to show if the appellants held the licence
for the a manufacture of the offending beverage and if, as noted
above, the first appellant was the manufacturer thereof. “
8. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal submission, as
the complaint of petitioner before the learned trial court was
dismissed under Section 203 of the Cr.P.C. with a reasoned order,
which was challenged before learned Sessions Judge, which also
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approved by revisional order supplying reason. Therefore, impugned
order of revision cannot be said perverse to the extent as to compel
this Court to exercise its inherent power in view of Kailash Verma
Case (supra).
9. Accordingly, the aforesaid impugned order need not be
interfered with.
10. The present petition stands dismissed.
11. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the learned trial
court forthwith.
(Chandra Shekhar Jha, J.)
S.Tripathi/-
AFR/NAFR NAFR CAV DATE NA Uploading Date 21.07.2026 Transmission Date 21.07.2026
