Chattisgarh High Court
Shai Transporter vs Employees State Insurance Corporation on 14 July, 2026
1
Digitally
signed by
SIDDHANT
SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR
TAMRAKAR Date:
2026.07.16
11:44:51
+0530
CGHC010165702018 2026:CGHC:29759
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPL No. 110 of 2018
ï‚· Shai Transporter Registered Office At Plot 8-B Industial Estate, Bhilai,
District- Durg, Chhattisgarh 490026, Through Partner Namely Hemant Sial
S/o Late Shri B.S. Sial, Aged About 47 Years, R/o- 78a/3, Nehru Nagar
(West), Bhilai, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner
versus
1. Employees State Insurance Corporation Through- Its Regional Director,
Regional Office, 102 Ramnagar Road Kota, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2. Deputy Director Employees State Insurance Corporation, Regional Office,
102 Ramnagar Raod Kota, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner : None, in two rounds.
For State : Mr. Pranav Saxena, Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board
14.07.2026
1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):-
“10.1 This Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to
call for the entire record from the ESI Corporation
showing on which basis the the authority has
assessed contribution under section 45-A of the
Employee State Insurance Act.
10.2 This Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to
set aside the order dated 02.02.2018 passed by the
appellate authority respondent no. 1 (ANNEXURE
P-1) and consequently the letter of recovery dated
12.02.2018.
2
10.3 This Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to
direct the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal
of the petitioner on its own merits with affording
opportunity of hearing.
10.4 Any other relief as deemed fit by this Hon’ble
Court.”
2. Facts in brief are that the petitioner is a partnership firm indulged in business
of Civil, Mechanical Erection, Fabrication, Refractory and material handling
under the respondents. The petitioner had obtained labour licence as well as
ESI code to carry out above stated works. It is further pleaded that
respondent No. 2 passed an order on 24.10.2017 and issued a demand notice
of Rs. 165722/-.
3. The petitioner preferred an appeal according to the provisions of Section 45-
AA of Act of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (for short “Act,
1948”), but it was presented after expiry of prescribed limitation period of 60
days on 20.01.2018, and therefore, it was dismissed by the appellate
authority vide order dated 02.02.2018. Against said order this petition has
been preferred.
4. It is pleaded in the writ petition that the appellate authority should have
condoned the delay caused in filing appeal.
5. Mr. Pranav Saxena, Advocate appearing for respondents would contend that
under the Act of 1948, the appellate authority exercises quasi-judicial powers
and as there is no application of law of limitation, therefore, the application,
if any, moved by the petitioner for condonation of delay could not be
considered. He has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh in WP No. 9129 of 2024 parties being Gyan Singh
Parmar vs. Employee State Insurance Corporation and Others, wherein,
3
it is held that the Court cannot fix a period of limitation, if not fixed by the
Legislature. He would contend that this petition deserves to be dismissed.
6. I have heard Mr. Saxena and perused the documents placed on record.
7. Admittedly, appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the appellate
authority on 20.01.2018, whereas, original order was passed on 24.10.2017
and it was duly communicated to the petitioner on 30.10.2017. The period of
limitation prescribed under Section 45AA of the Act of 1948 is 60 days.
8. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Gyan Singh Parmar
(supra) while dealing with the similar issue referred various judgments of
Hon’ble Supreme Court and in para 12, 13 & 14 held as under :-
“12. In absence of any provision for
condonation of delay, this Court cannot compel
the Appellate Authority to decide the
application for condonation of delay. This
Court, by passing a Judicial Order cannot give
the power to the Appellate Authority to condone
the delay. It is well established principle of law
that Constitutional Court cannot legislate and if
the Court directs the Appellate Authority to
consider the application for condondation of
delay even in absence of any provision of law,
then it would amount to legislation, which
cannot be done. The Supreme Court in the case
of Sangeeta Singh v. Union of India, reported in
(2005) 7 SCC 484 has held as under :
9. While interpreting a provision the court
only interprets the law and cannot legislate it.
If a provision of law is misused and subjected
to the abuse of process of law, it is for the
legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if
deemed necessary. (See CST v. Popular
Trading Co.) The legislative casus omissus
cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative
process.
13. The Supreme Court in the case of V.K.
Naswa v. Union of India, reported in (2012) 2
4
SCC 542has held as under:
6. It is a settled legal proposition that the
court can neither legislate nor issue a
direction to the legislature to enact in a
particular manner.
7. In Mallikarjuna Rao v. State of A.P. and
V.K. Sood v. Deptt. of Civil Aviation, this
Court has held that the writ court, in exercise
of its power under Article 226, has no power
even indirectly to require the executive to
exercise its law-making power. The Court
observed that it is neither legal nor proper for
the High Court to issue directions or advisory
sermons to the executive in respect of the
sphere which is exclusively within the
domain of the executive under the
Constitution. The power under Article 309 of
the Constitution to frame rules is the
legislative power. This power under the
Constitution has to be exercised by the
President or the Governor of a State, as the
case may be. The courts cannot usurp the
functions assigned to the executive under the
Constitution and cannot even indirectly
require the executive to exercise its law-
making power in any manner. The courts
cannot assume to themselves a supervisory
role over the rule-making power of the
executive under Article 309 of the
Constitution. While deciding the said case,
the Court placed reliance on a large number
of judgments, particularly Narinder Chand
Hem Raj v. UT, H.P., where it has been held
that legislative power can be exercised only
by the legislature or its delegate and none
else.
8. In State of H.P. v. Parent of a Student of
Medical College, this Court deprecated the
practice adopted by the courts to issue
directions to the legislature to enact a
legislation to meet a particular situation
observing : (SCC p. 174, para 4)
“4. … The direction given by the Division
5
Bench was really nothing short of an
indirect attempt to compel the State
Government to initiate legislation with a
view to curbing the evil of ragging, for
otherwise it is difficult to see why, after the
clear and categorical statement by the
Chief Secretary on behalf of the State
Government that the Government will
introduce legislation if found necessary and
so advised, the Division Bench should have
proceeded to again give the same direction.
Thus the Division Bench was clearly not
entitled to do. It is entirely a matter for the
executive branch of the Government to
decide whether or not to introduce any
particular legislation.”
9. In Asif Hameed v. State of J&K this
Court while dealing with a case like this at
hand observed : (SCC p. 374, para 19) “19.
… While doing so the court must remain
within its self-imposed limits. The court
sits in judgment on the action of a
coordinate branch of the Government.
While exercising power of judicial review
of administrative action, the court is not an
appellate authority. The Constitution does
not permit the court to direct or advise the
executive in matters of policy or to
sermonise qua any matter which under the
Constitution lies within the sphere of
legislature or executive.” (emphasis added)
10. In Union of India v. Deoki Nandan
Aggarwal, this Court similarly observed : (SCC
p. 332, para 14)
“14. … It is not the duty of the
court either to enlarge the scope of
the legislation…. The court cannot
rewrite, recast or reframe the
legislation for the very good reason
that it has no power to legislate.
The power to legislate has not been
conferred on the courts.”
11. Similarly in Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind
6
Coop. Marketing- cum-Processing
Service Society Ltd., this Court held that
the court cannot fix a period of limitation,
if not fixed by the legislature, as “the
courts can admittedly interpret the law
and do not make laws”. The court cannot
interpret the statutory provision in such a
manner “which would amount to
legislation intentionally left over by the
legislature”.
12. A similar view has been reiterated by
this Court in Union of India v. Assn. for
Democratic Reforms observing that the
court cannot issue direction to the
legislature for amending the Act or Rules.
It is for Parliament to amend the Act or
Rules. In District Mining Officer v.
TISCO, this Court held that function of
the court is only to expound the law and
not to legislate.
13. Similarly, in Supreme Court
Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of
India, this Court held that the court
cannot direct the legislature to enact a
particular law for the reason that under
the constitutional scheme Parliament
exercises sovereign power to enact law
and no outside power or authority can
issue a particular piece of legislation.
(See also State of J&K v. A.R. Zakki.)
14. In Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, this
Court held that if the court issues a direction
which amounts to legislation and is not
complied with by the State, it cannot be held
that the State has committed the contempt of
court for the reason that the order passed by the
court was without jurisdiction and it has no
competence to issue a direction amounting to
legislation.
9. Having considered the facts discussed-above and law laid down by the High
Court of M.P., this Court is of the opinion that as appeal was not preferred
within a period of limitation and there is no application of Section 5 or 29 of
7
Limitation Act, therefore, the appellate authority rightly dismissed the appeal
preferred by the petitioner. Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby
dismissed.
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
JUDGE
$iddhant
