Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Adbala Parvathi And Others vs Adabala Maridayyakapu on 17 July, 2026
APHC010437072009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3397]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY, THE 17th DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA
KRISHNA RAO
APPEAL SUIT NO: 167/2009
Between:
Adbala Parvathi and Others ...APPELLANT(S)
AND
Adabala Maridayyakapu ...RESPONDENT
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. N SIVA REDDY
Counsel for the Respondent:
1. VENKAT CHALLA
2. VARREY VENKATA NAGA VISHNU TEJA
The Court made the following:
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HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO
APPEAL SUIT No.167 of 2009
JUDGMENT:
This Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure [for short
„the C.P.C.’], is filed by the Appellants/Defendant Nos.1 to 4 challenging the
Decree and Judgment, dated 22.12.2008, in O.S.No.64 of 2005 passed by the
learned I Additional District Judge, East Godavari, Rajahmundry [for short „the
trial Court’].
2. The appellants herein are the defendant Nos.1 to 4 and the respondent
is the plaintiff. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant No.3 died and
the appellant Nos.5 to 7 are brought on record as the legal representatives of
the deceased appellant No.3.
3. Originally, the plaintiff in O.S.No.64 of 2005 filed the suit against the
sole-defendant, seeking to (i) grant preliminary decree of partition of plaint
schedule properties into four equal shares and allot three such shares by
metes and bounds and put him in possession in respect of item No.2 of the
plaint schedule property and to pass a final decree in terms of the preliminary
decree, (ii) grant mesne profits from the date of suit in respect of item No.2 of
the plaint schedule property; (iii) grant a decree for Rs.54,000/- with
subsequent interest at 12% per annum from the date of suit till the date of
realization; (iv) appoint advocate commissioner for ascertaining the mesne
profits and for costs of the suit.
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During the course of the trial before the trial Court, the defendant Nos.2
to 4 were added as parties to the suit vide orders dated 03.08.2007 in
I.A.No.1623 of 2007.
4. Both parties in the appeal will be referred to as they were arrayed
before the trial Court.
5. The case of the plaintiff as per the plaint averments in O.S.No.64 of
2005, in brief, is as follows:
I. The plaintiff pleaded that the plaintiff is the adoptive son of late Adabala
Sankara Narayana Brahmanandam @ Brahmananda Rao and the
defendant No.1 herein, and the natural father of the plaintiff is one
Adabala Appa Rao and the natural mother of the plaintiff is one
Suryakantham, and the adoptive father is the elder brother of the
natural father of the plaintiff. The plaintiff further pleaded that his
adoptive parents had no issues and he was given in adoption by his
natural parents to the adoptive parents during his 8th year by following
all the formalities, including the ceremony of Datta Homa, etc. The
plaintiff further pleaded that the said adoption took place in the
presence of close relatives and friends like Adabala Lakshminarayana,
Talatam Pedakapu, Velugubantla Veerraju, Yalamarthi Ammi Raju, and
others, and ever since the date of adoption, the plaintiff has been
brought up by the adoptive parents and became the son of his adoptive
parents. The plaintiff further pleaded that, in order to have a record of
such adoption, the natural parents and the adoptive parents of the
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plaintiff executed a registered adoption deed dated 04.06.1979, wherein
it is clearly mentioned that the plaintiff was adopted during his childhood
and, to have a record of past adoption, the adoption deed was executed.
II. The plaintiff further pleaded that Item No.1 of the plaint schedule
property consists of agricultural lands and the same are ancestral
properties devolved on the plaintiff and his adoptive father from their
ancestors. The plaintiff further pleaded that Item No.2 of the plaint
schedule property is a residential house which was purchased by his
adoptive father with the income derived from Item No.1 of the plaint
schedule property and, therefore, the said properties are also
considered as joint Hindu family ancestral properties. The plaintiff
further pleaded that his adoptive parents performed his first marriage
with one Sitamahalakshmi, who died during childbirth, and again the
adoptive parents of the plaintiff performed his marriage with one
Raghavamma, through whom the plaintiff begot two daughters. The
plaintiff further pleaded that the defendant started demanding the
plaintiff to perform the marriage of the eldest daughter with her nephew
by name N.V.V.Satyanarayana, but the plaintiff and his adoptive father
did not agree to the same, and they performed the marriage of the
eldest daughter of the plaintiff with another person.
III. The plaintiff further pleaded that the adoptive father of the plaintiff died
intestate on 12.04.2001 and the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment
of the plaint schedule properties. The plaintiff further pleaded that after
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the death of his adoptive father, his adoptive mother has been acting in
a hostile manner and has been taking the sides of her nephews. The
plaintiff further pleaded that the defendant, because of her hostile
attitude exhibited towards the plaintiff, joined hands with her nephews
and is trying to create sham and nominal documents and is also
fabricating several documents to the detriment of the plaintiff and also
creating encumbrances and liabilities on the properties. As such, the
plaintiff was constrained to file the suit for partition of the plaint schedule
properties.
6. The defendant No.1 filed the written statement and the case of the
defendant No.1 as per the written statement is as follows:
I. The defendant No.1 pleaded that the plaintiff is not the adopted son of
herself and her husband, Adabala Sankara Narayana Brahmanandam
@ Brahmanadarao, and the plaintiff was never given in adoption. The
defendant No.1 further pleaded that the said Datta Homa and the
adoption ceremony did not take place in the presence of Adabala
Lakshminarayana, Talatam Pedakapu, Velugubantla Veeranna,
Yalamarthi Ammi Raju. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that the
plaintiff never lived in the house of the defendant No.1 and that her
husband, during his lifetime, executed a Will dated 09.05.2000 in a
sound and disposing state of mind and bequeathed Ac.6.25 cents of
land in R.S.No.88/2 of Doddigunta Village in favour of the defendant
No.1 and Ac.6.99 ½ cents, i.e., Ac.4.63 cents in R.S.No.89 and Ac.1.56
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½ cents in R.S.No.115/5 of Doddigunta Village in favour of his
Abhimana Putrudu and nephew by name Nagireddi Veera Venkata
Satyanarayana Murthy, reserving the life interest for himself and
recognizing his title, possession, and enjoyment of those properties.
The defendant No.1 further pleaded that the Revenue authorities
granted Ryotwari Pattadar Pass Books in favour of the defendant No.1
and, till today, the plaintiff was never in possession and enjoyment of
Item No.1 of the plaint schedule and never managed the same nor
enjoyed the usufruct from the aforesaid properties in Item No.1. The
defendant No.1 further pleaded that Item Nos.1 and 2 of the plaint
schedule properties were never in the possession and enjoyment of the
plaintiff.
II. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that after the demise of her
husband on 12.04.2001, the defendant No.1, along with her nephews,
sold her Sampara property under sale deeds dated 05.09.2002 and
08.09.2003 and, out of the consideration received by her, she
discharged the family debts and utilized the balance amount for the
improvement of her properties. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that
she and her husband had never performed the marriage of the plaintiff
with one Sita Mahalakshmi and that the wedding invitation was got
printed by the plaintiff. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that in the
school records and voters’ list, the plaintiff was shown as the son of
Apparao and was never shown as the adopted son of the defendant
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No.1. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that the plaintiff is not entitled
to any share in any of the properties of the defendant or her husband
and the plaintiff can never be termed to be in constructive joint
possession of the plaint schedule properties, and Item No.1 of the plaint
schedule is in the physical possession and enjoyment of the nephews of
the defendant No.1. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that Item No.2
was settled in favour of Nagireddi Veera Venkata Satyanarayana
Murthy by the defendant No.1 under a registered settlement deed dated
29.07.2002 and that the plaintiff has no right to question the acts of the
defendant No.1. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that there is
absolutely no cause of action for the suit and, further, the cause of
action stated in paragraph No.9 of the plaint is not true and correct.
III. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that the plaintiff was aged about 21
years on the date of the alleged adoption and the plaintiff, being the
eldest son of his parents, would never be given in adoption, as under
the Hindu Dharma Shastra, the eldest son has to perform the obsequies
and other religious ceremonies of his parents. The defendant No.1
further pleaded that by the date of the alleged adoption, the plaintiff was
already 21 years old, and under Section 13 of the Hindu Adoptions and
Maintenance Act, 1956, the plaintiff can never be termed an adopted
son, and the adopted son does not deprive the adoptive father or
mother of the power to dispose of his or her property by transfer inter
vivos or by Will. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that, taking
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advantage of the innocence, illiteracy, and lack of worldly knowledge of
the defendant No.1 and her husband, the document dated 04.06.1979
was brought into existence and that the plaintiff and his father requested
the defendant No.1 and her husband to lease out their properties and
represented that they would properly pay the rents to them, and when
the defendant No.1 and her husband believed the said representations
of the plaintiff and his father, they executed and registered the adoption
deed. As such, the defendant No.1 requested for dismissal of the suit
with costs.
7. The plaintiff filed a rejoinder before the trial Court and pleaded that he
was adopted when he was aged about 8 years and, subsequently, a deed of
adoption was executed on 04.06.1979 and the same was registered before
the Sub-Registrar by the natural parents and also the adoptive parents to
record the past adoption. The plaintiff further pleaded that at the time of his
adoption, he was aged about 8 years and was already admitted to school by
his natural parents and that no changes were effected in the school records by
his adoptive parents.
After filing of the rejoinder by the plaintiff in the year 2007, the
defendant No.2 filed a written statement, and the same was adopted by
defendant Nos.3 and 4, and they supported the case of the defendant No.1 in
all aspects.
8. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following
issues:
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1) Whether the plaintiff is adopted son of the defendant and her husband
Adabala Brahmananda Rao?
2) Whether the plaintiff is in possession of item No.1 of plaint schedule
property?
3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition of plaint schedule property
into four equal shares and allotment of three shares as prayed?
4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits on item No.2 of plaint
schedule?
5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree for Rs.54,000/- with interest at
12% per annum as prayed?
6) To what relief?
On 30.10.2007, the trial Court framed the following additional issues:
1) Whether the Registered settlement deed dated 30.10.2002 is true, valid
and binding on the plaintiff?
2) Whether the Relinquishment deed dated 23.06.2005 is true, valid and
binding on the plaintiff?
9. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiff,
P.Ws.1 to 6 were examined and Ex.A-1 to Ex.A-5 were marked. On behalf
of the defendants, D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Ex.B-1 to
Ex.B-11 were marked.
10. After completion of the trial and on hearing the arguments of both sides,
the trial Court decreed the suit in part vide its judgment, dated 22.12.2008,
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against which the present appeal is preferred by the appellants/defendant
No.1 to 4 in the suit.
11. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the judgment
and decree of the trial Court are erroneous, contrary to law, and weight of the
evidence. He would further contend that the trial Court erred in relying on the
evidence of P.W.2 to P.W.4 and came to a conclusion that the plaintiff is the
adopted son of the defendant and her husband. He would further contend that
the trial Court committed a grave mistake in observing that the plaintiff is
entitled to the presumption envisaged under Section 16 of the Hindu
Adoptions and Maintenance Act and that the reasoning given by the trial Court
in support of the same is perverse. He would further contend that the trial
Court came to a wrong conclusion and decreed the suit in part, and that the
appeal may be allowed by setting aside the findings of the trial Court that the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief of partition of Item No.1 of the plaint schedule
property.
12. Per contra, Sri P.Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent/plaintiff, would contend that, on appreciation of the
entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge rightly arrived at a correct
conclusion that the plaintiff is the adopted son of the defendant No.1 and her
husband and that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of partition of Item No.1 of
the plaint schedule property. He would further contend that there are no
grounds to interfere with the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court
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and that the appeal may be dismissed by confirming the decree and judgment
passed by the trial Court.
13. Heard Sri M.Radha Krishna, learned counsel, representing Sri N.Siva
Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri P.Veera Reddy, learned
Senior Counsel, representing Sri Varre Venkata Naga Vishnu Teja and
Sri Venkat Challa, learned counsel for the respondents.
14. Now, in deciding the present appeal, the points that arise for
determination is as follows:
1) Whether the plaintiff is the adopted son of the defendant No.1 and
her husband Adabala Brahmananda Rao?
2) Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for
partition of Item No.1 of the suit schedule property?
3) Whether the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court needs
any interference?
15. Point No.1:
Whether the plaintiff is the adopted son of the defendant No.1 and
her husband Adabala Brahmananda Rao?
The case of the respondent/plaintiff is that the plaintiff is the adopted
son of Adabala Sankara Narayana Brahmanandam alias Brahmananda Rao
and the defendant No.1 herein, and the adoptive father is the elder brother of
the natural father of the plaintiff. The plaintiff further pleaded that the adoptive
parents of the plaintiff had no issues and that the plaintiff was given in
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adoption by the natural parents to the adoptive parents at the age of his 8th
year by following all the formalities, including the ceremony of Datta Homa,
etc., in the presence of close relatives and friends like Adabala
Lakshminarayana, Talatam Pedakapu, Velugubantla Veerraju, Yalamarthi
Ammi Raju, and others, and ever since the date of adoption, the plaintiff has
been brought up by the adoptive parents and, for all purposes, he had
become the son of his adoptive parents. The plaintiff further pleaded that,
subsequently, in order to have a record of the past adoption, the natural
parents and the adoptive parents executed a registered adoption deed dated
04.06.1979, wherein it was clearly recited that the plaintiff had been adopted
during his childhood days and, to have a record of the adoption, the said
registered adoption deed was executed. The appellants contended that the
plaintiff is not the adopted son of the defendant No.1 and her husband and
they never adopted the plaintiff.
16. The plaintiff, to discharge his initial burden, relied on the evidence of
P.W.1. P.W.1 is the plaintiff, P.W.2 and P.W.3 are the witnesses to the
adoption of the plaintiff at the age of 8 years by the defendant No.1 and her
husband. P.W.4 is the natural father of the plaintiff. P.W.5 is the attestor to
Ex.A-1. P.W.2 and P.W.3 narrated in their evidence that they were present
when the plaintiff was given in adoption to the defendant No.1 and her
husband by the natural parents of the plaintiff, when the plaintiff was 8 years
old. They further deposed that the natural parents handed over the plaintiff to
the defendant No.1 and her husband physically in the presence of the Purohit,
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relatives, and friends by following all formalities, including the ceremony of
Datta Homa. P.W.2 and P.W.3 further deposed that, along with them, Talatam
Pedakapu, Velugubantla Veeraju, and others were present at the time of
adoption and ever since the date of adoption, the plaintiff was brought up in
the house of defendant No.1 and her husband as their own son. They further
deposed that the two marriages of the plaintiff were performed by the
defendant No.1 and her husband and the plaintiff performed the last rites of
his adoptive father. It is admitted by the defendant No.1 that P.W.2 is their
relative. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that P.W.3 is the common relative
of the plaintiff and the defendant No.1, but the same is denied by D.W.1. It is
not the case of the defendant No.1 that she has enmity with P.W.2 and P.W.3,
due to that they deposed falsehood against her. To prove the valid adoption, it
would be necessary to prove that there had been an actual giving and taking
ceremony. The evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 proves about the actual giving
and taking ceremony of the plaintiff by the defendant No.1 and her husband at
the age of 8 years of plaintiff, by following the formalities, including the
ceremonies of Datta Homa.
17. P.W.4, who is the natural father of the plaintiff, asserted in his evidence
that his elder brother and the defendant No.1 had no issues, and they
themselves requested him and his wife to give them the plaintiff, who was
given in adoption to the defendant No.1 and her husband, and the adoption
ceremony took place in their joint house. He further stated that P.W.2, P.W.3,
and others attended the adoption ceremony and that he and his wife
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physically handed over the plaintiff to the defendant No.1 and her husband
and that at the time of adoption the Purohit was also present and performed
Datta Homa, and ever since the date of adoption, the plaintiff has been
residing in the house of the defendant No.1 and her husband, and they
brought him up like their own son. He further asserted that, to record the said
past adoption, a registered adoption deed was executed, and the same was
registered on 04.06.1979 itself. The evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 is well
corroborated by the evidence of P.W.4.
18. The learned counsel for the appellants stressed upon Section 7 of the
Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and contends that the consent
of the wife/defendant No.1 is essential to prove the validity of the adoption and
no consent was given by the defendant No.1 to adopt the plaintiff at the age of
8 years.
19. Learned counsel for the appellants placed a case law in Ghisalal Vs
Dhapubai (Dead) by L.Rs. and others 1, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court
held as follows:
“20. The term `consent’ used in the proviso to Section 7 and the explanation appended thereto
has not been defined in the Act. Therefore, while interpreting these provisions, the Court shall
have to keep in view the legal position obtaining before enactment of the 1956 Act, the object of
the new legislation and apply the rule of purposive interpretation and if that is done, it would be
reasonable to say that the consent of wife envisaged in the proviso to Section 7 should either
be in writing or reflected by an affirmative/positive act voluntarily and willingly done by her. If
the adoption by a Hindu male becomes subject matter of challenge before the Court, the party
supporting the adoption has to adduce evidence to prove that the same was done with the
consent of his wife. This can be done either by producing document evidencing her consent in
1
2011 AIR SCW 592
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writing or by leading evidence to show that wife had actively participated in the ceremonies of
adoption with an affirmative mindset to support the action of the husband to take a son or a
daughter in adoption. The presence of wife as a spectator in the assembly of people who
gather at the place where the ceremonies of adoption are performed cannot be treated as her
consent. In other words, the Court cannot presume the consent of wife simply because she was
present at the time of adoption. The wife’s silence or lack of protest on her part also cannot give
rise to an inference that she had consented to the adoption.
In the present case, the adoption of the plaintiff is denied by defendant
No.1 in the written statement itself. It is not the case of defendant No.1 that
her husband did not obtain her consent at the time of the adoption of the
plaintiff, and the same is not pleaded or deposed to in her evidence by the
defendant No.1. It is also not the case of the defendant No.1 that her
presence at the time of adoption was that of a mute spectator and not that of
an active participant. The natural father/P.W.4 asserted in his evidence that
his elder brother and his wife/defendant No.1 had no issues and they
requested him and his wife to give the plaintiff in adoption, accordingly, during
the plaintiff’s 8th year, the plaintiff was given in adoption to the defendant No.1
and her husband. It is undisputed that the defendant No.1 and her husband
had a cordial relationship with the plaintiff‟s natural parents. The adoptive
father of the plaintiff/the husband of the defendant No.1 died on 12.04.2001.
Subsequently, the disputes arose between the plaintiff and D.W.1. It was not
suggested to P.W.4 in cross-examination by the learned counsel for the
appellants that, at the time of the alleged adoption, the consent of the
defendant No.1 was not at all obtained. As on the date of giving evidence, i.e.,
07.11.2006, the plaintiff was aged about 51 years. It seems that he was born
in the year 1955. As per the case of the plaintiff, he was adopted by the
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defendant No.1 and her husband at the age of 8 years, i.e., around the year
1963; therefore, it is highly impossible for the plaintiff to remember what was
happened at the age of 8 years, after a lapse of more than 40 years about the
manner of adoption and the details of the adoption. P.W.2 and P.W.3, who
were aged about 60 years and 70 years, respectively, were competent
persons to depose about the details and manner of the adoption, as they were
present at the time of the adoption ceremony of the plaintiff. The presence of
P.W.2 and P.W.3 at the time of the adoption ceremony was also asserted by
the natural father/P.W.4 in his evidence. The evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3
inspires confidence to prove the manner of adoption of the plaintiff at the age
of 8 years by the defendant No.1 and her husband.
20. The plaintiff, to prove the alleged adoption at the age of 8 years, relied
on Ex.A-1, the registration extract of the adoption deed. The past adoption
was recorded in the original of Ex.A-1; it is a registered adoption deed. The
learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the original was not
produced by the plaintiff and placed reliance on a case law of a Five Judge
Bench of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in The Roman Catholic Mission vs. The
State of Madras and another 2 , and contended that the original was not
produced by the plaintiff before the Court and no foundation was laid for the
establishment of the right to give secondary evidence and that Ex.A-1 cannot
be looked into. As seen from the plaint averments, the certified copy of the
registered adoption deed dated 04.06.1979 was executed by the natural
2
AIR 1966 SUPREME COURT 1457
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parents of the plaintiff and the adoptive parents of the plaintiff to record the
past adoption of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the natural parents and the adoptive
parents executed a registered adoption deed under the original of Ex.A-1, and
the certified copy of the registered adoption deed was filed along with the
plaint, and the same was marked as Ex.A-1. At the time of exhibiting the said
document as Ex.A-1, no objection was raised by the defendants or their
counsel before the trial Court.
21. The law is well settled that “ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of
evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The
objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into
two classes: (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is
itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute
the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode
of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case,
merely because a document has been marked as “an exhibit”, an objection as
to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later
stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be
taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been
admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not
have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the
document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent
to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of
fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate
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point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the
defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to
object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows
the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite
party is not serious about the mode of proof”.
22. In the present case, Ex.A-1 is not a suit document. Ex.A-1 reveals that it
was executed to record the past adoption, and a registered adoption deed
was executed by the natural parents and the adoptive parents. The natural
father of the plaintiff/P.W.4 asserted that the original adoption deed was
retained by the defendant No.1 and her husband. The plaintiff is not a party to
the document under Ex.A-1; therefore, P.W.4, who is a party to the document,
i.e., the natural father of the plaintiff, is the best person to speak about the
custody of the original of Ex.A-1. It was suggested to D.W.1 in cross-
examination by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the defendant No.1
had custody of the original of Ex.A-1, the said suggestion was denied by
D.W.1. As per the case of D.W.1, her husband was literate, and the contention
of the defendant No.1 is that the plaintiff obtained the adoption deed under the
guise of a lease deed. It clearly goes to show that D.W.1 is admitting the
execution of Ex.A-1, but she is disputing the contents of Ex.A-1. Since D.W.1
admitted the execution of Ex.A-1, therefore, it is for the defendant No.1/D.W.1
to prove that the plaintiff obtained the adoption deed fraudulently under the
guise of a lease deed.
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23. To prove Ex.A-1 document, the plaintiff relied on the evidence of P.W.5,
who is one of the attestors to Ex.A-1. The defendant No.1 asserted in her
evidence that she does not have any enmity with P.W.5 and that he worked as
the Village Munsif. As per the evidence of P.W.5, he worked as the Village
Munsif, and he had personal knowledge about the adoption of the plaintiff by
the defendant No.1 and her husband, as they were issueless, and the plaintiff
was brought up by D.W.1 and her husband, and his two marriages were
performed by the defendant No.1 and her husband. He further asserted that
the natural parents and the adoptive parents wanted to execute a registered
adoption deed evidencing the past adoption that took place during the
childhood days of the plaintiff, and the same was executed and registered in
the Sub-Registrar’s office, and he acted as one of the attestors to the adoption
deed dated 04.06.1979.
24. The defendant No.1 admitted that she does not have any enmity with
P.W.5 and that P.W.5 also acted as the identifying witness before the Sub-
Registrar in a sale deed executed by D.W.1 and her nephews, and the same
was elicited from D.W.1 in cross-examination by the learned counsel for the
plaintiff. So far as Ex.A-1 is concerned, in cross-examination, except giving
formal suggestions to deny Ex.A-1, nothing was elicited from P.W.5 to
disbelieve the Ex.A-1 document. It was not suggested to P.W.4 and P.W.5 in
cross-examination by the learned counsel for the defendant No.1 that the
original of Ex.A-1 was obtained under the guise of a lease deed. Furthermore,
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the defendant No.1 admits that she does not know under what circumstances
Ex.A-1 came into force.
25. The defendant No.1 is not denying the execution and registration of the
original of Ex.A-1 on 04.06.1979 before the Sub-Registrar. The contention of
the appellants is that the adoption deed was obtained on 04.06.1979 on the
pretext of a lease deed. It is undisputed fact that there was no enmity between
both the families till the husband of the defendant No.1 died in the year 2001,
and both families had cordial terms. After the death of the husband of D.W.1,
disputes arose between both the families. Admittedly, no notice was issued by
the defendant No.1 or her husband stating that a registered adoption deed
was obtained under the guise of a lease deed. The defendant No.1 kept quiet
for a period of more than 25 years and, for the first time, the defendant No.1
pleaded in the written statement in the year 2005 that an adoption deed was
obtained under the guise of a lease deed.
26. It is also relevant to note that if a document is registered in accordance
with law, it is presumed that the adoption has been made in compliance of the
provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. It is relevant to
note Section 16 of the Act:
“Section16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption.―Whenever
any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before
any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving
and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption
has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is
disproved.”
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27. In the present case, the plaintiff proved Ex.A-1 by examining one of the
attestors to the original of Ex.A-1 as P.W.5. It is the admitted case of the
defendant No.1 that she is having cordial terms with P.W.5 and that P.W.5
worked as the Village Administrative Officer and was an elder of the village.
Furthermore, the natural father of the plaintiff asserted that the defendant No.1
and her husband themselves requested him and his wife to give the plaintiff in
adoption since they had no issues and, accordingly, during the plaintiff’s 8th
year, the plaintiff was given in adoption to the defendant No.1 and her
husband, and the adoption ceremony took place in their joint house. P.W.2
and P.W.3 attended the adoption ceremony of the plaintiff at the age of 8
years, and at the time of adoption, the Purohit also performed Datta Homa
and, subsequently, to record the past adoption, a registered adoption deed
was executed in the year 1979. To disprove Ex.A-1, no rebuttal evidence was
produced by the defendant No.1.
28. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the
plaintiff failed to prove the validity of the adoption. It is well settled that “for a
valid adoption, the physical act of giving and taking is an essential requisite, a
ceremony imperative in all adoptions whatever the caste, and the consent of
both the parties is also an essential requisite for a valid adoption.” In the
present case, at the age of 8 years of plaintiff, about more than 40 years prior
to the filing of the suit, the plaintiff was adopted by the defendant No.1 and her
husband from the natural parents by performing all the necessary ceremonies
required for a valid adoption and, to record the past adoption, a registered
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adoption deed was executed by the natural parents and the adoptive parents
in the year 1979. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants
that the defendant No.1 had not given any consent and the consent of the wife
is an essential requisite to prove a valid adoption. As stated supra, it is not the
case of the defendant No.1 that she stood as a mute spectator at the time of
adoption and her consent was not obtained by her husband. For the first time
after 50 years, i.e., after the death of her husband, due to love and affection
on her brother‟s children, the defendant No.1 came with a stand that she was
not a consenting party to the adoption and that the said adoption is invalid.
29. To prove the valid adoption, which was happened at the age of 8 years,
the plaintiff relied on the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3. The plaintiff pleaded in
the plaint itself that the adoptive parents of the plaintiff had no issues and that
the plaintiff was given in adoption by the natural parents of the plaintiff to the
adoptive parents during his 8th year by performing all the ceremonies,
including the ceremony of Datta Homa, in the presence of P.W.2, P.W.3, and
other relatives. The plaintiff pleaded in the plaint itself that he was adopted at
the age of 8 years by performing all the necessary ceremonies by the adoptive
parents from the natural parents. The presence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 at the
time of the adoption ceremony at the age of 8 years of the plaintiff was
narrated by the plaintiff in the plaint itself.
30. It is well settled that “in the matter of appreciation of evidence of
witnesses, it is not the number of witnesses but quality of their evidence which
is important, as there is no requirement in Law of Evidence that any particular
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number of witnesses is to be examined to prove/disprove a fact. It is time-
honoured principle, that evidence must be weighed and not counted. The test
is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy
or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on value provided by
each witness, rather than multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is quality
and not quantity, which determines the adequacy of evidence as has been
provided by Section 134 of the Evidence Act.
31. In the present case, it is an admitted case of the defendant No.1 that
P.W.2 is their relative. It is not the case of the defendant No.1 that she is
having enmity with P.W.2 and P.W.3, and as noticed supra, the evidence of
P.W.2 and P.W.3 is inspiring confidence to prove the valid adoption of P.W.1.
32. As stated supra, to prove the valid adoption, the person who claims to
be an adopted son, namely the plaintiff herein, placed cogent and reliable
evidence to prove the valid adoption. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that
he performed the last rites of the husband of the defendant No.1, i.e., of his
adoptive father/the husband of the defendant No.1, and the same is asserted
by P.W.2 to P.W.4 in their evidence. The defendant No.1/D.W.1 also did not
deny the said aspect, but she pleaded ignorance.
33. The learned counsel for the appellants has drawn the attention of this
Court by showing variations in the wedding cards and also relying on the
voters‟ list. In my view, the wedding cards and the voters‟ list are not
conclusive proof to disbelieve the valid adoption. It was contended by the
learned counsel for the appellants that the school records show that the
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plaintiff continued as the son of the natural parents and if the plaintiff was
really adopted by the defendant No.1 and her husband, their names would
have been entered in the school records. Here, the plaintiff was a school-
going boy at the time of adoption, i.e., at the age of 8 years, and had already
been admitted to school by then; therefore, the names of the natural parents
continued in the school records and, therefore, no changes were effected in
the school records. Furthermore, the plaintiff herein is working as an
employee of the Road Transport Corporation. By the time of the alleged
adoption, both the families were living in the joint house, and the plaintiff was
none other than the son of the own brother of the husband of D.W.1. The
plaintiff was aged about 8 years at the time of the alleged adoption. There is
evidence on record to show that the plaintiff was adopted at the age of 8 years
by the adoptive parents by performing all the ceremonies and that the said
adoption took place with the consent of both the parties and, to record the
past adoption, a registered adoption deed dated 04.06.1979 was executed by
both the parties.
34. In the present case, D.W.1/defendant No.1 changed her version from
time to time. In her written statement, she narrated that her husband, during
his lifetime, executed a Will dated 09.05.2000 in a sound and disposing state
of mind and bequeathed Ac.6.25 cents of land in R.S.No.88/2 of Doddigunta
Village in her favour and Ac.6.99 ½ cents, i.e., Ac.4.63 cents in R.S.No.89 and
Ac.1.56 ½ cents in R.S.No.115/5 of Doddigunta Village, in favour of his
Abhimana Putrudu, who is his nephew by name Nagireddi Veera Venkata
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Satyanarayana Murthy, reserving the life interest for herself and recognizing
his title, possession, and enjoyment of the properties, and the Revenue
authorities also granted pattadar pass books. But, in her evidence, she
asserted that no such Will was executed by her husband. As noticed supra,
the plaintiff proved that he is the adopted son of the defendant No.1 and her
husband, but the defendant No.1 failed to produce any rebuttal evidence to
disprove the original of Ex.A-1 and the adoption of the plaintiff. Though the
defendants relied on the evidence of D.W.2, D.W.2 pleaded ignorance about
the adoption of the plaintiff by the defendant No.1 and her husband on the
pretext that he was not born at that time.
35. Learned counsel for the appellants placed a case law in Nivritti
Pandurang Nale Vs. Uttam Ganu Nale and Others3, wherein the High Court
of Bombay held as follows:
“24. ……the plea of adoption could not be accepted based on the production of some
documents to prove the adoption if the party claiming adoption fails to prove giving and taking.
26. Only because the adoption deed is a registered document it cannot be accepted as having
presumptive value under Section 16. The presumption under Section 16 is applicable only if the
document records the particulars of the adoption made and it is signed by the person giving
and the person taking the child in adoption. In the present case, admittedly, the document is not
signed by the person giving in adoption. On the date of the adoption deed, the biological
mother was alive; thus, in the absence of her signature, the presumption under Section 16 shall
not be applicable.”
36. Learned counsel for the appellants placed a case law in Jai Singh Vs.
Shakuntala4, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held as follows:
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“Section 16 envisages a statutory presumption that in the event of there being a registered
document pertaining to adoption there would be a presumption that adoption has been made in
accordance with law. Mandate of the Statute is rather definite since the Legislature has used
“shall” instead of any other word of lesser significance. Incidentally, however the inclusion of
the words “unless and until it is disproved” appearing at the end of the statutory provision has
made the situation not that rigid but flexible enough to depend upon the evidence available on
record in support of adoption. It is a matter of grave significance by reason of the factum of
adoption and displacement of the person adopted from the natural succession – thus onus of
proof is rather heavy. Statute has allowed some amount of flexibility, lest it turns out to be
solely dependent on a registered adoption deed. The reason for inclusion of the words “unless
and until it is disproved” shall have to be ascertained in its proper perspective and as such the
presumption cannot but be said to be a rebuttable presumption.”
37. Learned counsel for the appellants placed a case law in M.Vanaja Vs.
M.Sarla Devi (Dead)5, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held as follows:
“10. Section 6 of the Act of 1956, prescribes the pre- requisites for a valid adoption, which are:-
“6 Requisites of a valid adoption – No adoption shall be valid unless –
(i) the person adopting has the capacity, and also the right, to take in adoption,
(ii) the person giving in adoption has the capacity to do so;
(iii) the person adopted is capable of being taken in adoption; and
(iv) the adoption is made in compliance with the other conditions mentioned in this Chapter”
11. Section 7 provides that the male Hindu who is of sound mind and is not a minor has the
capacity to take a son or a daughter in adoption. The consent of his wife has been made
mandatory by the proviso to Section 7. Section 9 deals with persons who are capable of giving
a child in adoption. The other conditions for a valid adoption are stipulated in Section 11 of the
Act of 1956. One such condition is 11 (6) which is as under:-
“11. Other conditions for a valid adoption.
xx
(vi) the child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents
or guardian concerned or under their authority with intent to transfer the child from the
family of his birth (or in the case of an abandoned child or child whose parentage is not5
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known, from the place or family where it has been brought up) to the family of its
adoption:
Provided that the performance of data homam shall not be essential to the validity of
adoption”.
38. It is well settled that “in judging whether an adoption pleaded by a party
has been satisfactorily proved or not, the Court has to determine the lapse of
time between the date of the alleged adoption and the date on which the
concerned party is required to adduce proof.” In the present case, the
adoption took place when the plaintiff was 8 years of age, i.e., about more
than 40 years ago. On the date of adoption, the plaintiff was aged about 8
years, and his natural father/P.W.4 explained in detail about the manner of
adoption of the plaintiff, and he also explained that, to record the past
adoption, a deed was executed in the year 1979 by the adoptive parents and
the natural parents, which was registered before the Sub-Registrar. It is an
undisputed fact that by then both the families had cordial relations and they
had talking terms. As noticed supra, the husband of D.W.1 died in the year
2001; subsequently, disputes arose between both the parties. As per the case
of the plaintiff, after the death of his adoptive father, in view of the hostile
attitude of D.W.1 in favour of the sons of the natural brother of D.W.1, the
disputes arose between both the parties. It is also evident and is an
undisputed fact that from the date of the alleged adoption till the death of the
husband of D.W.1, both the families had cordial relations and no disputes
arose between both the parties. It is not at all the case of the appellants that
both the families did not have cordial terms. Therefore, in view of the hostile
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attitude of the defendant No.1 towards her nephews, the disputes cropped up
between both the parties, and later, the defendant No.1 came up with a stand
that the plaintiff is not an adopted son. But, there is cogent evidence to show
that the plaintiff was adopted by the defendant No.1 and her husband at the
age of 8 years of plaintiff and the said adoption took place with the consent of
both the parties, and the past adoption was recorded in the year 1979 by way
of a registered adoption deed, and the said registered adoption deed is in
force and remain unchallenged.
39. Learned counsel for the appellants placed a case law in Moturu Nalini
Kanth Vs. Gainedi Kaliprasad (dead, through Lrs.)6 .
In the present case on hand, where a natural father, who has given his
son in adoption at a young age, appears in the witness box and proves the
valid adoption and also, to prove the past adoption, the plaintiff placed the
certified copy of the registered adoption deed under the original of Ex.A-1,
which was proved through P.W.5. As stated supra, the adoption of the plaintiff
was corroborated by the common relative of both the parties, namely P.W.2.
As noticed supra, the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff contended
that P.W.3 is also the common relative of both the parties, the learned counsel
for the appellants contended that nowhere D.W.1 admitted that P.W.3 is the
common relative of both the parties. It is not at all the case of D.W.1 that she
is having enmity with P.W.2 and P.W.3 and that they deposed falsely against
the appellants. As stated supra, the said adoption was not questioned by the
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defendant No.1 and her husband. The husband of the defendant No.1 died in
the year 2001 and, subsequently, the disputes arose between both the parties,
which led to the filing of the present suit by the plaintiff. As stated supra, the
plaintiff pleaded and asserted in the plaint, rejoinder, and also in his evidence
that, after the death of the husband of D.W.1 and in view of the hostile attitude
towards the nephews of D.W.1, the disputes arose between both the parties.
40. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that the plaintiff,
by placing cogent and reliable evidence, proved the valid adoption, and there
is an ample evidence on record to prove the occurrence of the giving and
taking ceremony and with the consent of the natural parents and the adoptive
parents, the adoption was taken place. Furthermore, it is not at all the case of
D.W.1 that, without her consent, the plaintiff was adopted and she stood as a
silent spectator at the time of the alleged adoption of the plaintiff. As seen
from the written statement of the defendant No.1, it is nowhere pleaded in the
written statement by the defendant No.1 that, in the absence of her consent,
the alleged adoption took place. The trial Court, on an appreciation of the
entire evidence on record, found that the said alleged adoption was valid.
41. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the
plaintiff is the adopted son of the defendant No.1 and her husband.
Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered against the appellants.
42. Point No.2:
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Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for
partition of Item No.1 of the suit schedule property?
The plaintiff in the suit before the trial Court sought the relief of partition
of item Nos.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties and also sought the relief
of past and future profits. On a thorough appreciation of the oral and
documentary evidence, the learned trial Judge partly decreed the suit by
granting the relief of partition of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property, and
the learned trial Judge dismissed the relief of partition of item No.2 of the
plaint schedule property, and the relief of past and future profits was also
negatived by the learned trial Judge by assigning reasons. Against the said
partly decreed suit, the defendants filed a first appeal before this Court. To
challenge the negative findings arrived at by the trial Court, the plaintiff has
not filed any cross-objections in the present appeal filed by the defendants.
Therefore, the said findings reached their finality.
43. As per the case of the appellants, D.W.1 executed Ex.B-8 registered gift
deed in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 by retaining a life interest with
regard to item No.1-A of the landed property covered in R.S.No.88/2 to an
extent of Ac.6.25 cents, and it was pleaded by the appellants that later D.W.1
relinquished her life interest under Ex.B-8 by receiving a sum of Rs.80,000/- in
favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 under Ex.B-9, and the appellants relied
upon Ex.B-8 and Ex.B-9. As stated supra, the plaintiff, being an adoptive son
of defendant No.1 and her husband, is entitled to a 3/4th share in item No.1 of
the plaint schedule property, and the defendant No.1 is entitled to a 1/4th
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share in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. Since the defendant No.1 is
having a 1/4th share in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property, in my view, at
best she can alienate or gift only her 1/4th share in item No.1 of the plaint
schedule property; she cannot transfer or alienate more than the 1/4th share
which she had in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. Therefore, those
two documents under Ex.B-8 and Ex.B-9 are not binding on the plaintiff to the
extent of his 3/4th share in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. The trial
Court, on an appreciation of the entire evidence on record, rightly came to the
conclusion that the plaintiff herein is entitled to a 3/4th share in item No.1 of the
plaint schedule property.
Accordingly, Point No.2 is answered.
44. Point No.3:
Whether the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court needs
any interference?
In view of my findings on Point Nos.1 and 2, I do not find any illegality in
the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court. Therefore, there is no
need to interfere with the findings arrived at by the trial Court.
45. In the result, the present appeal suit is dismissed, confirming the decree
and judgment dated 22.12.2008 passed in O.S.No.64 of 2005 by the learned I
Additional District Judge, East Godavari, Rajahmundry. On considering the
facts and circumstances of the case, each party shall bear its own costs in the
appeal suit.
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As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall
stand closed
__________________________
V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J.
Date: 17.07.2026
SRT
Whether the order is:
Speaking Reasoned ☑ Reportable Non-reportable ☑
