Telangana High Court
Ms. K. Savitha vs Dr.E. Naveen Nicholas on 29 June, 2026
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR THE STATE OF
TELANGANA
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
CONTEMPT CASE No. 1666 OF 2025
29.06.2026
Between:
K. Savitha & others
..... Petitioners
And
Dr.G. Chinna reddy
(presently rep. by Dr. E. Naveen Nicolas/Dr. Priyanka Ala),
Secretary,
Telangana Public Service Commission (TGPSC) & others
..... Respondents
O R D E R:
The image of justice in the popular imagination is
that of a woman who is blind-folded with a weighing scale in her
hand. The blindfold represents the idea of impartiality i.e. the
belief that the judge has to be completely neutral and decide the
matter before her without being influenced by any consideration
other than the merits of the case.
By Saurabh Kirpal (Chapter 11 – The Telecom
Counter-Revolution from FIFTEEN JUDGMENTS CASES THAT
SHAPED INDIA’S FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE)
Respondent authorities appear to be on the
erroneous assumption that symbolism of the blindfold denotes
inability of the justice delivery system to perceive or take
2
cognizance of manifest illegality. The contemporary conception
of Justice, as reflected in the recently unveiled Nyay Devatha by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, depicts Lady Justice with open
eyes, signifying that the law is neither oblivious nor indifferent,
but remains vigilant and sees every citizen equally while
administering justice without fear or favour. Further significant
is the replacement of the traditional sword with the Constitution
of India, symbolizing that the constitutional values, the rule of
law, and the protection of fundamental rights constitute the
true foundation of the justice delivery system, and not the
punitive legacy of colonial jurisprudence.
*****
This Contempt Case is filed aggrieved by the
contumacious approach and disregard shown by the
Contemnors/ Respondents to the order dated 21.03.2025
passed by this Court in W.P. No. 14590 of 2019.
2. Petitioners are all candidates who participated in
the selection process initiated pursuant to Notification No. 54 of
2017 dated 21.10.2017 issued by the 1st Respondent-
Commission for the post of Language Pandit (Telugu), and were
subjected to certificate verification for the said post in the ratio
of 1:3, but were not selected on the ground of their merit
position vis-Ã -vis the cut-off marks of the last selected
3
candidates in their respective categories and district. W.P. No.
14590 of 2019, came to be filed for a direction to the
Respondent-Commission to undertake the process as required
under Rule 6(A) of the Telangana State Public Service
Commission Rules of Procedure and to identify the number of
relinquished/unfilled vacancies, and to further direct the
Respondent- Commission to fill up those relinquished vacancies
in pursuance of Notification No. 54 of 2017 dated 21.10.2017 by
considering the cases of the Petitioners whose certificate
verification was already undertaken, and not to notify the said
vacancies in the next recruitment. The Writ Petition was allowed
by order dated 21.03.2025 directing the 2nd respondent to
identify the number of unfilled vacancies, if any and appoint
petitioners pursuant to the Notification No. 54 of 2017, dated
21.10.2017.
2.1. Pursuant to the said order, Petitioners along with
other similarly-situated petitioners submitted representation
dated 12.05.2025 to the District Educational Officer,
Nizamabad; representation dated 13.05.2025 to the Director of
School Education; representation dated 13.05.2025 to the
Telangana Chief Minister and the Secretary, TGPSC;
representation dated 25.04.2025 to the Principal Secretary,
School Education Department, Government of Telangana;
4
representation dated 25.04.2025 to the Chairman, TGPSC; and
representation dated 04.06.2025 to the President, Telangana
Pradesh Congress Committee. In response, the District
Educational Officer, Nizamabad, vide letter No. 1337/B3/2025
dated 26.05.2025, wrote to the Director, School Education,
requesting that necessary orders be issued with respect to the
post of Language Pandit (Telugu), thereby acknowledging the
pendency of the grievance of Petitioners.
2.2. Instead of complying with the directions of this
Court by identifying the unfilled vacancies and appointing
Petitioners thereto, the 1st Respondent-Commission issued
Memo No. 707/TRT/Rectt-1/4/2017 dated 06.06.2025 to
Petitioner Nos. 4 and 6 (and similarly worded memos to other
Petitioners), rejecting their claim on the ground that the unfilled
vacancies of Language Pandits pertaining to Notification No. 54
of 2017 dated 21.10.2017 had already been carried forward and
notified in the subsequent notification, namely DSC/2024 dated
29.02.2024, and there were, therefore, no vacancies available to
be offered to Petitioners.
2.3. It is significant and indeed surprising that, with
specific reference to Petitioner No. 4 (K. Savitha), the rejection
order itself states that the BC-D reserved vacancy in
Mahabubnagar District under the 2017 Notification was carried
5
forward and notified in DSC/2024 dated 29.02.2024 due to
non- joining of selected candidates, and eligible candidates filled
up the said vacancy subsequently; yet, upon perusal of the
subsequent notification of 2024, no vacancy whatsoever was
shown under the BC-D category, thereby directly negating and
contradicting the very response given by the Respondents in
their own rejection order dated 06.06.2025.
2.4. The manner in which the rejection orders were
issued by the Respondent-Commission to the several
Petitioners, with identical and similar phrasing and with mere
changing of names and other particulars, clearly reflects and
demonstrates that the same was done mechanically and without
individually examining or considering the distinct cases of each
of Petitioners, as was specifically mandated by the order of this
Court dated 21.03.2025. Insofar as the rejection is founded on
the ground that the vacancies were stated to have been filled up
in the subsequent notification, it is a matter of record that there
were unfilled vacancies in existence at the time when the
present batch of writ petitions, including W.P. No. 14590 of
2019, were originally filed; the said unfilled vacancies continued
to be available when learned Single Judge earlier disposed of the
batch of writ petitions, including W.P. Nos. 9626, 12700, 14590,
19222, 19242, 19278, 19337, 19848, 20566 of 2019 and W.P.
6
Nos. 1434, 1884, 3356, 5456, 8198, 9840, 9911, 13039, 13074,
13887 and 24159 of 2020, by the common judgment dated
24.06.2021; and the said vacancies further remained available
even when the Division Bench, by its common order dated
26.10.2021 in W.A. Nos. 533, 466, 468, 478, 485, 493, 494,
496, 497, 498, 499, 501, 502, 505, 506, 509, 532, 535, 536 and
544 of 2021, remanded the matters back to the learned Single
Judge for a fresh hearing.
2.5. A reading of the judgment dated 21.03.2025 itself
reflects that it was not even the case or the contention of
Respondents before this Court, at the time of final hearing, that
the unfilled vacancies stood already filled up; therefore, the said
ground is not available to Respondents at this belated stage to
defeat the rights crystallised in favour of Petitioners under the
said judgment. It is stated, petitioners cannot be held
responsible for efflux of time, inasmuch as the matter was
dragged on for several years on account of the writ petition, the
subsequent writ appeal preferred by the Commission, and the
consequent delay occasioned in carrying the process forward;
this Court, having allowed the writ petition and having thereby
established the right of Petitioners, the said rights cannot be
permitted to be lightly thrown away by the Respondents by
7
taking advantage of subsequent events that occurred during the
pendency of the litigation.
2.6. Respondents have indulged in illegality at three
distinct stages, namely: firstly, in not adhering to their own Rule
6(A) of the TGPSC Rules of Procedure and dragging the issue for
several years; secondly, in carrying forward the unfilled
vacancies, which Petitioners are claiming, into the next
notification, namely DSC-2024, during the pendency of the very
litigation in which Petitioners were asserting their claim; and
thirdly, in declaring, by way of the impugned rejection memos,
that Petitioners are not entitled to the said vacancies by relying
upon their own subsequent illegality, namely the unauthorised
carrying forward of the vacancies, so as to render the relief
granted to Petitioners illusory and to show Petitioners empty
hands; paragraph 16 of the judgment dated 21.03.2025 shows
that the learned Single Judge, in specific and unambiguous
terms, directed the 2nd Respondent therein to consider the
candidature of Petitioners as per their merit list, in view of the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Telangana State Level
Police Recruitment Board v. Narimetla Vamshi, which
specifically elucidates that if a candidate has not gone through
the process of recruitment and has not done what was required
to be done by him, it cannot be construed as a vacancy arising
8
which can be carried forward to the next recruitment process; in
other words, vacancies that arise due to the non- joining of
selected candidates cannot be carried forward to the next
recruitment process.
2.7. It is for the Respondents to take steps to create
supernumerary posts, or to consider the claim of the Petitioners
in the existing vacancies, when the Respondents have hurriedly
filled up the very vacancies for which the Petitioners are
claiming, at a time when the matter was sub-judice, and
Petitioners are liable to be accommodated in one of those
vacancies. The above action of Respondents/Contemnors
amount not only to an unfair act resulting in destruction of the
rights of the Petitioners, but also amount to tricking this Court,
and the same is impermissible and contemptuous, warranting
serious notice being taken of the conduct of the
Respondents/Contemnors by this Hon’ble Court
3. Respondents filed a counter affidavit, contending
that as per the indent received from the School Education
Department, the post of Language Pandit (Telugu) is a District
Cadre post; in pursuance of Notification No. 54/2017,
candidates were provisionally selected for appointment to the
said post vide the Commission’s Selection Notification dated
01.03.2019, duly after obtaining relinquishment from the
9
candidates who were selected to the post of School Assistant
(Telugu), for which the result notification was published on
01.11.2018; all the six Petitioners herein were picked up for
certificate verification to the post of Language Pandit (Telugu) in
the ratio of 1:3, but as per the rules applicable to a district post,
candidates are required to be selected as per their rank in the
merit list and as per District Preference for allotment of
candidates against the vacancies.
3.1. All the Petitioners did not come within the zone of
selection in their respective district and category, on account of
their comparatively lower merit, the respective merit position of
the Petitioners being as follows: K. Savitha (Hall Ticket No.
1754111354), BC-B category, Nizamabad District, having
secured 65.733 marks as against the marks of the last selected
candidate in the BC-B(W)-L sub-category, namely 66.100
marks; P. Srikanth (Hall Ticket No. 1754100702), BC-D
category, Nizamabad District, having secured 68.167 marks as
against the last selected candidate’s marks of 68.700 in the BC-
D(G)-L sub-category; M. Sanjeev (Hall Ticket No. 1754100492),
BC-D category, Nizamabad District, having secured 68.500
marks as against the last selected candidate’s marks of 68.700
in the BC- D(G)-L sub-category; B. Vijay Kumar (Hall Ticket No.
1754105249), BC-D category, Mahabubnagar District, having
10
secured 70.633 marks as against the last selected candidate’s
marks of 70.700 in the BC-D(G)-L sub- category; N. Venkanna
(Hall Ticket No. 1754117538), SC category, Nalgonda District,
having secured 68.967 marks as against the last selected
candidate’s marks of 69.000 in the SC(G) sub-category; and
Banoth Narasimha Rao (Hall Ticket No. 1754116822), ST
category, Khammam District, having secured 60.167 marks as
against the last selected candidate’s marks of 60.233 in the
ST(G)-L sub-category.
3.2. A total of 634 vacancies were notified under
Notification No. 54/2017; out of the said 634 notified vacancies,
602 vacancies were filled up with eligible meritorious
candidates, and after publishing the final selection lists, the
unit lists were sent to the concerned department on 28.03.2019;
however, 28 vacancies remained unfilled due to non-availability
of eligible candidates under various categories in various
districts, the district-wise details of the unfilled vacancies in the
Petitioners’ respective districts being as follows: in Nizamabad
District, 55 vacancies were notified, of which 52 were filled, the
unfilled vacancies being one vacancy in category BC-E(W)- L-CF,
a second vacancy in category BC-E(W)-L-CF, and a third
vacancy withheld on account of another pending court case; in
Mahabubnagar District, 73 vacancies were notified, of which 71
11
were filled, the unfilled vacancies being one vacancy in category
VH(W)-L and one vacancy in category HH(W)-L; in Nalgonda
District, 72 vacancies were notified, of which 71 were filled, the
unfilled vacancy being one vacancy in category HH(G)-L; and in
Khammam District, all 40 notified vacancies stood filled, with
no vacancy remaining unfilled.
3.3. The vacancies left unfilled in the aforesaid reserved
categories, on account of non-availability of eligible candidates
in the entire ranking list, are liable to be carried forward to the
next recruitment as per the Telangana State and Subordinate
Service Rules, and since Petitioners do not belong to the specific
categories in which the said vacancies remained unfilled, their
candidature cannot be considered against those unfilled
vacancies: the same position was duly communicated to
Petitioners by the Commission vide Memo No.
707/Rectt/1/4/2018 dated 06.06.2025.
3.4. In compliance with the order under contempt, the
entire issue has been examined in detail by the TGPSC and as
per the rules of reservation, the roster points specifically meant
for the reserved communities cannot be filled up by other
candidates outside the said reserved categories; in the event of
non- availability of a suitable person at the roster point, the
existing rules mandate that the said roster point be carried
12
forward to the succeeding recruitment year; TGPSC strictly
follows the rules of reservation laid down under Rule 22 of the
Telangana State and Subordinate Service Rules, therefore,
Petitioners cannot be considered for selection against the
unfilled vacancies in accordance with the extant Rules and
Government Orders, which were in force as on the date of the
Notification.
3.5. TGPSC is merely a recruiting agency and is not
authorised to relax the rules at its own discretion; the unfilled
vacancies were surrendered to the indenting department,
namely the School Education Department, which alone
maintains the rosters and furnishes the indents specifying the
roster points, while the TGPSC merely aggregates the total
number of vacancies received from each department and notifies
the same; the School Education Department, vide letter No.
88/RC-1/2025 dated 30.05.2025, informed the Commission
that the backlog and non-joining vacancies of TRT-2017 were
notified in DSC-2024, and that the said vacancies were filled by
eligible candidates.
3.6. When the facts are as stated above, Petitioners have
filed the present Contempt Case alleging disobedience of the
order dated 21.03.2025, as if no action whatsoever had been
initiated by Respondents, whereas the reason for not
13
considering Petitioners is not liable to be disregarded, all the
Petitioners having been duly informed of the said facts vide
Memo No. 707/Rectt/I/4/2018 dated 06.06.2025; therefore,
there is no violation of the order dated 21.03.2025 passed in
W.P. No. 14590 of 2019 in its implementation.
3.7. Pursuant to the order dated 21.03.2025, TGPSC
wrote to the Indenting Officer, School Education Department,
seeking information regarding the availability of
unfilled/unclaimed vacancies under Notification No. 54/2017
dated 21.10.2017, in response to which the School Education
Department, vide letter No. 88/RC-1/2025 dated 30.05.2025,
informed the Commission that all the non-joining and backlog
vacancies of Teacher Recruitment Test (TRT)-2017 had already
been notified in DSC-2024 and unfilled/non-joining vacancies
remained under Notification No. 54/2017; it is further
contended therein that the TGPSC issued Memo No.
707/Rectt/I/4/2018 dated 06.06.2025 communicating the said
position to the Petitioners, and complied with the order of this
Court by issuing Memo No. 708/Rectt/1/4/2018 dated
06.06.2025: that the unit list with the 28 unfilled vacancies of
Language Pandit (Telugu) was forwarded to the Director, School
Education Department on 28.03.2019: that once a person
selected does not join the post after issuance of appointment
14
orders, such a vacancy is to be treated as a Non-Joining
vacancy which, as per G.O. Ms. No. 81, GA (Ser-A) Department,
dated 22.02.1997, and G.O. Ms. No. 544, GA (Ser-A)
Department, dated 04.12.1998, is required to be notified in the
next recruitment; and that reliance is further placed upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.V. Bhogeswarudu
v. APPSC 1, wherein it was held that vacancies remaining to be
filled up on account of non-joining of selected candidates, for
whatever reason, shall be filled from out of the candidates in the
very same select list, and not by a fresh selection.
4. Petitioner filed a reply contending that rejection
order was sent to Petitioners by merely changing the names and
other details, without properly examining the individual facts
and circumstances of each of Petitioners’ cases, and this itself
amounts to a clear and deliberate contempt of the order dated
21.03.2025. As regards the rejection on the ground that the
vacancies were already filled up in the subsequent notification,
namely DSC-2024, it is pertinent to note that there were
unfilled vacancies in existence when Petitioners filed the above
Writ Petition, the learned Single Judge had earlier allowed the
said Writ Petition along with a batch of other writ petitions vide
judgment dated 24.06.2021, and that the said unfilled
1
JT 1989 (4) SC 130
15
vacancies were also available when the TGPSC filed the writ
appeals, which the Division Bench remanded back to the
learned Single Judge for fresh hearing vide common order dated
26.10.2021; Respondents meddled with the relevant vacancies
by carrying them forward to the subsequent notification when
the matter was pending and sub-judice before this Court.
4.1. A reading of the order dated 21.03.2025 itself
reflects that it was not even the contention of Respondents
before this Court, at the time the matter was argued and
decided, the unfilled vacancies were already filled up; therefore,
the said ground is not available to Respondents at this stage,
and Respondents cannot be permitted to take advantage of their
own subsequent conduct, carried out during the pendency of
the litigation, to defeat the right that had crystallised in favour
of Petitioners.
4.2. When this Court had already declared that
Respondents had indulged in illegality, namely firstly, by not
adhering to their own Rule 6(A) of the Rules and dragging the
issue for several years, and secondly, by carrying forward the
unfilled vacancies which the Petitioners are claiming to the next
notification i.e. DSC-2024, it is not open to Respondents to rely
upon the said subsequent event, which itself is a second
16
illegality, to justify the first illegality and to thereby show the
Petitioners empty hands and drag the issue for justice further.
4.3. Paragraph 16 of the order dated 21.03.2025
specifically directed the 2nd Respondent therein to consider the
candidature of Petitioners as per their merit list in specific
terms, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Narimetla Vamshi‘s case, which categorically holds that if a
candidate has not gone through the process of recruitment and
has not done what was required to be done by him, it cannot be
construed as a vacancy arising which can be carried forward to
the next recruitment process; in other words, vacancies that
arise due to the non-joining of the selected candidates cannot be
carried forward to the next recruitment process at all, and the
Respondents, by carrying forward such vacancies to DSC-2024
and thereafter relying upon the same to reject Petitioners’ claim,
have acted contrary to the very directions contained in the
judgment dated 21.03.2025 as well as the ratio of the binding
precedent referred to therein.
4.4. A reading of the judgment, and particularly
paragraph 18 thereof, would show that intention of this Court
was to direct Respondents to identify the unfilled vacancies
pertaining to 2017 Notification and to appoint Petitioners
thereto, and that if the said judgment is read in a manner that
17
Petitioners can be considered only if the unfilled vacancies are
still available, the very purpose of giving the said judgment
would be rendered nugatory and of no avail, that being precisely
the reason why the language used by this Court in the final
portion of the said judgment does not admit of such a restrictive
reading; rather, the correct interpretation is that the
Respondents are required to take steps to identify the vacancies
pertaining to the 2017 Notification and to appoint the
Petitioners thereunder, and even if, for the sake of argument,
there are no vacancies presently identified or available, the
Respondents are required to take steps, in a given case, to fill
up the vacancies for which the Petitioners are claiming, such
vacancies continuously arising in the said cadre on account of
retirements and other attritions, and the Petitioners have to be
accommodated in one of those vacancies.
4.5. It is for Respondents to take steps to create
supernumerary posts, or to consider the claim of Petitioners
against the existing vacancies, particularly when the
Respondents have hurriedly filled up the very vacancies for
which the Petitioners are claiming, at a time when the matter
was sub-judice before this Court, and the said conduct on the
part of the Respondents amounts not only to an act unfair to
the Petitioners and destructive of their rights, but also amounts
18
to tricking this Court, which conduct is wholly impermissible
and contemptuous, warranting that this Court take serious note
of the said series of illegalities committed by Respondents.
5. Heard Sri J. Sudheer, learned counsel for
petitioners and Sri P.S. Rajashekar, learned Standing Counsel
for respondent – Commission.
6. At the outset, it is necessary to recapitulate the
precise contours of the order dated 21.03.2025, the alleged
disobedience of which is the subject matter of the present
Contempt Case. The said order was passed by the learned
Single Judge in W.P. No. 14590 of 2019, after extensively
considering the rival submissions advanced by the learned
counsel for the respective parties, the relevant statutory
provision being Rule 6(A) of the Telangana State Public Service
Commission Rules of Procedure, introduced by ad hoc Rule
issued in G.O. Ms. No. 544, GA (Ser.A) Department, dated
04.12.1998, which provides that, notwithstanding anything
contained in the said ad hoc Rule, any candidate whose name
has been included in a selection list prepared by the
Commission in a direct recruitment, may, on enquiry by the
Commission, relinquish his claim for appointment in writing in
the proforma prescribed by the Commission, whereupon the
Commission shall remove the name of such candidate from the
19
selection list and select any other candidate according to rules,
the candidate so removed having no right for the said
appointment in future with reference to the said selection; the
proviso to the said Rule makes it clear that the provision applies
only when a single category of posts is notified in a notification,
and not to a notification where multiple categories of posts are
notified, and further that the selection list, for the purpose of
selecting candidates in place of relinquished candidates, shall
be operated only till the next notification is issued or for a
period of one year, whichever is earlier.
7. The learned Single Judge, after considering the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Telangana State
Level Police Recruitment Board v. Narimetla Vamshi,
arising out of Civil Appeal No. 4735 of 2022 dated 23.11.2022,
and the earlier decision in Munja Praveen v. State of
Telangana 2, as also the judgment in Ashok alias Somanna
Gowda v. State of Karnataka 3, held that while it is true that
if a candidate has not gone through the process of recruitment
and has not done what was required to be done by him, it
cannot be construed as a vacancy arising which has to be
carried forward to the next recruitment process, it was
2
(2017) 14 SCC 797
3
(1992) 1 SCC 28
20
nonetheless also necessary to bear in mind that public
employment is an persons in the country, and an important
source of employability for young interpretation that would leave
a large number of vacancies permanently unfilled would not be
an appropriate interpretation of the Rule in question. Applying
the said principle, and noting that the Commission itself, in its
counter, had admitted that out of 634 vacancies notified under
Notification No. 54/2017, only 602 had been filled and 28
vacancies were lying unfilled, and that this Court had, in similar
circumstances dealing with a similar notification in W.P. Nos.
20232 and 20273 of 2018, directed the Commission to strictly
abide by the mandate of Rule 6(A) and to make enquiry with the
rest of the candidates figuring in the selection list, which
direction stood confirmed in W.A. Nos. 1494 and 1524 of 2018,
the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition and, in
unambiguous terms in paragraph 16 of the judgment, directed
the 2nd Respondent therein to consider the candidature of the
Petitioners as per their merit list, while also directing, in
paragraph 18, that the 2nd Respondent identify the number of
unfilled vacancies, if any, and appoint the Petitioners pursuant
to Notification No. 54 of 2017 dated 21.10.2017.
8. Bearing the above directions in mind, this Court
has now to examine whether the action taken by the
21
Respondents/Contemnors, pursuant to the said order, amounts
to genuine and bona fide compliance, or whether the same
constitutes willful and deliberate disobedience warranting the
exercise of the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. It is well
settled that the jurisdiction in contempt is summary in nature,
and before a contemnor can be punished, it must be shown that
the disobedience is willful, deliberate and intentional, and not
merely a result of a difference in the interpretation of the order
said to have been disobeyed; at the same time, it is equally well
settled that a party cannot be permitted to defeat the directions
of a Court by adopting a circuitous or technical interpretation of
the order so as to render the relief granted illusory, nor can a
party take advantage of its own wrong, committed during the
pendency of litigation, to thereafter contend that compliance
with the order has become impossible.
9. Examined in this light, the stand taken by the
Respondents in their counter affidavit and synopsis, that out of
634 vacancies notified under Notification No. 54/2017 dated
21.10.2017, 602 vacancies were filled up, the final selection list
was published on 01.03.2019, and the Unit List with the
remaining 28 unfilled vacancies was forwarded to the Director,
School Education Department on 28.03.2019, with the district-
wise break-up of the unfilled vacancies being one vacancy each
22
in category BC-E(W)-L-CF (two such vacancies) and one vacancy
withheld due to another pending court case in Nizamabad
District, one vacancy each in categories VH(W)-L and HH(W)-L
in Mahabubnagar District, one vacancy in category HH(G)-L in
Nalgonda District, and no vacancy remaining unfilled in
Khammam District, does not, by itself, answer the real
grievance raised by the Petitioners. The grievance of the
Petitioners is not that the Respondents have failed to identify
the unfilled vacancies as such; the grievance is that the very
same vacancies, which fell vacant on account of non-
joining/relinquishment by selected candidates under
Notification No. 54/2017, and which continued to remain
unfilled throughout the pendency of the writ petition, the writ
appeal, and the remand proceedings, came to be carried forward
by the Respondents to the subsequent notification, namely
DSC-2024 dated 29.02.2024, during the very pendency of the
litigation in which the Petitioners were asserting their right to be
considered against those very vacancies, and were thereafter
filled up in DSC-2024, with appointment orders being issued to
the DSC-2024 candidates as early as 09.10.2024, that is to say,
more than five months prior to the date of the final order dated
21.03.2025 in W.P. No. 14590 of 2019. 11. It is no doubt true,
as contended by the Respondents, that the Teacher Recruitment
23
Test, DSC-2024, was conducted from 18.07.2024 to
05.08.2024, the results were released on 30.09.2024, certificate
verification at the ratio of 1:3 was held from 01.10.2024 to
05.10.2024, and appointment orders were issued to the
successful candidates on 09.10.2024, all of which preceded the
final order dated 21.03.2025 in point of time. However, the
chronology relied upon by the Respondents, far from improving
their case, in fact exposes the very infirmity of which the
Petitioners complain. The unfilled vacancies pertaining to
Notification No. 54/2017 had remained vacant since the year
2019; the writ petitions assailing the inaction of the
Commission in filling up the said vacancies were pending before
this Court at least since the year 2019, were heard and disposed
of by the common judgment dated 24.06.2021, were carried in
appeal by the Commission, and were remanded for fresh
hearing by the Division Bench vide common order dated
26.10.2021; despite the said litigation having continued without
interruption before this Court for several years, and despite the
matter being admittedly sub-judice, the School Education
Department proceeded, in the year 2024, to notify the very same
backlog and non-joining vacancies of TRT-2017 in DSC-2024,
and to fill up the said vacancies through a fresh recruitment
process, without awaiting the outcome of the very litigation in
24
which the entitlement of the Petitioners to be considered against
those very vacancies was the subject matter of adjudication.
10. This conduct, in the considered view of this Court,
cannot be countenanced. A litigant who approaches a Court of
law for vindication of a right is entitled to expect that the State
and its instrumentalities, who are parties to that very litigation,
will not, during its pendency, take unilateral action that has the
effect of rendering the relief sought infructuous, more so when
the said action consists of the very Department surrendering,
and the very Commission absorbing, the disputed vacancies
into a fresh recruitment cycle without reference to the pending
proceedings. The Respondents cannot be heard to contend that
they were merely complying with the general policy reflected in
G.O. Ms. No. 81, GA (Ser-A) Department, dated 22.02.1997, and
G.O. Ms. No. 544, GA (Ser-A) Department, dated 04.12.1998,
regarding the notification of non-joining vacancies in the next
recruitment, inasmuch as the said general policy cannot
override the specific entitlement of the Petitioners, which was
the very subject matter of the pending litigation, nor can a
general administrative practice be permitted to be deployed so
as to defeat a particular and specific right that is sub-judice
before a competent Court.
25
11. Reliance placed by Respondents upon the decision
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.V. Bhogeswarudu v.
APPSC 4, is with respect to misplaced in the facts of the present
case. The said decision lays down the salutary principle that, in
the event of non-joining of selected candidates, the resultant
vacancies ought to be filled up from the very same select list, by
recommending the candidates next in order of merit, rather
than embarking upon a fresh selection process; far from
supporting the stand of the Respondents, the said decision in
fact reinforces the very grievance of the Petitioners, namely that
the vacancies arising on account of non-joining under
Notification No. 54/2017 ought to have been filled up from the
very same selection list pertaining to that notification, by
extending the benefit to the next meritorious candidates such as
the Petitioners herein, rather than being carried forward to an
altogether fresh and subsequent recruitment, namely DSC-
2024, conducted under a different notification altogether.
12. The reliance placed by the Respondents upon Rule
22 of the Telangana State and Subordinate Service Rules, and
upon the principle that roster points specifically meant for
reserved communities cannot be filled up by candidates outside
those categories, also does not, in the considered view of this
4
JT 1989 (4) SC 130
26
Court, fully answer the grievance of the Petitioners. The said
principle would have considerable force in a case where the
categories in which vacancies remained unfilled, and the
categories to which the Petitioners belong, were demonstrably
different, so that there existed no occasion at all for the
Petitioners to be considered against those very vacancies;
however, the difficulty in the present case is that the unfilled
vacancies pertaining to Notification No. 54/2017, which ought
to have continued to be available for consideration of candidates
such as the Petitioners in the order of their merit, came to be
subsumed into the entirely different exercise of DSC-2024,
thereby pre-empting any examination, at the relevant point of
time, of whether the Petitioners’ categories could, in fact, have
been accommodated against the vacancies that fell vacant
under Notification No. 54/2017 on account of non-joining or
relinquishment, before those vacancies were allowed to be
carried forward and absorbed into the subsequent recruitment.
15. It is also necessary to notice that, as recorded in paragraph
9 of the Respondents’ counter affidavit, the operative direction
of this Court dated 21.03.2025 was twofold: firstly, to identify
the number of unfilled vacancies, if any, and secondly, to
appoint the Petitioners pursuant to Notification No. 54 of 2017.
The Respondents, in their Memo No. 707/Rectt/I/4/2018 dated
27
06.06.2025, appear to have treated the first limb of the direction
as having been rendered otiose by the fact that the vacancies
had, by the date of the said order, already been notified and
filled up in DSC-2024, and have accordingly concluded that the
second limb of the direction, namely appointment of the
Petitioners, cannot be given effect to for want of any vacancy.
Such a reading of the order dated 21.03.2025, in the considered
opinion of this Court, does not give full and fair effect to the
intent of the said order. If the order is to be read in the manner
suggested by the Respondents, namely that the Petitioners are
entitled to be considered only if vacancies are found to be still
available on the date of compliance, the very purpose of the
direction contained in the order would stand wholly defeated,
inasmuch as it would permit the very party against whom the
direction was issued to render the direction nugatory by its own
subsequent conduct of exhausting the vacancies during the
pendency of the proceedings, which is precisely the conduct of
which the Petitioners complain in the present Contempt Case.
13. This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that
mere issuance of the Memo No. 707/Rectt/I/4/2018 dated
06.06.2025, informing the Petitioners that there are no
unfilled/non-joining vacancies available under Notification No.
54/2017, without anything more, does not amount to true and
28
faithful compliance with the order dated 21.03.2025. The said
order required the Respondents to identify the unfilled
vacancies that were referable to Notification No. 54/2017 dated
21.10.2017, and having regard to the fact, admitted by the
Respondents themselves, that 28 such vacancies existed and
were forwarded to the Director, School Education Department
as far back as on 28.03.2019, the obligation of the Respondents
was to ensure that the Petitioners, who were found eligible and
meritorious enough to be called for certificate verification, were
considered for appointment against the said 28 vacancies, or
such of them as may correspond to the Petitioners’ respective
permitted to be categories and districts, before the said
vacancies were carried forward and absorbed into an entirely
separate and subsequent recruitment notification. Having failed
to do so, and having instead allowed the vacancies to be
absorbed into DSC-2024 during the pendency of the very
litigation, the Respondents cannot now be heard to say, by way
of an after- the-fact justification, that there exists no vacancy to
comply with the order.
14. At the same time, this Court is conscious of the fact
that the contempt jurisdiction is not to be exercised lightly, and
Respondent No. 1, through its present Secretary, has, in
paragraph 13 of the counter affidavit, expressed the highest
29
regard towards the orders of this Court and has stated that
there was no intention whatsoever to disobey the order dated
21.03.2025, going to the extent of tendering an unconditional
apology in the event this Court were to hold otherwise. This
Court also takes note of the fact that the Respondents did take
certain steps pursuant to the order, including addressing a
communication to the Indenting Officer, School Education
Department, and obtaining a reply vide letter No. 88/RC-
1/2025 dated 30.05.2025, before issuing the impugned
rejection Memo dated 06.06.2025. The conduct of the
Respondents, therefore, while falling short of full and faithful
compliance with the order dated 21.03.2025, in the manner
discussed above, does not, in the facts and circumstances of
this case, disclose such a degree of contumacious defiance as
would justify the imposition of punishment by way of fine or
imprisonment upon the individual Contemnors at this stage,
particularly when the apology tendered is bona fide and the
non-compliance appears to stem from an erroneous, though not
entirely mala fide, interpretation of the order, rather than from
any deliberate intent to flout the authority of this Court.
15. However, tendering of an apology and the absence
of a finding of willful contumacious conduct sufficient to attract
punishment, cannot be permitted to result in the order dated
30
21.03.2025 being reduced to a dead letter. The right of
Petitioners, which came to be crystallised by the said order, has
to be given real and meaningful effect, and it would be a
travesty of justice if the Respondents were permitted to escape
compliance merely by reiterating, through successive memos
and synopses, that no vacancies remain available, when the
unfilled vacancies in question were themselves allowed to be
absorbed into a subsequent recruitment during the pendency of
the very proceedings in which the Petitioners’ right to be
considered against those vacancies was under adjudication.
This Court, accordingly, deems it necessary to allow the present
Contempt Case to the extent of directing true and faithful
compliance with the order dated 21.03.2025, while declining, for
the present, to proceed to punish the individual Contemnors,
having regard to the unconditional apology tendered and the
absence of unequivocal mala fides.
16. This Court is also placing reliance upon the law
laid down in Celir LLP v. Mr. Sumathi Prasad Bafna 5,
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that once a court passes
an order, the said order is required to be complied with in letter
and spirit, and that a party cannot be permitted to sit in
judgment over the order of the court and decide for itself
5
2024 INSC 978
31
whether to comply with it or not. The Hon’ble Apex Court
further held that when a court passes a clear and unequivocal
direction, the authority or party bound by such direction is
under an absolute obligation to comply with the same, and that
any attempt to wriggle out of the said obligation by raising
technical pleas or by advancing justifications that were either
already considered or ought to have been raised before the court
that passed the order, would amount to willful disobedience
constituting contempt. The Hon’ble Apex Court also made it
clear that where a party has chosen not to challenge the order
by preferring an appeal and has allowed the same to attain
finality, such a party cannot be heard to raise objections to
compliance at the stage of contempt proceedings, as the
correctness of the order is no longer open for examination at
that stage. The operative portion of the judgment is extracted
hereunder:
” 182.In order to decide whether the appellants are guilty of
civil contempt, it would be apposite to refer to Section 2(b) of the Act,
1971, which reads as under:
“2. Definitions.-
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
xxx xxx xxx
(b) “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any judgment,
decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach
of an undertaking given to a court;”
32
183. The Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, at page 1599,
defines “willful” as hereunder: –
“Proceeding from a conscious motion of the will; voluntary; knowingly;
deliberate. Intending the result which actually comes to pass; designed; intentional;
purposeful; not accidental or involuntary. Premeditated; malicious; done with evil intent, or
with a bad motive or purpose, or with indifference to the natural consequences; unlawful;
without legal justification. An act or omission is “willfully” done, if done voluntarily and
intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the specific
intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done; that is to say, with bad purpose
either to disobey or to disregard the law. It is a word of many meanings, with its
construction often influenced by its context. In civil actions, the word (willfully) often denotes
an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But
when used in a criminal context it generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without
justifiable excuse; stubbornly, obstinately, perversely.”
184. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha and
Ors. reported in (2003) 11 SCC 1, the expression ‘wilful disobedience’ in
the context of Section 2(b) of the Act, 1971 was read to mean an act or
omission done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent to do
something, which the law forbids or with the specific intention to fail to
do something which the law requires to be done. Wilfulness signifies
deliberate action done with evil intent and bad motive and purpose. It
should not be an act, which requires and is dependent upon, either
wholly or partly, any act or omission by a third party for compliance.
185. Hence, the expression or word “wilful” means act or
omission which is done voluntarily or intentionally and with the specific
intent to do something which the law forbids or with the specific intent
to fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say with
bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. It signifies a
deliberate action done with evil intent or with a bad motive or purpose.
186. Article 129 of the Constitution declares this Court as a “a
court of record” and states that it shall have all the powers of such a
court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. The
provisions of the Act, 1971 and the Rules framed thereunder form a part
of a special statutory jurisdiction that is vested in courts to punish an
offending party for its contemptuous conduct. It needs no emphasis that
the power of contempt ought to be exercised sparingly with great care
and caution. The contemptuous act complained of must be such that
would result in obstruction of justice, adversely affect the majesty of law
and impact the dignity of the courts of law.
33
187. It must also be understood that contempt proceedings are
sui generis inasmuch as the Law of Evidence and the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 are not to be strictly applied. At the same time, the
procedure adopted during the contempt proceedings must be fair and
just that is to say the principles governing the Rule of law must be
extended to the party against whom contempt proceedings have been
initiated. The party must have every opportunity to place its position
before the Court. Such a party must not be left unheard under any
circumstances.
188. In Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj & Ors. reported in (2014)
16 SCC 204 it was held that the contempt jurisdiction conferred on to
the law courts power to punish an offender not only for his wilful
disobedience but also for contumacious conduct or obstruction to the
majesty of law. It further observed that such power has been conferred
for the simple reason that the respect and authority commanded by the
courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen that his
rights shall be protected and the entire democratic fabric of the society
will crumble down if the respect of the judiciary is undermined. The
relevant observations read as under: –
“11. The contempt jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts power to punish
an offender for his wilful disobedience/contumacious conduct or obstruction to the majesty
of law, for the reason that respect and authority commanded by the courts of law are the
greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen that his rights shall be protected and the entire
democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect of the judiciary is
undermined. Undoubtedly, the contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the hands of
the courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution and unless, thus,
otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, it would neither be fair nor reasonable for the
law courts to exercise jurisdiction under the Act. The proceedings are quasi-criminal in
nature, and therefore, standard of proof required in these proceedings is beyond all
reasonable doubt. It would rather be hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the
authorities in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction on mere probabilities. […]”
(Emphasis supplied)
189. In Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia & Anr. reported in
(2000) 2 SCC 367 this Court held that the purpose of contempt
jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law
since the image of such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be
led to be distorted, as any indulgence which can even remotely be
termed to affect the majesty of law would result in the society losing its
confidence and faith in the judiciary and the law courts forfeiting the
34
trust and confidence of the people in general. The relevant observations
read as under: –
“9 […] The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity
of the courts of law since the image of such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be
led to be distorted. The respect and authority commanded by courts of law are the greatest
guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble
down if the respect for the judiciary is undermined. It is true that the judiciary will be judged
by the people for what the judiciary does, but in the event of any indulgence which can even
remotely be termed to affect the majesty of law, the society is bound to lose confidence and
faith in the judiciary and the law courts thus, would forfeit the trust and confidence of the
people in general.”
(Emphasis supplied)
190. In Pushpaben & Anr. v. Narandas Badiani & Anr.
reported in (1979) 2 SCC 394, it was held that contempt of court is a
special jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and with caution whenever
an act adversely affects the administration of justice or which tends to
impede its course or tends to shake public confidence in the judicial
institutions. It further held that this jurisdiction is to be exercised not
for the protection of the dignity of an individual judge but to protect the
administration of justice from being maligned and ensure that the
authority of the courts is neither imperilled nor is the administration of
justice by it interfered with in any manner. The relevant observations
read as under: –
” 42. The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly
and with caution whenever an act adversely affects the administration of justice or which
tends to impede its course or tends to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions.
This jurisdiction may also be exercised when the act complained of adversely affects the
majesty of law or dignity of the courts. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the
majesty and dignity of the courts of law. It is an unusual type of jurisdiction combining “the
jury, the judge and the hangman” and it is so because the court is not adjudicating upon any
claim between litigating parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the dignity of an
individual judge but to protect the administration of justice from being maligned. In the
general interest of the community it is imperative that the authority of courts should not be
imperilled and there should be no unjustifiable interference in the administration of justice. It
is a matter between the court and the contemner and third parties cannot intervene. It is
exercised in a summary manner in aid of the administration of justice, the majesty of law
and the dignity of the courts. No such act can be permitted which may have the tendency to
shake the public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the administration of justice.
(Emphasis supplied)
191. In Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian
Express Newspapers, Bombay Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. reported in (1988) 4
35
SCC 592 it was observed that the process of due course of
administration of justice must remain unimpaired. Public interest
demands that there should be no interference with judicial process and
the effect of the judicial decision should not be pre-empted or
circumvented. The relevant observations read as under: –
” 35. The question of contempt must be judged in a particular situation. The
process of due course of administration of justice must remain unimpaired. Public interest
demands that there should be no interference with judicial process and the effect of the
judicial decision should not be pre-empted or circumvented by public agitation or
publications. It has to be remembered that even at turbulent times through which the
developing countries are passing, contempt of court means interference with the due
administration of justice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
192. In Rita Markandey v. Surjit Singh Arora reported in
(1996) 6 SCC 14, it was observed that even if parties have not filed an
undertaking before the court but if the court was induced to sanction a
particular course of action or inaction on the representation made by a
party and the court ultimately finds that the party never intended to act
on the said representation or such representation was false, the party
would be guilty of committing contempt. The relevant observations read
as under: –
” 12. Law is well settled that if any party gives an undertaking to the court to
vacate the premises from which he is liable to be evicted under the orders of the court and
there is a clear and deliberate breach thereof it amounts to civil contempt but since, in the
present case, the respondent did not file any undertaking as envisaged in the order of this
Court the question of his being punished for breach thereof does not arise. However, in our
considered view even in a case where no such undertaking is given, a party to a litigation
may be held liable for such contempt if the court is induced to sanction a particular course of
action or inaction on the basis of the representation of such a party and the court ultimately
finds that the party never intended to act on such representation or such representation was
false. In other words, if on the representation of the respondent herein the Court was
persuaded to pass the order dated 5-10-1995 extending the time for vacation of the suit
premises, he may be held guilty of contempt of court, notwithstanding non-furnishing of the
undertaking, if it is found that the representation was false and the respondent never
intended to act upon it. […]”
(Emphasis supplied)
193. The Borrower and the Subsequent Transferee / the alleged
contemnors herein placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Patel
Rajnikant (supra) have contended that in the absence of any
disobedience or wilful breach of a prohibitory order no contempt could
36
be said to have been committed. It has been further canvased that this
Court in the Main Appeals never issued any specific direction either to
the Borrower or the Subsequent Transferee, & therefore no contempt
could be said to have been committed.
194. In Patel Rajnikant (supra), this Court upon examining
Section 2(b) of the Act, 1971 held that to hold a person guilty of having
committed contempt, there must be a judgment, order, direction etc. by
a court, there must be disobedience of such judgment, order, direction
etc and that such disobedience must be willful.
” 58. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 have also
been invoked. Section 2 of the Act is a definition clause. Clause (a) enacts that contempt of
court means “civil contempt or criminal contempt”. Clause (b) defines “civil contempt”
thus:
” 2. (b) ‘civil contempt’ means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree,
direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to
a court;”
Reading of the above clause makes it clear that the following conditions
must be satisfied before a person can be held to have committed a civil contempt:
(i) there must be a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process
of a court (or an undertaking given to a court);
(ii) there must be disobedience to such judgment, decree, direction, order,
writ or other process of a court (or breach of undertaking given to a court); and
(iii) such disobedience of judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other
process of a court (or breach of undertaking) must be wilful.”
195. However, the subsequent observations made by this Court
in Patel Rajnikant (supra) are significant. It observed that the court
should not hesitate in wielding the potent weapon of contempt, it is for
the proper administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with
the orders passed by it in order to uphold and maintain the dignity of
courts and majesty of law. The relevant observations read as under: –
” 70. From the above decisions, it is clear that punishing a person for contempt
of court is indeed a drastic step and normally such action should not be taken. At the same
time, however, it is not only the power but the duty of the court to uphold and maintain the
dignity of courts and majesty of law which may call for such extreme step. If for proper
administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with the orders passed by a court, it
is required to take strict view under the Act, it should not hesitate in wielding the potent
weapon of contempt.
(Emphasis supplied)
196. What can be discerned from the above exposition of law is
that any act of disobedience, defiance, or any attempt to malign the
authority of the court would amount to contempt because they
37
undermine the respect and trust that the public reposes in judicial
institutions. The judicial process relies on the confidence of society, and
any act that disrupts or disrespects this process threatens to erode the
foundation of justice and order.
197. Contempt jurisdiction exists to preserve the majesty and
sanctity of the law. Courts are the guardians of justice, and their
decisions must command respect and compliance to ensure the proper
functioning of society. When individuals or entities challenge the
authority of courts through wilful disobedience or obstructive behaviour,
they undermine the rule of law and create the risk of anarchy. Contempt
serves as a mechanism to protect the integrity of the courts, ensuring
that they remain a symbol of fairness, impartiality, and accountability.
198. When judicial orders are openly flouted or court proceedings
are disrespected, it sends a signal that the rule of law is ineffective,
leading to a loss of trust in the system. Judicial decisions must remain
unimpaired, free from external pressures, manipulation, or
circumvention. Acts that attempt to mislead the court, obstruct its
functioning or frustrate its decisions distort the process of justice and
would amount to contempt.
199. The contempt jurisdiction of this court cannot be construed
by any formulaic or rigid approach. Merely because there is no
prohibitory order or no specific direction issued the same would not
mean that the parties cannot be held guilty of contempt. The Contempt
jurisdiction of the court extends beyond the mere direct disobedience of
explicit orders or prohibitory directions issued by the court. Even in the
absence of such specific mandates, the deliberate conduct of parties
aimed at frustrating court proceedings or circumventing its eventual
decision may amount to contempt. This is because such actions strike
at the heart of the judicial process, undermining its authority and
obstructing its ability to deliver justice effectively. The authority of
courts must be respected not only in the letter of their orders but also in
the broader spirit of the proceedings before them.
200. Any contumacious conduct of the parties to bypass or
nullify the decision of the court or render it ineffective, or to frustrate
the proceedings of the court, or to ensure any undue advantage
therefrom would amount to contempt. Attempts to sidestep the court’s
38
jurisdiction or manipulate the course of litigation through dishonest or
obstructive conduct or malign or distort the decision of the courts would
inevitably tantamount to contempt sans any prohibitory order or
direction to such effect.
201. Thus, the mere conduct of parties aimed at frustrating the
court proceedings or circumventing its decisions, even without an
explicit prohibitory order, constitutes contempt. Such actions interfere
with the administration of justice, undermine the respect and authority
of the judiciary, and threaten the rule of law.
202. However, at the same time, the power of contempt ought to
be exercised sparingly and with caution and care. It operates with a
string of caution and unless otherwise satisfied beyond doubt, it would
neither be fair nor reasonable for the courts to resort to such powers.
The standard of proof required before a person is held guilty of
committing contempt of court must be beyond all reasonable doubt.
203. The courts while exercising its contempt jurisdiction must
remain circumspect, more particularly, where there exists a possibility
of the order being amenable to more than one interpretation. In
Jhareshwar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly reported in (2002) 5
SCC 352 it was held that if an order does not contain any specific
direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions
issued therein then it would be appropriate to direct the parties to
approach the court which disposed of the matter for necessary
clarification of the order instead of the court exercising its contempt
jurisdiction thereby taking upon itself the power to decide the original
proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the
judgment or order. The relevant observations read as under:
“The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been
any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the party who is
alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The court exercising contempt
jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided
in the judgment or order… The court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or
order and not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have
contained. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court exercising contempt
jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party,
which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the
judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific direction regarding
a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to
direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the
39order instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to
decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment
or order.”
(Emphasis supplied)”
17. The law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court,
mentioned supra in Celir LLP, is squarely applicable to the
present case. For the aforesaid reasons, the
Contemnors/Respondents are held to have not fully and
faithfully complied with the order dated 21.03.2025 in Writ
Petition No. 14590 of 2019.
18. Interestingly, an argument was sought to be put
forth contending that the direction in the Writ Petition was to
the TGPSC, therefore, there cannot be any contempt against the
State. In this connection, it is to be noted that Writ Petition was
filed against the State of Telangana (represented through
Principal Secretary, Roads & Buildings Department), and
Telangana State Public Service Commission, which is the
agency of the State. TGPSC being a recruiting agency of the
State Public Services, and acting for and on behalf of the State;
its role is to scrupulously follow the guidelines applicable for
conducting examinations, selection of candidates and
forwarding the select list to the State Government for issuance
of necessary appointment orders. Therefore, a direction to
TGPSC is invariably a direction to the State. Merely because the
40direction specified the TGPSC, that does not absolve the State of
its responsibility to act and implement the order. Therefore,
both the TGPSC as well as the State are duty-bound to take
action to implement the order under contempt.
19. Therefore, the grounds sought to be urged by
TGPSC that State has filled up / appointed the candidates
subsequently and that there are no vacancies, or the grounds
sought to be urged by the State that the direction is for TGPSC
are apparently a blame-game.
20. In that view of the matter, the Contempt Case is
allowed. The State of Telangana and TGPSC (respondents in the
Writ Petition) are directed to forthwith comply with the direction
issued in the order dated 21.03.2025 in Writ Petition No. 14590
of 2019, if necessary by creating a supernumerary post, within
eight weeks from today.
20.1. Respondents shall also be liable for punishment
under Sections 10 to 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
the quantum of which shall be determined upon the
Respondent’s compliance or non-compliance with this direction
being brought to the notice of this Court.
41
21. Consequently, miscellaneous applications, if any,
shall stand closed.
——– —————————–
NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J
29th June 2026
ksld
