Madhya Pradesh High Court
Devaswar Trading Private Limited … vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 16 July, 2026
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
1 WP-10900-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
WRIT PETITION No. 10900 of 2026
DEVASWAR TRADING PRIVATE LIMITED FORMERLY KNOWN
DEV FISCAL SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED THROUGH
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE SHARAD KUMAR JOSH
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Amit Lahoti - Advocate alongwith Shri Divakar Vyas - Advocate
for the petitioner.
Shri Ravindra Dixit - Govt. Advocate for the State.
Shri Rajmani Bansal - Advocate for the respondent No.5.
RESERVED ON :- 15/06/2026
DELIVERED ON :- 16/07/2026
ORDER
The present petition, under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, has been filed on 24.03.2026 by the petitioner seeking following
reliefs:-
“i) That, the order annexure P/1 dated 26.07.2019
passed by the respondent No. 3 may kindly be set aside.
ii) That, the ownership rights of the property in
question bearing Survey No. 1139 to 1146 situated at Gram
Mahalgaon may be restored in the name of petitioner firm
and further the same may be mutated in the revenue record.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
2 WP-10900-2026
iii) That, any other suitable direction which this
Hon’ble Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the
case may kindly be passed.”
FACTS
The petitioner, Devaswar Trading Private Limited, formerly known as
Dev Fiscal Services Private Limited, has filed the present petition through its
duly authorized representative vide Annexure P/2.
The present petition arises out of proceedings concerning land situated
at Village Mahalgaon, District Gwalior, bearing Survey Nos.1139, 1140,
1141, 1142, 1143, 1144, 1145 and 1146, ad-measuring a total area of 5.225
hectares. The petitioner company has been in possession of the said land for
several years and has been exercising rights over the same. An application
was submitted by the petitioner before the competent revenue authority
seeking recording of its possession in the revenue records. Upon conducting
due enquiry and after obtaining reports from the Patwari and Revenue
Inspector, both of whom confirmed the petitioner’s possession over the land,
notices were issued to all interested persons and objections were invited. As
no objections were received and the possession of the petitioner stood
established, the competent authority, vide order dated 23.01.2007 (Annexure
P/3) passed in Case No.353/2005-06/B-121, directed entry of the petitioner’s
name in Column No.12 of the revenue records in respect of the aforesaid
survey numbers. Thereafter, the petitioner moved an application under the
relevant provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, including
Sections 109, 110, 169 and 190, seeking conferment of ownership rights on
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
3 WP-10900-2026
the ground that it had been cultivating and possessing the land continuously
for more than three years. Upon issuance of notices and in the absence of
any objection from any interested person, the competent revenue authority,
vide order dated 25.11.2010 (Annexure P/4) passed in Case No. 01/2010-
11/A-46, declared the petitioner as Bhumiswami of the land in question and
directed corresponding entries in the revenue records. Consequently, the
petitioner’s ownership and possession over Survey Nos.1139 to 1146 came to
be duly reflected in the revenue records. Subsequently, on the basis of a
complaint made by a third person, the Collector, Gwalior initiated suo motu
revision proceedings bearing Case No.78/2012-13. The Collector, vide order
dated 12.04.2016 (Annexure P/5), set aside the order dated 25.11.2010 and
directed restoration of the land as Government land in the revenue records.
Aggrieved by the order dated 12.04.2016, the petitioner preferred a revision
before the Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh. The petitioner specifically
contended therein that the order dated 12.04.2016 had been passed in
violation of the principles of natural justice, as no opportunity of hearing had
been granted to the petitioner before adverse orders were passed. The Board
of Revenue accepted the said contention and, vide order dated 27.06.2019
(Annexure P/6), set aside the Collector’s order and remanded the matter for
fresh consideration after providing an adequate opportunity of hearing to all
concerned parties. Pursuant to the remand order dated 27.06.2019, fresh
proceedings were registered before the Collector, Gwalior as Case
No.4/Revision/2019-20. However, by the impugned order dated 26.07.2019,
the Collector once again set aside the order dated 25.11.2010 and held that
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
4 WP-10900-2026
the land bearing Survey Nos.1139 to 1146 constituted Government land,
directing restoration of Government entries in the revenue records. Being
aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the
Commissioner, Gwalior Division. However, the appeal was dismissed vide
order dated 12.07.2021 (Annexure P/7) solely on the ground of
maintainability without examining the merits of the petitioner’s claim. Being
left with no other efficacious remedy, the petitioner was constrained to
invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227 of
the Constitution of India challenging the impugned order dated 26.07.2019.
ARGUMENTS
At the outset, learned counsel submitted that though there is some
delay in filing the present petition, the law in this regard is well settled that
the doctrine of delay and laches is not an inflexible rule and cannot be
mechanically applied where the impugned action is patently illegal, without
jurisdiction or results in manifest injustice. Reliance was placed upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv Dass v. Union of India ,
reported in (2007) 9 SCC 274 , wherein it has been held that delay and laches
is a factor to be considered in exercise of writ jurisdiction but the same is not
an absolute bar and relief may be granted where refusal to interfere would
result in continuing injustice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that each
case must be examined on its own facts and the Court may exercise
jurisdiction where substantial justice so demands. Learned counsel further
placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dehri
Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur , reported in
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
5 WP-10900-2026
(1992) 2 SCC 598 , wherein it was held that the rule relating to delay and
laches is a rule of practice and discretion and not a rule that completely bars
the jurisdiction of the Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where the
impugned action is without jurisdiction or where manifest injustice would
result, the High Court may entertain a petition despite delay. Reliance was
also placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State
of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh , reported in (1991) 4 SCC 1 , wherein it has been
authoritatively held that an order which is void or without jurisdiction is a
nullity in the eyes of law. It was observed that a void order can be challenged
whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced and mere lapse of time
does not confer legality upon an order which is inherently without
jurisdiction. In the present case the very assumption of revisional jurisdiction
by the Collector after an unreasonable lapse of time is under challenge.
Therefore, applying the ratio of Gurdev Singh (supra), the impugned order
being without jurisdiction cannot be protected merely on the ground of delay.
Reliance was further placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India , reported in
(1997) 5 SCC 536 , wherein the Court recognized that where an order is void,
unconstitutional or passed without authority of law, constitutional courts
retain the power to grant relief notwithstanding procedural objections in
appropriate cases. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC , reported in (2013)
1 SCC 353, wherein it was held that delay and laches cannot be used as a
shield by the State where the action complained of is illegal or results in
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
6 WP-10900-2026
deprivation of property rights. The Apex Court observed that the right to
property, though no longer a fundamental right, continues to be a valuable
constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution and Courts
should be slow in denying relief on technical grounds where valuable
property rights are affected. He further relied upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and
Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu , reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108, whrein
while discussing the doctrine of delay and laches, it was observed that the
principle is founded on equity and must be applied with reference to the facts
of each case. It was emphasized that the doctrine is not to be applied
mechanically and substantial justice remains the guiding consideration.
Reliance was also placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ram Chand v. Union of India , reported in (1994) 1 SCC 44 , wherein it was
held that where the State action is arbitrary or results in continuing prejudice
to a citizen, the Court may grant relief despite delay, particularly when
valuable property rights are involved. Thus, he submitted that the revisional
jurisdiction exercised by the Collector, having been invoked after an
unreasonable and unexplained lapse of time, is unsustainable in law.
Consequently, the delay in the exercise of such jurisdiction cannot be made a
ground to non-suit or oust the petitioner.
In furtherance of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner,
adverting to the merits of the case, contended that the impugned order dated
26.07.2019 passed by the Collector, Gwalior is wholly arbitrary, illegal,
without jurisdiction, contrary to the record and unsustainable in law, as it
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
7 WP-10900-2026
proceeds on an erroneous assumption that the land in question constitutes
Government land, while completely disregarding the historical revenue
entries, the lawful proceedings conducted by the competent revenue
authorities, and the rights accrued in favour of the petitioner over a long
period of time.
It was further submitted that the petitioner’s possession over Survey
Nos.1139 to 1146 was duly verified by the Patwari and Revenue Inspector,
who, after conducting spot inspections and revenue enquiries, reported that
the petitioner was in possession of the land. Acting upon such reports and
after issuing notices to all interested persons, the competent revenue
authority passed an order dated 23.01.2007 directing entry of the petitioner’s
name in Column No.12 of the revenue records. The said order attained
finality and was never challenged by any affected person. Subsequently, the
petitioner invoked the provisions of Sections 109, 110, 169 and 190 of the
Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code seeking conferment of Bhumiswami
rights on the basis of continuous cultivation and possession. During the said
proceedings, notices were issued, statements of the concerned persons were
recorded and no objections were raised by any recorded tenure holder or
interested person. Upon consideration of the material available on record, the
competent authority passed the order dated 25.11.2010 declaring the
petitioner as Bhumiswami of the land in question and directed corresponding
entries in the revenue records. The said order remained operative for several
years and was never challenged by the persons in whose names the land was
previously recorded or by their legal representatives.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
8 WP-10900-2026
Elaborating further, learned counsel submitted that one of the principal
grounds adopted by the Collector for setting aside the order dated
25.11.2010, namely that the proceedings had been decided by a Naib
Tehsildar holding charge of the office of the Tehsildar, is wholly
misconceived and contrary to the statutory scheme governing the functioning
of revenue authorities. It was submitted that the officer who passed the order
was functioning as the In-charge Tehsildar and was lawfully discharging the
duties and functions of the office. An officer holding charge of the post of
Tehsildar is competent to exercise all the legal, administrative and quasi-
judicial powers vested in the office of the Tehsildar, unless such powers are
expressly restricted or withdrawn by a specific order issued by the competent
authority. Neither the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code nor any rule
framed thereunder creates any distinction between a regularly appointed
Tehsildar and a Naib Tehsildar who has been validly entrusted with the
charge of the office, so far as the exercise of the statutory powers attached to
that office is concerned. Once an officer is placed in charge of the office of
the Tehsildar, he exercises the jurisdiction attached to that office and is fully
competent to discharge all functions incidental thereto, including
adjudication of applications under the relevant provisions of the Code. The
only exception to the above principle would arise where the Collector or any
competent authority has issued a specific order restricting or excluding the
exercise of any particular statutory or quasi-judicial power by the officer
holding charge. However, in the present case, the Collector has neither
referred to nor produced any notification, administrative order, circular or
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
9 WP-10900-2026
direction indicating that the Naib Tehsildar holding charge of the office was
prohibited from deciding applications for conferment of Bhumiswami rights
under Sections 109, 110, 169 and 190 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue
Code. In the absence of any such restriction, the presumption in law is that
the officer was competent to exercise all powers attached to the office which
he was holding. Thus, the Collector’s finding regarding lack of competence is
founded entirely on assumption and not on any statutory provision or
documentary material. A finding affecting vested rights cannot rest upon
mere conjecture or administrative assumption without reference to any
statutory prohibition.
Learned counsel submitted that the land in question was originally
recorded as “Mafi Atiya Sarkar” in Samvat 1997 and was thereafter granted
as Mafi Atiya (gift) to His Highness Jiwaji Rao Scindia, who cultivated the
land and exercised ownership rights thereon. Consequently, the land came to
be recorded in his name as private landowner, and the subsequent revenue
entry in Samvat 2007 attained finality, having never been challenged by the
State. The petitioner thereafter derived its rights through the lawful
possession and cultivation of the land under the successors of Jiwaji Rao
Scindia, culminating in the conferment of Bhumiswami rights by the
competent revenue authority. Significantly, neither the original recorded
owner nor his legal heirs ever challenged the conferment of ownership rights
in favour of the petitioner, thereby lending further legitimacy to the
petitioner’s claim and the orders passed by the revenue authorities.
It was further submitted that the petitioner derived its rights through
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
10 WP-10900-2026
lawful possession and cultivation over the land and the conferment of
Bhumiswami rights was made after due compliance with the statutory
procedure. The Collector completely ignored the fact that neither the original
recorded tenure holders nor their legal heirs ever disputed the petitioner’s
possession or challenged the conferment of ownership rights in its favour.
The impugned order, therefore, unsettles vested rights which had crystallized
in favour of the petitioner and had remained unquestioned for several years.
It was further submitted that the entire suo motu revision was initiated
solely on the basis of a complaint submitted by a third party having no right,
title or interest in the property and the exercise of revisional jurisdiction at
the instance of a stranger to the proceedings is contrary to the scheme of the
Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code. The Collector failed to appreciate that
where statutory remedies of appeal and revision are available against an
original order, a complaint by a private individual cannot be used as a
substitute for such remedies so as to reopen concluded proceedings after
several years.
It was further submitted that the impugned proceedings are also
vitiated by gross violation of the principles of natural justice, as the Collector
relied upon enquiries, reports and materials which were never supplied to the
petitioner and no effective opportunity was granted to rebut the material
relied upon by the Collector. The petitioner was never afforded an
opportunity to lead evidence, cross-examine the persons whose reports
formed the basis of the adverse findings, or effectively contest the
allegations forming the foundation of the suo motu proceedings. The reliance
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
11 WP-10900-2026
on undisclosed material and ex parte enquiries has caused serious prejudice
to the petitioner and renders the impugned order unsustainable.
Learned counsel further submitted that even assuming, without
admitting, that there were procedural irregularities in the proceedings
culminating in the order dated 25.11.2010, the same could not furnish a
ground for outright extinguishment of the petitioner’s rights. The Collector
travelled far beyond the scope of the original proceedings and declared the
land itself to be Government land, an issue which was never the subject
matter of adjudication before the authority passing the order dated
25.11.2010.
It was further submitted that the Collector exceeded the scope of the
remand order passed by the Board of Revenue, after the Board of Revenue
had set aside the earlier order dated 12.04.2016 and remitted the matter for
fresh adjudication after granting adequate opportunity of hearing to all
concerned parties. However, instead of objectively reconsidering the matter
on the basis of the evidence and contentions advanced by the petitioner, the
Collector merely reiterated his earlier conclusions and once again arrived at
the same result without properly appreciating the evidence available on
record.
Learned counsel places strong reliance upon the Full Bench decision
of this Hon’ble Court in the matter of Ranveer Singh (Dead) through LRs.
Kishori Singh and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2010 (4)
MPLJ 178, wherein it has been authoritatively held that suo motu revisional
powers under Section 50 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code must
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
12 WP-10900-2026
be exercised within a reasonable period and ordinarily within 180 days from
the date of knowledge of the alleged illegality, irregularity or impropriety.
The Full Bench has further held that even where Government land or public
interest is involved, the revisional power cannot be exercised after an
indefinite lapse of time. In the present case, the order conferring
Bhumiswami rights was passed on 25.11.2010 whereas the suo motu revision
proceedings were initiated years thereafter. The impugned order does not
disclose any satisfactory explanation for such extraordinary delay nor does it
record the date on which the alleged illegality came to the knowledge of the
Collector. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction after such prolonged delay
is therefore ex facie barred by limitation and without jurisdiction.
It was also submitted that the petitioner cannot be penalized for any
alleged procedural lapse committed by revenue officials while discharging
their statutory duties and if any irregularity existed in the manner in which
the proceedings were conducted by the concerned revenue authority, the
same cannot be used to divest the petitioner of rights, which had accrued in
its favour pursuant to orders passed by competent authorities acting within
the framework of law. The settled principle is that a litigant should not suffer
for an error attributable to the administration.
Learned counsel further submitted that the Collector has committed a
manifest error in proceeding on the assumption that the petitioner company,
being a juristic entity, was incapable of acquiring Bhumiswami rights under
the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code. The expression
“person” used in the terms defined by the Code is governed by the definition
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
13 WP-10900-2026
contained in the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act. In that context, it
cannot be disputed that a bona fide agriculturist could even be a company or
an association of persons. Thus, the finding is contrary to the statutory
definition of the term “person” contained in Section 2(31) of the Madhya
Pradesh General Clauses Act, which expressly provides that the expression
“person” shall include any company, association or body of individuals,
whether incorporated or not. Therefore, wherever the provisions of the
Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code confer rights, impose liabilities, or
recognize legal status upon a “person”, such expression necessarily includes
a company unless the context otherwise requires..
It was further submitted that the petitioner is a duly incorporated
company and is therefore a juristic person recognized by law. Merely
because the petitioner is a corporate entity cannot be a ground to deny the
benefits flowing from the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue
Code. Agricultural operations can lawfully be carried out through
employees, agents, representatives or persons acting under the authority of a
company, and such cultivation cannot be disregarded solely because the
recorded occupant is a corporate entity. More so, the stand of the
State/Collector is not that no agricultural activities were being carried out by
the petitioner; rather, it is that, being a company and not a “person”, the
petitioner could not acquire Bhumiswami rights under the Code. The
impugned order, insofar as it proceeds on the premise that the petitioner
company could not have acquired rights under the Code merely because it is
a company, is contrary to Section 2(31) of the Madhya Pradesh General
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
14 WP-10900-2026
Clauses Act and is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.
In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is submitted that the impugned
order dated 26.07.2019 suffers from jurisdictional error, violation of the
principles of natural justice, misreading of the revenue records, non-
consideration of material evidence, and patent illegality in the exercise of
revisional powers under Section 50 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue
Code. The impugned order is therefore liable to be quashed and set aside and
the rights of the petitioner in respect of the land bearing Survey Nos. 1139 to
1146, Village Mahalgaon, District Gwalior deserve to be restored.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted
that the present writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated
26.07.2019 (Annexure P/1) passed by the respondent No.3/Collector,
Gwalior in Revision Case No.4/Revision/2019-20, whereby, in exercise of
powers conferred under Section 50 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue
Code, 1959, the respondent No.3 set aside the order dated
25.11.2010 (Annexure P/4) passed by the respondent No.4, Tehsildar,
Gwalior, and directed that the land bearing Survey Nos.1139 admeasuring
2.769 hectares, 1140 admeasuring 0.063 hectare, 1141 admeasuring 0.209
hectare, 1142 admeasuring 0.930 hectare, 1143 admeasuring 0.031 hectare,
1144 admeasuring 0.084 hectare, 1145 admeasuring 1.097 hectares and 1146
admeasuring 0.082 hectare, having a total area of 5.225 hectares, be restored
in the name of the Government.
It is the petitioner’s case that, by order dated 23.01.2007 (Annexure
P/3) passed in Case No.353/2005-06/B-121, the Tehsildar directed entry of
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
15 WP-10900-2026
the petitioner’s name in Column No.12 of the revenue records on the basis of
reports submitted by the Patwari and Revenue Inspector regarding its alleged
possession over the land and after issuance of notices to the interested
persons. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred an application under Sections
109, 110 and 190 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code seeking
conferment of ownership rights under Section 169 of the Code, pursuant to
which the Tehsildar passed an order dated 25.11.2010 (Annexure P/4)
declaring the petitioner as Bhumiswami of the land in question.
Subsequently, on the basis of a complaint, the Collector initiated suo motu
revision proceedings and, by order dated 12.04.2016 (Annexure P/5) , set
aside the order dated 25.11.2010 (Annexure P/4) and restored the land in the
name of the Government. Although the said order was remanded by the
Board of Revenue on the ground that adequate opportunity of hearing had
not been afforded to the petitioner, upon remand the Collector, after granting
proper opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties, again passed the order
dated 26.07.2019 (Annexure P/1) restoring the land in the name of the
Government. The appeal preferred by the petitioner before the
Commissioner, Gwalior Division, also came to be dismissed on 12.07.2021
(Annexure P/7) on the ground of maintainability, whereafter the present writ
petition has been filed.
Learned counsel further submitted that the present writ petition is
wholly misconceived, devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed, as the
principal issue for consideration is whether the Tehsildar had the jurisdiction
and legal competence to pass the orders dated 23.01.2007 and 25.11.2010,
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
16 WP-10900-2026
whereby the petitioner’s name was first entered in Column No.12 of the
revenue records and thereafter ownership rights were conferred in its favour.
Both the aforesaid orders were passed wholly without jurisdiction, contrary
to the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code and settled
principles of law, and are, therefore, void ab initio.
Learned counsel further submitted that it is a settled legal position that
the erstwhile Gwalior State was governed by its own revenue laws prior to
Independence and the land recorded as “Mafi Atiya Sarkar” meants that such
lands always belonged to the State and were never transferable in favour of
private individuals or entities. The revenue records, including the Khasras of
Samvat 1997 (1940), Samvat 2007 (1950) and Samvat 2008 (1951),
consistently recorded the land in question as “Mafi Atiya Sarkar” , clearly
establishing its character as Government land. Upon the merger of the
erstwhile Gwalior State, such land vested in the State Government and no
order was ever passed by the competent authority transferring the said land in
favour of the petitioner. Therefore, mere recording of the petitioner’s alleged
possession in Column No.12 of the revenue records and the subsequent
declaration of the petitioner as Bhumiswami by the Tehsildar could not
confer any valid title or ownership upon the petitioner. The said orders were
patently illegal, arbitrary and passed without jurisdiction, causing serious
prejudice to the rights and interests of the State. Accordingly, when the
illegality came to the notice of the Collector, he rightly exercised the
revisional jurisdiction vested in him under Section 50 of the Madhya Pradesh
Land Revenue Code and corrected the patent illegality by restoring the land
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
17 WP-10900-2026
in the name of the Government.
It was further submitted that a bare reading of the order dated
25.11.2010 (Annexure P/4) passed by the Tehsildar reveals that there is no
discussion whatsoever regarding the legal basis of the petitioner’s alleged
possession over the land and no documentary evidence establishing lawful
possession, title or entitlement of the petitioner was produced or considered.
Likewise, the earlier order dated 23.01.2007 (Annexure P/3) directing entry
of the petitioner’s name in Column No.12 was also passed without any legal
foundation. The proceedings before the Tehsildar were conducted in
complete disregard of the statutory provisions governing Government land
and did not disclose any legal basis for conferring Bhumiswami rights upon
the petitioner. The Collector, therefore, rightly exercised revisional
jurisdiction to rectify the manifest illegality committed by the Tehsildar.
It was further submitted that although the earlier order of the Collector
dated 12.04.2016 (Annexure P/5) was set aside by the learned Board of
Revenue, the same was only on the limited ground of violation of the
principles of natural justice and the Board of Revenue neither adjudicated
upon the merits of the controversy nor affirmed the legality of the orders
passed by the Tehsildar. Pursuant to the remand, the Collector granted full
and effective opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and all other concerned
parties and thereafter, upon due consideration of the entire material available
on record, passed the impugned order dated 26.07.2019. Consequently, the
petitioner’s plea alleging violation of the principles of natural justice is
wholly untenable and deserves to be rejected.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
18 WP-10900-2026
It was further submitted that while examining the legality of the
proceedings before the Tehsildar, the Collector also recorded specific
findings regarding the lack of jurisdiction of the concerned Tehsildar. It was
found that, at the relevant point of time, the Tehsildar was merely holding
temporary administrative charge and was not legally competent to pass
orders declaring the petitioner as Bhumiswami or directing mutation of
ownership in its favour. The Collector further noticed several serious
procedural irregularities and jurisdictional defects in the proceedings before
the Tehsildar, which rendered the orders dated 23.01.2007 and 25.11.2010
wholly unsustainable in law.
The respondents also raised a preliminary objection regarding delay
and laches, submitting that the impugned order was passed in July, 2019
whereas the present writ petition has been filed only in the year 2026. No
satisfactory explanation has been furnished for such extraordinary delay and
the plea based on the COVID-19 pandemic cannot justify approaching the
Court after several years. It was therefore submitted that the petitioner, being
guilty of gross delay and laches, is not entitled to invoke the discretionary
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. On these
grounds, they prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Before examining the merits of the controversy, this Court deems it
appropriate to deal with the preliminary objection raised by the respondents
regarding delay and laches.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
19 WP-10900-2026
According to the respondents, the impugned order was passed on
26.07.2019 whereas the present writ petition has been filed in the year 2026
and, therefore, deserves to be dismissed on the ground of unexplained delay.
This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid objection, as the record reveals
that immediately, upon being aggrieved by the order dated 26.07.2019, the
petitioner did not remain inactive or acquiesce in the impugned action. On
the contrary, the petitioner promptly invoked the remedy which it bona fide
believed to be available under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Land
Revenue Code by preferring an appeal before the Commissioner, Gwalior
Division and the said proceedings remained pending and were actively
prosecuted by the petitioner until their culmination on 12.07.2021, when the
appeal came to be dismissed solely on the ground of maintainability without
any adjudication on the merits of the controversy. The period spent by a
litigant in pursuing a remedy before a forum, which ultimately declines to
entertain the matter on a technical ground is a relevant consideration while
examining an objection based on delay and laches, particularly where the
litigant has acted with due diligence and in good faith. It is therefore,
apparent that the petitioner was continuously asserting its rights and pursuing
available legal remedies. The conduct of the petitioner does not indicate
negligence, indifference or abandonment of its claim, rather, the material on
record demonstrates a bona fide effort to obtain redress through legal
proceedings, which the petitioner genuinely believed to be maintainable. The
period consumed in such proceedings cannot be viewed in isolation while
considering the question whether the petitioner approached this Court within
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
20 WP-10900-2026
a reasonable time.
This Court also cannot lose sight of the fact that a substantial part of
the intervening period coincided with the unprecedented outbreak of the
COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted normal judicial functioning
throughout the country. The extraordinary situation created by the pandemic
was judicially recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in In Re:
Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.
3 of 2020, wherein the period of limitation prescribed under general and
special laws was directed to stand extended in order to obviate hardship to
litigants, who were unable to effectively pursue legal remedies during the
said period. The benefit flowing from the aforesaid orders cannot be ignored
while examining the present objection.
Apart from the aforesaid circumstances, the challenge raised in the
present petition pertains to the legality of the exercise of suo motu revisional
jurisdiction by the Collector after a considerable lapse of time and concerns
valuable rights in immovable property. The petitioner alleged that the
impugned order suffers from jurisdictional infirmities and has resulted in
divesting it of rights which had accrued pursuant to orders passed by
competent revenue authorities. The consequences of the impugned order are
not confined to a past event but continue to operate against the petitioner by
affecting its recorded rights in respect of the property in question. In such
circumstances, the Court is required to adopt a pragmatic and justice-oriented
approach rather than a purely technical one.
It is equally significant that no material has been placed before this
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
21 WP-10900-2026
Court to demonstrate that any third-party rights have intervened during the
intervening period or the respondents have altered their position to their
detriment on account of the delay. No prejudice has been shown to have
been caused to the respondents by reason of the petitioner approaching this
Court after pursuing alternate remedies. On the contrary, refusal to examine
the challenge on merits would have the effect of perpetuating an order,
which is alleged to be without jurisdiction and contrary to law.
It is a settled principle that the rule relating to delay and laches is not a
rule of limitation, but a rule of discretion founded on considerations of
equity. The doctrine cannot be applied mechanically so as to defeat
substantial justice, particularly where the litigant has been bona fide pursuing
available remedies and where the challenge raises questions touching upon
jurisdiction and continuing civil consequences.
Apart from the above, the challenge raised in the present petition goes
to the very root of the jurisdiction exercised by the Collector and the
petitioner has questioned the legality of the exercise of suo motu revisional
powers after an inordinate lapse of time and has alleged violation of settled
principles governing Section 50 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code.
It is well settled that where an order is alleged to be without jurisdiction,
arbitrary or productive of continuing civil consequences, the rule of delay
and laches cannot be applied in a rigid or mechanical manner.
I n Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District Board,
Bhojpur, (supra) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the doctrine of delay
and laches is a rule of discretion and not a rule of limitation and the relief
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
22 WP-10900-2026
may be granted notwithstanding delay where refusal to interfere would result
in perpetuation of illegality or manifest injustice. Similarly, in Shiv Dass v.
Union of India, (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated that delay by itself
cannot defeat a claim where substantial justice requires examination of the
matter on merits. The principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions are fully
attracted to the facts of the present case.
This Court also cannot lose sight of the fact that the impugned order
has the effect of depriving the petitioner of valuable rights in immovable
property and directs restoration of the land in the name of the Government.
The consequences of the impugned order are continuing in nature and
continue to affect the petitioner. No third-party rights have intervened during
the intervening period and no prejudice has been demonstrated by the
respondents on account of the delay. In such circumstances, this Court is of
the considered opinion that the objection regarding delay and laches does not
constitute a valid ground to non-suit the petitioner. The preliminary objection
is accordingly rejected.
Having held that the writ petition deserves consideration on merits,
this Court proceeds to examine the legality/illegality of the impugned order.
Status of the Petitioner as a Company
This Court finds considerable substance in the contention advanced on
behalf of the petitioner regarding its legal status as a company and its
competence to acquire and enjoy rights under the provisions of the Madhya
Pradesh Land Revenue Code, as a careful reading of the impugned order
reveals that the Collector has substantially proceeded on the premise that the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
23 WP-10900-2026
petitioner, being a corporate entity incorporated under the Companies Act,
could not have acquired rights flowing from possession, cultivation or
occupancy of agricultural land. In the considered opinion of this Court, such
an approach is founded upon an erroneous understanding of the legal status
of a company and is contrary to the statutory framework governing the
interpretation of State enactments.
It is a settled principle of law that a company, upon incorporation,
acquires a legal personality separate and distinct from its shareholders,
directors and officers. The doctrine of separate corporate personality,
authoritatively is recognized in a historical case of Salomon v. Salomon &
Co. Ltd., [1897] AC 22, which has been consistently accepted and applied by
Indian Courts. The Supreme Court in Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commissioner of
Income Tax, AIR 1955 SC 74 , and State Trading Corporation of India Ltd.
v. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1963 SC 1811 , has reiterated that a
company is a juristic person recognized by law and is capable of holding
property, acquiring rights and incurring liabilities in its own name. Thus,
once incorporated, a company is treated in law as a legal person capable of
owning and possessing property independent of the individuals who
constitute it.
The statutory position is made even more explicit by Section 2(31) of
the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act, which provides that the expression
“person” includes any company, association or body of individuals, whether
incorporated or not, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or
context. The definition is intentionally broad and inclusive. Consequently,
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
24 WP-10900-2026
wherever the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code confers rights, imposes
obligations or recognizes legal status in favour of a “person”, such
expression must ordinarily be construed to include a company unless the
statute expressly excludes corporate entities from its operation.
No provision of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code has been
brought to the notice of this Court, which excludes a company from the
ambit of the expression “person” or disentitles a corporate entity from
claiming rights recognized under the Code. In the absence of any such
statutory prohibition, it would be impermissible to read into the statute a
restriction which the Legislature itself has consciously omitted. The
interpretation adopted by the Collector effectively introduces a
disqualification which finds no place in the statutory scheme and is,
therefore, unsustainable.
The reasoning adopted by the Collector appears to proceed on the
assumption that agricultural operations can be undertaken only by a natural
human being and a company, being an artificial legal person, is incapable of
cultivating land. Such reasoning overlooks the fundamental principle that a
juristic person necessarily acts through human agency. Every act of a
company is performed through its directors, officers, servants, employees,
agents or authorized representatives. The law has consistently recognized
that acts performed by such persons within the scope of their authority are, in
the eyes of law, acts of the company itself.
Agricultural activities stand on no different footing. Cultivation may
lawfully be carried out through labourers, employees, managers or agents
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
25 WP-10900-2026
acting under the authority and control of a company. The fact that the
physical acts of cultivation are performed through human agency does not
alter the legal character of the possession or cultivation exercised by the
company. To hold otherwise would lead to the anomalous conclusion that a
company may own property, but can never cultivate or manage it, a
proposition unsupported either by statute or by settled principles of law.
The material available on record further indicates that the original
proceedings were not founded merely upon the corporate status of the
petitioner, but upon findings regarding actual possession, cultivation and
enjoyment of the land. Reports submitted by the Patwari and Revenue
Inspector, spot inspections, Panchanama proceedings and revenue entries
were all directed towards determining whether the petitioner was in
possession and exercising control over the land. The relevant consideration
under the statutory provisions was the existence of possession and cultivation
and not the corporate character of the person asserting such rights.
The Collector therefore committed a manifest error in law by treating
the petitioner’s status as a company as a circumstance disentitling it from
acquiring rights under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code. Such
reasoning is directly contrary to Section 2(31) of the Madhya Pradesh
General Clauses Act, ignores the well-established doctrine of separate
corporate personality and proceeds on an interpretation which finds no
support in the statutory provisions. Once it is accepted that a company is a
juristic person recognized by law and the expression “person” includes a
company, the petitioner’s claim was required to be examined on the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
26 WP-10900-2026
touchstone of the statutory requirements relating to possession, cultivation
and acquisition of rights under the Code, and not on the basis of an
assumption that a corporate entity is inherently incapable of acquiring such
rights. [Pls. see:- Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. vs. State of M.P. & Others
reported in 1984 MPLJ 40].
The undisputed record reveals that the petitioner’s possession over the
land bearing Survey Nos. 1139, 1140, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1144, 1145 and
1146 situated at Village Mahalgaon, District Gwalior was recognized by the
competent revenue authority vide order dated 23.01.2007 passed after
obtaining reports from the Patwari and Revenue Inspector and after issuing
notices to all concerned persons. The said order remained unchallenged and
attained finality.
Subsequently, the petitioner sought conferment of Bhumiswami rights
under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code. After
conducting due enquiry and following the prescribed procedure, the
competent authority passed the order dated 25.11.2010 declaring the
petitioner as Bhumiswami of the land in question. Significantly, neither the
recorded tenure holders nor their legal representatives questioned the
aforesaid order. Consequently, rights accrued in favour of the petitioner and
remained operative for several years.
The record further discloses that the suo motu revisional proceedings
were initiated after a substantial lapse of time and the Collector neither
recorded the date on which the alleged illegality came to his knowledge nor
assigned any satisfactory reason for invoking revisional jurisdiction after
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
27 WP-10900-2026
several years. The Full Bench of this Court in Ranveer Singh (Dead) through
LRs. Kishori Singh and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, ( supra) has
categorically held that suo motu revisional powers under Section 50 of the
Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code are required to be exercised within a
reasonable period and ordinarily within one hundred and eighty days from
the date of knowledge of the alleged illegality. The exercise of revisional
jurisdiction in the present case is therefore clearly contrary to the law laid
down by the Full Bench.
This Court also finds substance in the contention advanced on behalf
of the petitioner that the Collector committed a manifest error in holding that
the order dated 25.11.2010 was without jurisdiction merely because it had
been passed by the Naib Tehsildar, while holding charge of the office of the
Tehsildar. The Collector has not referred to any provision of the Madhya
Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, any statutory rule, notification, circular
or administrative instruction which either prohibits an In-charge Tehsildar
from exercising the powers of the Tehsildar or excludes from his jurisdiction
the adjudication of applications under Sections 109, 110, 169 and 190 of the
Code.
Equally, no order of the Collector placing any restriction upon the
exercise of such powers by the officer concerned has been brought on
record. In the absence of any such statutory or administrative embargo, an
officer who has been lawfully entrusted with the charge of the office of the
Tehsildar is competent to exercise all the statutory, administrative and quasi-
judicial powers attached to that office. The authority exercised by such an
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
28 WP-10900-2026
officer flows not from his substantive designation as Naib Tehsildar but from
the office of the Tehsildar, the charge whereof has been validly entrusted to
him. It is a settled principle of administrative law that an officer placed in
current charge of a statutory office is entitled to discharge all functions
attached to that office unless the governing statute or a lawful order expressly
provides otherwise. Jurisdiction cannot be denied merely on the basis of
nomenclature or the fact that the officer was holding current charge.
Acceptance of the contrary proposition would render every judicial or quasi-
judicial order passed by an officer holding current charge susceptible to
challenge solely on that ground, leading to uncertainty in public
administration and defeating the very purpose of making in-charge
arrangements. Since the Collector has failed to point out any legal provision
restricting the competence of the In-charge Tehsildar and has proceeded
merely on an unsupported assumption, the finding regarding lack of
jurisdiction cannot be sustained. Consequently, the order dated 25.11.2010
cannot be held to be invalid merely because it was passed by the In-charge
Tehsildar, and the reasoning adopted by the Collector on this aspect is legally
untenable and is hereby set aside.
This Court further finds that while exercising revisional jurisdiction,
the Collector travelled beyond the scope of the original proceedings. Instead
of confining himself to the legality of the order conferring Bhumiswami
rights, the Collector proceeded to determine the nature and title of the land
itself and declared the same to be Government land. Such an adjudication
was beyond the scope of the proceedings and could not have been
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
29 WP-10900-2026
undertaken while exercising limited revisional powers under Section 50 of
the Code.
The respondents have placed considerable reliance upon certain
historical revenue entries describing the land as “Mafi Atiya Sarkar” .
However, this Court is unable to accept the contention that the mere
existence of such historical entries conclusively establishes present
Government ownership over the land in question. The expression “Mafi
Atiya Sarkar” is an old revenue nomenclature traceable to the revenue
administration of the erstwhile princely State and ordinarily denotes land
which was originally associated with a revenue-free grant, concession or
assignment emanating from the State. Such an entry may indicate the
historical origin of the land, but it does not, by itself, constitute conclusive
proof of title in favour of the Government.
Apart from the aforesaid, one significant circumstance emerging from
the revenue entries relied upon by the State is that Column No. 5 specifically
records the name of the erstwhile Ruler, Shrimat Maharaj Major Sir
Jiwajirao Scindia. A plain reading of the said entry, if accepted in its
ordinary and natural sense, clearly indicates that the land was held by the
Ruler in his personal capacity and was exempted from payment of land
revenue. The erstwhile Maharaja, being the sovereign authority of the
Gwalior State, exercised plenary powers over the administration of the State,
including the power to own and manage private properties, realize land
revenue, and exempt certain lands from the payment of revenue.
Consequently, it was well within his authority to retain lands as his private
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
30 WP-10900-2026
property and exempt them from the ordinary incidence of land revenue.
A further examination of the revenue records pertaining to the years
1940-1950 reveals that there is no indication whatsoever that the lands in
question were recorded as Muafi (revenue-free grant) or Inam (grant-in-aid).
Had the lands been of such character, they would ordinarily have been
governed by the provisions of the Gwalior Kanoon Maal (Revenue
Administration Code) or the Kawayad Maufi Dauran (Rules Governing
Exempt Grants). Significantly, it is also not the case of the State that the
lands originally belonged to any other person and that the name of the
erstwhile Ruler was fraudulently or erroneously entered in the revenue
records merely to secure exemption from payment of land revenue. Equally,
no material has been placed on record to establish that the lands in question
vested in or stood transferred to the Dominion of India or the successor State
by virtue of the Instrument of Accession executed by the erstwhile Ruler.
There is also no material to demonstrate that the lands were held by Shrimat
Maharaj Major Sir Jiwajirao Scindia in the capacity of a proprietor so as to
attract the provisions of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates,
Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950.
Thus, when the record does not disclose that the lands in question
were ever transferred to or vested in the State, and the material available
indicates that they were held by the erstwhile Ruler in his individual
capacity, it cannot be presumed that the lands automatically merged with or
vested in the State Government. Neither the provisions of the Madhya Bharat
Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 (Act No. 66 of 1950) nor
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
31 WP-10900-2026
those of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated
Lands) Act, 1950 have been shown to have operated so as to divest the
erstwhile Ruler of such private ownership or to vest the lands in the State. In
the absence of any statutory vesting or any specific legal instrument
evidencing such transfer, the State cannot claim ownership merely on the
basis of assumption or inference.
Furthermore, the revenue entries themselves admittedly depict the
lands as standing in the name of the Scindia family in the capacity of
Bhumiswami. Once the revenue records recognize the lands as privately
owned and record the erstwhile Ruler or his successors as Bhumiswami, the
conclusion reached by the Collector that the lands belong to the State
Government is wholly unsupported by the revenue record. The findings
recorded by the Collector, therefore, are contrary to the documentary
evidence available on record and suffer from patent perversity and legal
infirmity.
The legal character of land must be determined not merely from
isolated historical entries but from the entirety of the revenue record,
subsequent settlements, mutations, recognition of rights by competent
authorities and other legally relevant materials. A historical entry describing
land as “Mafi Atiya Sarkar” cannot automatically override subsequent
revenue entries which have remained in existence for decades and have not
been challenged before any competent forum. Nor can such an entry
dispense with the requirement of establishing title in accordance with law.
Significantly, the State has not placed on record any sanad, grant,
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
32 WP-10900-2026
resumption order, settlement record, title proceeding or adjudication by a
competent authority conclusively demonstrating that the land continued to
vest in the Government. Equally significant is the fact that the State never
instituted any independent proceedings seeking declaration of title,
cancellation of revenue entries standing in favour of private persons, or
correction of the revenue record through an appropriate forum.
In these circumstances, the Collector could not have treated the
historical expression “Mafi Atiya Sarkar” as conclusive proof of Government
ownership, whether of the erstwhile Gwalior State or, subsequently, of the
State Government, and on that basis alone could not had proceeded to
declare the land to be Government land. Such a course effectively amounted
to adjudication of disputed questions of title in collateral revisional
proceedings arising out of an order granting Bhumiswami rights. The scope
of the revisional proceedings was confined to examining the legality and
propriety of the order under challenge and did not extend to rendering a final
declaration regarding title to the land itself. The Collector could not indirectly
accomplish in revisional proceedings what the State itself never sought to
achieve through independent legal proceedings. Consequently, the reliance
placed upon the historical entry “Mafi Atiya Sarkar” cannot sustain the
conclusion reached in the impugned order.
This Court further finds that the claim set up by Respondent No. 5,
Shivajirao Education Society, is founded upon an alleged registered deed of
gift executed in the year 1959 by the erstwhile Ruler, Shrimat Maharaj
Jiwajirao Scindia. The Board of Revenue, while passing the order dated
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
33 WP-10900-2026
27.06.2019, specifically recorded in paragraph 10 that, despite placing
reliance upon the said registered deed of gift, the Society had never taken
any steps to have its name mutated in the revenue records on the strength
thereof. The Board further recorded that the Society was not found to be in
possession of the land in dispute and, while reserving its independent rights,
expressly granted liberty to Respondent No. 5 to initiate separate proceedings
before the competent authority in accordance with law on the basis of the
registered deed of gift.
The liberty so granted by the Board of Revenue was intended to enable
Respondent No. 5 to establish its alleged title before the competent authority
in appropriate proceedings. However, instead of availing the statutory
remedy specifically reserved in its favour, Respondent No. 5 chose to invoke
the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Even the writ petition instituted by
Respondent No. 5 was ultimately dismissed for want of prosecution. Thus,
Respondent No. 5 neither pursued the remedy expressly granted by the
Board of Revenue nor diligently prosecuted the writ proceedings initiated by
it. Having failed to avail the proper remedy in accordance with law,
Respondent No. 5 cannot now seek adjudication of its disputed claim of title
in the present proceedings. Questions relating to title arising out of a
registered deed of gift, particularly where mutation has never been effected
and possession itself is disputed, necessarily require adjudication by the
competent authority upon appreciation of evidence and cannot ordinarily be
decided in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
What is, however, of considerable significance is the very foundation
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
34 WP-10900-2026
of the claim advanced by Respondent No.5. The Society itself asserts that the
land in question was gifted to it by the erstwhile Ruler, Shrimat Maharaj
Jiwajirao Scindia, under a registered deed of gift executed in the year 1959.
Such a plea necessarily proceeds on the premise that the donor possessed
lawful title and legal competence to transfer the property. A registered deed
of gift can be executed only by a person having transferable ownership rights
over the property sought to be gifted. Consequently, the stand consistently
taken by Respondent No. 5 itself constitutes a clear admission that the land
belonged to the erstwhile Ruler in his individual and personal capacity and
that he was competent to deal with the same as its owner. This circumstance
lends substantial support to the petitioner’s contention that the land was the
personal property of the Scindia family and not a property vested in the State.
The existence of the unchallenged registered deed of gift, coupled
with the stand taken by Respondent No. 5, constitutes a relevant
circumstance while determining the true nature and character of the property.
A person who has obtained orders from competent authorities acting
within their jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be deprived of such rights merely
because the authorities subsequently choose to revisit the matter after several
years.
For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is satisfied that the impugned
order dated 26.07.2019 suffers from jurisdictional error, arbitrary exercise of
revisional powers, non-compliance with the law laid down by the Full Bench
of this Court, and misappreciation of the material available on record. The
impugned order therefore cannot be sustained in law.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:17337
35 WP-10900-2026
Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated
26.07.2019 passed by the Collector, Gwalior in Revision Case No.
4/Revision/2019-20 is hereby quashed. Consequently, the order dated
25.11.2010 conferring Bhumiswami rights upon the petitioner shall stand
restored and all consequential revenue entries flowing therefrom shall also
stand revived. The respondents are directed to carry out necessary
corrections in the revenue records in accordance with law within a period of
thirty days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
The writ petition stands allowed. No order as to costs.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE)
JUDGE
Digitally signed by PAWAN KUMAR
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH AT
GWALIOR,
pwn*
2.5.4.20=b864d1ab4ace2215bfcf3ab301c34d631287f1b1cd
d90b4a49f265f02d9d593f, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA
PRADESH BENCH AT GWALIOR,CID – 7064434,
postalCode=474001, st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=61b9d129971d2ea4fd4455ed49ea436ea65e
26164beeed89153191c56e98ce21, cn=PAWAN KUMAR
Date: 2026.07.16 17:55:02 +05’30’
