One of the recurring questions in succession law is whether a probate petition becomes time-barred if it is filed more than three years after the testator’s death. In Sanjay Sharma @ Sanjay Bhardwaj v. Krishnadhan Khaware & Ors., 2026 INSC 708, the Supreme Court clarified that the three-year limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act does not automatically commence from the date of death. Instead, the right to apply for probate arises only when it becomes necessary to seek judicial recognition of the Will.
The judgment also reiterates that probate petitions involving disputed questions of fact should not be rejected summarily under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, thereby providing important guidance on limitation and testamentary proceedings.
Background of the Case
The dispute concerned a Will executed on 15 April 1995 by Shrilal Singhania. After the testator passed away on 7 June 1995, the executor named in the Will, Bhudeo Prasad Singh, filed an application for probate only on 31 August 2005 under Sections 222 and 276 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.
The respondents objected to the probate petition by filing an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, contending that:
- the probate petition had been filed almost ten years after the death of the testator;
- the delay had not been explained; and
- the petition was barred by limitation.
Accepting these objections, the District Judge rejected the probate petition.
The Jharkhand High Court affirmed this decision, agreeing that the unexplained delay rendered the petition time-barred.
The matter eventually reached the Supreme Court.
Issues Before the Supreme Court
The Court examined two principal questions:
- Whether a probate petition filed more than three years after the death of the testator is barred by limitation.
- Whether a probate petition can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC by deciding disputed questions relating to the validity or suspicious nature of the Will itself.
Arguments Before the Supreme Court
Appellant
The appellant argued that:
- the Indian Succession Act does not prescribe any limitation period for filing probate proceedings;
- Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies only when the “right to apply” actually accrues;
- the right to seek probate is a continuing right;
- the cause of action arose only when persons claiming adverse rights acted contrary to the Will.
Therefore, the probate petition filed in August 2005 was well within the limitation because hostile action had arisen only shortly before its filing.
Respondents
The respondents maintained that:
- the right to seek probate accrued immediately upon the death of the testator;
- filing a probate petition after almost ten years was hopelessly delayed;
- the unexplained delay itself justified dismissal of the application.
Does the Indian Succession Act Prescribe Any Limitation?
The Supreme Court first observed that the Indian Succession Act does not prescribe any limitation period whatsoever for:
- filing a probate petition;
- seeking letters of administration; or
- applying for revocation of probate.
Therefore, courts have to examine the Limitation Act. Since no specific article governs probate proceedings, Article 137, the residuary provision, becomes applicable.
Article 137 prescribes:
- Period of limitation: Three years
- When limitation begins: When the right to apply accrues.
However, the Court emphasised that merely applying Article 137 does not answer the real question.
The crucial issue is:
When does the right to apply actually accrue?
Three Purposes of Probate
The Court explained the nature of probate proceedings by identifying their three principal functions. Probate:
- provides judicial confirmation that the Will is genuine;
- recognises the executor appointed under the Will; and
- authorises the executor to administer the estate according to the Will.
Thus, probate is not merely a suit enforcing a private right. Rather, it is judicial recognition of authority granted by the Will. This nature of probate becomes important in determining limitation.
Limitation Does Not Automatically Start From the Testator’s Death
The Supreme Court rejected the approach adopted by the courts below. The Court held that it is incorrect to assume that the limitation period necessarily begins on the date of the testator’s death.
Instead, the Court relied upon earlier decisions, including:
- Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani v. Sajni Prem Lalwani
- Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur v. Kirandeep Kaur
- Sameer Kapoor v. State
The Court reiterated that although Article 137 applies, the “right to apply” does not invariably accrue immediately upon death.
Probate Is a Continuing Right
Perhaps the most important principle reaffirmed in this judgment is that:
The right to seek probate is a continuing right which can be exercised so long as the purpose of the Will survives.
The Court observed that probate becomes necessary only when circumstances require judicial recognition of the executor’s authority.
Accordingly:
- the executor is not legally compelled to obtain probate immediately after death;
- probate may become necessary much later due to disputes over the estate;
- therefore, limitation begins only when such necessity actually arises.
When Did Limitation Begin in This Case?
Applying the above principles, the Court examined the facts. The respondents had taken action contrary to the Will by executing a General Power of Attorney on 8 August 2005.
According to the Court:
- this hostile act created the necessity to seek probate;
- the right to apply accrued at that point;
- the probate petition filed on 31 August 2005 was therefore within limitation.
Thus, despite being filed approximately ten years after the death of the testator, the petition was held to be maintainable.
Delay May Create Suspicion, But Not an Absolute Bar
The Supreme Court also reaffirmed another important distinction. Delay beyond three years:
- may create suspicion regarding the Will;
- may require explanation during trial;
- but does not automatically render the petition barred by limitation.
The Court approved the principle that:
- longer delay invites greater judicial scrutiny;
- however, once execution and attestation of the Will are proved, the mere delay loses significance.
Therefore, suspicion and limitation are distinct legal concepts. A delayed probate petition is not liable to be rejected solely because several years have elapsed.
Scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC
The Court next considered whether the probate petition could have been rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Order VII Rule 11 empowers courts to reject a plaint at the threshold only where statutory grounds clearly exist, including when the suit appears barred by law.
However, the Court emphasised that:
- probate proceedings often involve disputed factual questions;
- issues relating to the genuineness of the Will require evidence;
- limitation may itself depend upon disputed facts.
Consequently, such matters ordinarily cannot be decided summarily.
Courts Cannot Decide Merits at the Threshold
The Supreme Court criticised the approach of the courts below. It was observed that while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11, the High Court had made observations regarding the suspicious nature of the Will itself.
The Court held that such findings were impermissible because:
- evidence had not been recorded;
- witnesses had not been examined;
- execution and attestation had not yet been proved.
Whether a Will is suspicious is a matter requiring a full trial and cannot be determined while deciding a preliminary application for rejection of the plaint.
Limitation Often Becomes a Mixed Question of Law and Fact
The Supreme Court further relied upon earlier precedents including:
- Salim D. Agboatwala v. Shamalji Oddhavji Thakkar
- P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan
The Court reiterated that:
- when the date on which the right accrued is disputed;
- or when knowledge of material facts is in issue;
limitation becomes a mixed question of law and fact.
Such issues require evidence and therefore cannot ordinarily be decided under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal.
It held that:
- the District Judge had wrongly dismissed the probate petition;
- the High Court had committed the same error;
- the probate petition was not barred by limitation;
- disputed questions concerning the Will could not be decided summarily.
Accordingly:
- both impugned judgments were set aside;
- the probate proceedings were restored to the Civil Court for adjudication on merits.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Sanjay Sharma @ Sanjay Bhardwaj v. Krishnadhan Khaware & Ors. (2026 INSC 708) provides an authoritative clarification on limitations in probate proceedings. Rejecting the simplistic assumption that limitation invariably runs from the date of the testator’s death, the Court reaffirmed that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies only when the right to seek probate actually accrues, which depends on the necessity to obtain judicial recognition of the Will. A probate petition filed after three years, or even several years after the testator’s death, may therefore remain maintainable if the need to seek probate arises later.
Equally significant is the Court’s reminder that probate disputes often involve contested factual issues concerning the validity of the Will and the accrual of the cause of action. Such matters cannot ordinarily be decided through a summary rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. By restoring the probate petition for trial, the Court reinforced the principle that procedural rules should not be used to deny adjudication where genuine triable issues exist. The judgment thus offers important guidance to executors, beneficiaries, and courts on balancing limitation principles with the unique nature of testamentary proceedings.
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