Himachal Pradesh High Court
Vinod Verma vs State Of Hp & Ors on 17 July, 2026
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2026:HHC:29330
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 607 of 2026
Reserved on: 8.7.2026
.
Date of Decision: 17.7.2026.
Vinod Verma .... Petitioner
Versus
State of HP & ors. .... Respondents
of
Coram
rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr N.K. Bhalla, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy
Advocate General.
For Respondent No.2 : Nemo.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition to quash
the charge sheet/final report filed under Section 173 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC) corresponding to Section 193 of
Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) in FIR No. 105 of
2022, dated 30.04.2022, registered at Police Station, West
Shimla, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 323, 447, 504, and 506 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed
before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
.
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the informant Vikas Thakur was getting his
house repaired on 29.04.2022. Vinod Verma (present petitioner)
and Tarun Verma went to the informant’s courtyard at about
of
9-10 p.m. and started abusing the labourers. The informant
intervened, and the accused threatened to kill him. The accused
rt
also gave beatings to the informant. They caught hold of Rati
Ram Verma and tried to strangulate him. The matter was
reported to the police. The police registered the FIR and
investigated the matter. Vikas Thakur was medically examined.
The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version,
and after the completion of the investigation, a challan was
prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared before the
Court, they were charged with a commission of offences
punishable under Sections 447, 323, 504 and 506 read with
Section 34 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and
claimed to be tried.
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4. Being aggrieved by the filing of the charge sheet and
framing of the charges, the petitioner/accused Vinod Verma has
.
filed the present petition, asserting that the FIR was registered
for the commission of non-cognizable offences under Sections
323, 504, 506 and 34 of the IPC. The police subsequently
introduced Section 447 of the IPC to make the offences
of
cognizable. The statements of witnesses contradicted each other.
The incident occurred in the informant’s courtyard existing on
rt
Khasra No. 512, which is an Abadi Deh and jointly owned by the
parties. Therefore, the provisions of Section 447 of the IPC would
not apply. The informant had attacked the accused and his family
members. The accused and his family members had also
sustained injuries. Learned Trial Court had no material to frame
the charges and erred in framing the charges against the accused.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and
the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
5. Mr N.K. Bhalla, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the police had initially registered the FIR for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 504 and
506 read with Section 34 of the IPC. All these offences are non-
cognizable. The police subsequently introduced Section 447 to
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make the offences cognizable. The incident had occurred in the
informant’s courtyard located over Abadi Deh, which is jointly
.
owned. There cannot be any trespass on joint land. The
statements of the witnesses contradicted each other on material
particulars, and the prosecution’s case is doubtful. No fruitful
purpose would be served by continuing with the prosecution.
of
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
FIR and consequential proceedings pending before the learned
rt
Trial Court be quashed.
6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
7. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: –
“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to
be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised
some of the principles under which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this::: Downloaded on – 17/07/2026 20:42:27 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:29330Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the.
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwiseto secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines orof
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
rt taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence ormake out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanyingthe FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under anorder of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclosethe commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently::: Downloaded on – 17/07/2026 20:42:27 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:29330improbable based on which no prudent person
can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted)
to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings, and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
of
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.
rt (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)
would be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
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8. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
.
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,
may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processesor to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound natureof
of this authority, the High Court must exercise it
sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are
embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing
the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of
rt
process or where intervention is essential to uphold the
ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and
guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-
empting the Prosecution from building its case before the
Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,
contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminalcomplaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR
represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie
offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.)
the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations;
and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the
dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335).
9. A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State
of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:
“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear
that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of
any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the
ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only::: Downloaded on – 17/07/2026 20:42:27 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:29330empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its
inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new
power on the High Court but rather saves the power which
the High Court already possesses, from before the.
enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very
existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate
for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if theHigh Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it
may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the
proceedings would serve the ends of justice.”
of
10. The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11.
rt
It is undisputed that the learned Trial Court had
framed the charges against the petitioner on 30.05.2025. An
order framing charges is revisable and the period of limitation
for filing the revision has expired. The Petitioner has also sought
the quashing of the charges, but when it was enquired how a
petition for quashing the charges would be maintainable when
an alternative remedy of revision has become barred by
limitation, learned counsel for the petitioner opted not to press
the relief for questioning the charges, which means that the
order framing charges has attained finality.
12. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri)
1181 that once the Competent Court has framed the charges, the
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person aggrieved may invoke the revisional jurisdiction, and the
High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under
.
Section 482 of Cr.P.C., except in rare cases. It was observed on
page 145: –
“7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240
CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been madeof
out — as has been done in the instant case — the person
arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to
contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section
rt
173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any
ground to presume that he had committed any offence forwhich he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied
can quash the charges framed against him. To put it
differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC,
the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not bejustified in relying upon documents other than those referred
to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in
invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC toquash the same except in those rare cases where forensic
exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course.
We hasten to add, even in such exceptional cases, the High
Court can look into only those documents which are
unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevantevidence.” (Emphasis supplied)
13. This Court also held in Reena Devi vs State of H.P.
(2019) 3 Sml.LC 1773 that a petition for quashing the F.I.R. cannot
be filed after the charges have been framed or notice of
accusation has been put. It was observed:
“9. Before arriving at any conclusion to ascertain the
appropriate remedy for an accused, against whom a notice::: Downloaded on – 17/07/2026 20:42:27 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:29330of accusation has been issued, or the charge has been
framed, and who wants to challenge the same, the tour of
the following stages will give the required exposure.
.
Stage-1 The most prominent and the earliest
provision, which ignites the engine of criminal law
and brings it into motion, is the registration of FIR,
under Section 154 of the CrPC. Needless to say, thisprovision confines itself to cognizable offences. After
the investigation, if in the opinion of the Station
House Officer, a case for the prosecution is made out,of
then he files a report under Section 173 of the CrPC.
Any person arraigned as an accused in such an FIR can
seek its quashing from the High Court having
jurisdiction, by filing a petition under section 482
rt
CrPC.
Stage-2 Section 190 of the CrPC, envisages three
situations, upon which the Magistrate can take
cognizance of offence, namely, (a) Upon receiving a
complaint of facts which constitutes such offence; (b)Upon a Police Report of such facts; (c) Upon
information received from any person other than a
Police Officer or upon his own knowledge that such anoffence has been committed. Exercising powers under
Section 204 of CrPC, the Magistrate taking cognisanceof offences, may proceed against an accused, if he
believes in the existence of sufficient grounds for
proceeding. Any person who has been arraigned as anaccused and is aggrieved either by registration of FIR,
filing of charge-sheet, taking cognisance, or issuance
of the process can seek adjudication under Section
482 of the CrPC. Order taking cognisance can also be
challenged by filing a revision petition in the Sessions
Court or High Court. There will be a situation where,
after the filing of the petition for quashing of FIR, in
the meantime, the charge-sheet is filed; the law is no
more res Integra that in all those cases, FIR and all
consequential proceedings can be quashed. An
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2026:HHC:29330stage because the only available statutory remedy is
by invoking the inherent powers of the High Court
under Section 482 of the CrPC.
.
Stage-3 The next stage in criminal proceedings is
similar to the transformation of a caterpillar
emerging as a butterfly, and it begins on the framing
of charges under Sections 211 and 228 of the CrPC oron the issuance of notice of accusation under Section
251 of the CrPC. If not challenged, it shall culminate
under section 229, 241 or 248 of the CrPC only by aof
judgment of acquittal or conviction. Once charges
stand framed or the notice of accusation stands
issued, as the case may be, then the appropriate
remedy to challenge the same is only by filing a
rt
Criminal Revision Petition in the Court where it lies
and not by filing a petition under section 482 CrPC.
Stage 4: The next stage is post-conviction or
acquittal. A judgment of conviction can only be
challenged under Chapter-29 of the CrPC (Sections372 to 394). During the pendency of such an appeal,
the parties may file an application for compounding
of the offences, but such applications in appeal wouldbe within and not without. A convict cannot bypass
Chapter 29 and, instead of filing a statutory appealbefore the First Appellate Court, cannot straightaway
resort to Sections 397, 401 and 482 of the CrPC.
Stage-5 The next stage is challenging the dismissal ofthe appeals of the convicts, and that can be done by
approaching the Courts under its Revisionary
Jurisdiction, under sections 397-401 CrPC. During the
pendency of such Revision Petitions, if parties
compound the offences, then the process is similar to
that in the appeals.
10. The other stages, if any, would also tread a similar
path and cross similar obstacles.
11. The above survey leads to an irresistible conclusion
that once charges have been framed, then the remedy is::: Downloaded on – 17/07/2026 20:42:27 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:29330not to file a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC but to
invoke the revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 &
401 CrPC. However, in the present petition, what is
sought to be quashed is the FIR and all consequential.
proceedings, based upon the out-of-court compromise
entered between the victim and the accused, and the
challenge is not on the merits of charges or accusations.”
14. A similar view was taken in Ramesh Kumar vs. State of
H.P. 2025 SCC Online HP 6561, wherein it was observed:
of
13. Note submitted by the petitioner mentions that out of
forty witnesses, seventeen witnesses have been
examined. The charge-sheet was filed on 22.12.2023, and
rt
the supplementary charge-sheet was filed on 30.08.2024.
There is nothing in the petition as to why the petitioner
has approached this Court after the lapse of two years
from the date of filing of the charge-sheet. The petition is
also silent as to why the order of framing charge was not
challenged by the petitioner and why the prosecution was
permitted to examine the prosecution’s witnesses. The
jurisdiction to quash the F.I.R. is extraordinary and
should be exercised sparingly. It was laid down by the
Delhi High Court in Sanyam Bhushan v. State (NCT of
Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine Del 4545, that the Court should
not entertain the belated petitions for quashing the FIR.
It was observed:
“43. At the outset, I find merit in the submission
made by the learned counsel for the Complainant
that the present set of petitions is liable to be
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, as also
for the failure of the petitioners to avail of their
alternate efficacious remedy in the form of Revision
Petitions under Section 397 of the Cr. P.C.
44. It need not be emphasised that powers under
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.s are discretionary in
nature, and though there may not be a total ban on
the exercise of such power where the situation so::: Downloaded on – 17/07/2026 20:42:27 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:29330warrants, at the same time, there are limitations of
self-restraint that are recognised and followed by
the Courts in exercising this jurisdiction. One such
limitation is where the petitioner had an alternate.
efficacious remedy; however, they did not avail of
the same within the period of limitation and
thereafter filed the petition under Section 482 of theCr. P.C. to overcome the objection of limitation.
Similarly, the Courts have refused to entertain a
petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., where it isof
filed with unexplained delay and laches and in the
meantime, the trial has proceeded.”
14. In the present case, the petitioner has a remedy of
challenging the order framing charge, but he did not do
rt
so within the limitation. He filed the present petition to
circumvent the period of limitation prescribed for
challenging the order of framing the charges.
15. It was laid down in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar,
(1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the
Competent Court has framed the charges, the aggrieved
person may invoke the revisional jurisdiction, and the
High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction
under Section 482 of Cr. P.C., except in rare cases. It was
observed on page 145: —
“7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section
240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been
made out — as has been done in the instant case —
the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved,
invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or
the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet
submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents
sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume
that he had committed any offence for which he is
charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can
quash the charges framed against him. To put it
differently, once charges are framed under Section 240
CrPC, the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would
not be justified in relying upon documents other than::: Downloaded on – 17/07/2026 20:42:27 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:29330those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would
it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare
cases where forensic exigencies and formidable.
compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add
even in such exceptional cases, the High Court can
look into only those documents which areunimpeachable and can be legally translated into
relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied)
16. In the present case, the trial has sufficiently
of
progressed. Statements of seventeen witnesses have
been recorded. Since the petitioner has approached
this Court belatedly, this Court declines to exercise
rt
the inherent jurisdiction and relegates the petitioner
to avail the remedies in the ongoing trial. It is not
necessary to discuss the judgments cited at Bar and
to comment whether the F.I.R. and subsequent
proceedings disclose the commission of an offence
or not.
15. Therefore, the charges cannot be quashed by taking
recourse to the inherent jurisdiction.
16. It was submitted that the offences punishable under
Sections 323, 504 and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC are
non-cognizable, and the police introduced Section 447 of the IPC
subsequently to make the offences cognizable. This submission
cannot be accepted. The State of Himachal Pradesh has amended
the Code of Criminal Procedure and made the offence punishable
under Section 506 of the IPC cognizable and non-bailable. This
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position was recognised by this Court in the State of H.P. Vs. Brij
Lal and others 2011 HHC 10063, wherein it was observed: –
.
7. On behalf of the petitioners, it has been submitted that
as per the notification dated 9.3.1978, Section 506 IPC is
cognizable within the territory of Himachal Pradesh. The
notification dated 9.3.1978 is as follows: –
“No.Home (C) F (8)1/77 – In exercise of powers
vested in him under Section 10 of the Criminal Lawof
Amendment Act, 1932, the Governor, Himachal
Pradesh, is pleased to declare offences under Section
506 of the Indian Penal Code committed within the
rt
territory of Himachal Pradesh as cognizable.”
The notification dated 6.9.1980 issued by the State of
Himachal Pradesh is clear to the effect that Section 506
IPC within the territorial limits of the State of Himachal
Pradesh shall be non-bailable. The notification dated
6.9.1980 is as follows:
“No. Home-II (E)5-10/80. – In exercise of the
powers vested in him, under sub-section (2) of
section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932(Act No. 23 of 1932) and all other powers enabling
him in this behalf, the Governor of HimachalPradesh is pleased to declare that when any offence
which is punishable under section 506 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), is committed withinthe territorial limits of the State of Himachal
Pradesh shall be non-bailable.”
17. Thus, the submission that the offences were non-
cognizable cannot be accepted.
18. It was submitted that there are contradictions in the
FIR and the charge sheet. The witnesses improved upon their
versions, and their testimonies cannot be relied upon. This
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submission will not help the accused. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025
.
SCC OnLine SC 2355, that the High Court cannot quash the F.I.R.
based on the improvements made in the statements. It was
observed: –
“17. The main issue that arises for our analysis is whether
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the High Court was right in quashing the criminal
proceedings against the private respondents primarily on
the ground that the earlier complaints did not mention the
rt
two specific incidents dated 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022,
which were later on added in the FIR and whether the
same would not amount to conducting a ‘mini trial’ whichis clearly prohibited under the scheme of Section 482 of
the Cr. P.C.
xxxx
19. From a bare perusal of the above-mentioned
paragraphs, it can be seen that one of the important
factors that weighed in while allowing the quashing
application of the private respondents was that in the
earlier complaints filed by the appellant, there was no
mention of the events of harassment that happened on
22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later added in the
FIR dated 28.01.2024.
Xxxx
27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law
by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the
credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the
complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it
must be shown that there exists no prima facie case
against the accused persons. In the present case, from the
conjoint reading of the complaints and the FIR, it can be
seen that prime facie allegations of harassment and
demand of dowry are made out, despite that the High
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Court quashed the FIR against the private respondents
primarily on the ground that the earlier two complaints
that were filed by the appellant did not mention the
specific instances that happened on 22.07.2021 and
.
27.11.2022 and the same were later on mentioned in the
FIR only as an afterthought and was a counterblast to the
legal notice sent by respondent no. 1/husband to the
appellant, as she was not coming back to her matrimonial
home. This approach adopted by the High Court, in our
considered opinion, amounts to conducting a mini-trial.
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19. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed simply because
of some contradictions. It is for the learned Trial Court to
rt
evaluate the evidence after the trial and not this Court while
exercising the inherent jurisdiction.
20. It was submitted that the land is located in Abadi Deh,
which is jointly owned by the parties, and a joint owner cannot
commit a trespass onto the land of another joint owner. This
submission will also not help the petitioner. The offence of
trespass is committed against the possession and has nothing to
do with the ownership. It was held more than 100 years ago in
Emperor v. Gopalrao Venkatesh, 1908 SCC OnLine Bom 65: (1908) 7
Cri LJ 309 that a joint owner may be entitled to the possession of
the joint land, but if he takes law into his hands, he is liable for
trespass. It was observed on page 310:
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2….It may be that accused No. 5 has an interest in the
property as a joint owner and that he is entitled to
possession.
.
3. And it may be contended on the authority of Leigh v. Jack
([(1879) 49 L.J.Q.B. 220.]), that he is entitled to have that
possession restored to him in a Civil Court. Nevertheless, a
person with a right is not justified in taking the law intohis own hands, and if he does, he becomes liable for
criminal trespass….
21. Allahabad High Court also took the same view in
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Emperor v. Ram Prasad, 1911 SCC OnLine All 141: ILR (1911) 33 All
773 and observed at page 773:
rt
“…The argument before us has taken the line that RamPrasad, the petitioner (and Bhagwan Das, his servant),
being a joint owner in this grove, had not even, on the
facts proved, committed any trespass on the land in
question. We have heard all that the learned Counsel couldurge on behalf of the petitioners. No precedent was cited
to us in support of the contention that a person who enters
upon land belonging to himself with the intention of doinga wrongful act to a joint owner does not commit trespass.
We know of no authority that carries the case so far as
this. It appears to us that a joint owner of land who enters
upon the land with the intention or knowledge that he wasabout to do an act which was wrongful to his fellow-
owners, does commit trespass….”
22. It was laid down by the Kerala High Court in Anil
Kumar vs State of Kerala Cr. Appeal no. 1129 of 2018 decided on
15.03.2024 that possession and not ownership is relevant under
Section 441 of IPC, and the property entered into by the offender
must be in possession of another. The informant has specifically
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2026:HHC:29330stated that the accused trespassed into the courtyard of his
house, clearly showing that he was in exclusive possession of the
.
house as he had constructed a structure over a portion of Abadi
Deh. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the fact that
the land is jointly owned by the parties.
23. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are
of
false and no such incident had taken place. This submission will
not help the petitioner. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT
rt
of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations
in the complaint as correct. It was observed:
“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a
complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly withcircumspection, and while exercising this power, the
Court must believe the averments and allegations in thecomplaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly
held that, save in exceptional cases where non-
interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the
Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the
stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and
inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely
according to its whims or caprice.”
24. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P.,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent
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2026:HHC:29330
jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or
otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: –
.
“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of theallegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of
quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C.
However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, ifof
taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of
an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the
cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made
in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do
rt
not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a
case against the accused. We are of the considered viewthat the present case would fall under Category-3 of the
categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan
Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court
in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:
“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission
of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 thatonce the charge sheet is filed, the petition for
quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any
merit in this submission, keeping in mind theposition of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7
SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A.
[Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59:
(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the
question of whether the High Court could entertain
the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when
the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the
pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC
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2026:HHC:29330“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the
various sections under which the appellant is
being charged and is to be prosecuted would
show that the same is not made out even prima.
facie from the complainant’s FIR. Even if the
charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single
Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007
SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined
whether the offences alleged to have been
committed by the appellant were prima facie
of
made out from the complainant’s FIR, charge-
sheet, documents, etc. or not.”
25. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
rt
Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-
trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It
was observed on page 397:
“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that
while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court isnot supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference
can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v.
Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379].
The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted
hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings,
while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC,
the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …
7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising
the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very
limited jurisdiction and is required to consider
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2026:HHC:29330further against the accused for which the accused is
required to be tried or not’.”
26. This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan
.
(Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: –
22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of
quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial.
Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.
of
with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court
has to only consider whether any sufficient material is
available to proceed against the accused or not. If
sufficient material is available, the power under Section
rt
482 should not be exercised.
Xxxx
27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law
by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the
credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the
complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it
must be shown that there exists no prima facie case
against the accused persons…”
27. It was held in C.S. Prasad v. C. Satyakumar, 2026 SCC
OnLine SC 50 that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction
cannot go into the genuineness of the allegations or the
reliability, sufficiency or the acceptability of the evidence. It was
observed:
“24. On these lines, it is clear that even though the powers
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. are very wide, their
conferment requires the High Courts to be more cautious
and diligent. While examining any FIR, the High Court,
exercising its power under this provision, cannot embark
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2026:HHC:29330Court must only consider whether there exists any
sufficient material to proceed against the accused or not,
and must not be concerned with the reliability,
sufficiency, or acceptability of the evidence.”
.
28. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to
conduct a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the
FIR are correct or not.
of
29. It is undisputed that the charge sheet has been filed
before the Court. The Court has also framed the charges against
rt
the accused. Thus, the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of
U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the
charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left
to appreciate the same. It was observed:
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is
ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the
FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in theabsence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged
offences, we are of the view that the appellants should
prefer a discharge application before the trial court under
Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We
say so because even according to the State, the
investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be
filed before the competent court. In such circumstances,
the trial court should be allowed to look into the
materials which the investigating officer might have
collected forming part of the charge sheet….”
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2026:HHC:29330
30. Therefore, the present petition cannot be allowed on
this consideration as well.
.
31. No other point was urged.
32. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed.
of
33. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on
the case’s merits.
rt
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
17th July, 2026
(Chander)
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