Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
M/S Sri Sai And Co vs The State Of Ap And Others on 13 July, 2026
Date of reserved for orders : 27.02.2026
Date of pronouncement : 13.07.2026
Date of uploading : 14.07.2026
APHC010718612025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3329]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY, THE 13th DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
WRIT PETITION NO: 36674/2025
Between:
M/s Sri Sai And Co ...PETITIONER
AND
The State Of Ap and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. S RAM BABU
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. THE ADVOCATE GENERAL
The Court made the following:
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
2
APHC010718472025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3329]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY, THE 13th DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
WRIT PETITION NO: 36675/2025
Between:
Harihareshwara Mahila Udyoga Matthu Seva Sangha ...PETITIONER
AND
The State Of Ap and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. S N CHIDAMBARA SASTRY
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GP FOR WOMEN DEV CHILD WELFARE
The Court made the following:
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
3
APHC010717262025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3329]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY, THE 13th DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
WRIT PETITION NO: 36748/2025
Between:
Sanjeevini Mahila Vikasa Seva Sangha ...PETITIONER
AND
The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. B.ABHAY SIDDHANTH MOOTHA
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. THE ADVOCATE GENERAL
The Court made the following:
NV,J
W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
4
APHC010717212025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3329]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY, THE 13th DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
WRIT PETITION NO: 36753/2025
Between:
Sanjeevini Mahila Vikasa Seva Sangha ...PETITIONER
AND
The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. B.ABHAY SIDDHANTH MOOTHA
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GP FOR WOMEN DEV CHILD WELFARE
The Court made the following:
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
5
APHC010000972026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3329]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY, THE 13th DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
WRIT PETITION NO: 59/2026
Between:
M/s.sanwaria Sweets Private Limited, ...PETITIONER
AND
The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. B.ABHAY SIDDHANTH MOOTHA
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. THE ADVOCATE GENERAL
The Court made the following:
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
6
APHC010016912026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3329]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY, THE 13th DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
WRIT PETITION NO: 1208/2026
Between:
Christy Friedgram Industry Private Limited ...PETITIONER
AND
The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. P BADRINATH
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. THE ADVOCATE GENERAL
The Court made the following:
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
7
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
WRIT PETITION NOS.36674, 36675, 36748, 36753 OF 2025 &
WRIT PETITION NOs.59 AND 1208 OF 2026
COMMON ORDER:
–
1. The present batch of cases arises out of the tender process initiated
by the Government of Andhra Pradesh for procurement and supply of
Junior Balamrutham for children aged 7-12 months and Senior
Balamrutham for children aged 13-36 months under the Bala Sanjeevani
and Bala Sanjeevani Plus Schemes implemented as part of the Integrated
Child Development Services (ICDS) Programme. The State floated the
tender notification on 04.09.2025 through the Andhra Pradesh
e-Procurement Portal for three zones across the State. The scheme is
intended to provide nutritional support to children through Anganwadi
Centres and forms part of the State’s welfare measures addressing child
nutrition.
2. Pursuant to the tender notification, a pre-bid meeting was conducted
on 12.09.2025, wherein prospective bidders participated and certain
queries were raised regarding the tender conditions. The original bid
submission deadline was fixed as 20.09.2025. Subsequently, the deadline
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
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was extended on more than one occasion and ultimately stood extended
till 28.10.2025. In the interregnum, a Corrigendum, signed on 11.12.2025
and published on 12.12.2025, was issued modifying certain clauses of the
tender document. The modifications inter alia related to the definition of
“similar food products”, eligibility criteria, BIS certification, ISO certification,
manufacturing requirements, land requirements, submission of samples,
production plans and proof of raw material availability.
3. The tender conditions and the Corrigendum were considered by a
State Level Procurement Committee constituted by the Government. The
Committee comprised of Senior Government officials and other members
was entrusted with the responsibility of examining and finalising the tender
conditions. Pursuant to the publication of the Corrigendum and extension
of the bid submission date, various writ petitions came to be instituted
challenging the tender conditions and the Corrigendum.
4. It is not in dispute that most of the petitioners in the batch of writ
petitions challenging the tender conditions did not participate in the bidding
process and even they did not register in the e-tender portal website, which
is preliminary requirement for participation in the tender process. However,
M/s. Christy Friedgram Industry Private Limited, the petitioner in
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
9
W.P. No.1208 of 2026, participated in the tender process and submitted its
bid on 29.12.2025. According to the said petitioner, it submitted all
mandatory documents prescribed under the tender, including a shelf-life
certificate issued by a Government Food Research Laboratory certifying a
minimum shelf life of ninety days. The tender conditions prescribed various
eligibility and technical requirements relating to prior experience, turnover,
delivery capability, BIS certification, ISO certification, performance
certificates and shelf-life certification. It is also a matter of record that on
08.01.2026 this Court permitted the respondents to proceed with the
tender process while restraining finalisation of the bids pending further
consideration of the matter.
5. Insofar as W.P. No.1208 of 2026 is concerned, the petitioner therein,
M/s. Christy Friedgram Industry Private Limited, does not challenge the
tender conditions. Its grievance is directed against the manner in which the
tender is proposed to be evaluated. According to the petitioner, the shelf-
life certificate prescribed under the tender is an essential condition and
mandatory for all bidders. It is contended that the petitioner alone
submitted the requisite shelf-life certificate issued by a Government Food
Research Laboratory, whereas the other bidders failed to furnish the said
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
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document. Therefore, non-compliance of a mandatory clause, renders
ineligible in further process of tender.
6. Sri S.S. Prasad, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner
in W.P.No.36675 of 2025 submits that the tender process has been
conducted in a manner that is unfair, arbitrary and contrary to the tender
conditions. The original tender notification was issued on 04.09.2025 and
the last date for submission of bids was extended several times up to
28.10.2025. Even after these extensions, no bids were received.
Therefore, once the final bid date expired, the entire tender process had
come to an end. In such a situation, the respondents could not have
brought the tender back to life by issuing a corrigendum on 12.12.2025. If
the authorities intend that the tender conditions required modification, they
should have cancelled the earlier tender and issued a fresh notification.
Instead, the respondents attempted to continue an expired tender by
making substantial changes through a corrigendum, which, according to
the petitioner, is not permitted under the tender conditions. It is argued that
Clause 2.12 of the tender document permits amendments only before the
bid due date and, therefore, any modification made after 28.10.2025 is
illegal and without authority.
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
11
7. Learned Senior Counsel drawn attention of this Court to paragraph
No.19 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinishma
Technologies Private Limited vs. State of Chattisgarh1, wherein the
Court held as follows:
“The object of public procurement is to secure quality goods
and services for the benefit of public exchequer. The said
object can be achieved by requiring the bidders to
demonstrate financial capacity, technical experience, and
past performance in contracts of similar nature, regardless
of place of performance of the contract. To confine the
eligibility to participate in the tender, within one State is not
only irrational but is also disproportionate to the goal of
ensuring effective delivery of Sports Kits”.
8. The learned Senior Counsel contends that the tender notification
itself did not mention about any pre-bid meeting, nor was such meeting
publicised. As a result, many prospective bidders, including the petitioner,
had no opportunity to participate in those discussions/deliberations or
place their concerns before the authorities. It is argued that any changes to
important tender conditions must be made through a transparent process,
muchless, that is equally accessible to all interested parties. Instead, the
1
2025 SCC Online SC 2119
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
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respondents relied upon representations submitted by a few entities and
used those representations for altering major eligibility conditions.
According to the petitioner, this entire procedure lacked transparency and
denied equal opportunity to other manufacturers who may have been
interested in participating, if they were aware of the proposed amendments
to the existing terms.
9. In Saheli Nandi vs. Union of India2, High Court of Calcutta,
observed as follows:
“It is also well-settled that “the goal posts cannot be
changed once the game has begun”. In the present case,
the respondent-Authorities have altered the cardinal
premise of the tender, that is, the minimum quotable rate,
after all the bidders submitted their bid and had no occasion
to alter the same. Such arbitrary fixation of a minimum price
after taking in all the bids is unheard of and ex facie
arbitrary. If the petitioner and the private respondent nos.6
to 12 and the other bidders were aware that the minimum
rate was Rs.88.63p they would havedefinitely taken the
same into consideration and put in their bids accordingly. In
fact, fixing a particular minimum rate has its own demerits. It
is often seen that in such cases several, if not all, bidders2
2023 SCC Online Cal 4953
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch13
quote exactly the minimum rate as their own quotations,
which would render an otherwise competitive tender a
farce.”
10. The learned Senior Counsel also argues that the corrigendum does
not merely clarify the original tender conditions but completely changes the
nature of the tender. One of the main grievance is with regard to definition
of “similar food products.” The original tender referred broadly to
experience in the manufacture and supply of Balamrutham or similar food
products. However, the corrigendum restricted the meaning of similar
products only regarding few specified items such as multigrain atta, ragi
flour, rice flakes, groundnut chikki and hot cooked meals. According to the
petitioner, these products are not truly comparable to Balamrutham, which
is a specialised nutritional food supplied to children. The petitioner submits
that there are many other nutritional products with similar nature, but
manufacturers of those products have been excluded by the narrow
definition introduced through the corrigendum. It is therefore argued that
the amendment is arbitrary and appears to have been designed to favour a
limited category of bidders while excluding others who possess relevant
experience and expertise in respect of Balamrutham products.
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
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11. The petitioner further challenges the eligibility conditions relating to
past supply experience and manufacturing facilities. It is submitted that the
tender effectively requires bidders to have prior experience of supplying
products to a large number of delivery points in Andhra Pradesh and also
insists upon establishment of a manufacturing unit within the State.
According to the petitioner, these conditions have no reasonable
connection with the objective of ensuring quality supply. The petitioner
claims to have extensive experience in manufacturing and supplying
comparable nutritional products under government programmes in the
State of Karnataka and other places. Nevertheless, because the
experience requirement is exclusively linked to State of Andhra Pradesh
and due to the manufacturing unit is required to be located within the State,
the petitioner is effectively excluded from participating. Learned Senior
Counsel argues that such amended conditions unnecessarily restrict
competition and prevent otherwise competent manufacturers from
competing for the contract. It is submitted that public tenders should
encourage wider participation and competition rather than creating barriers
that would favour a small group of local participants.
12. Another submission is that, while the respondents have imposed
restrictive eligibility conditions, they have at the same time diluted several
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
15
important quality-control requirements. Senior Counsel points out that the
original tender required bidders to possess BIS licences, ISO certifications,
accredited testing facilities and other quality certifications at the time of
bidding. These requirements were intended to ensure that only qualified
manufacturers supplying safe and nutritious food could participate.
However, through the corrigendum, the respondents permitted bidders to
participate even without possessing such certifications, provided they
merely submitted proof that they had applied for them or undertook to
obtain them later. Similar relaxations were granted with regard to
laboratory facilities, testing requirements and submission of product
samples. According to the petitioner, these relaxations seriously
compromise quality standards, particularly because the product is intended
for infants and young children. It is argued that food safety and quality
cannot be left to future compliance or promises and that mandatory
certifications should exist at the time of bidding itself.
13. In Tata Cellular vs Union of India3, the Hon’;ble Supreme Court
held as follows:
“It cannot be denied that the principles of judicial review
would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by3
1994 (6) SCC 6651
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch16
Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or
favoritism. However, it must be clearly stated that there are
inherent limitations in exercise of that power of judicial
review. Government is the guardian of the finances of the
State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the
State. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is
always available to the Government. But, the principles laid
down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view
while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no
question of infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries
to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to
choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of
course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral
purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down.”
14. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel placed
reliance of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the following judgments:
(i) Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India4;
(ii) Vinishma Technologies Private Limited vs. State of Chattisgarh
(referred supra);
(iii) Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd vs. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar
Municipal Corporation Limited5;
4
1979 (3) SCC 489
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
17
(iv) Saheli Nandi vs. Union of India (referred supra);
(v) Tata Cellular vs Union of India6;
(vi) Central Coalfields Limited vs. Sll-Sml and others7;
(vii) Reliance Energy Limited vs. Maharashtra State Road Development
Corporation Limited8;
(viii) Nova Ads vs. Metropolitan Transport Corporation9
15. Finally, learned Senior Counsel submits that the tender and the
subsequent corrigendum suffers from transparency and wider participation
of bidders apart from multiple legal defects. The corrigendum was issued
after expiry of the tender, essential eligibility conditions were altered
without following a transparent process, eligibility criteria were framed in a
restrictive manner that excluded genuine competitors, and essential
quality-control safeguards were diluted without justification. For these
reasons, it is reiterated that the tender process is arbitrary, colourable
exercise of power, discriminatory and contrary to law, and that the tender
notification as well as corrigendum are liable to be set aside.
5
2000 (5) SCC 287
6
1994 (6) SCC 6651
7
2016 (8) SCC 622
8
2007 (8) SCC 1
9
2015 (13) SCc 257
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
18
16. Sri S. Rambabu, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.36674
of 2025 adopted the contentions submitted by Sri S.S. Prasad, learned
Senior Counsel in W.P.No.36675 of 2025.
17. Sri Abhay Siddhanth Mootha, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners in W.P. Nos.36748 and 36753 of 2025 and W.P. No.59 of 2026
would contend that the Corrigendum issued on 12.12.2025 is illegal,
arbitrary and unsustainable in law. He submits that, the tender process had
concluded upon expiry of the bid submission date and any modification to
the tender document thereafter, could not have been carried out through a
Corrigendum. It is their contention that Clause 2.12 of the tender document
permitted amendments only before the bid due date and only through an
Addenda, but not corrigendum. Consequently, the Corrigendum, having
been issued after the expiry of the earlier bid deadline, is stated to be non
est in law and incapable of altering the tender process.
18. He further contends that the present Corrigendum fundamentally
altered mandatory/essential eligibility conditions and, in effect, resulted in a
fresh tender process under the guise of a clarification. The changes
introduced through the Corrigendum were substantial in nature and
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
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therefore required for issuance of a fresh tender notification with adequate
time being afforded to all eligible participants.
19. With regard to conduct of the pre-bid meeting, it is contended that
the original tender document did not contain particulars regarding the pre-
bid meeting and therefore the proceedings conducted on 12.09.2025 were
legally not permissible, as such, the Corrigendum is vitiated.
20. The main challenge of the petitioners is with regard to modification of
Clause 2.2.1(c) relating to “similar food products”. According to the
petitioners, the Corrigendum restricted the expression “similar food
products” to specified products such as multigrain atta, ragi flour, rice
flakes, groundnut chikki and hot cooked meals. It is argued that the said
classification bears no nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the
tender and excludes several other nutritional products of Balamrutham as
notified . The petitioners allege that the modification is tailor-made to
favour a select class of entities while excluding otherwise experienced and
eligible suppliers in national sphere.
21. The petitioners also assail the relaxation of BIS and ISO certification
requirements. It is contended that mandatory eligibility conditions cannot
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
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be relaxed after issuance of the tender and that such relaxation
compromises the quality standards.
22. The petitioners further contend that the tender conditions, read as a
whole, are arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21
of the Constitution of India. They submit that the conditions have been
designed in a manner that favours selected entities and excludes genuine
eligible competitors. It is also contended that participation in the tender
process is not a prerequisite where the challenge is directed against the
legality and constitutionality of the tender conditions themselves.
23. In support of his contentions, Sri Abhay Siddhanth Mootha, learned
counsel placed reliance upon the following decisions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court:
(i) Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways Limited vs. Mandeep
Enterprises (Civil Appeal No.11418 of 2025);
(ii) Andhra Pradesh Waqf Board vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
(2022 SCC Online SC 159);
(iii) Meerut Development Authorities vs. Association of
management Studies10
(iv) New Bihar Biri leaves vs. State of Bihar11
10
2009 (6) SCC 171
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(v) Tafcon Projects (I) (P) Ltd vs. Union of India12;
(vi) Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd vs. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar
Municipal Corporation Limited (referred supra);
(vii) West Bengal State Electricity Board vs. Patel Engineering
Limited13;
(viii) Reliance Energy Limited vs. Maharashtra State Road
Development Corporation Limited (referred supra);
(ix) Central Coalfields Limited vs. Sll-Sml and others (referred
supra)
24. Whereas, Sri P. Badrinath, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner inn W.P.No.1208 of 2026, while adopting the contentions of
Sri S.S. Prasad, learned Senior Counsel, additionally, submits that, other
bidders have also failed to satisfy mandatory requirements relating to
turnover and performance certificates. According to the petitioner, a
request for relaxation of the shelf-life certificate requirement was
specifically rejected during the pre-bid stage and through the Corrigendum.
It is therefore argued that the respondents are precluded from relaxing the
said requirement during technical evaluation. The petitioner asserts that
any attempt to qualify bidders who have not complied with the mandatory
tender conditions would be arbitrary, contrary to the terms of the tender
11
(1981) 1 SCC 537
12
(2004) 13 SCC 788
13
(2001) 2 SCC 451
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
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and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. He submits that strict
adherence to the tender conditions is necessary not only to maintain
fairness in the procurement process but also to ensure food safety and
protection of public interest, particularly having regard to the vulnerable
class of beneficiaries under the ICDS scheme.
25. On the other hand, Learned Advocate General appearing for the
State, raised a preliminary objection as to maintainability of the writ
petition. It is contended that most of the petitioners herein neither
registered themselves on the e-procurement portal nor participated in the
bidding process. He submits that, a person who has consciously abstained
from participation in the tender process, cannot challenge the tender
process. The petitioners have failed to establish that the conditions of
tender document and corrigendum prevented them from participating in the
tender.
26. He further submitted that, a writ of mandamus can be issued only
where there exists a clear legal right in favour of the petitioner and a
corresponding statutory or public on the part of the respondent, coupled
with a failure to discharge such duty. In the absence of any accrued right or
infringement thereof, writ petition seeking preventive directions is not
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
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maintainable. further, he submits that, a person who has not participated in
the tender process cannot ordinarily challenge the evaluation, process or
consideration of bids submitted by others. In support of his contentions,
learned Advocate General placed reliance upon the judgments of Hon’ble
Supreme Court and this Court in NHAI vs. Gwalior – Jhansi Expressway
Limited14 and Vakacharla Veeraiah vs. State of A.P15.
27. The learned Advocate General would contend that the writ petitions
suffer from delay and latches. It is submitted that the petitioners were fully
aware of the Corrigendum and the extension of time but chose to approach
this Court only after closure of the bid submission process. Such conduct,
according to the respondents, disentitles the petitioners to get any
discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.
28. The learned Advocate General narrates that the Corrigendum did
not impose any restrictive condition, but rather expanded participation by
relaxing several eligibility requirements at the request of the bidders at pre-
bid meeting. It is submitted that the modifications concerning BIS
certification, ISO certification, establishment of manufacturing units and
14
(2018) 8 SCC 243
15
2021 SCC Online AP 1901
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land ownership requirements were intended to remove entry level barriers
and to facilitate wider participation and the Corrigendum certainly
broadened the scope of tender rather than restricting the competition.
29. With regard to the definition of “similar food products”, the learned
Advocate General contend that the original tender document did not define
the expression and as such the clarification was issued only to remove
ambiguity. It is further explained that designing the constitution of similar
food products falls within the exclusive domain of the tendering authority
and that courts ought not to interfere with such technical
definition/determinations and necessity of the hour unless shown to be
arbitrary or mala fide. He argued that, tender conditions cannot be
interpreted in the same manner as statutory provisions and that at
pragmatic, purposive approach must be adopted. Unless the decision is
shown to be arbitrary, malafide or irrational, courts ought not to interfere
with the interpretation or formulation of tender conditions, even if another
view is possible. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the
judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Agmatel India (P) Ltd vs.
Resoursys Telecom16.
16
(2022) 5 SCC 362
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
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30. The learned Advocate General also emphasizes the public interest
involved in the tender. According to them, the procurement pertains to a
child nutrition programme catering to approximately thirteen lakh children
in the State. It is submitted that the categorisation of Balamrutham into
Junior and Senior variants was undertaken on the basis of
recommendations made by expert bodies and after detailed studies
conducted by the concerned authorities of the Government. The
respondents therefore contend that interference with the tender process
would adversely affect implementation of an important child welfare
programme.
31. The respondents further reiterated that the entire tender process
was transparent and undertaken after consultation with stakeholders and
legal scrutiny by the State Level Procurement Committee. It is therefore
contended that the allegations of arbitrariness and favouritism are wholly
unfounded.
32. In support of his contentions, learned Advocate General, placed
reliance on the following judgments:
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch26
a. Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd vs. State of Karnataka17
b. NHAI vs. Gwalior – Jhansi Expressway Limited18
c. Agmatel India (P) Ltd vs. Resoursys Telecom (referred supra)
d. Vikram Book Links Pvt. Ltd vs. State of A.P19
e. Vakacharla Veeraiah vs. State of A.P (referred supra)
33. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Advocate
General for the Respondents/State and perused the material available on
record.
34. After hearing all the counsel for all the parties and learned Advocate
General for respondents and on perusing the material available on record,
the points that arise for consideration are as follows:
1. Whether the writ petitioners have locus standi and whether the writ
petitions are hit by delay and latches?
2. Whether the Corrigendum dated 12.12.2025 is legally valid and in
conformity with the tender documents?
17
(2012) 8 SCC 216
18
(2018) 8 SCC 243
19
W.P.No.5435 of 2025 dated 06.05.2025
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3. Whether the impugned tender conditions, particularly Clause 2.2.1(c)
and the definition of “similar food products”, are arbitrary,
discriminatory or tailor-made so as to warrant judicial interference?
4. Whether the tender process suffers from arbitrariness, mala fides or
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution?
5. Whether the respondents are entitled to qualify bidders who have
not complied with the mandatory tender conditions, particularly the
shelf-life certification requirement, and to what relief?
6. Whether this Court can exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in
contractual or tender matters in the absence of pleadings regarding
bias, malafide or arbitrary action on the part of tendering authority?
POINT No.1
35. The preliminary objection raised by the respondents regarding
maintainability of the writ petitions. It is contended that every contractor or
bidder intend to participate in tender process, they shall get it registered at
e-portal procurement to access to the tender document and to correspond
with the tendering authority and for every information is like pre-bid
meetings and its deliberations, resolutions and all other modifications etc,
whereas in the cases in hand most of the petitioners neither registered on
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
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the e-procurement portal nor participated in the tender process and,
therefore, lack the locus standi to challenge the tender conditions or the
actions of the tendering authority. According to the respondents, a person
who has chosen not to participate in the bidding process cannot
subsequently question the tender terms. It is further observed that the
petitioners were aware of the Corrigendum and the extension of the bid
submission dates but approached this Court only after the tender process
was finalized, thereby all the petitions are attracting the Doctrine of delay
and latches.
36. On the other hand, the petitioners, submit that participation in the
tender process is not a precondition where the challenge is directed
against the legality and validity of the tender conditions. According to them,
the impugned conditions are arbitrary, exclusionary, and operated as
barriers to their participation. Their grievance is directed not against any
decision taken during bid evaluation but against the tender framework and
the Corrigendum and its governing the process.
37. The question that arises is whether non-participation in a tender
process by itself bars a challenge to the legality of the tender conditions.
While participation may strengthen a challenge to the outcome of a tender,
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it is not an absolute requirement where the challenge concerns allegedly
arbitrary, discriminatory, or unconstitutional eligibility conditions. In such
cases, the Court must examine whether the petitioners have a genuine
interest in the subject matter and whether the impugned conditions
excluded the petitioners from participation.
38. As regards delay and latches, it is settled that relief under Article 226
is discretionary and may be declined in cases of unexplained delay.
However, the principle must be applied having regard to the facts of each
case. The present challenge concerns the validity of the Corrigendum and
tender conditions governing public procurement under a welfare scheme.
Therefore, the Court must examine the allegations of illegality and
arbitrariness on their merits rather than reject the petitions on technical
grounds alone.
39. Having considered the nature of the challenge and the material on
record, this Court is unable to accept the objections relating to locus standi
and maintainability. The petitioners are manufacturers operating in the
relevant field and cannot be regarded as strangers to the nature of the
tender procurement process. Their non-participation, when exposed to the
conditions under challenge, does not deprive them of the right to question
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such conditions. The objection based on delay is also without merit. No
third-party rights had taken place when the writ petitions were instituted. In
these circumstances, no such delay has been shown as would justify
dismissal of the petitions at the threshold. Accordingly, the preliminary
objections raised by the respondents are hereby rejected. Accordingly, the
point is answered in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents.
POINT No.2
40. The next issue for consideration is whether the Corrigendum dated
12.12.2025 is legally valid and whether its issuance is consistent with the
tender conditions governing the procurement process. The petitioners
contend that the Corrigendum was issued after expiry of the original bid
submission deadline and, therefore, to be without legal sanction. According
to them, once the original bidding period expired, any modification to the
tender conditions could only have been made by cancelling the tender and
issuing a fresh notification. Attention of this Court is drawn to Clause 2.12
of the tender document to contend that amendments were permissible only
before the bid due date and only through an Addenda. It is further
contended that the changes introduced were not merely clarificatory but
substantially modified the eligibility criteria, quality control requirements,
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certification norms, manufacturing conditions and other essential terms of
the tender. According to the petitioners, these changes materially altered
the tender framework and warranted a fresh tender process to ensure
equal opportunity to all prospective bidders. The respondents, on the other
hand, submit that the Corrigendum was issued after considering
representations received from all the bidders, stakeholders and
discussions held during the pre-bid meeting. It is also contended that the
essential object of the tender document remained unchanged and that the
subject revised conditions were made available to all interested parties
through the e-procurement portal for further necessary steps.
41. The question, therefore, is whether the Corrigendum amounted to an
impermissible revival of an expired tender process and whether the
changes introduced were of such significance as to require a fresh tender
notification. While public procurement demands fairness and transparency,
it also permits modifications to address practical concerns and clarify
tender conditions. Unless such changes fundamentally alter the nature of
the procurement or cause prejudice to prospective bidders, a fresh tender
process may not be necessary.
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42. The material on record shows that the Corrigendum was issued
following the pre-bid deliberations to address concerns raised by all the
bidders and stakeholders. The revised conditions were uploaded on the e-
procurement portal and made accessible to all prospective bidders afresh
to participate tender process. No material has been placed before the
Court to show that any bidder was denied notice of the revised conditions
or was prevented from participating on that account. In matters of public
procurement, what is relevant is whether the revised conditions were
transparently communicated and whether equal opportunity was afforded
to all interested bidders. Since the modifications were publicly notified
through the e-procurement portal and adequate time was made available
for submission of bids, the requirements of transparency and fair notice
stand substantially satisfied. Mere use of the term “Corrigendum” instead
of “Addenda” does not render the process invalid. Accordingly, the
challenge to the legality and validity of the Corrigendum is rejected.
Accordingly, the point is answered in favour of the respondents and
against the petitioners.
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POINT No.3
43. The third point that arises for consideration is whether the
amendment introduced to Clause 2.2.1(c), particularly the definition of
“similar food products,” is arbitrary, discriminatory, irrational, or tailor-made
to favour a particular class of bidders.
44. The petitioners contend that under the original tender notification,
experience in manufacture and supply of Balamrutham or similar food
products was recognized broadly without restrictive definitions. However,
by virtue of the Corrigendum, the expression “similar food products” was
confined to a limited category of products such as multigrain atta, ragi flour,
rice flakes, groundnut chikki, and hot cooked meals. It is argued that
numerous manufacturers possessing substantial experience in production
of fortified nutritional foods, supplementary nutrition products, protein-
enriched food formulations, and government nutrition programme supplies
have been unjustifiably excluded by the restrictive definition. The
petitioners therefore contend that the classification has the effect of
narrowing competition in favour of a select group of entities.
45. The respondents deny these allegations and explained that the
original tender document did not define the term “similar food products,”
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which led to confusion among prospective bidders. According to them, the
Corrigendum was issued only to clarify the types of products that would be
treated as similar food products. It is contended that this is a technical
matter within the domain of the procurement authority and that the Court
should not interfere unless the decision is shown to be arbitrary or mala
fide. It is also observed that the clarification applied equally to all bidders
and was intended to bring clarity and transparency to the tender process,
not to restrict competition.
46. The question, therefore, is whether the definition introduced through
the Corrigendum is related to the purpose of the tender and whether it is so
arbitrary or unreasonable as to warrant interference by this Court. It is well
settled that the tendering authority has considerable knowledge,
experience and discretion in prescribing eligibility conditions and
determining the qualifications required for participation. Such decisions are
based on technical and administrative considerations and are ordinarily left
to the expertise of the concerned authority. in one word, it is the exclusive
domain of the tendering authority. therefore, the role of the Court in judicial
review is not to examine the correctness of the decision but to determine
whether the decision-making process is legal, fair, and free from
arbitrariness.
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47. This Court is therefore of the opinion that the amendment to
Clause 2.2.1(c) cannot be characterised as an act of arbitrary or
discriminatory merely because some manufacturers are possessing
experience in other nutritional products and which do not fall within the
defined category. The determination of comparable products is essentially
a matter of technical assessment falling within the domain of the procuring
authority. In the absence of demonstrable mala fides, irrationality, or
manifest unreasonableness, this Court would not interfere with such policy
decisions. Consequently, the allegation that the definition of “similar food
products” is tailor-made or intended to exclude genuine competitors is
liable to be rejected, for the reason that it is not the case of petitioners that
the issuance of corrigendum restricted the participation of bidders.
48. Learned counsel for the petitioners had placed reliance on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Vinishma Technologies Private
Limited vs. State of Chattisgarh (referred supra) to contend that, the
impugned condition operates as a closed door to outsiders and restricts
the wider participation of bidders and restricts competition. But, this
contention cannot be accepted, for the reason that, the issue involved in
the above case pertains to sports kits, which can be manufactured in other
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states also. But, in the present case, the food item called as Balamrutam is
a perishable good should be prepared in the State of Andhra Pradesh only,
making easy for transporting the commodity. Hence, the contention raised
by the learned counsel for the petitioners is rejected.
49. The petitioners have not placed any material before this Court to
establish that the products specified in the Corrigendum are wholly
unrelated to the nutritional characteristics required under the scheme. As
such, in the absence of such material, the Court cannot hold that the
classification lacks a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.
50. The scope of judicial review in tender matters is inherently limited.
Courts do not sit in appeal over decisions of the tendering authority and
cannot substitute their views for those of financial, administrative or
technical experts. Unless the impugned action is shown to be arbitrary,
discriminatory, mala fide, or patently illegal, judicial interference is
ordinarily unwarranted. Point is answered in favour of the respondents and
against the petitioners.
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POINT No.4
51. The petitioners contend that the tender conditions were framed in a
manner that excluded genuine competitors and favoured a limited class of
entities. According to them, while certain quality-control requirements were
relaxed, eligibility was restricted through selective definitions and
conditions, rendering the process arbitrary and lacking in transparency.
52. The respondents deny these allegations. They submit that the tender
relates to procurement of nutritional supplements for nearly thirteen lakh
children under the Integrated Child Development Services Programme and
that the conditions were framed after consultation with stakeholders,
scrutiny by the State Level Procurement Committee, and consideration of
practical requirements. It is stated that the Corrigendum was issued
pursuant to suggestions received during the pre-bid meeting and that all
modifications were uniformly communicated through the e-procurement
portal. According to the respondents, the changes were intended to widen
participation and not to restrict competition.
53. The issue for consideration is whether the decision-making process
was arbitrary, biased, mala fide, or intended to favour any particular bidder.
Mere disagreement with the tender conditions or policy choices of the
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tendering authority is not sufficient to establish arbitrariness. The material
on record shows that the modifications were introduced after pre-bid
deliberations to address concerns raised by stakeholders. The revised
conditions were publicly notified and made available to all prospective
bidders. No material has been placed before the Court to show that any
bidder received preferential treatment or that the conditions were tailored
to benefit an entity. As contended by by the learned Senior Counsel, as per
tender notice, it is published as National Level Bidding, but the pre-
requisite condition is that, the bidder should have a manufacturing unit
within the jurisdiction of the State, which is nothing but restricting the bid in
favour of State level players. In similar circumstances, the Hon’ble Apex
Court specifically held in in Vinishma Technologies Private Limited vs.
State of Chattisgarh (referred supra), wherein it was held that, the
impugned condition operates as a closed door to outsiders and restricts
the wider participation of bidders and restricts competition. On that ground,
the tender notice in the said case was set aside. The said ruling may not
be applicable to the present facts of the case, for the reason that the
procurement under the scheme in the said case was sports kits to the
school children of Government Schools in the State of Chattisgarh. The
procurement of sports kits would be possible from any corner of India,
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W.P.No.36674 of 2025 & batch
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since that product is not perishable and as per the approved colour and
designed can be procured. Whereas, in the case in hand, the food
products are perishable in nature and food habits of children of a particular
state is different from other state, as such, the similar food products were
expanded. Hence, the ruling of the Hon’ble Apex court is not applicable to
the present facts of the case.
54. As long as there is no material evidence to show that the tender
process was suffered with bias, malice and irrational, the Judicial review in
such matters is confined to examining the fairness and transparency of the
decision-making process and not the merits of the policy itself. On the
material available, this Court finds that the Corrigendum was issued to
facilitate participation and ensure effective implementation of the
procurement process. The allegations of mala fides, favouritism and
arbitrariness are unsupported by evidence. Accordingly, it is held that the
tender process does not suffer from arbitrariness or violate Article 14 of the
Constitution, and the said submissions are rejected.
POINT No.5
55. The next issue for consideration is whether bidders who did not
submit the shelf-life certificate and certain other documents at the time of
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bidding could still be considered eligible, and whether such consideration
would render the tender process illegal or arbitrary.
56. The petitioner in W.P. No.1208 of 2026 contends that the shelf-life
certificate issued by a Government Food Research Laboratory is a
mandatory requirement under the tender conditions. It is submitted that the
petitioner alone furnished a certificate certifying a minimum shelf life of
ninety days, while the other bidders failed to do so. It is further contended
that requests for relaxation of this requirement were rejected during the
pre-bid stage and through the Corrigendum, and therefore the respondents
cannot relax the condition during technical evaluation.
57. The respondents, however, submit that certain certificates and
documents can be produced at a later stage and that non-submission at
the initial stage does not automatically render a bidder ineligible. According
to them, the objective of the tender is to procure quality nutritional products
and not to exclude otherwise eligible bidders for curable procedural
deficiencies. As such, the intention of the petitioner that the tender
conditions must be interpreted in a practical manner consistent with public
interest.
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58. The question, therefore, is whether the shelf-life certificate is an
essential eligibility condition requiring submission along with the bid or
whether it is a requirement capable of subsequent compliance. The
distinction between a mandatory eligibility condition and a procedural
requirement assumes significance in this context. Absolutely, the subject
condition is a procedural requirement only.
59. Upon consideration of the material on record, this Court is of the
view that, non-submission of the shelf-life certificate at the initial stage
cannot, by itself, result in automatic disqualification. The requirement is
intended to ensure quality and safety standards, but the certificate is
capable of subsequent production and verification. No material has been
placed before the Court to show that any relaxation granted in this regard
has caused prejudice to the petitioners or compromised the quality
standards contemplated under the tender. Accordingly, the contention that
bidders who did not furnish the certificate along with their bids must be
treated as ineligible is hereby rejected. Accordingly, the point is answered
in favour of the respondents and against the petitioners.
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POINT No.6
60. The final point that arises for consideration is whether this Court, in
exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, can interfere with the tender process and contractual
decisions of the tendering authority in the absence of specific pleadings
and proof of mala fides, bias, arbitrariness, or patent illegality. The
petitioners contend that the impugned tender conditions and the
Corrigendum violate constitutional guarantees of equality and fairness and
therefore warrant judicial intervention. According to them, the Court is duty-
bound to ensure that public procurement processes remain transparent,
non-discriminatory, and consistent with constitutional principles.
61. The Constitutional Courts must view that element of public interest is
involved or not in the tender process. The scope of present tender is the
procurement pertaining to child nutrition programme, which is meant for
catering to nearly 13 lakh children belonging to the Below Poverty Line
families in the State. The said programme itself is formulated as per the
statistics of national survey duly conducted by National Family Health
Survey-6.
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62. The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a
public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving
at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are
commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive
at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not
open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally
deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be
the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation,
for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation, for
bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may
not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest.
But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to
adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and
cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable
to judicial review, the court can examine the decision-making process and
interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and
arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies
have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is
found in the decision-making process the court must exercise its
discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should
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exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the
making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public
interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or
not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest
requires interference, the Court should intervene. [Air India Ltd. vs.
Cochin International Airport Ltd20.
63. The respondents, however, submit that the scope of judicial review
in tender and contractual matters is extremely limited. It is contended that
formulation of tender conditions, determination of eligibility criteria,
assessment of technical requirements, and evaluation of bids fall primarily
within the domain of the expert authorities entrusted with the procurement
process. The respondents rely upon a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court referred supra, to contend that judicial review is only
confined to examination of the decision-making process but not the merits
of the decision itself.
64. The settled legal position is that the Court does not sit as an
appellate authority over administrative decisions relating to tenders and
contracts. The Court is not expected to substitute its own views for those of
20
2000 (2) SCC 617
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technical experts or procurement authorities merely because an alternative
view may be possible. Therefore, the Judicial intervention is justified only
when the decision-making process is shown to be vitiated by mala fides,
arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, procedural impropriety, or patent illegality.
The freedom of the Government to prescribe tender conditions and
determine the manner in which public contracts are awarded is an
essential component of administrative discretion, subject only to
constitutional limitations.
65. In the present case, apart from making allegations of arbitrariness
and favouritism, the petitioners have not placed any convincing material
demonstrating mala fides, bias, or abuse of power on the part of the
tendering authority. The record indicates that the tender conditions were
examined by the competent authorities and subsequently published
through the prescribed electronic platform. The Court finds no material
irregularity in the decision-making process warranting interference. The
controversy essentially relates to the wisdom and propriety of the tender
conditions rather than the legality of the process by which they were
framed. Such matters ordinarily fall within the exclusive domain of the
tendering authority.
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66. To explain the scheme in more emphatic manner, it is appropriate to
draw the statistics of National Family Health Survey-5, for the year 2023-
2024 conducted across 715 districts, which reveals in respect of child
nutrition that, nearly 30% of children were categorized as stunned and
severe wasting nearly 6% and rate child mortality is high rate in India while
comparing any developed or developing countries in the world. Therefore,
this ground level data promoted the policy making for brining this
programme to get rid of, or to reduce the percentage to the lower level, the
said object was achieved through this programme by effective
implementing the scheme. Therefore, the change of figures can be
visualized from National Family Health Survey-5 to National Family Health
Survey-6 (2019 – 2020 to 2023 – 2024).
67. Therefore, applying the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court governing judicial review of tender matters, this Court holds that no
case has been made out for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of proven arbitrariness, mala
fides, or patent illegality, the tender process is not liable to be interfered
with. Consequently, the challenge raised by the petitioners fails and the
writ petitions are liable to be dismissed.
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68. Normally, the Courts cannot give different interpretation to the tender
terms and the duty of this Court is to verify whether the respondent
followed the procedure in processing the tender or not and the Courts
would not interfere with the tenders, interpreting tender conditions, relaxing
any tender conditions, in view of law declared by the Apex Court in
Durgawathi Devi v. Union of India THR, Its Secretary, Ministry and
others21.
69. In The Silppi Constructions Contractors vs. The Union of India
and Ors22, the Apex Court reiterated the same principles with regard to
maintainability of writ petition in tender of contractual matters, relying on
the catena of judgments of Supreme Court, more particularly, Tata Celluar
v. Union of India23, wherein the Apex Court laid down six guidelines which
are as follows:
(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative
action.
(2) The Court does no sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews
the manner in which the decision was made.
(3) The Court does not have the expertise to correct the
administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision21
Special Leave Petition (c) No.37479 of 2016
22
Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.13802-13805 of 2019 dated 21.06.2019
23
(1994) 6 SCC 651
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is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the
necessary expertise which itself may be fallible.
(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial
scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of
contract.
Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award
the contract is reached by process of negotiations through
several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made
qualitatively by experts.
(5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other
words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an
administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or
quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only
be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of
reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but
must be free arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by
mala fides.
(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden
on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted
expenditure.
70. The Apex Court also referred to various earlier judgments in Raunaq
International Ltd. V. I.V.R. Construction Ltd24, Air India Limited v.
Cochin International Airport Ltd (referred supra), Karnataka SIIDC Ltd
24
(1999) 1 SCC 492
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v. Cavalet India Ltd25, Master Marine Services (P) Ltd v. Metcalfe &
Hodgkinson (P) Ltd26, B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd v. Nair Coal Services
Ltd27, Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa28 and Michigan Rubber (India)
Ltd. V. State of Karnataka & Ors29 and finally concluded that the Courts
should not normally intervene in the decision making process for award of
contracts, unless blatant illegality and arbitrariness can be pointed out. The
controversy before this Court is to ascertain whether there was any
illegality or arbitrariness in the decision making process rather than the
question of whether the decision was correct. In the present case, the
District Diet Management Committee discharged its duty of finalizing the
diet contract in faovur of one diet contractor, thus discharged its duty.
Unless, there is blatant illegality and arbitrariness pointed out in awarding
the contract to any of the diet contractor, this Court cannot interfere into the
matter.
71. In view of my foregoing discussion, this Court does not find any
illegality or arbitrariness to set-aside the tender notification impugned in the
writ petitions, exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the
25
(2005) 4 SCC 456
26
(2005) 6 SCC 138
27
(2006) 11 SCC 548
28
(2007) 14 SCC 517
29
(2012) 8 SCC 216
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Constitution of India. Consequently, the writ petitions are liable to be
dismissed.
72. In the result, writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.
73. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand
dismissed.
______________________________________
JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
Date: 13.07.2026
SP
Whether the order is:
Speaking No Reasoned Yes
Reportable No Non-reportable Yes
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73
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
WRIT PETITION NOS.36674, 36675, 36748, 36753 OF 2025 &
WRIT PETITION NOs.59 AND 1208 OF 2026
Date:13.06.2026
W
SP
