Supreme Court – Daily Orders
Subhash Chander vs The State Of Haryana on 1 July, 2026
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No(s). 650/2013
SUBHASH CHANDER Appellant(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF HARYANA Respondent(s)
O R D E R
The appellant who was arraigned as A1, was convicted
for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860, by both the Trial Court and the High
Court. Aggrieved, the appellant is before us.
The case of the prosecution in a nutshell, is that
the deceased was married to the appellant, about 10 years
prior to the occurrence. On 25.05.1998, the deceased was
found lying dead on the ground in front of one Ram Narain’s
house, which is situated next to the house of the
appellant. A complaint was lodged by PW-6, uncle of the
deceased implicating the appellant, his father and
grandmother. The appellant’s father and his grandmother
were acquitted vide the Trial Court by judgment dated 11-
01-2002.
In sum and substance, the case of the prosecution is
that, the appellant along with his father and grandmother
had been demanding dowry, as is evident from the statement
Signature Not Verifiedmade by PWs 6 and 7, the uncle and mother of the deceased,
Digitally signed by
PRIYANKA MALIK
Date: 2026.07.14
16:45:26 IST
Reason:
respectively. Therefore, according to the prosecution with
that motive, since the dowry sought had not been given, the
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appellant, along with his father and grandmother, committed
the offence.Suffice it to state that the evidence against
all the three accused is one and the same.
Before the Trial Court, nine prosecution witnesses
were examined. In his statement recorded under Section 313
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short,
‘Code’) the appellant has stated that the deceased had been
suffering from an illness. The Trial Court disbelieved the
prosecution evidence insofar as his father and grandmother
were concerned. Accordingly, the order of acquittal, passed
in their favour has attained finality. However, the
appellant was convicted by the Trial Court solely on the
ground that he is the husband of the deceased.
The High Court, by the impugned judgment, concurred
with the findings of the Trial Court by placing reliance on
the appellant’s statement recorded under Section 313 of the
Code coupled with the evidence of PW-1, the postmortem
doctor.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted
that, what applies to co-accused must equally apply to the
appellant. Admittedly, all the three accused were living in
the same house along with the deceased. There is no
distinguishing factor for convicting the appellant on the
same evidence, particularly when the case rests entirely on
circumstantial evidence and there is no direct eye witness
to the occurrence. It was further submitted that the
evidence of PW-1, the postmortem doctor does not inspire
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confidence, especially when the postmortem report, even
according to the doctor himself, does not mention asphyxia
as the cause of death. The doctor also suspected it as a
case of poisoning in view of the condition of the lips and
nails of the deceased. Although the doctor stated that the
thyroid bone was fractured, there were no other external
injuries on the body of the deceased.
The evidence on record is not sufficient to establish
the guilt of the appellant. To invoke Section 106 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the foundational facts must be
proved first, which has not been done in the instant case.
Learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that
the fact that the appellant is the wife of the deceased is
not in dispute. Though the death did not occur in the
house, the body was found near to the house, therefore, it
is for the appellant to dispel the suspicion, which he
failed to do, as rightly noted by the Courts below. The
appellant was also unable to adduce any evidence in support
of his statement made under Section 313 of the Code
regarding the illness of the deceased. Since the courts
below have concurrently found the appellant guilty, there
is no need for any interference.
Admittedly, the case of the prosecution against the
appellant and the other accused persons are exactly the
same. It is also the case of the prosecution that, all the
accused were living together with the deceased. We are
dealing with a case of circumstantial evidence. In such a
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case, the links should be so connected that they should
unerringly point to the appellant and the appellant alone.
While the two other accused have been acquitted on the same
evidence, merely because the appellant is the husband of
the deceased, he cannot be convicted. Suspicion, however
strong, cannot be the basis for conviction.
As against the other accused, the evidence adduced by
the prosecution was rejected by the Trial Court, as stated
above. This includes the evidence of PWs 6 and 7 as well.
What remains is the evidence of PW 1. As rightly submitted
by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, the
evidence of PW 1 is not sufficient enough to implicate the
appellant alone. The post mortem report does not make any
record that the death of the deceased was due to asphyxia.
In fact, the cause of death has not been given in the
postmortem report, as admitted, by PW 1. PW 1 was not very
sure about the cause, and that is the reason why viscera
test was undertaken. PW 1 suspected it as a case of
poisoning. This very suspicion itself would show that the
report cannot be taken to establish that the deceased died
due to asphyxia caused by strangulation. In our considered
view, these aspects have not been taken into proper
consideration by both the Courts.
As stated, the body was not found in the house. Rather,
it was found near the matrimonial home. The mere fact that
the complaint was made by PW 6 and not by the appellant
himself cannot be ground to implicate the appellant.
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Looking at it from this perspective also, we find that the
appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. Suffice it
is to state that the Courts below have not considered the
relevant materials in the correct perspective as they were
dealing with a case of circumstantial evidence. In such a
view of the matter there is no hesitation in setting aside
the conviction rendered against the appellant by both the
Courts. Accordingly, the same is set aside, and the
appellant is acquitted of all the charges framed against
him. The bail bond executed by him stands discharged.
The appeal is allowed, accordingly.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
………………………………………..J.
[M.M. SUNDRESH]
………………………………………..J.
[SHEEL NAGU]
NEW DELHI;
01.07.2026
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ITEM NO.104 COURT NO.2 SECTION II-B
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 650/2013
SUBHASH CHANDER Appellant(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF HARYANA Respondent(s)
Date : 01-07-2026 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M.M. SUNDRESH
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SHEEL NAGU
(PARTIAL COURT WORKING DAYS BENCH)
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Manish Raghav , AOR
Mr. Manish Raghav, Adv.
Mr. Prakash Srivastava, Adv.
Mr. Rajan Thakur, Adv.
Ms. Smriti Dubey, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Deepak Thukral, A.A.G.
Mr. Akshay Amritanshu, AOR
Mr. Vineet Kumar, Adv.
Mr. S P Karhana, Adv.
Mr. Sarthak Srivastava, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
The criminal appeal is allowed in terms of the
signed order placed on file.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
(PRIYANKA MALIK) (POONAM VAID)
COURT MASTER (SH) ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
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