Himachal Pradesh High Court
Harbans Chaudhary vs State Of H.P. & Others on 16 July, 2026
2026:HHC:29072
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 573 of 2026
.
Reserved on: 19.06.2026
Date of Decision: 16.07.2026.
Harbans Chaudhary ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & others ...Respondents
of
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
rt
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri,
Advocate.
For Respondents/State : : Mr Jitender K. Sharma,
Additional Advocate General, for
respondent No.1 & 2/State.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
quashing of FIR No. 255 of 2024, dated 29.08.2024, registered at
Police Station Sadar Una, District Una, H.P., for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 376, 506(2) and 201 of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC) and consequential proceedings arising
therefrom.
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the informant (name being withheld to protect
.
her identity) came in contact with the petitioner when she was
undergoing coaching for her NET exam. The petitioner employed
her. The informant felt that the petitioner’s intention was not
good, and she expressed her desire to leave the job. She returned
of
to Una after the imposition of the lockdown in 2020. The
petitioner contacted her several times and asked her to visit
rt
Gurgaon and start working again. However, the informant
expressed her desire not to continue with her job. The petitioner
persisted, and the informant agreed to start working in the
Company. The petitioner hired an accommodation for the
informant near his residence and increased her salary from
₹20,000 to ₹50,000. He also paid the rent for the informant’s
accommodation. One day, the petitioner visited the informant’s
room and raped her. He threatened to kill her if the incident was
revealed to any person. He had also video recorded the incident
and threatened the informant that he would upload the video
recording on the internet. Thereafter, he repeatedly raped the
informant. He took her to various hotels on the pretext of
attending meetings and raped her in the hotels. The informant’s
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marriage was fixed in the year 2023, and the petitioner told her
not to get married, otherwise he would forward her indecent
.
pictures to her future husband. The informant nevertheless
married and shifted to Canada. But the petitioner continued to
threaten the informant. She returned to India in August 2023, and
the petitioner took her to an unknown flat in Gurgaon, where he
of
raped her. He visited Una in November 2023 and took her to Peer
Nigaha. He raped her in a lonely place. He threatened to upload her
rt
pictures on the internet and forward them to her husband if the
incident was narrated to any person. He also purchased stamp
papers in the informant’s name and forged the informant’s
signature on various documents. The matter was reported to the
police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter.
The informant declined to undergo a medical examination, and
her medical examination could not be conducted. The call detail
record of the petitioner was obtained, and it was found that the
petitioner was in constant touch with the informant between
01.09.2022 and 08.01.2024. The petitioner’s location was not
found at Una in November 2023. The records from various hotels
were seized. However, the recording in the CCTV footage was not
available. The petitioner had other mobile phones, besides the
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ones mentioned in the FIR. The statements of witnesses were
recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the
.
investigation, the charge-sheet was prepared and presented
before the Court.
3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and
filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioner has filed the present
of
petition asserting that the allegations in the FIR are false. They are
not supported by the material collected by the police during the
rt
investigation. The informant refused to undergo her medical
examination, and there is no material to corroborate her version.
The analysis of the call detail record showed that the petitioner’s
location was not found at Una in November 2023, which falsifies
her version that the petitioner had raped her at Una in November
2023. The informant had herself purchased stamp papers, and the
allegation made by her that the petitioner had purchased the
stamp papers in her name and forged her signature is not proved.
The landlord of the rented flat at Sector 45, Gurgaon, Haryana said
that the informant used to stay in the flat along with her brother,
mother and father, which falsifies the informant’s version that
she was residing alone. The petitioner had also lodged an FIR No.
255 of 2024 before the registration of the FIR by the informant,
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and the present FIR has been lodged to create pressure upon the
petitioner to withdraw the FIR lodged by him. Only one incident
.
had taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of Una, and the
police at Una had no jurisdiction to carry out the investigation.
The allegations are vague and do not contain any details.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and
of
the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be
quashed.
4.
rt
I have heard Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel
for the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate General, for the respondent/State.
5. Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the investigation conducted by the
police does not support the allegations made in the FIR. The
petitioner had also lodged an FIR against the informant, and the
present FIR was lodged as a counterblast to the petitioner’s FIR.
The present case falls within the parameters of the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. The continuation of the proceedings
amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, he
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prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and
consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed.
.
6. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate-
General for the respondent, submitted that the allegations in the
FIR show the commission of cognizable offences. This Court
should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to evaluate the
of
material and quash the FIR because some parts of it are not
corroborated by the result of the investigation. Hence, he prayed
rt
that the present petition be dismissed.
7. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions
made at the Bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: –
“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
is now more or less well settled as regards the principles tobe applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised
some of the principles under which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series::: Downloaded on – 16/07/2026 20:34:02 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:29072of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of.
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearlydefined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive
list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power shouldof
be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
rt taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers underSection 156(1) of the Code except under an order of
a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected insupport of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
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person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
.
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings,
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
of
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
rt private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would
be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR
or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such
a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
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9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
.
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its
extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may
issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to
secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers areneither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of
this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly.
of
The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded
within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High
Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where
intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
rt
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelinesthat High Courts must follow before quashing criminal
proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the
Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court.
The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate thefollowing situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been
filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the
legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv)the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains
vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties arewilling to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)10 The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11. The FIR specifically mentions that the petitioner had
taken a flat on rent where he repeatedly raped the informant. He
had also taken the informant with her to various hotels on the
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2026:HHC:29072pretext of company meetings, and he raped her in those hotels.
The police have collected the identity cards of the petitioner and
.
the informant, showing that they had stayed together in various
hotels. Therefore, the allegations in the FIR prima facie show the
commission of cognizable offences.
12. It was submitted that the allegations are inherently
of
improbable. The petitioner never protested before any employeeof the hotel regarding her repeated rapes. This submission will not
rt
help the petitioner. The informant specifically asserted that thepetitioner had video-recorded the first incident, and he
threatened to upload the video recording on social media.
Therefore, the informant was under a constant threat that her
reputation would be tarnished if she did not consent to the
petitioner’s activities. The informant was acting under coercion
and could not have been expected to raise any hue and cry or make
any complaint to any person. Hence, the FIR cannot be quashed
because the informant had not complained to any person about
the rape.
13, It was submitted that the landlord of the
accommodation hired by the informant stated that the informant
was staying with her family members, which falsifies her
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2026:HHC:29072allegation that she was residing alone and that the petitioner had
raped her. This submission will also not help the petitioner. The
.
complete statement of the landlord has not been placed on record
to show that the informant never resided alone. The family
members of the informant could reside with her on some
occasions, and the petitioner could reside alone on another
of
occasion, providing an opportunity for the petitioner to rape her.
14. It was submitted that the petitioner’s call detail record
rt
shows that his location was not found at Una in November 2023,which falsifies the informant’s allegation that the petitioner had
raped her at Una in November 2023. This submission will not help
the petitioner. The police had specifically stated that the petitioner
was in possession of other mobile phones. Further, it is possible
for the petitioner to keep his mobile phone somewhere else and
visit Una without the mobile phone. All these possibilities have to
be explored after the conclusion of the trial and not during the
proceedings for quashing of the FIR.
15. It was submitted that the petitioner had lodged an FIR
against the informant, and the present FIR is the result of a
counterblast to compel the petitioner to withdraw the FIR lodged
by him. This submission will not help the petitioner. The F.I.R.
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lodged by the petitioner shows that there was some dispute
related to the money between the parties. It is for the learned trial
.
Court to determine which of the versions is correct, and this Court
cannot assume that the FIR lodged by the petitioner is correct
because it was lodged before the FIR of the informant. Thus, not
much advantage can be derived from the registration of the FIR by
of
the petitioner.
16. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are
rt
false. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid downby the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of
Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising the
inherent jurisdiction has to treat the allegations in the FIR as
correct. It was observed: –
“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a
complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly withcircumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court
must believe the averments and allegations in the
complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly heldthat, save in exceptional cases where non-interference
would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the
judicial process should not interfere at the stage of
investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent
powers of the Court should not be used routinely according
to its whims or caprice.”
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17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the
.
Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to determine the genuineness of
the allegations. It was observed: –
“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegationsof
made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of
the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the
allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face
value, must disclose the commission of an offence and
rt
make out a case against the accused. At the cost of
repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in theFIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not
disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case
against the accused. We are of the considered view that the
present case would fall under Category-3 of the categoriesenumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court
in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:
“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission
of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that
once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for
quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see anymerit in this submission, keeping in mind the
position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7
SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A.
[Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59:
(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the
question of whether the High Court could entertain
the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the
charge-sheet was filed by the police during the::: Downloaded on – 16/07/2026 20:34:02 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:29072pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC
p. 63, para 16)
“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the
various sections under which the appellant is.
being charged and is to be prosecuted would
show that the same are not made out even
prima facie from the complainant’s FIR. Even
if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned
Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have
still examined whether the offences alleged
of
to have been committed by the appellant
were prima facie made out from the
complainant’s FIR, charge-sheet,
rt documents, etc. or not.”
18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-
trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. It was
observed at page 397:
“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that
while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not
supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can bemade to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan
Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The
relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted
hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings,
while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the
Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …
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7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the
powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very
limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether
any sufficient material is available to proceed further.
against the accused for which the accused is required to
be tried or not’.”
19. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed at this stage on
the ground that the allegations of the FIR are false. This is a
matter of trial and is to be determined by the learned Trial Court,
of
where the matter is pending.
20. It was submitted that the police of police station Una
rt
had no territorial jurisdiction to investigate the matter. This
submission cannot be accepted. The FIR and the investigation
show that a part of the incident had taken place at Peernigah
within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station Una and the
police had jurisdiction to investigate the matter. In any case, it
was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satvinder Kaur v.
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728 that SHO has a
statutory authority to investigate any cognizable offence and the
investigation cannot be quashed on the ground of lack of
territorial jurisdiction. It was observed:-
“8. In our view, the submission made by the learned
counsel for the appellant requires to be accepted. The
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2026:HHC:29072quashing the FIR on the ground that the Delhi Police
Station did not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate
the offence. From the discussion made by the learned Judge,
it appears that the learned Judge has considered the.
provisions applicable to criminal trials. The High Court
arrived at the conclusion by appreciating the allegations
made by the parties that the SHO, Police Station Paschim
Vihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction toentertain and investigate the FIR lodged by the appellant
because the alleged dowry items were entrusted to the
respondent at Patiala and that the alleged cause of actionof
for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC arose at
Patiala. In our view, the findings given by the High Court
are, on the face of it, illegal and erroneous because:
(1) The SHO has statutory authority under Section 156 of
rt the Criminal Procedure Code to investigate any
cognizable case for which an FIR is lodged.
(2) At the stage of investigation, there is no question of
interference under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code on the ground that the investigating
officer has no territorial jurisdiction.
(3) After the investigation is over, if the investigating
officer arrives at the conclusion that the cause of
action for lodging the FIR has not arisen within histerritorial jurisdiction, then he is required to submit a
report accordingly under Section 170 of the CriminalProcedure Code and to forward the case to the
Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the
offence.
9. This would be clear from the following discussion.
Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers
the police officer to investigate any cognizable offence.
It reads as under:
“156. Police officer’s power to investigate a cognizable
case.–(1) Any officer in charge of a police station
may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate
any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction::: Downloaded on – 16/07/2026 20:34:02 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:29072over the local area within the limits of such station
would have the power to enquire into or try under the
provisions of Chapter XIII.
(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case
.
shall at any stage be called into question on the
ground that the case was one which such officer was
not empowered under this section to investigate.
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190
may order such an investigation as above-
mentioned.”
of
10. It is true that territorial jurisdiction is also prescribed
under sub-section (1) to the extent that the officer can
investigate any cognizable case in which a court having
jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such
rt
police station would have the power to enquire into or try
under the provisions of Chapter XIII. However, sub-section
(2) makes the position clear by providing that no
proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any
stage be called into question on the ground that the case
was one which such officer was not empowered to
investigate. After the investigation is completed, the result
of such investigation is required to be submitted as
provided under Sections 168, 169 and 170. Section 170
specifically provides that if, upon an investigation, it
appears to the officer in charge of the police station that
there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of
suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a
Magistrate, such officer shall forward the accused under
custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of
the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or
commit for trial. Further, if the investigating officer arrives
at the conclusion that the crime was not committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the police station, then the FIR
can be forwarded to the police station having jurisdiction
over the area in which the crime was committed. But this
would not mean that in a case which requires investigation,
the police officer can refuse to record the FIR and/or
investigate it.
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11. Chapter XIII of the Code provides for “jurisdiction of the
criminal courts in enquiries and trials”. It is to be stated
that under the said chapter, there are various provisions
which empower the court for enquiry or trial of a criminal
.
case and that there is no absolute prohibition that the
offence committed beyond the local territorial jurisdiction
cannot be investigated, enquired or tried. This would be
clear by referring to Sections 177 to 188. For our purpose, it
would suffice to refer only to Sections 177 and 178, which
are as under:
“177. Ordinary place of enquiry and trial.–Every
of
offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a
court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.
178. Place of enquiry or trial.–(a) When it is uncertain
in which of several local areas an offence was
rt
committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local
area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues
to be committed in more local areas than one, or
(d) where it consists of several acts done in different
local areas,
it may be enquired into or tried by a court havingjurisdiction over any of such local areas.”
12. A reading of the aforesaid sections would make it clear
that Section 177 provides for an “ordinary” place of enquiry
or trial. Section 178, inter alia, provides for place of enquiry
or trial when it is uncertain in which of several local areas
an offence was committed or where the offence was
committed partly in one local area and partly in another
and where it consisted of several acts done in different local
areas, it could be enquired into or tried by a court having
jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Hence, at the stage
of investigation, it cannot be held that the SHO does not
have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the crime.
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13. This Court in State of W.B. v. S.N. Basak [AIR 1963 SC 447 :
(1963) 2 SCR 52] dealt with a similar contention wherein the
High Court had held that the statutory powers of
investigation given to the police under Chapter XIV were.
not available in respect of an offence triable under the West
Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949
and hence the investigation was without jurisdiction.
Reversing the said finding, it was held thus:
“The powers of investigation into cognizable
offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Section 154 which is in thatof
chapter deals with information in cognizable offences
and Section 156 with the investigation into such
offences and under these sections the police have the
rt statutory right to investigate into the circumstances
of any alleged cognizable offence without authority
from a Magistrate and this statutory power of thepolice to investigate cannot be interfered with by the
exercise of power under Section 439 or the inherent
power of the court under Section 561-A of the
Criminal Procedure Code. As to the powers of thejudiciary in regard to the statutory right of the police
to investigate, the Privy Council in King
Emperor v. KhwajaNazir Ahmad [(1944) 71 IA 203, 212:
AIR 1945 PC 18] (IA at p. 212) observed as follows–
‘The functions of the judiciary and the police
are complementary, not overlapping and the
combination of individual liberty with a due
observance of law and order is only to beobtained by leaving each to exercise its own
function, always, of course, subject to the right
of the court to intervene in an appropriate case
when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal
Procedure Code to give directions in the nature
of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present,
however, the court’s functions begin when a
charge is preferred before it, and not until then.
It has sometimes been thought that Section::: Downloaded on – 16/07/2026 20:34:02 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:29072561-A has given increased powers to the court
which it did not possess before that section was
enacted. But this is not so. The section gives no
new powers, it only provides that those which.
the court already inherently possesses shall be
preserved and is inserted, as their Lordships
think, lest it should be considered that the only
powers possessed by the court are thoseexpressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure
Code and that no inherent power had survived
the passing of that Act.’of
With this interpretation, which has been put on the
statutory duties and powers of the police and of the powers
of the Court, we are in accord. The High Court was in error,
therefore in interfering with the powers of the police in
rt
investigating the offence which was alleged in the
information sent to the officer in charge of the policestation.”
14. Further, the legal position is well settled that if an
offence is disclosed, the court will not normally interfere
with an investigation into the case and will permit an
investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. If the
FIR, prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence,
the court does not normally stop the investigation, for, to
do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police
to investigate into cognizable offences. [State of
W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982) 1 SCC 561: 1982 SCC (Cri)
283] It is also settled by a long course of decisions of this
Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under
Section 482 CrPC to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High
Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the
allegations made in the complaint or the documents
accompanying the same per se; it has no jurisdiction to
examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations.
[Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370, 395 : 1985
SCC (Cri) 180]
15. Hence, in the present case, the High Court committed a
grave error in accepting the contention of the respondent
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that the investigating officer had no jurisdiction to
investigate the matters on the alleged ground that no part
of the offence was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the police station at Delhi. The appreciation
.
of the evidence is the function of the courts when seized of
the matter. At the stage of the investigation, the material
collected by an investigating officer cannot be judicially
scrutinised for arriving at a conclusion that the police
station officer of a particular police station would not have
territorial jurisdiction. In any case, it has to be stated that in
view of Section 178(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when
of
it is uncertain in which of the several local areas an offence
was committed, or where it consists of several acts done in
different local areas, the said offence can be enquired into
or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local
rt
areas. Therefore, to say at the stage of the investigation that
the SHO, Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi, was not
having territorial jurisdiction is, on the face of it, illegal and
erroneous. That apart, Section 156(2) contains an embargo
that no proceeding of a police officer shall be challenged on
the ground that he has no territorial power to investigate.
The High Court has completely overlooked the said
embargo when it entertained the petition of Respondent 2
on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction.
21. It was held in Rasiklal Dalpatram Thakkar v. State of
Gujarat, (2010) 1 SCC 1, that once an investigation is commenced
under Section 156(1), it cannot be interrupted on the ground that
the Police Officer was not empowered. It was observed:-
24. From the aforesaid provisions, it is quite clear that a
police officer in charge of a police station can, without the
order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable offence
which a court having jurisdiction over such police station
can inquire into or try under Chapter III of the Code. Sub-
section (2) of Section 156 ensures that once an investigation
is commenced under sub-section (1), the same is not
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interrupted on the ground that the police officer was not
empowered under the section to investigate. It is in the
nature of a “savings clause” in respect of investigations
undertaken in respect of cognizable offences. In addition to
.
the powers vested in a Magistrate empowered under Section
190 CrPC to order an investigation under sub-section (1) of
Section 202 CrPC, sub-section (3) of Section 156 also
empowers such Magistrate to order an investigation on a
complaint filed before him.
26. In the instant case, the stage contemplated under
Section 181(4) CrPC has not yet been reached. Prior to
of
taking cognizance on the complaint filed by the Bank, the
learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad had
directed an inquiry under Section 156(3) CrPC and as it
appears, a final report was submitted by the investigating
rt
agency entrusted with the investigation stating that since
the alleged transactions had taken place within the
territorial limits of the city of Mumbai, no cause of action
had arisen in the State of Gujarat and therefore, the
investigation should be transferred to the police agency in
Mumbai. There seems to be little doubt that the Economic
Offences Wing, State CID (Crime), which had been
entrusted with the investigation, had, upon initial
inquiries, recommended that the investigation be
transferred to the police agency of Mumbai.
27. In our view, both the trial court as well as the Bombay
High Court had correctly interpreted the provisions of
Section 156 CrPC to hold that it was not within the
jurisdiction of the investigating agency to refrain itself
from holding a proper and complete investigation merely
upon arriving at a conclusion that the offences had been
committed beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
28. A glance at the material before the Magistrate would
indicate that the major part of the loan transaction had, in
fact, taken place in the State of Gujarat and that having
regard to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 156
CrPC, the proceedings of the investigation could not be
questioned on the ground of jurisdiction of the officer to
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conduct such investigation. It was open to the learned
Magistrate to direct an investigation under Section 156(3)
CrPC without taking cognizance on the complaint and
where an investigation is undertaken at the instance of the
.
Magistrate, a police officer empowered under sub-section
(1) of Section 156 is bound, except in specific and specially
exceptional cases, to conduct such an investigation even if
he was of the view that he did not have jurisdiction to
investigate the matter.
29. Having regard to the law in existence today, we are
unable to accept Mr Syed’s submissions that the High Court
of
had erred in upholding the order of the learned trial Judge
when the entire cause of action in respect of the offence had
allegedly arisen outside the State of Gujarat. We are also
unable to accept the submission that it was for the
rt
investigating officer in the course of the investigation to
decide whether a particular court had jurisdiction to
entertain a complaint or not.
30. It is the settled law that the complaint made in a
criminal case follows the place where the cause arises, but
the distinguishing feature in the instant case is that the
stage of taking cognisance was yet to arrive. The
investigating agency was required to place the facts elicited
during the investigation before the court in order to enable
the court to come to a conclusion as to whether it had
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or not. Without
conducting such an investigation, it was improper on the
part of the investigating agency to forward its report with
the observation that since the entire cause of action for the
alleged offence had purportedly arisen in the city of
Mumbai within the State of Maharashtra, the investigation
should be transferred to the police station concerned in
Mumbai.
31. Section 156(3) CrPC contemplates a stage where the
learned Magistrate is not convinced as to whether the
process should be based on the facts disclosed in the
complaint. Once the facts are received, it is for the
Magistrate to decide his next course of action. In this case,
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there are materials to show that the appellant had filed his
application for a loan with the Head Office of the Bank at
Ahmedabad and that the processing and the sanction of the
loan was also done in Ahmedabad which clearly indicates
.
that the major part of the cause of action for the complaints
arose within the jurisdiction of the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Ahmedabad. It was not, therefore, desirable on
the part of the investigating agency to make an observation
that it did not have territorial jurisdiction to proceed with
the investigation, which was required to be transferred to
the police station having jurisdiction to do so.
of
32. On the materials before him, the learned Magistrate was
fully justified in rejecting the final report submitted by the
Economic Offences Wing, State CID (Crime), and to order a
fresh investigation into the allegations made on behalf of
rt
the Bank. The High Court, therefore, did not commit any
error in upholding the views expressed by the trial court. As
mentioned hereinbefore, Section 181(4) CrPC deals with the
court’s powers to inquire into or try an offence of criminal
misappropriation or a criminal breach of trust if the same
has been committed or any part of the property, which is
the subject of the offence, is received or retained within the
local jurisdiction of the said court.
33. The various decisions cited by Mr Syed, and in particular
the decision in Satvinder Kaur case [(1999) 8 SCC 728: 1999
SCC (Cri) 1503] provide an insight into the views held by the
Supreme Court on the accepted position that the
investigating officer was entitled to transfer an
investigation to a police station having jurisdiction to
conduct the same. The said question is not in issue before
us and as indicated hereinbefore, we are only required to
consider whether the investigating officer in respect of an
investigation undertaken under Section 156(3) CrPC can file
a report stating that he had no jurisdiction to investigate
into the complaint as the entire cause of action had arisen
outside his jurisdiction despite there being material
available to the contrary. The answer, in our view, is in
negative and we are of the firm view that the powers vested
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in the investigating authorities, under Section 156(1) CrPC,
did not restrict the jurisdiction of the investigating agency
to investigate into a complaint even if it did not have
territorial jurisdiction to do so. Unlike in other cases, it was
.
for the court to decide whether it had jurisdiction to
entertain the complaint as and when the entire facts were
placed before it.”
22. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed because the
police had no territorial jurisdiction to investigate the matter.
of
23. It is undisputed that the police had completed the
investigation and filed the charge sheet before the Court. It was
rt
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P.,
(2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge
sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to
appreciate the same. It was observed:
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and the charge sheet isready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the
FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in theabsence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged
offences, we are of the view that the appellants should
prefer a discharge application before the trial court underSection 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We
say so because even according to the State, the
investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be
filed before the competent court. In such circumstances,
the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials
which the investigating officer might have collected
forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge
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2026:HHC:29072materials and take a call whether any case for discharge is
made out or not.”
24. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is
.
dismissed. The pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed
of.
25. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on
of
the merits of the case.
rt (Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
16th , July, 2026.
(ravinder)
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