Madras High Court
Vijay Jain vs Thilagavathy on 13 July, 2026
Author: C.Saravanan
Bench: C.Saravanan
CRL.A.No.702 of 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on 18.06.2026
Pronounced on 13.07.2026
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.SARAVANAN
CRL.A.No.702 of 2018
Vijay Jain ... Appellant / Respondent / Complainant
Vs.
Thilagavathy ... Respondent / Appellant / Accused
Criminal Appeal filed under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, to set aside the Order of acquittal dated 25.04.2018 made in
C.A.No.291 of 2017 on the file of the I Additional District and Sessions
Court, Erode, reversing the Order dated 30.10.2017 made in S.T.C.No.106 of
2016 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate (Fast Track Court No.2), Erode.
For Appellant : Mr.R.Shase
For Respondent : Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy
Senior Counsel
For Mr.S.Kaithamalai Kumaran
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JUDGMENT
The Appellant / Complainant is aggrieved by the impugned judgment
dated 25.04.2018 passed by the Learned I Additional District and Sessions
Judge, Erode, in Criminal Appeal No.291 of 2017 filed by the Respondent /
Accused.
2. By the impugned judgment, the Appellate Court reversed the
judgment of the Learned Judicial Magistrate (Fast Track Court No.II), Erode
in S.T.C.No.106 of 2016 dated 30.10.2017 convicting the
Respondent/Accused for the offence punishable under Section 139 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
3. The Operative portion of the impugned judgment dated 25.04.2018
of the Appellate Court reads as under:
“80. In the result
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The Judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned
Judicial Magistrate Fast Track Court No.II, Erode min STC No.
106/2016, Dated 30.10.2017 is hereby set aside.
3. The respondent / complainant not proved the accusation
against the appellant / accused U/s. 138 of the
Negotiable Instrument Act beyond all reasonable doubt.
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4. Hence, the appellant/accused is acquitted of the accusation U/s
138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act and set at liberty.
5. The learned Judicial Magistrate, Fast Track Court No.II is
directed to refund the fine amount of Rs.5,000/- paid by the
appellant/accused to the appellant/accused forthwith.
6. The bail bonds if any executed by the appellant/accused shall
stand cancelled.”
4. The Trial Court, by its Order dated 30.10.2017 in S.T.C.No.106 of
2016, had earlier convicted the Respondent herein (Accused therein) for the
offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
5. Before the Trial Court, on behalf of the Appellant / Complainant, the
Appellant/Complainant examined himself as PW1, and one
Mr.C.Eswaramoorthy, the Notary Public before whom Ex.P8-Sale
Agreement, dated 13.01.2014 was signed by the Respondent/Accused and
witnessed by DW1, was examined as PW2. The Appellant/Complainant
marked Exs.P1 to P11, as detailed below:
1. Ex.P1 15.10.2015 Original Cheque bearing No.969445 received from
Syndicate Bank, Erode Branch
2. Ex.P2 13.10.2015 Original Cheque bearing No.969446 received from
Syndicate Bank, Erode Branch
3. Ex.P3 30.10.2015 Cheque Return Memo
4. Ex.P4 14.10.2015 Cheque Return Memo
5. Ex.P5 06.11.2015 Advocate Notice
6. Ex.P6 06.11.2015 Postal Receipt
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7. Ex.P7 11.11.2015 Return Cover
8. Ex.P8 13.01.2014 Copy of the Sale Agreement executed between the
Petitioner and the Respondent
9. Ex.P9 Copy of the Photograph taken on 01.05.2014, when
Logasamy (DW1) visited the petitioner’s marriage
10. Ex.P10 Registration copy of the agreement between
Thilagavathy and Vijay Jain dated 13.01.2014,
recorded in Book No.25, Serial No.826
11. Ex.P11 Copy of the Sale Agreement notarized by the
Advocate
6. On behalf of the Respondent / Accused, one Logasamy, who was a
witness to Ex.P8-Sale Agreement, dated 13.01.2014, was examined as DW1,
Mrs.Rajasulochana, Sub Inspector of Police, Land Grabbing Cell, was
examined as DW2 and one Moorthy was examined as DW3. The respondent
also marked Exs.D1 to D9, as detailed below:
1. Ex.D1 Copy of FIR
2. Ex.D2 Certified copy of the Complaint given by Moorthy to the District
Superintendent of Police on 31.10.2014
3. Ex.D3 Certified copy of the deposition of Logasamy
4. Ex.D4 Certified copy of the deposition of Periyasamy
5. Ex.D5 Certified Copy of the deposition of Moorthy
6. Ex.D6 Certified Copy of the deposition of Rajkumar
7. Ex.D7 Certified copy of the Sale Deed executed by Raja in favour of
Lalithkumar Jain on 11.12.2012.
8. Ex.D8 Certified copy of the Mortgage Deed executed by Raja in favour
of Lalit Kumar Jain on 11.12.2012 for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-
9. Ex.D9 Certified copy of the General Power of Attorney executed in
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7. The Trial Court has primarily come to the conclusion that the
Respondent/Accused failed to rebut the statutory presumption in favour of the
Appellant/Complainant as contemplated under Section 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, by pointing out contradictions in the date and time of
the alleged execution of Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated 13.01.2014, and the
circumstances under which it was stated to be executed by the Respondent /
Accused.
8. Specifically, the Trial Court has noted the contradiction elicited
during the cross-examination of DW2 (Mrs.Rajasulochana, Sub Inspector of
Police, Land Grabbing Cell, Erode). During the course of cross-examination,
the DW2 admitted that the date in the Ex.D2-Police Complaint dated
30.10.2014 (actually 31.10.2014) by DW3 was overwritten by substituting
the date 28.10.2014, while mentioning the occurrence prior to six months.
9. That apart, the Trial Court has found fault with the
Respondent/Accused for failing to file a complaint against the alleged
coercion by the Appellant/Complainant and his father, Mr.Lalit Kumar Jain,
in the execution of Ex.P8-Sale Agreement, dated 13.01.2014 and in the
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complaint marked as Ex.D2 by DW3 on 30.10.2014, as noted in the
impugned judgment.
10. The Trial Court has also found fault with the Respondent/Accused
in failing to issue any stop-payment instructions to her bank after the dates
prescribed in Ex.P1 (Cheque No.969445 dated 15.10.2015 for a sum of
Rs.40,00,000/-) and Ex.P2 (Cheque No.969446 dated 13.10.2015 for a sum
of Rs.10,00,000/-), were issued and presented for clearance.
11. It was specifically observed by the Trial Court that there was a
huge delay in filing the Ex.D2-Police Complaint dated 30.10.2014 (actually
31.10.2014) by DW3 after Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated 13.01.2014. The
Trial Court has also observed that even though the defence of the
Respondent/Accused was that there was a coercion, no complaint was given
in this regard prior to Ex.D2-Police Complaint dated 30.10.2014 (actually
31.10.2014) by DW3, the husband of the Respondent/Accused.
12. The Trial Court has also found that the signatures in Ex.P8-Sale
Agreement dated 13.01.2014 and Exs.P1 & P2-Cheques dated 15.10.2015 &
13.10.2015 were admitted by the Respondent/Accused, and that the defence,
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that only a photocopy of Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated 13.01.2014 was
marked, was not sufficient to disprove either the execution of the said sale
agreement or Exs.P1 & P2-Cheques dated 15.10.2015 & 13.10.2015.
13. The Trial Court has relied on the following decisions to uphold the
conviction:-
i) The Doveton-Corrie Protestant Schools
Association v. Dr. Prof. Geoffery K. Francis [2012
(6) CTC 648]
ii) Shivheri Lkhande Vs. Prabha Singh [2017 (1)
MWN (Cri) Dec 190 (MP)]
14. In other words, the Trial Court has come to the conclusion that
although Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated 13.01.2014 was neither registered nor
its original produced, its content can be admitted as a secondary evidence and
can be looked into in view of Section 17 read with Section 49 of the
Registration Act, 1908.
15. The defence that the Appellant/Complainant had no means to lend
Rs.50 lakhs to the Respondent/Accused by producing necessary income tax
records has been considered to be irrelevant by the Trial Court, following the
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decision of this Court in T.R. Palanisamy v. Hariharan [2012 (2) MWN
(Cr.) DCC 141 (Mad.)].
16. As far as the defence regarding the capacity to give money and the
failure on the part of the Appellant/Complainant to produce income tax
records are concerned, the issue is now squarely covered against the
Respondent/Accused in view of the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Sanjabij Tari vs. Kishore S.Borcar and Another [2025 SCC
OnLine SC 2069]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“15. In the present case, the cheque in question has
admittedly been signed by the Respondent No.1-Accused . This
Court is of the view that once the execution of the cheque is
admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act that
the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the
presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that the holder of
the cheque received the said cheque in discharge of a legally
enforceable debt or liability arises against the accused. It is
pertinent to mention that observations to the contrary by a two
Judges Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs. Dattatraya
G.Hedge (2008) 4 SCC 54 have been set aside by a three Judges
Bench in Rangappa (supra).
…..
19. Recently, the Kerala High Court in P.C. Hari vs. Shine
Varghese & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 5535 has taken the view
that a debt created by a cash transaction above Rs. 20,000/-
(Rupees Twenty Thousand) in violation of the provisions of
Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘IT Act,
1961‘) is not a ‘legally enforceable debt’ unless there is a valid
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explanation for the same, meaning thereby that the presumption
under Section 139 of the Act will not be attracted in cash
transactions above Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand).
20. However, this Court is of the view that any breach of
Section 269SS of the IT Act, 1961 is subject to a penalty only
under Section 271D of the IT Act, 1961. Further neither
Section 269SS nor 271D of the IT Act, 1961 state that any
transaction in breach thereof will be illegal, invalid or
statutorily void. Therefore, any violation of Section 269SS
would not render the transaction unenforceable under Section
138 of the NI Act or rebut the presumptions under Sections 118
and 139 of the NI Act because such a person, assuming
him/her to be the payee/holder in due course, is liable to be
visited by a penalty only as prescribed. Consequently, the view
that any transaction above Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty
Thousand) is illegal and void and therefore does not fall within
the definition of ‘legally enforceable debt’ cannot be
countenanced. Accordingly, the conclusion of law in P.C. Hari
(supra) is set aside.”
17. The Appellate Court has reversed the decision of the Trial Court on
various grounds, as follows:
GROUNDS/ISSUES TRIAL COURT FINDINGS APPELLATE COURT
AND CONVICTION REVERSAL
1. Rebuttal of 1.Rejected the defense of 1.Held that the defense
Presumption & coercion. successfully rebutted
Coercion 2.The court noted substantial the Section 139
contradictions in the statutory
dates and times presumption by
provided by defense establishing standard
witnesses (DW1). “preponderance of
3.Furthermore, the court probabilities”.
placed weight on the fact 2.The testimonies of
that despite allegations of DW1 and DW3
ongoing threat, the established that the
formal complaint was cheques were
delayed by 10 months obtained by the
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and the investigation Appellant /
was incomplete. Complainant under
4.Crucially, the accused coercion and threat,
failed to execute a “stop and were not issued
payment” order with the to discharge any
bank. Para 20, 23 legally enforceable
debt. Para 39, 40
2. Admissibility of 1.Ruled the document 1.Ruled that by
Unregistered Sale admissible. operation of law
Agreement 2.The court held that even an from 01.12.2012
unregistered sale onwards, all
agreement can be legally agreements for the
admitted as evidence for sale of immovable
collateral purposes. property are
Para 24 compulsorily
registrable.
2.The choice to bypass
the Registrar and
execute the
document (Ex.P8)
before a Notary
Public strongly
corroborates the
defense's version
that it was obtained
by exercising threat
and coercion. Para
44, 51, 55, 56
3. Notary 1.Relied strictly on the 1.Identified severe
Formalities & signature and the technical defects:
Financial Receipt issuance of the physical Ex.P8 completely
cheque, which were not lacked the Notary
explicitly disputed by Advocate’s book or
the accused. serial number,
2.The technical defects of the unlike Ex.P10
document execution (Serial No. 826,
were not considered Book No. 25).
fatal. Para 25, 27 2.Critically, PW2 (the
Notary Public)
admitted in cross-
examination that no
cash changeover of
Rs. 50,00,000/ took
place in his
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presence. Para 48,
50
4. Non-Production 1.Deemed secondary. 1.Raised serious doubt
of Original 2.Held that because a basic over the
Document underlying liability complainant's case.
existed, secondary 2.The complainant failed
documentation details to produce or mark
did not require further the original sale
rigorous verification. agreement in court.
Para 26 3.It is difficult to
believe that a buyer
paying a massive
sum of Rs.
50,00,000/- as part
consideration
would permit the
seller (accused) to
retain the original
document while the
transaction
remained
uncompleted. Para
49
5. Suspicion in 1.Considered the debt 1.Highlighted the
Consideration absolute because the commercial
Terms signature on the improbability of the
negotiable instrument contract terms: the
was valid. agreement allowed
2.The commercial logic a long period of one
behind the contractual year to execute the
terms was not rigorously sale for small
scrutinized. Para 27 amount remaining
balance of Rs.
5,00,000/-, despite a
massive amount of
Rs. 50,00,000/-
allegedly being paid
advance payment.
2.This structural layout
creates heavy doubt
on the actual
transaction. Para 59
6. Financial 1.Held that once a liability is 1.Reversed the burden.
Capacity & Income admitted, there is no 2.Since the accused
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Tax Status legal requirement for fundamentally
the complainant to disputed the
produce separate, transaction, and the
independent proof complainant is a
regarding the source of businessman (not an
funds or the explicit agriculturist), he was
means of cash strictly required to
advancement. file Income Tax
Para 25, 26 returns and Bank
Statements proving
he possessed Rs.
50,00,000/- in cash
liquidity on
13.01.2014.
3.Failure to produce
these financial
accounts is fatal to
the case. Para 68, 69
18. The case of the Appellant/Complainant is that the
Appellant/Complainant had advanced a sum of Rs.50 lakhs as earnest money
for the purchase of the Respondent’s/Accused’s house property for a total sale
consideration of Rs.55 lakhs and that the balance was to be paid by the
Appellant/Complainant within one year. On payment of the balance amount
of Rs.5 lakhs, the Respondent/Accused was to execute a Sale Deed in favour
of the Appellant/Complainant.
19. The learned counsel for the Appellant/Complainant would submit
that well-considered decision based on the evidence by the Trial Court has
been reversed by the Appellate Court. Hence, the learned counsel submits
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that the impugned judgment of the Appellate Court, reversing the judgment
of the Trial Court, is liable to be set aside and the decision convicting the
Respondent/Accused should be restored.
20. In support of the present appeal, the learned counsel for the
Appellant/Complainant has placed reliance on the following decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court:-
(i) Sanjabij Tari vs. Kishore S.Borcar and Another [2025 SCC
OnLine SC 2069]
(ii) R. Hemalatha vs. Kashthuri [(2023) 10 SCC 725
21. On the other hand, the case of the Respondent/Accused is that the
respondent owed no money to the Appellant/Complainant, and that there was
a collateral transaction between the Respondent’s/Accused’s husband, namely
Moothy (DW3) and the Appellant’s/Complainant’s father, namely Lalit
Kumar Jain, in connection with the educational institution, namely Don
Bosco School (Teachers Training Institute) Erode of the
Respondent/Accused.
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22. The further case of the Respondent/Accused is that Ex.D4-
Deposition of Periyasamy dated 10.11.2014, which was marked through
DW2, who registered Ex.D1-FIR dated 13.04.2016 pursuant to a direction of
this Court in Crl.O.P.No.28721 of 2015 clearly states that the land of the
school property had earlier been sold and mortgaged to Raja and Palanisamy,
and that the Appellant’s/Accused’s father, namely Lalit Kumar Jain, showed
interest in taking over the loan by discharging the dues to Raja and
Palanisamy.
23. It is the further case of the Respondent/Accused that the
Appellant’s/Complainant’s father, Mr.Lalit Kumar Jain, paid a sum of Rs.40
lakhs to Raja and Palanisamy. In connection therewith, documents were
executed in favour of the Appellant’s/Complainant’s father, which were
marked as Exs.D7 to D9. It is further submitted that subsequent to the
proceedings under the PMLA, the attachment of the property in Ex.P8-Sale
Agreement dated 13.01.2014 was executed by coercing the
Respondent/Accused to sign the same, as if she had received a sum of Rs.50
lakhs in cash as an advance from the Appellant/Complainant.
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24. The learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent/Accused, on the
other hand, would submit that there was no money transaction between the
Appellant/Complainant and the Respondent/Accused and that the transaction
was actually between the Respondent’s/Accused’s father, Mr.Lalit Kumar
Jain, and the Respondent’s/Accused’s husband, Moothy (DW3), who had
given Ex.D2-Police Complaint dated 30.10.2014 (actually 31.10.2014).
25. The case of the respondent is that the Respondent’s/Accused’s
husband, namely Moorthy, was running an educational institution, namely
Don Bosco School. He had earlier borrowed Rs.32,00,000/- from one
Periyasamy and his son Raja for construction of a building for the aforesaid
educational institution. While the loan was being discharged from time to
time, the said Periyasamy requested the Respondent’s/Accused’s husband to
repay the loan amount, as he was in urgent need of the money lent to the
Respondent’s/Accused’s husband.
26. It is in this background, the Respondent/Accused had marked
Ex.D7-Sale Deed, dated 11.12.2012, Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated
13.01.2014 and Ex.D9-Power of Attorney, dated 11.12.2012, which were
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executed in favour of the Appellant’s/Complainant’s father for the purpose of
taking over the loan.
27. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the
Respondent/Accused that the properties in Ex.D7-Sale Deed, dated
11.12.2012, Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated 13.01.2014 and Ex.D9-Power of
Attorney, dated 11.12.2012 were originally sold to the father of Raja and
were transferred to the Appellant’s/Complainant’s father in view of the above
request to secure the loan repayment directly to Raja and Palanisamy and that
interest of the loan was subsequently paid to the Appellant’s/Complainant’s
father. It is further submitted that the properties mentioned in Ex.D7, Ex.D8
and Ex.D9 were thereafter attached by the Enforcement Directorate at Delhi
in connection with a PMLA case and that under these circumstances, the
Appellant’s/Complainant’s father was unwilling to receive any amounts either
towards principle and/or interest in installments for discharge of the debt of
the Respondent’s/Accused’s husband.
28. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that on
13.01.2014, the Respondent’s/Accused’s husband was asked to come to the
Appellant’s/Complainant’s house to resolve the matter. Thereafter, the
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Appellant/Complainant and his father asked the Respondent’s/Accused’s
husband to transfer the house property and since the Respondent’s/Accused’s
husband informed that the house was in the name of the
Respondent/Accused, Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated 13.01.2014 was obtained
together with Ex.P1 (Cheque No.969445 dated 15.10.2015 for a sum of
Rs.40,00,000/-) and Ex.P2 (Cheque No.969446 dated 13.10.2015 for a sum
of Rs.10,00,000/-). It is further submitted that the Respondent/Accused, who
was staying in Bangalore at that time, was immediately asked to come to
Erode. On the same day, Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated 13.01.2014 was
executed for the sale of the Respondent’s/Accused’s house for a total value of
Rs.55 lakhs, out of which, it was recorded as if a sum of Rs.50 lakhs had been
paid by the Appellant/Complainant to the Respondent/Accused.
29. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that even
though there was no agreement for such sale in reality and no amount was
received by the Respondent/Accused, Ex.P1 (Cheque No.969445 dated
15.10.2015 for a sum of Rs.40,00,000/-) and Ex.P2 (Cheque No.969446
dated 13.10.2015 for a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-) were obtained along with other
documents and Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated 13.01.2014 was signed in the
presence of Mr.C.Eswaramoorthy (PW2), which was witnessed by Logasamy
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(DW1) and Moorthy (DW3), the husband of the Respondent/Accused.
30. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that there is
no dispute regarding the pre-existing loan taken by the
Respondent’s/Accused’s husband from the Appellant’s/Complainant’s father,
after the Appellant’s/Complainant’s father decided to take over the loan that
was earlier given by Palanisamy and Raja, and that in view of the
complications arising from the attachment of the properties in Ex.D7-Sale
Deed, dated 11.12.2012, Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated 13.01.2014 and Ex.D9-
Power of Attorney, dated 11.12.2012, coercion was exercised by confining
the Respondent’s/Accused’s husband.
31. In this background, Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated 13.01.2014 was
signed. Later, it was made to appear that a dispute and complications had
arisen regarding the house property, which was the subject of Ex.P8-Sale
Agreement dated 13.01.2014 between the Appellant/Complainant and the
Respondent/Accused.
32. On behalf of the Respondent/Accused, the learned Senior Counsel
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has relied on the following decisions:
(i) Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant [(2022) 6 SCC 735]
(ii) M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala and Another
[2006 (3) CTC 730 (SC)]
(iii) K. Prakashan v. P.K. Surenderan [(2008) 1 SCC 258]
(iv) Hiten P. Dalai v. Bratindranath Banerjee [2001 (3) CTC 243
(SC)]
(v) T.R. Palanisamy v. Hariharan [2012 (2) MWN (Cr.) DCC 141
(Mad.)]
(vi) Sanjay Mishra v. Kanishka Kapoor and Ors
[MANU/MH/1078/2009]
(vii) V. Ponkasamuthu v. M. Aathimuthu [2009 (1) MWN (Cr.) DCC
65 (Mad)]
(viii) Kalavally v. Parthasarathy [2008 (5) CTC 527 (Mad)]
33. In Bir Singh Vs. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
“33. A meaningful reading of the provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular,
Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a
person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the
payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to
rebut the presumption that the cheque had been19/27
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liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have
been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if
the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the
cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of
Section 138 would be attracted.
34. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a
payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up
the amount and other particulars. This in itself would
not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on
the accused to prove that the cheque was not in
discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence.
35. …..
36. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and
handed over by the accused, which is towards some
payment, would attract presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence
of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was
not issued in discharge of a debt.”
34. The point for consideration in this appeal is whether the decision of
the Appellate Court is to be reversed by restoring the decision of the Trial
Court in the given facts and circumstances of the case.
35. Keeping the above principles of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bir
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Singh’s case referred to supra in mind, I proceed to give my reasoning and
conclusion as to whether the impugned judgment of the First Appellate Court
dated 25.04.2018 warrants interference.
36. Under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, there
is a presumption drawn in favour of the holder of a cheque that the holder
received the cheque from the drawee for the discharge of debt or other
liability , whether in whole or in part, of any debt.
37. In other words, there is a presumption drawn against the drawer of
the cheque that the cheque was issued by the drawer in favour of the drawee/
holder of a cheque for the discharge of a debt or other liability whether in
whole or in part.
38. For the Respondent/Accused as the drawer of the cheque to shift
the burden cast under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, it
was sufficient for the Respondent/Accused to make out a case that there was
no preponderance of probability for issuance of Ex.P1 (Cheque No.969445
dated 15.10.2015 for a sum of Rs.40,00,000/-) and Ex.P2 (Cheque
No.969446 dated 13.10.2015 for a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-) for the discharge
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of a debt or other liability whether in whole or in part.
39. The admitted position is that DW3, i.e., the Respondent’s/Accused’s
husband, owed money to the Appellant’s/Complainant’s father namely Mr.
Lalith Jain. Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated 13.01.2014 was signed by the
Respondent’s/Accused. It was witnessed by the Witness who were
examined on behalf of the Respondent’s/Accused.
40. The facts on record also reveal that Ex.D2-Police Complaint was
given on 31.10.2014 by DW3, the husband of the Respondent/Accused
regarding the event surrounding execution of Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated
13.01.2014. Ex.D2-Police Complaint dated 31.10.2014 was approximately
10 months after the execution of Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated 13.01.2014.
The Land Grabbing Cell had however refused to register it for reasons best
known.
41. This impelled DW3, the husband of the Respondent/Accused to file
Crl.O.P.No.28721 of 2015. Pursuant to the order passed in Crl.O.P.No.28721
of 2015, Ex.D2-Police Complaint dated 30.10.2014 (actually 31.10.2014)
was taken on file and thereafter Ex.D1-FIR in Crime No.07 of 2016 dated
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13.04.2016 was registered. It is not clear as to what is the status of the case
after Ex.D1-FIR in Crime No.07 of 2016 dated 13.04.2016 was registered.
42. The consistent stand of the witnesses examined on behalf of the
Respondent/Accused was that no amount was paid by the
Appellant/Complainant to the Respondent/Accused and that Ex.P8-Sale
Agreement dated 13.01.2014 was obtained by exercising coercion on
Respondent/Accused, as if there was a proposal for sale of her house
property to the Appellant/Complainant.
43. It was also stated that neither there was any negotiation for sale
of the property of the Respondent/Accused for a sum of Rs.55 lakhs nor a
sum of Rs.50 lakhs was paid by Appellant/Complainant the to the
Respondent/Accused as an advance.
44. Thus, the Trial Court could have examined the circumstances
under which Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated 13.01.2014 was executed, in light
of the overwhelming evidence that was produced before the Trial Court.
45. Though, the Respondent/Accused as the drawer of Ex.P1 (Cheque
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CRL.A.No.702 of 2018
No.969445 dated 15.10.2015 for a sum of Rs.40,00,000/-) and Ex.P2
(Cheque No.969446 dated 13.10.2015 for a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-) has
neither denied her signature on them nor execution of Ex.P8-Sale Agreement
dated 13.01.2014, yet it cannot be held to be fatal to the defence of the
Respondent/Accused before the Trial Court.
46. Though, there has also been a delay in approaching the Land
Grabbing Cell regarding the events surrounding the execution of Ex.P8-Sale
Agreement dated 13.01.2014, by DW3, by the husband of the
Respondent/Accused, it is sufficient to conclude that the
Respondent/Accused has shifted the burden on the Appellant/ Complainant
as there is overwhelming evidence to infer that Ex-P8 Sale Agreement dated
13.01.2014 and Ex.P1 (Cheque No.969445 dated 15.10.2015 for a sum of
Rs.40,00,000/-) and Ex.P2 (Cheque No.969446 dated 13.10.2015 for a sum
of Rs.10,00,000/-) were obtained under coercion.
47. Therefore, it was incumbent for the Appellant/Complainant prove
that Ex.P1 (Cheque No.969445 dated 15.10.2015 for a sum of
Rs.40,00,000/-) and Ex.P2 (Cheque No.969446 dated 13.10.2015 for a sum
of Rs.10,00,000/-) were indeed issued by the Respondent/Accused for the
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CRL.A.No.702 of 2018
discharge of a debt, arising out of execution of Ex.P8 – Sale Agreement dated
13.01.2014. Since, the Respondent/Accused is merely required to make
out a probable defence to shift the burden on the Appellant/Complainant.
48. In my view, the Respondent/Accused had discharged the burden by
shifting onus under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 onto
the Appellant/Complainant to prove that indeed, a sum of Rs.50 lakhs was
advanced towards sale consideration in cash for the sale of the property
which led to the in execution of Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated 13.01.2014 and
the balance of Rs.5 lakhs was to be paid by the Respondent/Accused within
one year for which Ex.P1 (Cheque No.969445 dated 15.10.2015 for a sum of
Rs.40,00,000/-) and Ex.P2 (Cheque No.969446 dated 13.10.2015 for a sum
of Rs.10,00,000/-) were given.
49. That apart, in the complaint also, there was no record of the post-
dated cheques in Ex.P1 (Cheque No.969445 dated 15.10.2015 for a sum of
Rs.40,00,000/-) and Ex.P2 (Cheque No.969446 dated 13.10.2015 for a sum
of Rs.10,00,000/-) were given on 10.01.2015 to refund the amount allegedly
advanced pursuant to Ex.P8-Sale Agreement dated 13.01.2014.
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50. In my view, the decision of the Appellate Court, reversing the
judgment of the Trial Court does not merit any interference.
51. Therefore, this Criminal Appeal is liable to be dismissed, and
accordingly, dismissed with liberty to the Appellant/Claimant to work out
civil remedy, in accordance with law, if so advised. No costs.
13.07.2026
raja
Neutral Citation : Yes / No
To
1. The I Additional District and Sessions Court, Erode.
2. The Judicial Magistrate (Fast Track Court No.2), Erode.
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C.SARAVANAN, J.
raja
CRL.A.No.702 of 2018
13.07.2026
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