Punjab-Haryana High Court
Ms Balaji Ispat And Anr vs Debts Recovery Tribunal Iii, … on 13 July, 2026
Author: Jasgurpreet Singh Puri
Bench: Jasgurpreet Singh Puri
CWP-20978-2026 (O&M) -1-
138
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP-20978-2026 (O&M)
Date of decision: 13.07.2026
M/S BALAJI ISPAT AND ANOTHER
...Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL-III, CHANDIGARH AND OTHERS
...Respondent(s)
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASGURPREET SINGH PURI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV BERRY
Present:- Mr. Anand Chhibbar, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Vaibhav Sahni, Advocate and
Mr. Inderjeet Singh, Advocate for the petitioners.
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JASGURPREET SINGH PURI, J.
1. The present Civil Writ Petition has been filed under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of a writ in the nature of
certiorari for quashing the impugned order dated 23.06.2026 (Annexure P-10),
whereby the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chandigarh has dismissed the
Securitization Application No.240 of 2026, along with the sale notice
dated 19.05.2026, the auction conducted on 24.06.2026 and all subsequent
and consequential actions undertaken by the respondent-Bank under the
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the SARFAESI Act‘) and
also the subsequent sale notice dated 25.06.2026 (Annexure P-13), with a
further prayer for directing the respondents to refrain from taking any coercive
action against the petitioners during the pendency of the present petition.
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2. Mr. Anand Chhibbar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of the petitioners submitted that petitioner No.1, which is a partnership concern,
had availed financial facilities by way of a loan from the respondent-Bank and
petitioner No.2 is also one of the partners as well as one of the mortgagors of
the property, the details whereof have been described in paragraph No.3 of the
writ petition. The petitioners being aggrieved by the action of the respondent-
Bank, whereby the Bank had earlier issued a notice dated 04.08.2021 under
Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, had moved a representation dated
15.09.2021 under Section 13(3-A) of the SARFAESI Act but the same was
neither replied to nor decided by the respondent-Bank and in this way, the
respondent-Bank failed to reply to the objections raised under Section 13(3-A)
of the SARFAESI Act and therefore, the petitioners filed a Securitization
Application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chandigarh, which was
allowed vide order dated 21.08.2025 (Annexure P-4) on the ground that the
aforesaid objections were not considered and communicated by the respondent-
Bank to the petitioners. Consequently, the proceedings initiated by the
respondent-Bank under the SARFAESI Act were quashed and the application
was allowed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chandigarh and liberty was
granted to the respondent-Bank to initiate fresh proceedings under the
SARFAESI Act as per law.
3. Thereafter, fresh notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act
was issued on 01.11.2025 vide Annexure P-5 and subsequently, notice under
Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act was also issued on 21.02.2026 vide
Annexure P-6. The petitioners challenged the aforesaid notices and the
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proceedings initiated thereunder before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III,
Chandigarh and in this way, a second Securitization Application was filed
before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chandigarh vide Annexure P-7. The
Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chandigarh decided the second application vide
Annexure P-8 dated 27.03.2026. The Debts Recovery Tribunal considered the
aspect that no valuation reports were filed by the respondent-Bank along with
the reply to show that the properties were put on sale after obtaining fresh
valuation reports and came to the conclusion that in the absence of any reports,
it appears that the respondent-Bank had not obtained fresh valuation
reports before putting the properties on sale and therefore, the
Securitization Application was allowed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III,
Chandigarh and the respondent-Bank was restrained from auctioning the
property, which was put to sale vide sale notice dated 21.02.2026. It was
also directed that the respondent-Bank may initiate fresh SARFAESI
proceedings as per law.
4. Thereafter, a fresh sale notice was issued by the respondent-Bank
vide Annexure P-9 dated 19.05.2026, which was again challenged by the
petitioners before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chandigarh and by way of
the impugned order dated 23.06.2026 (Annexure P-10), the Securitization
Application was dismissed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chandigarh.
The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners seeking quashing of
the order dated 23.06.2026 (Annexure P-10), sale notice dated 19.05.2026
(Annexure P-9), the auction conducted on 24.06.2026 and the subsequent sale
notice dated 25.06.2026 (Annexure P-13).
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5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners
submitted that when the petitioners had filed the second Securitization
Application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chandigarh, which was
decided on 27.03.2026 vide Annexure P-8, they had challenged the SARFAESI
proceedings and the Debts Recovery Tribunal had allowed the Securitization
Application with a direction that the respondent-Bank may initiate fresh
SARFAESI proceedings as per law, which would mean that the respondent-
Bank was permitted to initiate fresh SARFAESI proceedings in its entirety
starting from the stage of issuance of notice under Section 13(2) of the
SARFAESI Act. However, the respondent-Bank did not initiate the SARFAESI
proceedings as per law but issued a sale notice once again on the basis of the
earlier notices issued under Section 13(2) and Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI
Act and therefore, the action of the respondents-Bank was contrary to the order
dated 27.03.2026 (Annexure P-8) passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III,
Chandigarh.
6. Mr. Chhibbar submitted that once the present impugned order
passed vide Annexure P-9 was without jurisdiction as the entire SARFAESI
proceedings itself had been quashed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III,
Chandigarh, the impugned order dated 23.06.2026 (Annexure P-10) is also
liable to be set aside by this Court even if an alternative remedy of appeal is
available to the petitioners under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. He further
submitted that despite the availability of an alternative remedy to the
petitioners, they can still invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the aforesaid grounds. In this
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regard, he referred to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Whirlpool Corporation versus Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, 1998 (8)
SCC 1 to contend that when the order or proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction, then even if an alternative remedy is available, the High Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can
entertain a writ petition. He also submitted that since the Securitization
Application was filed challenging the entire SARFAESI proceedings and it has
been so recorded in the order dated 27.03.2026 (Annexure P-8) that the said
application was allowed, it would automatically mean that the entire prayer
made in the application stood allowed.
7. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the petitioners.
8. Before proceeding further, it would be just and proper to reproduce
the operative parts of all the three orders passed by the Debts Recovery
Tribunal-III, Chandigarh:-
Annexure P-4 dated 21.08.2025
“No other point was argued/pressed.
After considering the above facts it appears that
objections raised by applicants under Section 13(3-A) of the
SARFAESI Act to the notice under Section 13(2) of the
SARFAESI Act dated 04.08.2021 was not considered and
communicated by the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 is proved.
Therefore, all proceedings initiated by the respondent Nos.1
& 2 under the SARFAESI Act are hereby quashed and SA is
allowed. It is made clear that respondent Nos. 1 & 2 may
initiate fresh proceedings under the SARFAESI Act as per
law.
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Record be consigned to record room after due
compliance.”
Annexure P-8 dated 27.03.2026
“In light of above provision of law, reply/written
statement filed by respondents, which is admittedly a
pleading in the present matter was required to be supported
by affidavit of Authorised Officer of the respondent bank but
the same does not supported by any affidavit. Except it, there
is no verification of the pleadings in the reply, which was
also mandatory. Therefore, the same is liable to be rejected.
Perusal of reply further shows that no valuation
reports were filed by respondents along with the reply to
show that the properties were put on sale after obtaining
fresh valuation reports. It was not argued by learned counsel
for respondents that on which date valuation was done
neither it was pleaded in the reply to SA. There is no merit in
the argument by Sh. Kamal Satija, Advocate that applicants
have not filed any valuation report to contradict the reserve
price. In the considered opinion of this Tribunal, there was
no need of negative evidence. Therefore, in absence of any
reports it appears that respondents had not obtained fresh
valuation reports before putting the properties on sale.
No other point was argued/pressed.
In light of above facts, circumstances as well as
evidence on record, applicants have made out their case.
Therefore, respondents are restrained to auction the
property, which is fixed for today as per sale notice dated
21.02.2026.
Accordingly, SA is allowed. Respondents may initiate
fresh SARFAESI proceedings as per law.
Record be consigned to record room after due
compliance.”
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Annexure P-10 dated 23.06.2026
“In the considered opinion of this Tribunal, it appears
that in the present SA all the compliances were duly made by
respondents in issuance of sale notice dated 19.05.2026 and
applicants have not made out any case in their favour, they
have misrepresented the facts before this Tribunal stated that
earlier SA was allowed by this Tribunal, therefore
respondents have no authority for issuance of fresh sale
notice without issuing fresh notices under Section 13(2) &
13(4) of the Act. There is no force in the said argument of
learned counsel for applicants because vide order dated
27.03.2026 passed in SA No.120/2026, this Tribunal has
only set aside the sale notice 21.02.2026, whereby auction of
the property was fixed for 27.03.2026 because both the
parties had argued to the extent of sale notice only as
mentioned in the said order. No arguments were advanced by
applicants in the earlier SA on the point of notices under
Section 13(2) & 13(4) of the Act, therefore no order was
passed in respect of the said notices and the said notices
were not set aside in the earlier SA.
In light of above facts, circumstances as well as
evidence on record, no case is made out by applicants in
their favour to set aside sale notice dated 19.05.2026,
whereby auction of the properties are fixed for 24.06.2026.
Accordingly, this SA is dismissed.
Record be consigned to record room after due
compliance.”
9. The facts of the present case clearly suggest that when in the
first round of litigation, the petitioners had filed a Securitization Application
challenging the notice issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, the
Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chandigarh vide order dated 21.08.2025
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(Annexure P-4) allowed the same and quashed all the proceedings initiated
under the SARFAESI Act and liberty was granted to the respondent-Bank to
initiate fresh proceedings under the SARFAESI Act as per law. Thereafter, fresh
notices were issued under Section 13(2) and Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI
Act, which were again challenged by the petitioners before the Debts Recovery
Tribunal in the second round of litigation. Prayer was made by the petitioners
by laying challenge to the SARFAESI proceedings but while passing the
order dated 27.03.2026 (Annexure P-8), the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III,
Chandigarh restrained the respondent-Bank from auctioning the property, which
was fixed as per the sale notice dated 21.02.2026 and further observed that the
respondent-Bank may initiate fresh SARFAESI proceedings as per law.
10. It was thereafter when the respondent-Bank issued a fresh sale
notice vide Annexure P-9 to the petitioners and the petitioners filed the third
Securitization Application that the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chandigarh
discussed in detail the issue of whether the entire SARFAESI proceedings were
set aside in the earlier order or whether it was only the sale notice which was set
aside. The argument of the petitioners was rejected and it was observed in the
impugned order dated 23.06.2026 (Annexure P-10) that the Debts Recovery
Tribunal had in its earlier order only set aside the sale notice dated 21.02.2026.
11. By way of the impugned order dated 23.06.2026 (Annexure P-10),
the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chandigarh has dismissed the Securitization
Application filed by the petitioners. The said order is appealable under Section
18 of the SARFAESI Act but the petitioners have chosen to invoke the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
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India instead of filing the statutory appeal. It was the argument of the learned
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned order
dated 23.06.2026 (Annexure P-10) passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III,
Chandigarh was without jurisdiction and therefore, the petitioners can invoke
the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India.
12. The law with regard to the maintainability and entertainability of a
writ petition in the presence of an alternative remedy under Section 18 of the
SARFAESI Act is no longer res integra. Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Varimadugu Obi Reddy versus B. Sreenivasulu and others, (2023) 2 SCC 168
held that in the ordinary course of business where the order of the Tribunal is an
appealable order, the borrowers/person aggrieved is supposed to avail the
statutory remedy of appeal which the law provides under Section 18 of the
SARFAESI Act. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced
as under:-
“34. The order of the Tribunal dated 1st August, 2019
was an appealable order under Section 18 of the SARFAESI
Act, 2002 and in the ordinary course of business, the
borrowers/person aggrieved was supposed to avail the
statutory remedy of appeal which the law provides under
Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 in the absence of
efficacious alternative remedy being availed, there was no
reasonable justification tendered by the respondent
borrowers in approaching the High Court and filing writ
application assailing order of the Tribunal dated 1st August,
2019 under its jurisdiction under Article 226 of theCHETAN THAKUR
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Constitution without exhausting the statutory right of appeal
available at its command.
35. This Court in the judgment in United Bank of
India v. Satyawati Tondon & Others, (2010) 8 SCC
110 was concerned with the argument of alternative remedy
provided under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and dealing with
the argument of alternative remedy, this Court had observed
that where an effective remedy is available to an aggrieved
person, the High Court ordinarily must insist that before
availing the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution,
the alternative remedy available under the relevant
statute must be exhausted. Paras 43, 44 and 45 of the said
judgment are relevant for the purpose and are extracted
below:
“43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the
settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not
entertain a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the
aggrieved person and that this rule applies with
greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes,
cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of
banks and other financial institutions. In our view,
while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to
the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc.
the High Court must keep in mind that the legislation’s
enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for
recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves
inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive
procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage
constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of
the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in
all such cases, the High Court must insist that before
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availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution,
a person must exhaust the remedies available under
the relevant statute.
44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are
conscious that the powers conferred upon the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to
any person or authority, including in appropriate
cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs
including the five prerogative writs for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III
or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no
express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the
same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-
imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which
every High Court is bound to keep in view
while exercising power under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative
remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of
compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason
why the High Court should entertain a petition filed
under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim
order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail
effective alternative remedy by filing application,
appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation
contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his
grievance.”
36. In the instant case, although the respondent borrowers
initially approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal by filing
an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002,
but the order of the Tribunal indeed was appealable under
Section 18 of the Act subject to the compliance of condition
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of pre-deposit and without exhausting the statutory remedy
of appeal, the respondent borrowers approached the High
Court by filing the writ application under Article 226 of the
Constitution. We deprecate such practice of entertaining the
writ application by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution without exhausting the
alternative statutory remedy available under the law. This
circuitous route appears to have been adopted to avoid the
condition of pre-deposit contemplated under 2nd proviso to
Section 18 of the Act 2002.”
13. Basic principle for exercising the power under Article 226 was
considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Babubhai Muljibhai Patel versus
Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706, wherein it was held that the
discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. The relevant portion
of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:-
“10. Exercise of the jurisdiction is no doubt
discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound
judicial principles. When the petition raises complex
questions of fact, which may for their determination require
oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High
Court is of the view that the dispute should not
appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may
decline to try a petition (see Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda
Municipality (1969) 3 SCC 769).”
14. In Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev versus State of Maharashtra,
(2011) 2 SCC 782, while considering the question of maintainability of the writ
petition, when alternate remedy is available, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
as under:-
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“23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly
dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious
remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of
the Act. It is well settled that ordinarily relief
under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is
not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is
available to any aggrieved person. (See Sadhana Lodh v.
National Insurance Co. Ltd., Surya Dev Rai v. Ram
Chander Rai and SBI v. Allied Chemical Laboratories.)
24. In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v.
Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala this Court had observed
that:
“30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under
Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether:
(a) adjudication of the writ petition involves any
complex and disputed questions of facts and whether
they can be satisfactorily resolved;
(b) the petition reveals all material facts;
(c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective
remedy for the resolution of the dispute;
(d) the person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of
unexplained delay and laches;
(e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation;
(f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by
any valid law; and host of other factors.”
15. In Nivedita Sharma versus Cellular Operators Assn. of India,
(2011) 14 SCC 337, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when a statutory forum is
created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be
entertained, ignoring the statutory dispensation.
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16. In Southern Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd. versus Sri
Seetaram Rice Mill, (2012) 2 SCC 108, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it
should only be for the specialised tribunal or the appellate authority to examine
the merits of assessment or even the factual matrix of the case. The relevant
portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:-
“80. It is a settled canon of law that the High Court would
not normally interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India where statutory
alternative remedy is available. It is equally settled that this
canon of law is not free of exceptions. The courts, including
this Court, have taken the view that the statutory remedy, if
provided under a specific law, would impliedly oust the
jurisdiction of the civil courts. The High Court in exercise of
its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India can entertain writ or appropriate
proceedings despite availability of an alternative
remedy. This jurisdiction, the High Court would exercise
with some circumspection in exceptional cases, particularly,
where the cases involve a pure question of law or vires of an
Act are challenged. This class of cases we are mentioning by
way of illustration and should not be understood to be an
exhaustive exposition of law which, in our opinion,
is neither practical nor possible to state with precision. The
availability of alternative statutory or other remedy by itself
may not operate as an absolute bar for exercise of
jurisdiction by the courts. It will normally depend upon the
facts and circumstances of a given case. The further
question that would inevitably come up for consideration
before the Court even in such cases would be as to what
extent the jurisdiction has to be exercised.
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81. Should the courts determine on merits of the case or
should they preferably answer the preliminary issue or
jurisdictional issue arising in the facts of the case and remit
the matter for consideration on merits by the competent
authority? Again, it is somewhat difficult to state with
absolute clarity any principle governing such exercise of
jurisdiction. It always will depend upon the facts of a given
case. We are of the considered view that interest of
administration of justice shall be better sub-served if the
cases of the present kind are heard by the courts only where
they involve primary questions of jurisdiction or the matters
which go to the very root of jurisdiction and where the
authorities have acted beyond the provisions of the
Act. However, it should only be for the specialised tribunal
or the appellate authorities to examine the merits of
assessment or even the factual matrix of the case.”
17. In Cicily Kallarackal versus Vehicle Factory, (2012) 8 SCC 524,
Hon’ble Supreme Court issued a direction of caution that it will not be a proper
exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court to entertain a writ petition against
such orders against which statutory appeal lies. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:-
“4. Despite this, we cannot help but state in absolute
terms that it is not appropriate for the High Courts to
entertain writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India against the orders passed by the Commission, as a
statutory appeal is provided and lies to this Court under the
provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Once the
legislature has provided for a statutory appeal to a higher
court, it cannot be proper exercise of jurisdiction to permit
the parties to bypass the statutory appeal to such higher
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court and entertain petitions in exercise of its powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even in the present
case, the High Court has not exercised its jurisdiction in
accordance with law. The case is one of improper exercise of
jurisdiction. It is no expected of us to deal with this issue at
any greater length as we are dismissing this petition on
other grounds.”
18. In CIT versus Chhabil Dass Agrawal, (2014) 1 SCC 603, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that when a statutory forum is created by law for
redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the
statutory dispensation.
19. So far as the judgment relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Whirlpool Corporation‘s case (Supra)
is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in South India Bank Limited and
others versus Naveen Mathew Philip and another, (2023) 17 SCC 311 while
referring to the earlier judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Radha Krishan
Industries versus State of H.P., (2021) 6 SCC 771, in which Whirlpool
Corporation‘s case (Supra) finds reference, held that although the power under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue writs can be exercised not only
for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights but for any other purposes as well,
the High Court still has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition and one of
the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is wherein an effective
alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person. The relevant portion of
the aforesaid judgment in South India Bank South India Bank Limited‘s case
(Supra) is reproduced as under:-
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“16. We wish to quote with profit a recent decision of this
Court in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. (2021) 6
SCC 771 : (SCC pp. 794-95, paras 25-27)
“25. In this background, it becomes necessary for this
Court, to dwell on the “rule of alternate remedy” and its
judicial exposition. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of
Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1, a two-Judge Bench of this
Court after reviewing the case law on this point, noted:
(SCC pp. 9-10, paras 14-15)
“14. The power to issue prerogative writs under
Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature
and is not limited by any other provision of the
Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High
Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto
and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the
Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the
Constitution but also for “any other purpose”.
15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High
Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a
discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ
petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself
certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective
and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court
would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the
alternative remedy has been consistently held by this
Court not to operate as a bar in at least three
contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has
been filed for the enforcement of any of the
Fundamental Rights or where there has been a
violation of the principle of natural justice or where
the order or proceedings are wholly without
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jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There
is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down
this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on
some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the
constitutional law as they still hold the field”.
26. Following the dictum of this Court in Whirlpool Corpn.
v. Registrar of Trade Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1],
in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [(2003) 2
SCC 107], this Court noted that: (Harbanslal Sahnia case,
SCC p. 110, para 7)
“7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the
remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was
available to the appellants and therefore the writ
petition filed by the appellants was liable to be
dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the
rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of
an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not
one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of
availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court
may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three
contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks
enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii)
where there is failure of principles of natural justice;
or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly
without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is
challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of
Trade Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1].) The present case
attracts applicability of the first two contingencies.
Moreover, as noted, the appellants’ dealership, which
is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an
irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such
circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have
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been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of
driving them to the need of initiating arbitration
proceedings.”
27. The principles of law which emerge are that:
27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to
issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well.
27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a
writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of
the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is
available to the aggrieved person.
27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where:
(a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a
fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution;
(b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural
justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged.
27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High
Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in
an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should
not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is
provided by law.
27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself
prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or
liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory
remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under
Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of
statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion.
27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the
High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ
petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the
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view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise
of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be
interfered with.”
20. By way of impugned order dated 23.06.2026 (Annexure P-10), the
Securitization Application has been decided by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-
III, Chandigarh. The argument which was raised by the learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned order has been passed
without jurisdiction is misconceived and unsustainable. It is not the case of the
petitioners that the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chandigarh did not have any
jurisdiction or was lacking jurisdiction in passing the order and rather it was the
argument of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners
that the Debts Recovery Tribunal could not have dismissed the Securitization
Application filed by the petitioners because in the earlier round of litigation, the
SARFAESI proceedings were set aside.
21. We are of the considered view that the aforesaid ground would not
mean that the Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Chandigarh did not have any
jurisdiction to pass an order.
22. Therefore, we are conscious of the fact that the power under Article
226 of the Constitution of India to issue writs is rather wide but is required to be
exercised only in exceptional circumstances but this Court in the facts and
circumstances of the present case is not inclined to entertain the present writ
petition in the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction as the case does not fall
within any of the well recognized exceptions carved out in the aforesaid
judgments, namely where, (a) the writ petition has been filed for enforcement of
a Fundamental Right protected by Part III of the Constitution of India, (b) there
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has been a violation of the principles of natural justice, (c) the order or
proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction and (d) the vires of a legislation is
challenged.
23. In view of the above, we are of the considered view that the present
petition is liable to be dismissed in view of the availability of an alternative
remedy to the petitioners under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. The
petitioners may avail the aforesaid remedy in accordance with law.
24. Consequently, the present Civil Writ Petition is dismissed. Liberty
is granted to the petitioners to avail the alternative remedy available to them by
filing an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, in accordance with
law.
(JASGURPREET SINGH PURI)
JUDGE
(SANJIV BERRY)
13.07.2026 JUDGE
Chetan Thakur
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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