Kerala High Court
Kannan.S.Pillai vs Radhakrishna Pillai on 8 July, 2026
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
WEDNESDAY, THE 8TH DAY OF JULY 2026 / 17TH ASHADHA, 1948
WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018
PETITIONER/S:
KANNAN.S.PILLAI, AGED 48 YEARS
PARTNER, ANU CASHEWS, PARAMESWAR NAGAR, PBNO.53,
KOLLAM, SREEVARDHAN, THEVALLY, KOLLAM-691001.
BY ADVS.
SMT.LATHA ANAND
SRI.M.N.RADHAKRISHNA MENON
SRI.K.R.PRAMOTH KUMAR
SRI.JOSEPH SEBASTIAN (PARACKAL)
SHRI.S.VISHNU
RESPONDENT/S:
1 RADHAKRISHNA PILLAI,
SHELLING MAISTRY, ARAPPURAKAZHAKKATHIL,
POOVATTOOR P.O., MAVADY, PIN-691521.
2 SRI.HARISUDHANPILLAI,
CLERK, PEZHUVILAPUTHENVEEDU,
MUTHUPILAKKADU P.O., KOLLAM,PIN-690520.
3 SRI.VENUGOPALA NAIR,WATCHER, SYAMNIVAS, PERAYAM,
MULAVANA P.O., KOLLAM,PIN-691503.
4 SRI.JAYARAJAN PILLAI,WATCHER,
MANGALASSERIL THEKKATHIL VEEDU, CHONAMCHIRA,
PERINADU P.O., KOLLAM PIN-691601.
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5 SRI.SUNILKUMAR,CLERK,
REVISADANAN,
POOVATTOOR,MAVADY P.O.,
KOLLAM PIN-691521.
6 SRI.DILEEP KUMAR,
THODIYILPUTHEN VEEDU, PUNUKKANNOOR,
PERUMPUZHA P.O., KOLLAM PIN-691504.
7 SRI.SIVANKUTTY,
SHELLING MISTRY, SHREE SHYLAM,
NEDUMPANA P.O., KANNANANALLOR,
KOLLAM PIN-691576.
8 SRI.THULASEEDHARAN PILLAI,
CLERK, PRAMPILAZHIKATHU VADAKKETHIL,
PANAPPETTY, PORUVAZHI, KOLLAM PIN-691520.
9 SRI.RAJAN, BLACKSMITH, SANKARAN VILA VEEDU,
NEAR SIVARAM N.S.S.H.S. KARIKKODU,
T.K.M..C.P.O., KOLLAM PIN-691004.
10 SRI.CHANDRASEKHARAN PILLAI,
WATCHER, MULLOOR VEEDU,
PERUVELIKKARA P.O., WEST KALLADA,
KOLLAM,PIN-690521.
11 SRI.SREEKUMAR,
CLERK, SANTHI BHAVAN, KUDAVATTOOR,
ODANAVATTAM P.O., KOLLAM, PIN-691512.
12 SRI.RAVIKUMAR,
WATCHER, THENGUVILA, PUTHEN VEEDU,
ARINALLOOR, THEVALAKKARA,
KOLLAM PIN-690 538.
13 LABOUR COURT,
TD NAGAR, KOLLAM PIN-691013.
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Addl. R14 THE DISTRICT LABOUR OFFICER,
CIVIL STATION,
KOLLAM - 691 013
[ADDL. R14 IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED 08.07.2026 IN
I.A. NO.4/2019]
BY ADVS.
SHRI.M.K.CHANDRA MOHANDAS
SHRI.MURALI MADANTHACODU
SMT. CHITHRA P. GEORGE, GP
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
08.07.2026, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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JUDGMENT
This writ petition has been filed challenging Ext.P4
order of the Labour Court, Kollam in Claim Petition No.12 of
2014 filed by respondents 1 to 12 under Section 33C(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
1947 Act’). The respondents 1 to 12 were employees of the
petitioner. According to them, Ext.P1 is a settlement arrived
at in terms of the provisions contained in Section 18 of the
1947 Act and on the failure of the petitioner to comply with
the terms of the settlement, respondents 1 to 12 were
entitled to have such claim adjudicated in terms of the
provisions contained in Section 33C(2) of the 1947 Act. The
Labour Court on a consideration of the claim raised by
respondents 1 to 12 concluded that they were entitled to the
benefit of the settlement and were therefore entitled to the
payment of amounts determined under Ext.P4 order.
2. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
vehemently submits that the entire claim of respondents 1 to
12 is based on Ext.P1 agreement. It is submitted that the
petitioner is not a party to Ext.P1. It is submitted that Ext.P1
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is an agreement entered into between the Chief Executives of
certain Public Sector Undertakings and three/four Private
Sector Undertakings and the petitioner was not a party to the
said settlement. It is submitted that in terms of Section 18 of
the 1947 Act, such a settlement cannot be binding on the
petitioner and no claim petition could have been filed on the
basis of such settlement. It is submitted that if respondents 1
to 12 have a case that they are entitled to certain benefits,
they should have independently raised an Industrial Dispute
and ought to have had their claims either settled during the
process of conciliation or outside conciliation. It is submitted
that while the petitioner does not dispute that an agreement
entered into in terms of Section 18 of the 1947 Act is binding,
it is the specific case of the petitioner that since the
petitioner was not a party to Ext.P1 agreement, the terms
thereof are not binding on the petitioner. It is submitted that
the provisions of Section 33C(2) of the 1947 Act make it clear
that a claim under Section 33C(2) of the 1947 Act must either
be based on an Award or a settlement. It is submitted that
since there is no prior Award or settlement with the
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petitioner conceding to or agreeing to any settlement, a
petition under Section 33C(2) of the 1947 Act could not have
been maintained before the Labour Court, Kollam. The
learned counsel also placed reliance on the judgments of the
Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v.
Ganesh Razak and Others; (1995) 1 SCC 235, Chief
Superintendent, Government Livestock Farm v. Ramesh
Kumar; III LLJ (Supp.)187 and Bombay Chemical
Industries v. Deputy Labour Commissioner and Others;
(2022) 5 SCC 629 as also the judgment of this Court in
D+H Solutions India Private Limited v. Jayakrishnan
Ramachandran Nair and others; 2026 SCC OnLine Ker
1641 in support of his contention.
3. The learned counsel appearing for respondents
vehemently opposed the grant of any reliefs in the writ
petition. It is submitted that the contention taken before this
Court that Exhibit P1 is not binding on the petitioner is
absolutely incorrect. It is submitted that Exhibit P1 is a
memorandum of settlement in terms of the provisions
contained in Section 18(3) of the 1947 Act. It is submitted
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that the representatives of the Management were parties to
Exhibit P1 agreement. It is submitted that the representation
of the Management and the employees, in Exhibit P1
agreement, was through the Industrial Relations Committee,
which is a statutory Committee constituted by the
Government in terms of the provisions contained in Section
38 of the 1947 Act. It is submitted that the Government
Order constituting the Industrial Relations Committee has
been placed on record along with the statement dated
16.07.2025 filed by the learned Government Pleader. It is
submitted that the said Government Order can only be seen
as an exercise of statutory power by the Government in terms
of the provisions contained in Section 38(2)(g) of the 1947
Act. It is submitted that the question raised is covered
against the petitioner by the judgments of the Supreme Court
in P. Virudhachalam and Others V. Management of
Lotus Mills and Another; (1998) 1 SCC 650 and National
Engineering Industries Ltd V. State of Rajasthan and
Others; 2000 LAB.I.C.260. It is submitted that both these
decisions categorically hold that agreements in the nature of
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Exhibit P1 (where a dispute covering large number of
employees and employers is settled), would be binding in
terms of Section 18 of the 1947 Act and could therefore form
the subject matter of a claim under Section 33C(2) of the
1947 Act.
4. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents, I am of the view that the petitioner is entitled to
succeed. It is clear from a reading of the impugned Award
that the claims of the respondents have been adjudicated
solely on the basis of Exhibit P1 settlement. Exhibit P1
settlement does not show that the petitioner was a party to
the said agreement. The contention of the learned counsel
appearing for the respondents that since the representatives,
who participated in the meeting leading to Exhibit P1
settlement were the representatives of the Management and
the workmen on the Industrial Relations Committee the
terms of the agreement should be binding on the petitioner
cannot be accepted. Section 18 of the 1947 Act reads thus:-
“18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 9binding.- (1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between
the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the
agreement.
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), an arbitration
award which has become enforceable shall be binding on the
parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to
arbitration.
(3) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation
proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case
where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3-A)
of section 10-A or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or
National Tribunal, which has become enforceable shall be
binding on-
(a) all parties to the industrial dispute;
(b) all other parties summoned to appear in the
proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board,
arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as
the case may be, records the opinion that they were so
summoned without proper cause;
(c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is
an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of
the establishment to which the dispute relates;
(d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is
composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the
establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may
be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute
and all persons who subsequently become employed in that
establishment or part.”It is clear from a reading of Section 18 of the 1947 Act that the
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 10settlement either under Section 18(1) of the 1947 Act or
under Section 18(3) of the 1947 Act are binding on the parties
and also on the non-parties only in the manner contemplated
by Section 18(3)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the 1947 Act. A reading
of Section 18 of the 1947 Act does not suggest to me that
where the employer is, admittedly, not a party to any
agreement, such agreement should also be treated as binding
on account of the provisions contained in Section 18 of the
1947 Act. The decision of the Supreme Court in P.
Virudhachalam (supra), on which considerable reliance was
placed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents,
does not come to their aid. Paragraph Nos.8 and 9 of the
Judgment of the Supreme Court in P. Virudhachalam
(supra) reads thus:-
“Discussion on the point for consideration
8. The aforesaid relevant provisions of the Act, therefore, leave
no room for doubt that once a written settlement is arrived at
during the conciliation proceedings such settlement under
Section 12(3) has a binding effect not only on the signatories to
the settlement but also on all parties to the industrial dispute
which would cover the entire body of workmen, not only existing
workmen but also future workmen. Such a settlement during
conciliation proceedings has the same legal effect as an award of
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 11Labour Court, or Tribunal or National Tribunal or an arbitration
award. They all stand on a par. It is easy to visualise that
settlement contemplated by Section 12(3) necessarily means a
written settlement which would be based on a written
agreement where signatories to such settlement sign the
agreement. Therefore, settlement under Section 12(3) during
conciliation proceedings and all other settlements contemplated
by Section 2(p) outside conciliation proceedings must be based
on written agreements. Written agreements would become
settlements contemplated by Section 2(p) read with Section
12(3) of the Act when arrived at during conciliation proceedings
or even outside conciliation proceedings. Thus, written
agreements would become settlements after relevant procedural
provisions for arriving at such settlements are followed. Thus, all
settlements necessarily are based on written agreements
between the parties. It is impossible to accept the submission of
learned counsel for the appellants that settlements between the
parties are different from agreements between the parties. It is
trite to observe that all settlements must be based on written
agreements and such written agreements get embedded in
settlements. But all agreements may not necessarily be
settlements till the aforesaid procedure giving them status of
such settlements gets followed. In other words, under the
scheme of the Act, all settlements are necessarily to be treated
as binding agreements between the parties but all agreements
may not be settlements so as to have binding effect as provided
under Section 18(1) or (3) if the necessary procedure for giving
them such status is not followed in given cases. On the aforesaid
scheme of the Act, therefore, it must be held that the settlement
arrived at during conciliation proceedings on 5-5-1980 between
Respondent 1-management on the one hand and the four out of
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 12five unions of workmen on the other, had a binding effect under
Section 18(3) of the Act not only on the members of the
signatory unions but also on the remaining workmen who were
represented by the fifth union which, though having taken part
in conciliation proceedings, refused to sign the settlement. It is
axiomatic that if such settlement arrived at during the
conciliation proceedings is binding on even future workmen as
laid down by Section 18(3)(d), it would ipso facto bind all the
existing workmen who are all parties to the industrial dispute
and who may not be members of unions that are signatories to
such settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act.
9. It has to be kept in view that the Act is based on the principle
of collective bargaining for resolving industrial disputes and for
maintaining industrial peace. Thus principle of industrial
democracy is the bedrock of the Act. The employer or a class of
employers on the one hand and the accredited representatives of
the workmen on the other are expected to resolve the industrial
dispute amicably as far as possible by entering into the
settlement outside the conciliation proceedings or if no
settlement is reached and the dispute reaches the conciliator
even during conciliation proceedings. In all these negotiations
based on collective bargaining the individual workman
necessarily recedes to the background. The reins of bargaining
on his behalf are handed over to the union representing such
workman. The unions espouse the common cause on behalf of all
their members. Consequently, settlement arrived at by them
with management would bind at least their members and if such
settlement is arrived at during conciliation proceedings, it would
bind even non-members. Thus, settlements are the live wires
under the Act for ensuring industrial peace and prosperity.
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 13Section 10(2) of the Act highlights this position by providing that
where the parties to an industrial dispute apply in the
prescribed manner, whether jointly or separately, for a
reference of the dispute to a Board, Court, Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal, the appropriate Government, if
satisfied that the persons applying represent the majority of
each party, shall make the reference accordingly. Individual
workman comes into the picture only in connection with a
limited class of industrial disputes as indicated by Section 2-A of
the Act dealing with discharges, dismissals, retrenchments or
otherwise termination of services of an individual workman.
Save and except the aforesaid class of disputes, which an
individual workman can raise, rest of the industrial disputes
including disputes pertaining to illegal lock-out, lay-off and lay-
off compensation have to be filtered through the process of
collective bargaining and they are disputes of general nature or
class disputes wherein individual workman by himself has no
say. In this connection, it is profitable to keep in view a decision
of a three-member Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Prasad
Vishwakarma v. Chairman, Industrial Tribunal, Patna wherein
Das Gupta, J., speaking for this Court made the following
pertinent observations on the scheme of the Act, at the time
when Section 2-A was not on the statute-book:
“It is now well settled that a dispute between an
individual workman and an employer cannot be an
industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(k) of the
Industrial Disputes Act unless it is taken up by a Union
of the workmen or by a considerable number of
workmen. In Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd.
v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan Mr Justice
Venkatarama Ayyar speaking for the Court pointed out
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 14after considering numerous decisions in this matter
that the preponderance of judicial opinion was clearly
in favour of the view that a dispute between an
employer and a single employee cannot per se be an
industrial dispute but it may become one if it is taken
up by a Union or a number of workmen.
‘Notwithstanding that the language of Section 2(k) is wide
enough to cover disputes between an employer and a single
employee,’ observed the learned Judge, ‘the scheme of the
Industrial Disputes Act does appear to contemplate that the
machinery provided therein should be set in motion to settle
only disputes which involve the rights of workmen as a class and
that a dispute touching the individual rights of a workman was
not intended to be the subject of adjudication under the Act,
when the same had not been taken up by the Union or a number
of workmen’.
This view which has been reaffirmed by the Court in several
later decisions recognises the great importance in modern
industrial life of collective bargaining between the workmen and
the employers. It is well known how before the days of collective
bargaining labour was at a great disadvantage in obtaining
reasonable terms for contracts of service from his employer. As
trade unions developed in the country and collective bargaining
became the rule the employers found it necessary and
convenient to deal with the representatives of workmen, instead
of individual workmen, not only for the making or modification of
contracts but in the matter of taking disciplinary action against
one or more workmen and as regards all other disputes.
The necessary corollary to this is that the individual workman is
at no stage a party to the industrial dispute independently of the
Union. The Union or those workmen who have by their
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 15sponsoring turned the individual dispute into an industrial
dispute, can therefore claim to have a say in the conduct of the
proceedings before the Tribunal.
It is not unreasonable to think that Section 36 of the Industrial
Disputes Act recognises this position, by providing that the
workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be
represented by an officer of a registered trade union of which he
is a member.”
In my opinion, the ratio of the judgment in P.
Virudhachalam (supra) does not indicate that even
where the Management is not a party to a settlement, the
terms of such settlement should be treated as binding in
terms of the provisions contained in Section 18 of the
1947 Act.
5. In National Engineering Industries Ltd (supra),
the Supreme Court has analyzed the provisions of Section 18
of the 1947 Act and has held as follows:-
“19. The High Court came to the conclusion that the settlement
arrived at in conciliation proceedings was binding on the
workmen and one of the clauses of the settlement kept the
service conditions intact and another clause did not permit
raising of any demand throwing an additional financial burden
on the IOCL, it was not permissible to modify the certified
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 16Standing Order by an amendment as that would alter the service
conditions and increase the financial burden on the
management. High Court, therefore, quashed the orders
amending the Standing Orders. Aggrieved the union approached
this Court. This Court analysed the provisions of Sections 2(p),
18(1) and 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and it also
refers to the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946 and held as under:
It may be seen on a plain reading of subsections (1) and (3) of
Section 18 that settlements are divided into two categories,
namely, (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings
and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation
proceedings. A settlement which belongs to the first category
has limited application in that it merely binds the parties to the
agreement but the settlement belonging to the second category
has extended application since it is binding on all parties to the
industrial dispute, to all others who were summoned to appear
in the conciliation proceedings and to all persons employed in
the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may
be, to which the dispute related on the date of the dispute and to
all others who joined the establishment thereafter. Therefore, a
settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings
with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen
of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority
union which had objected to the same. To that extent it departs
from the ordinary law of contract. The object obviously is to
uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active
assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discharge an
individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the
settlement. There is an underlying assumption that a settlement
2026:KER:49907
WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 17reached with the help of the Conciliation Officer must be fair
and reasonable and can, therefore, safely be made binding not
only on the workmen belonging to the union signing the
settlement but also 6n others. That is why a settlement arrived
at in the course of conciliation proceedings is put on par with an
award made by an adjudicatory authority.
This Court upheld the judgment of the High Court.
19A. In K. C. P. Limited v. Presiding Officer a labour dispute had
erupted at the engineering unit of the appellant employing about
500 workmen. The workmen were demanding higher amount of
bonus. There were strike and lockout. Appellant dismissed 29
workmen on the charges of misconduct after holding enquiries.
An agreement was reached between the appellant and the union
representing all the workmen on the quantum of increase in
wages etc. It was further agreed that the issue of non-
employment of 29 dismissed workmen would be discussed
separately. On that basis all the workmen except the 29
dismissed workmen agreed to resume work. Subsequently a
settlement was arrived at between the appellant and the
respondent union under Section 12(3) of the Act that the issue of
non-employment of 29 dismissed workmen would be discussed
in proceedings to be initiated by the Joint Labour Commissioner.
Meetings were held by the Joint Labour Commissioner but no
settlement could be reached. Report of the failure of conciliation
proceedings was submitted to the State Government which
referred issue of non-employment of 29 workmen for
adjudication to the Labour Court. This Court noticed that the
industrial dispute was referred for adjudication pursuant to the
demand espoused by all the workmen and raised by the second
respondent union under Section 2(k) of the Act and that of the
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 18
said 29 workmen who were members of the respondent union
had authorised the second respondent to represent them before
the Conciliation Officer whereafter reference was made before
to the Labour Court. This Court noticed that none of the said 29
workmen raised industrial dispute in their individual capacity
under Section 2-A of the Act. During the pendency of the dispute
before the Labour Court, appellant and the respondent-union
held discussions regarding non-employment of 29 workmen and
ultimately understanding was reached that that option would be
given to the 29 workmen either to accept reinstatement without
back wages or a lump sum amount of Rs. 75,000/-with other
monetary benefits. Some of the workmen out of these 29
workmen did not accept the proposed settlement. Nevertheless,
respondent-Union entered into a settlement with the appellant
under Section 18(1) of the Act on behalf of the 29 workmen. A
joint memorandum was signed between them and it was filed
before the Labour Court before whom the industrial dispute was
pending. It was requested that award in terms of the settlement
may be passed. First respondent who was presiding over the
Labour Court declined to do so on the ground that some of the
workmen had not approved settlement and, therefore, industrial
dispute in respect qua them would continue. The Order of the
Labour Court not to make the award in terms of the settlement
was challenged by the appellant in a writ petition before the
Madras High Court. High Court did not agree with the
contention raised by the appellant and dismissed the writ
petition. Aggrieved, appellant came to this Court. This Court
held that terms of the settlement could not be considered to be
in any way ex facie, unjust or unfair and the settlement
consequently must be held to be binding on the workmen who
did not accept the settlement. This Court referred in great detail
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 19
to the provisions of Sections 2(k), 2(p) and 18(1) of the Act and
noticed the decision of this Court in Herbertsons Ltd. v.
Workmen where this Court had said that when a recognised
Union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals do
not come into the picture. It is not necessary that each
individual worker should know the implications of the settlement
since a recognised Union, which is expected to protect the
legitimate interests of labour enters into a settlement in the best
interests of labour. This would be the normal rule. There may be
exceptional cases where there may be allegations of mala fides,
fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But in the
absence of such allegations a settlement in the course of
collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration.
This Court then observed as under (Para 25 of AIR SCW and
AIR):
It has to be kept in view that under the scheme of labour
legislations like the Act in the present case, collective
bargaining and the principle of industrial democracy permeate
the relations between the management on the one hand and the
Union which resorts to collective bargaining on behalf of its
members workmen with the management on the other. Such a
collective bargaining which may result in just and fair
settlement would always be beneficial to the management as
well as to the body of workmen and society at large as there
would be industrial peace and tranquillity pursuant to such
settlement and which would avoid unnecessary social strife and
tribulation on the one hand and promote industrial and
commercial development on the other hand. Keeping in view the
aforesaid salient features of the Act the settlement which is
sought to be impugned has to be scanned and scrutinised.
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 20Settlement of labour disputes by direct negotiation and
collective bargaining is always to be preferred for it is the best
guarantee of industrial peace which is the aim of all legislations
for settlement of labour disputes. In order to bring about such a
settlement more easily and to make it more workable and
effective it may not be always possible or necessary that such a
settlement is arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings
which may be the first step towards resolving the industrial
dispute which may be lingering between the employers and their
workmen represented by their unions but even if at that stage
such settlement does not take place and the industrial dispute
gets referred for adjudication, even pending such disputes, the
parties can arrive at amicable settlement which may be binding
to the parties to the settlement unlike settlement arrived at
during conciliation proceedings which may be binding not only
to the parties to the settlement but even to the entire labour
force working in the organisation concerned even though they
may not be members of the Union which might have entered
into settlement during conciliation proceedings.
This Court then referred to the difference between the
settlement arrived at under the Act during conciliation
proceedings by the parties and the settlement arrived at
otherwise than during conciliation proceedings as pointed out in
Barauni Refinery Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad’s case.
20-24 ……………………………
25. It will be thus seen that High Court has jurisdiction to
entertain a writ petition when there is allegation that there is no
industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be subject
matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal
2026:KER:49907
WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 21under Section 10 of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction
of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High
Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the industrial
tribunal which would clothe the appropriate Government with
power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to
adjudicate it.
If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended
appropriate government lacks power to make any reference.
A settlement of dispute between the parties themselves is to be
preferred, where it could be arrived at, to industrial
adjudication, as the settlement is likely to lead to more lasting
peace than an award. Settlement is arrived at by the free will of
the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between
them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona
fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud,
misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption
and other inducements it could be subject matter of yet another
industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer
for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an
underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help
of the Conciliation Officer must be fair and reasonable. A
settlement which is sought to be impugned has to be scanned
and scrutinized. Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 18 divide
settlements into two categories, namely, (1) those arrived at
outside the conciliation proceedings and (2) those arrived at in
the course of conciliation proceedings. A settlement which
belongs to the first category has limited application in that it
merely binds the parties to the agreement but the settlement
belonging to the second category has extended application since
it is binding on all the parties to the industrial disputes, to all
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 22
others who were summoned to appear in the conciliation
proceedings and to all persons employed in the establishment or
part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the
dispute related on the date of the dispute and to all others who
joined the establishment thereafter. A settlement arrived at in
the course of conciliation proceedings with a recognised
majority union will be binding on all workmen of the
establishment, even those who belong to the minority union
which has objected to the same. Recognised union having
majority of members is expected to protect the legitimate
interest of labour and enter into a settlement in the best interest
of labour. This is with the object to uphold the sanctity of
settlement reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation
Officer and to discourage an Individual employee or minority
union from scuttling the settlement. When a settlement is
arrived at during the conciliation proceedings it is binding on
the members of the Workers’ Union as laid down by Section
18(3)(d) of the Act. It would ipso facto bind all the existing
workmen who are all parties to the industrial dispute and who
may not be members of unions that are signatories to such
settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act. Act is based on the
principle of collective bargaining for resolving industrial
disputes and for maintaining industrial peace. “This principle of
industrial democracy is the bedrock of the Act”, as pointed out
in the case of P. Virudhachalam v. Management of Lotus Mills .
In all these negotiations based on collective bargaining
individual workman necessarily recedes to the background.
Settle merits will encompass all the disputes existing at the time
of the settlement except those specifically left out.”
6. The provisions of Section 33C(1) of the 1947 Act reads
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 23
thus:-
“Section 33-C . Recovery of money due from an employer:-
(1) Where any money is due to a workman from an
employer under a settlement or an award or under the
provisions of Chapter VA or Chapter VB the workman
himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in
this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his
assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode
of recovery, make an application to the appropriate
Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and
if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is
so due, it shall issue certificate for that amount to the
Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the
same manner as an arrear of land revenue:
Provided that every such application shall be made within
one year from the date on which the money became due to
the workman from the employer:
Provided further that any such application may be
entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if
the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant
had sufficient cause for not making the application within
the said period.”
It is apparent from a reading of Section 33C(1) of the 1947 Act
that the claim under Section 33C(1) must be either based on
2026:KER:49907
WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 24an agreement or an Award.
7. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), it was
held as follows:
“12. The High Court has referred to some of these decisions but
missed the true import thereof. The ratio of these decisions
clearly indicates that where the very basis of the claim or the
entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefit is disputed, there
being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the
employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to
the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of
a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court
has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen’s entitlement and
then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis
in exercise of its power under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It is only
when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised
by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation
or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation
that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour
Court’s power under Section 33-C(2) like that of the Executing
Court’s power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its
execution
13. In these matters, the claim of the respondent-workmen who
were all daily-rated/casual workers, to be paid wages at the same
rate as the regular workers, had not been earlier settled by
adjudication or recognition by the employer without which the
stage for computation of that benefit could not reach. The
workmen’s claim of doing the same kind of work and their
entitlement to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular
workmen on the principle of “equal pay for equal work” being
disputed, without an adjudication of their dispute resulting in
2026:KER:49907
WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 25acceptance of their claim to this effect, there could be no occasion
for computation of the benefit on that basis to attract Section 33-
C(2). The mere fact that some other workmen are alleged to have
made a similar claim by filing writ petitions under Article 32 of
the Constitution is indicative of the need for adjudication of the
claim of entitlement to the benefit before computation of such a
benefit could be sought. Respondents’ claim is not based on a
prior adjudication made in the writ petitions filed by some other
workmen upholding a similar claim which could be relied on as an
adjudication enuring to the benefit of these respondents as well.
The writ petitions by some other workmen to which some
reference was casually made, particulars of which are not
available in these matters, have, therefore, no relevance for the
present purpose. It must, therefore, be held that the Labour Court
as well as the High Court were in error in treating as
maintainable the applications made under Section 33-C(2) of the
Act by these respondents.”
8. In Chief Superintendent, Government Livestock
Farm (supra), it was held thus:-
“2. We are unable to appreciate how the application of the
Respondent could be entertained Under Section 33-C(2) of the
Act. The remedy: of Section 33-C(2) is available only in those
cases where there is no dispute about entitlement of the
workman. The remedy of Section 33-C(2) cannot be invoked in a
case where the entitlement is disputed. In the instant case, the:
entitlement of the Respondent to regular scale was disputed by
the Appellant and, therefore, it was not a case in which the
remedy of Section 33-C(2) could be invoked. The proper course
for the Respondent was to have his entitlement to regular scale
2026:KER:49907
WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 26determined by a competent Court or Tribunal and in the event of
non-payment of the amount payable to him as per his entitlement
under such determination he could invoke the remedy Under
Section 33-C(2).”
9. In Bombay Chemical Industries (supra), it was
held as follows:-
“8. As per the settled proposition of law, in an application under
Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court
has no jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate dispute of entitlement
or the basis of the claim of workmen. It can only interpret the
award or settlement on which the claim is based. As held by this
Court in Ganesh Razak, the Labour Court’s jurisdiction under
Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is like that of an
executing court. As per the settled proposition of law without
prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claim of the
workmen, proceedings for computation of the arrears of wages
and/or difference of wages claimed by the workmen shall not be
maintainable under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
(See MCD v. Ganesh Razak).
9. In Kankuben, it is observed and held that whenever a workman
is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit
which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which
he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such
benefit can approach the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of
the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit sought to be
enforced under Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-
existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The
difference between a pre-existing right or benefit on one hand and
the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other
2026:KER:49907
WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 27hand is vital. The former falls within the jurisdiction of the Labour
Court exercising powers under Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act while
the latter does not.”
10. Considering some of the above judgments, this Court
in D+H Solutions India Private Limited (supra), held as
follows:-
“The learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent in both
the writ petitions does not dispute the proposition of law as laid
down by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above.
Therefore, these writ petitions are allowed, and Ext.P4 in W.P
(C) No. 38729/2025 and Ext.P5 in W.P (C) No. 43396/2025 will
stand set aside, reserving liberty of the 1st respondent to have
any claim adjudicated in accordance with the law. Since it has
come to the notice of this court that in several cases, claims
have been considered under Section 33 C (2) of the 1947 Act
even in the absence of any prior adjudication, the Registry is
directed to send a copy of this judgment to the Labour Courts
and Industrial Tribunals functioning within the jurisdiction of
this court. All other contentions on merits raised by either side
are left open.”
11. On the wording of Section 33C, it is difficult to hold
that any claim of the workmen could be based on an
agreement to which the employer was not a party. The
submission of the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents that the Industrial Relations Committee is a
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 28
statutory Committee constituted by the Government and
therefore, the settlement arrived at by the members of the
Industrial Relations Committee should be binding on all
classes of employers cannot be accepted. A reading of the
Government Order produced along with the statement dated
16.07.2025, filed by the learned Government Pleader, does not
indicate that the Government had constituted the Industrial
Relations Committee and had prescribed the contours of its
working in exercise of its statutory power. Section 38 of the
1947 Act deals with the power of the Government to make
Rules. Section 38(2) of the 1947 Act specifies the matters for
which such Rules can be framed by the Government and
Section 38(2)(g) of the 1947 Act indicates that such power to
make Rules may also extend to any other matter (not
enumerated), which is to be or may be prescribed. The
Government Order produced along with the statement dated
16.07.2025 indicates that it is only a Government Order
regarding working of the Industrial Relations Committee and
the same does not appear to be an exercise of statutory power
to make Rules under Section 38 of the 1947 Act. Therefore, I
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 29
cannot accept the contention of the learned counsel appearing
for the respondents that since Exhibit P1 settlement was
signed by certain members representing the Managements on
the Industrial Relations Committee, the same should be taken
as binding on the petitioner also.
12. In the light of the above findings, this writ petition is
only to be allowed.
Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Exhibit P4 will
stand quashed, making it clear that the setting aside of Exhibit
P4 will not be treated as a bar for the respondents to initiate
any proceedings for adjudication of their claim, in accordance
with the law.
Sd/-
GOPINATH P.
JUDGE
DK/ajt
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WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018 30
APPENDIX OF WP(C) NO. 40625 OF 2018
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF SETTLEMENTT DATED 27.3.2012.
EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF CLAIM PETITION DATED 10.7.2014.
EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF WRITTEN OBJECTION FILED BY THE
PETITIONER DATED 11.4.2015.
EXHIBIT P4 TRYE COPY OF ORDER DATED 31.7.2018 IN
C.P.NO.12/14.
Exhibit P5 True copy of the extract of the website of
the Labour Commisionerate of the Government
of Kerala
Exhibit P6 True copy of show cause notice dated
7.3.2019 issued by the District Labour
Court, Kollam.
Exhibit P7 True copy of reply dated 15.3.2019 sent by
the petiitioner.
RESPONDENT
ANNEXURES
Annexure A1 True copy of GO(rt) 4941/62/HLD dated
14.12.1962
