Himachal Pradesh High Court
Zakir Hussain vs State Of Hp & Others on 16 July, 2026
2026:HHC:29076
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1007 of 2026
Reserved on : 15.07.2026
.
Date of Decision: 16.7.2026.
Zakir Hussain ....Petitioner
Versus
of
State of HP & others ....Respondents
Coram
rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : M/s Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary
and Panku Chaudhary,
Advocates.
For the Respondents/State : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in FIR No. 118 of 2024, dated 12.08.2024,
registered at Police Station Paonta Sahib District Sirmour, H.P.
for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 15 and
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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29 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act
(NDPS Act).
.
2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police had received secret information on 12.08.2024 that
petitioner Zakir Hussain was going to supply narcotics in his
vehicle bearing registration No. HP-85-5786. The information
of
was reduced to writing and was sent to the Supervisory Officer.
The police joined Deepak Kumar and went towards the vehicle
rt
bearing registration No. HP-85-5786. One person opened the
door of the car and ran away after seeing the police. The police
apprehended the driver. He revealed his name as Zakir Hussain,
alias Pappu, the present petitioner. The police searched the
vehicle and recovered five white plastic bags kept on the rear seat
of the car. The police checked the bags and found 98.012
kilograms of poppy husk in them. The petitioner, Zakir Hussain,
made a disclosure statement, which led to the recovery of 4 white
plastic bags containing 78.438 kilograms of poppy husk. These
allegations are false. The petitioner is suffering from diabetes,
and he has to undergo surgical amputation of the large toe of the
foot. The wound has not healed after the operation. The
continued detention of the petitioner would endanger his life.
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The bail is the rule, and jail is the exception. The petitioner would
abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose.
.
Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
petitioner be released on bail.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police had received secret information on
of
12.08.2024 that the petitioner, Zakir Hussain, was transporting a
huge quantity of narcotics in his vehicle bearing registration No.
rt
HP-85-5786. The information was reduced to writing and sent
to the Supervisory Officer. The police joined Deepak Kumar and
went to the spot where the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-
85-5786 was parked. One person ran away after seeing the police.
The police apprehended the driver, and he revealed his name as
Zakir Hussain. The police found five plastic bags on the rear seat
of the vehicle. The police checked the contents and found that
they contained 98.012 kilograms of poppy husk. The police
arrested the petitioner and seized the poppy husk. The petitioner
also made a disclosure statement, which led to the recovery of 4
plastic bags containing 78.438 kilograms of poppy husk. The
poppy husk was sent for analysis to SFSL, and as per the result,
the exhibit was a sample of poppy straw. F.I.R. No. 264 of 2008,
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dated 25.07.2008, for the commission of offences punishable
under Section 15 of the NDPS Act, F.I.R. No. 260 of 2012, dated
.
16.07.2012, for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 15 of the NDPS Act and F.I.R. No. 133 of 2022, dated
25.06.2022, for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 15 of the NDPS Act at Police Station Poanta Sahib,
of
District Nahan, H.P., have been registered against the petitioner.
The petitioner is a known case of type 2 diabetes mellitus and
rt
chronic kidney disease, with bilateral kidney stones. His right big
toe was amputated on 09.05.2026, and he was undergoing
treatment in Dr Yashwant Singh Parmar, Medical College and
Hospital at Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. Hence, the status
report.
4. I have heard M/s. Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary and
Panku Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr
Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the
respondent/State.
5. Mr Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was
falsely implicated. The prosecution has failed to complete the
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evidence despite the lapse of about 2 years, and the petitioner’s
right to a speedy trial is being violated. The petitioner would
.
abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. No
fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in
custody. Therefore, he pleaded that the present petition be
allowed and that the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon
of
following judgments in support of his submissions:
 Rajadurai vs. the State of Tamil Nadu SLP (Crl )
rtNo. 4729 of 2026, decided on 05.05.2025;
 Luxmi Dutt alias Laxmi Dutt alias Lakshmi Dutt vs
State of H.P. SLP (Crl) No. 2113 of 2026 decided on
08.04.2026;
 Lali Singh vs. State of H.P SLP (Crl) No. 1899 of
2026 decided on 25.03.2026;
 Jitender Thakur vs. State of H.P. SLP (Crl) No. 2166
of 2026 decided on 13.04.2026;
 Nittu vs. State of H.P. SLP (Crl) No. 2113 of 2026
decided on 02.04.2026;
 Ram Lal vs. State of H.P. SLP (Crl) No. 4043 of
2026 decided on 12.05.2026;
 Gaurav vs State of H.P. SLP (Crl) No. 504 of 2026
decided on 20.05.2026;
 Lil Bhahadur vs. State of H.P. SLP (Crl) No. 8157 of
2025 decided on 30.07.2025;
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 X vs. State of H.P. 2024 SCC OnLine H.P. 1906;
 Salim Valimamad Majothi vs. State of Gujrat :2023
SCC Online SC 659;
.
 Ganga Prasad @ Vicky vs State of NCT Delhi SLP
(Crl) No. 3439 of 2026 decided on 25.02.2026; and
 Mukesh Sangwan vs. State of NCT Delhi SLP (Crl)
of
No. 9542 of 2026 decided on 25.05,2026
6. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General,
rt
for the respondent, submitted that the State is providing
treatment to the petitioner for diabetes. He is being regularly
taken to Dr Yashwant Singh, Paramar Government Medical
College and Hospital for his treatment. The petitioner was found
in possession of a commercial quantity of poppy straw, and the
rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to his case. The
petitioner has failed to satisfy the twin conditions laid down
under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The petitioner has criminal
antecedents, and he would indulge in the commission of a similar
crime in case of his release on bail. Therefore, he prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
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7. I have given a considerable thought to the
submissions paid at the bar and have gone through the records
.
carefully.
8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
of
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikantis Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating
rt
on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the
context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laiddown the key factors that should be considered while
granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244,
paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is thevital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears
upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern
Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this
context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is
applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals,
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it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail
order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to
inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail
discretion, based on evidence about the criminal record of a
.
defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.”
(emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC
280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted
as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
of
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
rt
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will
entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the
accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused,
reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused
at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and
similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind
that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has
used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of
“the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant
of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a
genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution
will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the
charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in
matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
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judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for
bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless
to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon
the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the
.
court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the
placement of the accused in society, though it may be
considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter
of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with
other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature
of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant
of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the
chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent
of
on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application cannot
rt
undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an
elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court
is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the
grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC
496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a
High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order
would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind,
rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to
the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be
set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided
the Court’s decision to grant bail have also been detailed as
under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting
bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the
High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously
and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down
in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well
settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be
borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground
to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
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(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
.
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of
the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant
of
of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
rt
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of
discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused
is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2
SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court,
while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu
Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu
Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High
Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows:
(Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2
SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time whileconsidering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of
the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and
the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, whenthe accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in
nature but are supported by adequate material brought on
record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion.
While considering an application for the grant of bail, a
prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and
must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the
case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to
facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of
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punishment that would follow a conviction vis-Ã -vis the
offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)
9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
of
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail,
except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing
from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating
rt
other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or
intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who
seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intendto be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to
induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must
weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also,the heinousness of the crime….”
10. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
11. The status report shows that the petitioner was
occupying the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-85-5786,
from which the police recovered 98.012 kilograms of opium
poppy straw. The petitioner made a disclosure statement, and the
police recovered 78.438 kilograms of opium poppy straw. The
Central Government has notified 50 kg of poppy straw as the
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2026:HHC:29076commercial quantity, which means that the petitioner was found
in possession of a commercial quantity of poppy straw.
.
Therefore, the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the
present case. Section 37 of the NDPS Act reads as follows:
“37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. – (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)–
of
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognizable;
(b) No person accused of an offence punishable for
rtoffences under section 19 or section 24 or section
27A, and also for offences involving commercial
quantity, shall be released on bail or on his ownbond unless-
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for
such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that heis not guilty of such an offence and that he is
not likely to commit any offence while onbail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in
clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the
limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being
in force, on granting of bail.”
12. This section was interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC
738, and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the
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accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit
an offence while on bail, he cannot be released on bail. It was
.
observed:
“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions
with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certainoffences enumerated under the said Section. They
are:
(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence
of
punishable under Section 19,
(2) Under Section 24,rt (3) Under Section 27A and
(4) Of offences involving commercial quantity.
8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the
fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that
as it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application for bail to a person accused of the
enumerated offences under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, in case the court proposes to grant bail to such a
person, two conditions are to be mandatorily
satisfied in addition to the normal requirements
under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other
enactment.
(1) The court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the
person is not guilty of such an offence;
(2) that person is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.”
13. This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus
Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:
“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be
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2026:HHC:29076moved by the accused involved in offences under the
NDPS Act. In Union of India vs. Ram Samujh and Ors.,
(1999) 9 SCC 429, it has been elaborated as under: –
“7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
.
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to
and followed. It should be borne in mind that in
a murder case, the accused commits the
murder of one or two persons, while thosepersons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are
instrumental in causing death or in inflicting
death-blow to a number of innocent youngof
victims, who are vulnerable; it causes
deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the
society; they are a hazard to the society; even if
rt they are released temporarily, in all
probability, they would continue their
nefarious activities of trafficking and/ordealing in intoxicants clandestinely. The
reason may be the large stake and illegal profit
involved. This Court, dealing with the
contention with regard to punishment underthe NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about
the adverse effect of such activities in Durand
Didier vs. Chief Secy. Union Territory of Goa,(1990) 1 SCC 95) as under:
24. With deep concern, we may point out
that the organised activities of the
underworld and the clandestine
smuggling of narcotic drugs andpsychotropic substances into this
country and illegal trafficking in such
drugs and substances have led to drug
addiction among a sizeable section of the
public, particularly the adolescents and
students of both sexes and the menace
has assumed serious and alarming
proportions in recent years. Therefore, in
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2026:HHC:29076this proliferating and booming
devastating menace, causing deleterious
effects and a deadly impact on society as
a whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has.
made effective provisions by introducing
Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory
minimum imprisonment and fine.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding
the market, Parliament has provided that the
person accused of offences under the NDPS Act
should not be released on bail during trial
of
unless the mandatory conditions provided in
Section 37, namely,
(i) there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty
rt of such offence; and
(ii) that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail are satisfied. The
High Court has not given any justifiable
reason for not abiding by the aforesaid
mandate while ordering the release of
the respondent accused on bail. Instead
of attempting to take a holistic view of
the harmful socio-economic
consequences and health hazards which
would accompany trafficking illegally in
dangerous drugs, the court should
implement the law in the spirit with
which Parliament, after due
deliberation, has amended.”
20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of
power to grant bail is not only subject to the
limitations contained under Section 439 of the CrPC
but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section
37, which commences with the non-obstante clause.
The operative part of the said section is in the
negative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to
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any person accused of the commission of an offence
under the Act unless twin conditions are satisfied.
The first condition is that the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to oppose the application, and
.
the second is that the Court must be satisfied that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is
not guilty of such an offence. If either of these two
conditions is not satisfied, the ban for granting bail
operates.
21. The expression “reasonable grounds” means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
of
contemplates substantial probable causes for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the
rtprovision requires the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to
justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of
the alleged offence. In the case at hand, the High
Court seems to have completely overlooked the
underlying object of Section 37 that, in addition to
the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other
law for the time being in force, regulating the grant
of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under
the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.”
14. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd.
Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 1237, wherein it was observed at page 110:
“21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant
of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27-
A and also for offences involving a commercial quantity
are:
(i) The Prosecutor must be given an
opportunity to oppose the application for bail;
and
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(ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to
believe” that: (a) the person is not guilty of
such an offence; and (b) he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail.
.
22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is
“reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not
guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of
“reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench
of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v.
Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC
(Cri) 505], held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 &
of
10-11)
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is
“reasonable grounds”. The expression means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
rt connotes substantial probable causes for believing
that the accused is not guilty of the offence
charged, and this reasonable belief, contemplated
in turn, points to the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to
justify the recording of satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the offence charged.
8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima
facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to
act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is
difficult to give an exact definition of the word
“reasonable”.
‘7. … Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p.
2258 states that it would be unreasonable to
expect an exact definition of the word
“reasonable”. Reason varies in its conclusions
according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual,
and the times and circumstances in which he
thinks. The reasoning which built up the old
scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of
a child’s toy.’
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[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v.
Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497], SCC
p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply &
Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P)
.
Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v.
Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC
532]]
***
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in
accordance with reason”. In the ultimate
analysis, it is a question of fact whether a
of
particular act is reasonable or not, depends on
the circumstances in a given situation. (See
Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla
Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai
rt v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315]
11. The court, while considering the application
for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act,
is not called upon to record a finding of not
guilty. It is for the limited purpose, essentially
confined to the question of releasing the
accused on bail, that the court is called upon to
see if there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty and
records its satisfaction about the existence of
such grounds. But the court has not to consider
the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of
acquittal and recording a finding of not
guilty.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the
High Court and this Court are required to apply while
granting bail is whether there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the accused has not
committed an offence and whether he is likely to
commit any offence while on bail. Given the
seriousness of offences punishable under the NDPS
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Act and in order to curb the menace of drug
trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for
the grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been
prescribed.”
.
15. This position was reiterated in Narcotics Control
Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 891, wherein it was
observed:
“11. It is evident from a plain reading of the non-obstante
of
clause inserted in sub-section (1) and the conditions
imposed in sub-section (2) of Section 37 that there are
certain restrictions placed on the power of the Court when
granting bail to a person accused of having committed an
rt
offence under the NDPS Act. Not only are the limitations
imposed under Section 439 of the Criminal ProcedureCode, 1973, to be kept in mind, but the restrictions placed
under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 are also to
be factored in. The conditions imposed in subsection (1) of
Section 37 are that (i) the Public Prosecutor ought to begiven an opportunity to oppose the application moved by
an accused person for release, and (ii) if such an
application is opposed, then the Court must be satisfiedthat there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
person accused is not guilty of such an offence.
Additionally, the Court must be satisfied that the accused
person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail.
12. The expression “reasonable grounds” has come up for
discussion in several rulings of this Court. In “Collector of
Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira” (2004) 3 SCC
549, a decision rendered by a Three Judges Bench of this
Court, it has been held thus: —
“7. The limitations on granting bail come in only when
the question of granting bail arises on merits. Apart
from the grant of opportunity to the Public Prosecutor,
the other twin conditions which have relevance so far
as the present accused-respondent is concerned, are::: Downloaded on – 16/07/2026 20:34:10 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:29076the satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of
the alleged offence and that he is not likely to commit
any offence while on bail. The conditions are.
cumulative and not alternative. The satisfaction
contemplated regarding the accused being not guilty
has to be based on reasonable grounds. The expression
“reasonable grounds” means something more than primafacie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes
for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in theof
provision requires the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence.” [emphasis added]
rt
13. The expression “reasonable ground” came up for
discussion in “State of Kerala v. Rajesh” (2020) 12 SCC 122,and this Court has observed as below:
“20. The expression “reasonable grounds” means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for believingthat the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The
reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires
the existence of such facts and circumstances as aresufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case athand, the High Court seems to have completely
overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that, in
addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, orany other law for the time being in force, regulating the
grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail
under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.” [emphasis
added]
14. To sum up, the expression “reasonable grounds” used
in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 37 would mean
credible, plausible and grounds for the Court to believe
that the accused person is not guilty of the alleged offence.
For arriving at any such conclusion, such facts and::: Downloaded on – 16/07/2026 20:34:10 :::CIS
21
2026:HHC:29076circumstances must exist in a case that can persuade the
Court to believe that the accused person would not have
committed such an offence. Dovetailed with the aforesaid
satisfaction is an additional consideration that the accused.
person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail.
15. We may clarify that at the stage of examining an
application for bail in the context of Section 37 of the Act, the
Court is not required to record a finding that the accusedperson is not guilty. The Court is also not expected to weigh
the evidence for arriving at a finding as to whether the
accused has committed an offence under the NDPS Act or not.
of
The entire exercise that the Court is expected to undertake at
this stage is for the limited purpose of releasing him on bail.
Thus, the focus is on the availability of reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the offences that he
rt
has been charged with and that he is unlikely to commit an
offence under the Act while on bail.
16. In the present case, the petitioner was prima facie found
in possession of a commercial quantity of opium poppy straw, and
his criminal antecedents would show that there is a possibility that
the petitioner would indulge in the commission of a crime if released
on bail. Thus, the petitioner has not satisfied the twin conditions laid
down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and he cannot be held
entitled to bail.
17. It was submitted that the prosecution has failed to
complete the evidence, which violates the petitioner’s right to a
speedy trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this
consideration. This submission will not help the petitioner.. The
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2026:HHC:29076petitioner was, prima facie, found in possession of a commercial
quantity of opium poppy straw, and he is not entitled to bail
.
without satisfying the twin conditions laid down under Section
37 of the NDPS Act. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025: INSC:1316 that
bail cannot be granted on the ground of prolonged incarceration
of
without satisfying the twin conditions laid down under Section37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed: –
rt
“17. The High Court then, on the strength of those
premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonablegrounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the
alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and
likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is
not a casual observation. It is the statutory thresholdunder Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the
discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest
on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusionof this nature, if returned without addressing the
prosecution’s assertions of operative control andantecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the
appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of
the trial court at first instance.
18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion
exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of
bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity
of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing.
Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail
and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin
requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary
tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
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19. In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken
the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to
the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated
22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation.
regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days
prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the
present complaint, nor do they engage with theprosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in
arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the
consignments. The omission to consider these factorsof
bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by
Section 37(1)(b).”
18. A similar view was taken in Union of India v Namdeo
rt
Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025,
wherein it was observed:
“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the
Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, fourmonths, and charges have not been framed, yet the
allegations are serious inasmuch as not only is the
recovery much in excess of the commercial quantity, butthe Respondent-accused allegedly got the cavities
ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal thecontraband.
12. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the
Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in anorganised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing
with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS
Act is made out in the present matter.”
19. This position was reiterated in State of Punjab v.
Sukhwinder Singh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 671, wherein it was
observed: –
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2026:HHC:29076
9. It is well-settled that in matters involving recovery of
contraband in commercial quantity, the twin conditions
under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act are mandatory
and entail no relaxation merely on the ground that the.
accused has undergone prolonged incarceration during
the pendency of trial. The provision casts upon the Court a
duty to record, before enlarging an accused on bail, its
satisfaction on two cumulative conditions, first, that there
exist reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is
not guilty of the offence charged; and second, that he is
not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The
of
recording of such satisfaction is not a mere formality but a
mandatory precondition, the non-observance of which
vitiates the grant of bail. This Court, in Kashif (supra), has
held in no uncertain terms that the recording of
rt
satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section 37 is
mandatory and not merely directory, and that an order
granting bail without such recorded satisfaction stands
vitiated and cannot be sustained. The same view stands
reiterated in Lalrintluanga Sailo (supra).
10. The impugned order, on its own showing, does not
record the satisfaction mandated under Section
37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. Far from recording such
satisfaction, the High Court has gone on to observe that
‘the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted
bearing in mind the right to a speedy trial.’ Such an
approach is plainly contrary to the settled law laid down
by this Court and deserves to be set aside on this ground
alone. The right to speedy trial, rooted in Article 21 of the
Constitution, is undoubtedly a precious Constitutional
right. That said, in matters governed by a special
enactment such as the NDPS Act, particularly where the
recovery is of a commercial quantity, the said right under
Article 21 must be exercised within the framework of
Section 37 and cannot be pressed into service solely on the
ground of delay to override it. The constitutional right
under Article 21 and the special provision of law under
Section 37, NDPS Act, are to be read harmoniously and not
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placed in opposition to each other. The High Court, by
failing to record its satisfaction on the twin conditions
under Section 37, has, in this Court’s view, committed an
error.
.
****
9. The position of law on the grant of bail in matters
involving the recovery of a commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act is well settled. Section
37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act is cast in mandatory terms.
Where the Public Prosecutor opposes the bail application,
the Court can enlarge an accused on bail only upon
of
recording its satisfaction on two cumulative conditions:
first, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the accused is not guilty of the offence; and second, that
the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on
rt
bail. The recording of such satisfaction is not a mere
formality but a jurisdictional requirement. This Court inKashif (supra) has held, in plain terms, that the non-
recording of the twin satisfaction, being mandatory in
nature, renders an order granting bail unsustainable. A
similar view has been expressed in Lalrintluanga Sailo(supra) and Ajay Kumar Singh (supra).
10. When the impugned order is tested against that settled
position, it becomes apparent that paragraph 8 of the
impugned order, which carries the weight of the
reasoning, does not contain a finding on either of the twin
conditions prescribed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS
Act. What the High Court has, instead, proceeded on is the
proposition that “the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act
can be diluted bearing in mind the right to a speedy trial”.
The right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the
Constitution is undoubtedly a valuable constitutional
guarantee, but in the context of a special statute such as
the NDPS Act dealing with commercial quantity, that right
has to be read alongside, and not in displacement of, the
mandate of Section 37. The omission to record the twin
satisfaction prescribed by the statute, it appears, may
have escaped the attention of the High Court.
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20. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim bail because of the
violation of his right to a speedy trial.
.
21. In Rajadurai (supra), Laxmi Dutt (supra), Lali Singh (supra),
Jitender Thakur (supra), Nittu (supra), Ram Lal (supra), Gaurav
(supra), Lil Bahadur (supra), it has been held that the trial was not
likely to conclude soon. In the present case, the matter has been
of
listed before learned Trial Court for prosecution evidence on
30.07.2026 and there is nothing on record to show that the trial is
rt
not likely to conclude soon.
22. In X vs. State of H.P (supra), Salim Valimamad Majothi
(Supra) and Ganga Prasad @ Vicky (supra) and Mukesh Sangwan
(supra), the accused were released on medical ground, but the
facts of these cases do not show that the rigours of Section 37 of
NDPS Act applied to the cited cases, therefore, the cited judgemnt
will not assist the petitioner.
23. It was submitted that the petitioner is suffering from
diabetes and he should be released on bail. This submission will
not assist the petitioner. The illness of the petitioner will not
override the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. In State of
Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo, (2024) 15 SCC 36, the petitioner
was suffering from paraplegia. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held
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2026:HHC:29076
that the medical condition cannot be a reason to enlarge a person
on bail without satisfying the conditions laid down under Section
.
37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed: –
14. We have no hesitation in saying that in the above
circumstances, it can only be held that the twin conditionsunder Section 37 of the NDPS Act are not satisfied, and the
sole reason that the accused is an HIV patient cannot be a
reason to enlarge her on bail. Since the impugned orderof
[Lalrintluanga Sailo v. State of Meghalaya, 2023 SCC OnLine
Megh 562] was passed without adhering to the said
provision and in view of the rigour thereunder, the
accused Smt X is not entitled to be released on bail, the
rt
impugned order [Lalrintluanga Sailo v. State of Meghalaya,
2023 SCC OnLine Megh 562] invites interference.
24. It was submitted that the bail is a Rule and Jail is an
exception, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this
consideration. This submission will not help the petitioner, as he
is prima facie involved in the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act involving the
commercial quantity. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3848 that in cases under the NDPS Act
involving the commercial quantity, the negation of bail is the
rule and its grant an exception. It was observed at page 381:
“Compliance with the mandate under Section 37
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9. There has been a consistent and persistent view of
this Court that in the NDPS cases, where the offence is
punishable with a minimum sentence of ten years, the
accused shall generally not be released on bail. Negation of.
bail is the rule, and its grant is an exception. While
considering the bail application, the court has to bear in
mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which
are mandatory in nature. The recording of findings as
mandated in Section 37 is a sine qua non for granting bail
to the accused involved in the offences under the said
Act.”
of
25. No other point was urged.
26. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed.
rt
27. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on
the case’s merits.
( Rakesh Kainthla )
Judge
16th July, 2026
(Ravinder)
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