Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Kalpna Jain vs Union Of India on 14 July, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:51586
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DEEPAK KHOT
ON THE 14th OF JULY, 2026
ARBITRATION APPEAL No. 97 of 2024
SMT. KALPNA JAIN AND OTHERS
Versus
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Akhilesh Kumar Jain - Advocate for the appellants.
ORDER
The present appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section 37 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act
of 1996’ for the sake of brevity) being aggrieved by the order dated
14.03.2024 passed in MJC (AV) No. 50/2022 by 24th District Judge,
Jabalpur, whereby the application filed by the appellant under Section 34 of
the Act of 1996 has been rejected by the court and affirmed the award of the
Commissioner (Arbitrator) dated 28.09.2016 passed in Revenue Case No.
1158/A-82/2015-16.
2. It is the case of the appellant before this Court in appeal under
Section 37 of the Act of 1996 that despite an application under Section
3G(5) of the National Highway Act, 1956 (Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act
of 1956’ for the sake of brevity) demanding just compensation applying the
principles of Act of 1956 as well as the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
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2013, the authority as also the arbitrator have failed to determine the
appropriate compensation.
3. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the
arbitrator has assessed the compensation which is not according to the
market value of the land. It has been assessed on applying the rate of the
agriculture land while for adjoining land, the arbitrator has assessed the
market value by applying the government guidelines of Urban Nagar
Panchayt Land. It is submitted that to corroborate and substantiate his claim
the appellant has produced the award passed by the arbitrator in different
claim applications for the acquisition of the land, which is adjoining to the
land of the appellant, however, the arbitrator without considering the merits
of those cases has decided the application by holding that the facts of those
cases are distinguishable. It is submitted that the award passed by the
arbitrator is not on merit and it is not decided considering the documents,
which were submitted alongwith the application under Section 3G(5) of the
Act of 1956. Therefore, the award was required to be interfered with under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 by the Civil/Commercial Court, but the same
has not been done. Therefore, this Court having jurisdiction under Section 37
of the Act of 1996, where the same parameters as of Section 34 of the Act of
1996 can be exercised can interfere and set aside the award. It is further
prayed that the matter deserves to be remanded to the arbitrator to reconsider
the claim of the appellant in the light of Section 34 (4) of the Act of 1996 as
the just claim has been demanded on the basis of the documents, which have
skipped consideration of the arbitrator.
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4. It is submitted that it would not be permissible for the Court under
Sections 34 and 37 of the Act of 1996 to modify the award but it should
certainly be open to the court exercising power under Section 34 of Act,
1996 to set aside the award by indicating reasons and remitting the matter to
the arbitrator to reconsider the same in accordance with law. Therefore, on
the basis of the aforesaid principle, it is prayed that the matter be considered
and remanded to the arbitrator to reconsider the material available on record
and pass just and fair compensation.
5. It is further submitted that the claims or components of
compensation of the land acquired under the Act of 1956 were alive on or
after 28.03.2008 or pending before any of the fora shall be entitled to seek
addition of interest, solatium and interest on the solatium to their
compensation claim.
6 . Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently
opposed the prayer on the ground that the scope of Section 34 and thereafter
Section 37 of the Act of 1996 is very narrow and therefore, on the available
facts and circumstances of the case, no interference is warranted. It is further
submitted that the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 can be
considered only on the parameters, which are available under Section 34 (2)
of the Act of 1996, which provides that the award can be interfered with
when it is against the public policy, which has been explained in
the Explanation that any award which is in conflict with the public policy of
India i.e. in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law. As the
award has been passed on the application of the appellant under Section
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3G(5) of the Act of 1956 in which no ground has been raised in regard to
payment of solatium, therefore, there was no occasion for the arbitrator to
decide the compensation granting solatium in addition to compensation or
interest thereon. That being so, when such claim has not been even
demanded before the Civil/Commercial Court under Section 34 of the Act of
1996, there was no occasion for the court below to consider the case of the
appellant to grant solatium. It is further submitted that the arbitrator has
passed the award on the merit of the case and once the merit has been
discussed and considered then there is no scope of interference under Section
34 and thereafter under Section 37 of the Act of 1996.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the judgment
delivered by the Division Bench of Bombay High Court in the case
of Rishabhkumar vs. Secretary to the Government of India reported in 2021
SCC OnLine Bom 4561 and Single Bench in the case of Sumanbai
Shantaram Bachchav vs. Arbitrator and Additional Commissioner, Nastional
Highway Authority of India & ors.- Arbitration Appeal (ST) No. 222121 of
2023 decided on 09.06.2025.
8. It is submitted that the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
i n Rishabhkumar (supra) dealing with the question of modification of the
award in the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act of 1996, has
held that it is impermissible for the Court to modify the award under the
proceedings Sections 34 and 37 of the Act of 1996.
9. It is further submitted that it would be impermissible for the court to
award any statutory amount to which the land owner would be entitled
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consequent upon striking down of Section 3-J of the Act of 1956, if such
amount has not been granted under the award.
10. It is submitted that the Single Bench of the Bombay High Court
i n Sumanbai Shantaram Bachchav (supra) has opined that the Arbitral
Tribunal cannot be said to have erred in not granting solatium when it was
not even in the frame of reference of the Arbitral Tribunal and Section 3-J
was validly in existence on the statute book. It is further opined that had the
original award been passed after Union of India and another vs. Tarsem
Singh and others reported in (2019) 9 SCC 304 and had it been rejected for
grant of solatium, there would have been a case to argue that the Arbitral
Award was in conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian law governing
land acquisition for national highways and the payment of solatium on the
compensation payable, in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court,
but as the original award under Section 3(G)(1) of the Act of 1956 has been
passed prior to pronouncement of the judgment in the case of Tarsem Singh
(Supra) i.e. on 03.05.2013, therefore, it cannot be said to be against the
fundamental policy of Indian law governing land acquisition. Therefore, no
interference is warranted.
11. It is further submitted that the scope of remand in case of Section
37 of the Act of 1996 is very limited and it can be remanded only when
Section 34 application has been decided without consideration of merit,
without service of notice to respondents and when one or more contesting
parties have expired and their legal representatives have not been brought on
record. As in the present case in hand no such eventualities have been
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canvassed by the appellant, interference is not warranted to remand the
matter. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the
judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bombay Slum
Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited vs. Samir Narain
Bhojwani reported in (2024) 7 SCC 218 . and on the above such facts, it is
submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and another
vs. Tarsem Singh and others reported in (2019) 9 SCC 304 has held as
under:-
“46. It is worthy of note that even in acquisitions that take place
under the National Highways Act and the 1952 Act, the
notification of 2015 under the new Acquisition Act of 2013 makes
solatium and interest payable in cases covered by both Acts. In
fact, with effect from 1-1-2015, Amendment Ordinance 9 of 2014
was promulgated amending the 2013 Act. Section 10 of the said
Amendment Ordinance states as follows:
“10. In the principal Act, in Section 105–
(i) for sub-section (3), the following sub-section shall be
substituted, namely–
‘(3) The provisions of this Act relating to the
determination of compensation in accordance with the
First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement in
accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructure
amenities in accordance with the Third Schedule shall
apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition
specified in the Fourth Schedule with effect from 1-1-
2015;’
(ii) sub-section (4) shall be omitted.”
47. It is only when this Ordinance lapsed that the Notification
dated 28-8-2015 was then made under Section 113 of the 2013
Act. This notification is important and states as follows:
“ministry of rural development
order
New Delhi, 28-8-2015
S.O. 2368(E).–Whereas, the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013) (hereinafter referred to
as “the Rfctlarr Act“) came into effect from 1-1-2014;
And whereas, sub-section (3) of Section 105 ofSignature Not Verified
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the Rfctlarr Act provided for issuing of notification to make
the provisions of the Act relating to the determination of the
compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement applicable to
cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in
the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR ACT Act;
And whereas, the notification envisaged under sub-section
(3) of Section 105 of the RFCTLARR Act was not issued,
and the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014 (9 of
2014) was promulgated on 31-12-2014, thereby, inter alia,
amending Section 105 of the Rfctlarr Act to extend the
provisions of the Act relating to the determination of the
compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement to cases of
land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth
Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act;
And whereas, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance,
2015 (4 of 2015) was promulgated on 3-4-2015 to give
continuity to the provisions of
the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014;
And whereas, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second
Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) was promulgated on 30-5-2015
to give continuity to the provisions of
the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015);
And whereas, the replacement Bill relating to
the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015)
was referred to the Joint Committee of the Houses for
examination and report and the same is pending with the
Joint Committee;
And whereas, as per the provisions of Article 123 of the
Constitution, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second
Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) shall lapse on the 31st day of
August, 2015 and thereby placing the landowners at the
disadvantageous position, resulting in denial of benefits of
enhanced compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement to
the cases of land acquisition under the 13 Acts specified in
the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act as extended to
the landowners under the said Ordinance;
And whereas, the Central Government considers it necessary
to extend the benefits available to the landowners under
the RFCTLARR Act to similarly placed landowners whose
lands are acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the
Fourth Schedule; and accordingly the Central Government
keeping in view the aforesaid difficulties has decided to
extend the beneficial advantage to the landowners and
uniformly apply the beneficial provisions of
the RFCTLARR Act, relating to the determination of
compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement as were
made applicable to cases of land acquisition under the said
enactments in the interest of the landowners;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-
section (1) of Section 113 of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
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Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), the Central
Government hereby makes the following Order to remove
the aforesaid difficulties, namely:
1. (1) This Order may be called the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Removal of
Difficulties) Order, 2015.
(2) It shall come into force with effect from the 1st day
of September, 2015.
2. The provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, relating to the determination of
compensation in accordance with the First Schedule,
rehabilitation and resettlement in accordance with the
Second Schedule and infrastructure amenities in
accordance with the Third Schedule shall apply to all
cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified
in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act.
[F. No. 13011/01/2014-LRD]
K.P. Krishnan, Addl. Secy.”
48. It is thus clear that the Ordinance as well as the notification
have applied the principle contained in Nagpur Improvement
Trust [Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao , (1973) 1 SCC
500] , as the Central Government has considered it necessary to
extend the benefits available to landowners generally under the
2013 Act to similarly placed landowners whose lands are acquired
under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule, the
National Highways Act being one of the aforesaid enactments.
This being the case, it is clear that the Government has itself
accepted that the principle of Nagpur Improvement Trust [Nagpur
Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao, (1973) 1 SCC 500] would apply
to acquisitions which take place under the National Highways Act,
and that solatium and interest would be payable under the 2013
Act to persons whose lands are acquired for the purpose of
National Highways as they are similarly placed to those
landowners whose lands have been acquired for other public
purposes under the 2013 Act. This being the case, it is clear that
even the Government is of the view that it is not possible to
discriminate between landowners covered by the 2013 Act and
landowners covered by the National Highways Act, when it comes
to compensation to be paid for lands acquired under either of the
enactments. The judgments delivered under the 1952 Act as well
as the Defence of India Act, 1971, may, therefore, require a re-
look in the light of this development. [ The Defence of India Act,
1971, was a temporary statute which remained in force only
during the period of operation of a proclamation of emergency and
for a period of six months thereafter — vide Section 1(3) of the
Act. As this Act has since expired, it is not included in the Fourth
Schedule of the 2013 Act.] In any case, as has been pointed out
hereinabove, Chajju Ram [Union of India v. Chajju Ram , (2003) 5
SCC 568] , has been referred to a larger Bench. In this view of the
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matter, we are of the view that the view of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh , 2018 SCC
OnLine P&H 6036] , [Jang Bahadur v. Union of India, 2018 SCC
OnLine P&H 6034] , [Union of India v. Abhinav Cotspin Ltd.,
2016 SCC OnLine P&H 19319] is correct, whereas the view of
the Rajasthan High Court [Banshilal Samariya v. Union of India,
2005 SCC OnLine Raj 572 : 2005-06 Supp RLW 559] is not
correct.”
14. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Apex Court has again reviewed the said
judgment in Review Petition (Civil) No. 2528/2025-National Highways
Authority of India vs. Tarsem Singh and others and vide judgment dated
25.03.2026 has drawn conclusion, which reads as under:-
“D. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS
14. Considering the facts and circumstances explained in the
instant proceedings along with the various submissions placed on
record and with a view to balancing the equities regarding delay
and the entitlements of the landowners, we issue the following
directions:
(i) All landowners whose claims re: the quantum and/or
components of compensation for their lands acquired under
the NH Act were alive on or after 28.03.2008, i.e., they were
pending before one of the prescribed fora, shall be entitled to
seek addition of ‘interest’, ‘solatium’, and ‘interest on the
solatium’ to their compensation claim;
(ii) In the cases where compensation claims are alive on the
aforesaid date, but the landowner has claimed ‘interest’,
‘solatium’, and ‘interest on solatium’ after 28.03.2008, no
interest on both components shall be payable for the period
of delay. Such landowner shall be entitled to ‘interest’ and
‘interest on solatium’ only from the date on which such
claims were raised; and
(iii) If the claims of the landowners stood concluded prior to
28.03.2008, with no further appeal, Writ Petition, Special
Leave Petition, etc., then such landowners are not entitled to
seek reopening, review, or modification of the said decision
for the purpose of claiming ‘solatium’ or ‘interest’.”
15. From a reading the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
the original case of Tarsem Singh (supra) and thereafter in the review
petition, the principle which has been demystified is that the land owners are
entitled for solatium as Section 3-J of the Act of 1956 has been struck down
and declared ultra vire. The date of application of the notification as held by
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the Hon’ble Apex Court in paras 46 to 48 in the original case of Tarsem
Singh (Supra) is to be determined by the arbitrator. The award as per the
dictum can be awarded from the date when it was claimed by the appellant
for the first time. However, it is also held in the review petition that all
landowners whose claims re: the quantum and/or components of
compensation for their lands acquired under the NH Act were alive on or
after 28.03.2008, i.e., they were pending before one of the prescribed fora,
shall be entitled to seek addition of ‘interest’, ‘solatium’, and ‘interest on the
solatium’ to their compensation claim.
16. In the present case in hand it is not disputed that the original award
was passed on 04.05.2013. At the relevant point of time, Section 3-J of the
Act 1956 was very much in existence, however, same has been struck down
vide judgment dated 19.09.2019. It is not disputed that when the said
provision was struck down, the matter was pending adjudication, therefore,
the direction issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the review petition is
directly applicable in the case in hand as the claim of the appellant was alive
and pending before the prescribed fora. The appellant was entitled for
interest, solatium and interest on the solatium. That being so, now the facts
of the case are required to be considered to see that whether in accordance
with the principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases
discussed hereinabove the appellant is entitled for compensation in the
available facts and circumstances of the case.
17. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
application under Section 3-G(5) of the Act of 1956 was filed before the
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arbitrator and the documents containing true market value/consideration
price in respect of his land and land adjoining to the land of the petitioner
was also filed, however, the arbitrator in its award in one paragraph has
rejected the application on the ground that the facts of those cases are
distinguishable, however, no merit has been discussed that whether such land
is adjoining to the land of the appellant or not. The market value of adjoining
land treating it to be urban land has been applied in the case of the adjoining
land, however, in the case of appellant treating it to be agriculture land, the
award has been passed without considering the merit of the case and only in
a cursory manner. When the application to assail the said award has been
filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the Civil/Commercial Court has
also rejected the said application holding that it is not falling within the
parameters of Section 34 (2) of the Act of 1996 and the facts of cases in
which awards have been passed in the context of adjoining land of appellant
are distinguishable. Therefore, this Court finds apposite to deal with the
provision of Section 34 of the Act and to see whether the case of the
appellant falls within the parameters of Section 34 (2) of the Act of 1996 for
setting aside the award and whether the case of the appellant can be
remanded in the light of the judgment passed by the Apex Court passed in
the case of National Highways Authority of India vs. Sri. P. Nagaraju @
Cheluvaiah & Anr reported in 2022 (15) SCC 1 .
18. On bare perusal of the impugned award, it is found that the
Civil/Commercial Court has also held that as the award passed in the cases of
land owners whose land was adjoining to the land of the appellant having
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distinguishable facts are not applicable in the case of appellannt. The Court
has not opined anything in regard to applicability of solatium and grant of
just and fair compensation. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Sri P. Nagaraju
(supra) has held as under:-
“41. Having taken note of the rival contentions and while
examining the scope available under Section 34 of the 1996 Act in
the backdrop of the precedents, what is also to be kept in
perspective is the decision referred to in NHAI v. Sayedabad Tea
Co. Ltd. [NHAI v. Sayedabad Tea Co. Ltd. , (2020) 15 SCC 161]
In the said case, this Court while examining the question as to
whether the landloser can seek the appointment of an arbitrator in
terms of Section 11 of the 1996 Act, it was noted that such power
would not be available in view of the provisions contained in
Section 3-G(5) of the NH Act since the arbitrator is to be
appointed by the Central Government to discharge its functions as
per the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
42. Having taken note of the said decision, though it is seen that it
was held so while considering the maintainability of petition under
Section 11 of the 1996 Act to exclude the right of the landloser to
seek the appointment of an arbitrator keeping in view the statutory
provision in the NH Act, the larger perspective of such limited
right to the landloser in the process of arbitration is also to be kept
in view. Unlike the arbitration in a contractual matter where the
parties from the very inception at the stage of entering into a
contract would mutually agree to refer any future dispute to an
arbitrator, at that very stage are aware that in the event of any
dispute arising between the parties the contours of the right,
remedy, and scope from the commencement of the arbitration up
to the conclusion through the judicial process. The terms of
arbitration and the rights and obligations will also be a part of the
agreement and a reference to the same in the award will constitute
sufficient reasons for sustaining the award in terms of Section
31(3) of the 1996 Act. Whereas, in the arbitration proceedings
relating to the NH Act, the parties are not governed by an
agreement to regulate the process of arbitration. However, in the
process of determination of just and fair compensation, the
provisions in Sections 26 to 28 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 will
be the guiding factor. The requirement therein being adverted to,
should be demonstrated in the award to satisfy that Sections 28(2)
and 31(3) of the 1996 Act are complied with.
43. Therefore, what is also to be kept in perspective while noticing
the validity or otherwise of an award regarding which the non-
furnishing of reasons is contended as patent illegality is the reason
assigned for determining just compensation in terms thereof. The
situation which may arise in cases when a lesser compensation is
determined in the arbitration proceedings and the landloser is
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the requirement of reasons to be given by the learned arbitrator in
cases for determination of market value and compensation should
indicate reasons since the same will have to be arrived at on a
comparative analysis for which the reasons should be recorded and
Sections 26 to 28 of the Rfctlarr Act will be relevant. Neither the
landloser nor the exchequer should suffer in the matter of just and
fair compensation. Hence the reasons under Section 31(3) are to
be expected in that manner, the absence of which will call for
interference under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
44. Leaving aside the facts in the instant case for a while, if in a
matter as against the determination of the market value by SLAO,
the landloser had referred to the exemplar sale deeds and seeks
higher compensation than prescribed in the guidance value, and in
that circumstance, if no reasons are assigned by the learned
arbitrator for such determination and either approves SLAO award
or awards a lesser amount than the actual entitlement, in such
circumstance the arbitration process which is thrust on the
landloser should not be an impediment and limited interference
should not be a reason to deny the just and fair compensation. In
such cases while examining the award in the limited scope under
Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the Court is required to take note as to
whether the evidence available on record has been adverted to and
has been taken note of by the arbitrator in determining the just
compensation failing which it will fall foul of Section 31(3) and
amount to patent illegality.
45. Therefore, while examining the award within the parameters
permissible under Section 34 of the 1996 Act and while
examining the determination of compensation as provided under
Sections 26 and 28 of the Rfctlarr Act, 2013, the concept of just
compensation for the acquired land should be kept in view while
taking note of the award considering the sufficiency of the reasons
given in the award for the ultimate conclusion. In such event an
error if found, though it would not be possible for the Court
entertaining the petition under Section 34 or for the appellate court
under Section 37 of the 1996 Act to modify the award and alter
the compensation as it was open to the Court in the reference
proceedings under Section 18 of the old Land Acquisition Act or
an appeal under Section 54 of that Act, it should certainly be open
to the Court exercising power under Section 34 of the 1996 Act to
set aside the award by indicating reasons and remitting the matter
to the arbitrator to reconsider the same in accordance with law.
The said exercise can be undertaken to the limited extent without
entering into merits where it is seen that the arbitrator has on the
face of the award not appropriately considered the material on
record or has not recorded reasons for placing reliance on
materials available on record in the background of requirement
under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.”
19. What emerges from the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of Sri. P. Nagaraju (supra) is that it would not be possible
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for the Court entertaining the petition under Section 34 or for the appellate
court under Section 37 of the 1996 Act to modify the award and alter the
compensation as it was open to the Court in the reference proceedings under
Section 18 of the old Land Acquisition Act or an appeal under Section 54 of
that Act, it should certainly be open to the Court exercising power under
Section 34 of the 1996 Act to set aside the award by indicating reasons and
remitting the matter to the arbitrator to reconsider the same in accordance
with law. The said exercise can be undertaken to the limited extent without
entering into merits where it is seen that the arbitrator has on the face of the
award not appropriately considered the material on record or has not
recorded reasons for placing reliance on materials available on record in the
background of requirement under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
20. Undisputably, the arbitrator in its award under Section 3-G(5) of
the Act of 1956 has not discussed merit of the case on the basis of the
documents produced by the appellant. From bare perusal of the impugned
order passed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, it is found that the court
has though dealt with limited jurisdiction of the court to not to interfere in
the matters of compensation has found that the documents which have been
filed are having distinguishable facts, however, those facts are also not
mentioned touching the merit of the case. It is not disputed that the appellant
is entitled for solatium as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court
on or after 28.03.2008, if the claim of the land owner is pending before any
of the forum. Undisputably, the claim of the appellant was very much
pending before the forum i.e. under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 or before
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: LALIT SINGH
RANA
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the arbitrator when such judgment in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra)
(Review Petition No. 2528/2025) was pronounced. Therefore, the case of the
appellant ought to have been considered for grant of solatium, but as it has
not been done by the arbitrator as well as not considered by the
Civil/Commercial Court under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 by remanding
the matter to the arbitrator to reconsider the case in the light of the judgment
passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sri. P. Nagaraju (supra), this
Court finds it appropriate to set aside the award and remand the matter to the
arbitrator to reconsider the case in the light of the judgment passed in the
case of Sri. P. Nagaraju (supra) as well as the judgment passed in the case
o f Tarsem Singh (supra) (Review Petition No. 2528/2025) pronounced on
25.03.2026.
21. The reliance, which has been placed by the learned counsel for the
respondent upon the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench and
Single Bench of the Bombay High Court, this Court in respectful agreement
with those findings and the conclusion arrived at by the Bombay High Court
found that the Bombay High Court has dealt with the jurisdiction of the
Civil/Commercial Court under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and thereafter
of the High Court under Section 37 of the Act of 1996 and found that the
award passed by the arbitrator cannot be modified in the proceedings under
Sections 34 and 37 of the Act of 1996, but, as the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Sri. P. Nagaraju (supra) has held that as the arbitration under the Act
of 1956 is statutory arbitration by an arbitrator appointed by the Central
Government in contrast with the adjudication of the dispute by an arbitrator
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RANA
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appointed under Section 11 of the Act of 1996, if the merit of the case and
the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court has not been considered
declaring section 3(J) of the act of 1956 ultra vires and solatium is applicable
in the cases of the land owners whose claims are pending after 28.03.2008
then non-consideration of such issue goes to the root of the case which is
against or in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law. Once
Section 3-J of the Act of 1956 has been struck down and declared ultra
vires and the applicability of the Act of 2013 has been appended and
amended in the Schedule of the Act of 2013 then solatium is very much
applicable to be granted to the appellant whose claims were pending when
the judgment in the case of Tarsem Singh (Review Petition) has been
pronounced by the Hon’ble Apex Court.
22. Section 34 (4) of the Act of 1996 provides power to the Tribunal
to re-examine the award on an application submitted by the aggrieved person
if on merits, the case has been left to be considered, therefore, in the
considered opinion of this Court, the matter can be remanded to the arbitrator
to reconsider the case of the appellant for award of solatium and interest
thereon.
23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bombay Slum
Redevelopment Corporation (supra) has held that the matter can be
remanded under Section 37 of the Act of 1996 when the application under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is decided without consideration of the merit.
24. From perusal of the record, it is found that the Civil/Commercial
Court has not dealt with the applicability of the judgment pronounced by the
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RANA
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Apex Court in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra) (Review Petition) as well as
the awards which have been passed in the cases of land owners having
adjoining land, this Court finds it appropriate to remand the matter to the
arbitrator to consider the case on the question of just and fair compensation
including the solatium on the basis of available record.
25. Accordingly, the order dated 28.09.2016 passed by the
Commissioner (Arbitrator) in Revenue Case No. 1158/A-82/2015-16 and the
order dated 14.03.2024 passed by 24th District Judge, Jabalpur in MJC (AV)
No. 50/2022 are hereby set aside. The matter is remanded back to the
Arbitrator to decide it afresh considering the available record and the
applicability of the solatium and interest thereon. No further adjudication is
warranted. The arbitrator shall pass award considering the available
documents and record without getting influenced by this order within three
months from the date of production of certified copy of this order.
26. Accordingly, Arbitration appeal is disposed of.
(DEEPAK KHOT)
JUDGE
L.R.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: LALIT SINGH
RANA
Signing time: 15-07-2026
19:59:08
