Calcutta High Court
Commissioner Of Customs Port vs M/S Greenpanel Industries Limited on 10 July, 2026
Author: Rajarshi Bharadwaj
Bench: Rajarshi Bharadwaj
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
SPECIAL JURISDICTION [CUSTOMS]
ORIGINAL SIDE
BEFORE:
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE RAJARSHI BHARADWAJ
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE UDAY KUMAR
CUSTA 88 OF 2025
IA NO: GA 1 OF 2025
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS PORT
VS
M/S GREENPANEL INDUSTRIES LIMITED
(FORMERLY M/S GREENPLY INDUSTRIES LTD)
CUSTA 21 OF 2025
IA NO: GA 2 OF 2026
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AIRPORT AND AIR CARGO
VS
SHRI SANJAY AGARWAL
CUSTA 22 OF 2025
IA NO: GA 2 OF 2026
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AIRPORT AND AIR CARGO
VS
SHRI PREET KUMAR AGARWAL
CUSTA 25 OF 2025
IA NO: GA 2 OF 2026
IA NO: GA 3 OF 2026
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (AIRPORT AND AIR CARGO)
VS
SHRI DHRUVJYOTI ROY AND ORS.
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CUSTA 21 OF 2025
CUSTA 22 OF 2025
& CUSTA 25 OF 2025
For the Appellant : Mr. Vipul Kundalia, Ld. Sr. Adv.
(CUSTA 88 of 2025) Mr. Anurag Roy, Ld. Adv.
For the Respondent : Mr. Rahul Tangri, Ld. Adv.
(CUSTA 88 of 2025) Ms. Taniya Roy, Ld. Adv. For the Appellants : Mr. Tapan Bhanja, Ld. Adv. (CUSTA 21 of 2025 CUSTA 22 of 2025 & CUSTA 25 of 2025) For the Respondents : Mr. Arnab Chakraborty, Ld. Adv. (CUSTA 21 of 2025 Mr. Aniket Chaudhury, Ld. Adv. CUSTA 22 of 2025 & Ms. Shreya Mundhra, Ld. Adv. CUSTA 25 of 2025) Reserved on : 05.05.2026 Pronounced on : 10.07.2026 Uday Kumar, J:-
1. The present batch of statutory appeals has been preferred by the
Revenue under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962, assailing the
various final orders passed by the Customs, Excise & Service Tax
Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Eastern Zonal Bench, Kolkata. As these
matters are listed before us for formal admission, we are tasked with the
preliminary evaluation of whether the memorandums of appeal disclose
any substantial question of law warranting this Court’s intervention.
Before we could embark upon this judicial exercise, the proceedings
were interrupted by the appearance of the Respondents, who raised a
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CUSTA 22 OF 2025
& CUSTA 25 OF 2025
significant procedural hurdle regarding the maintainability of these
appeals.
2. At the very threshold of the admission hearing, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the respective Respondents sought an audience,
contending that this Court is duty-bound to hear them on the issue of
subject-matter jurisdiction, specifically concerning the “rate of duty”
under Section 130E, before any formal order of admission is passed. The
Respondents’ objection is grounded on the premise that if the appeals
are inherently defective or outside the Court’s jurisdiction, a preliminary
hearing would prevent a futile and time-consuming trial. To support this
contention, they have invoked Rule VI, Part XX, Chapter XXXVIII of the
High Court at Calcutta (Original Side) Rules, 1914, asserting it confers
upon this Bench the discretionary power to hear a respondent at the
admission stage. They argue that this rule is a salutary power intended
to ensure that the Court does not exercise jurisdiction where none
exists. Furthermore, by drawing a parallel between the appellate
framework of the Customs Act laid down under Section 130 and the civil
appellate procedure under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(CPC), they urged that an appellate court has an inherent duty to permit
a respondent to demonstrate, at the inception, that no substantial
question of law exists. The Court should borrow the procedural fairness
inherent in civil appellate law.
3. In support of this prayer, the Respondents have placed reliance on the
principles articulated in Asma Lateef v. Shabbir Ahmad (2024) 4 SCC
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CUSTA 21 OF 2025
CUSTA 22 OF 2025
& CUSTA 25 OF 2025
696, Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties (2020) 6 SCC 557, and
Commissioner of Customs v. Motorola India Ltd. (2019) 9 SCC 563,
arguing that jurisdictional challenges based on the applicability of an
exemption notification (Notification No. 104/2009-Cus), directly relates
to the “rate of duty” under Section 130E, must be addressed at the
earliest possible stage to ensure judicial economy. They contend that the
Court should not proceed with an ex-parte admission process when a
fundamental defect in the maintainability of the appeal has been
brought to its notice. When a challenge strikes at the very “root” of the
matter, such as the applicability of a duty exemption or a dispute over
the “rate of duty” under Section 130E, it is a judicial imperative to
resolve it immediately.
4. Further relying on Subrato Biswas v. Nahid Parveen
(MANU/MP/0463/2025) and K.K. Kannan v. Koolivathukkal Karikkan
Mandi (2010) 2 SCC 239, the respondents submitted that an Appellate
Court has a duty to permit a respondent to demonstrate at the threshold
that no substantial question of law exists.
5. They have also pointed to Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, to argue
for an integrated approach to procedural applications, suggesting that
the rigid “gatekeeping” exercise advocated by the Revenue is a departure
from the broader principles of natural justice and fair play. They posit
that the Court should adopt a holistic approach, ensuring that tax
litigation is not reduced to a one-sided inquisitorial exercise when a
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& CUSTA 25 OF 2025
respondent is present and ready to point out a patent lack of
jurisdiction.
6. In sharp contrast, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant-Revenue
maintained that the statutory scheme of the Customs Act is a self-
contained code that strictly precludes such preliminary interventions.
They submit that the admission stage under Section 130 is an
exclusively inquisitorial “gatekeeping” exercise, where the Court acts as
a sentinel to determine if a “substantial question of law” exists based
solely on the memorandum of appeal. Any participation by the
Respondent at this stage is, therefore, legally alien to the Act.
7. Learned Counsel relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s interpretation in
R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs v. Rajmani & Ors., (2025 SCC OnLine SC
762), arguing that the legislature intentionally crafted a two-step
process, an ex-parte admission followed by a fully contested final
hearing under Section 130(5). They submit that allowing the Respondent
to intervene now would “invert this sequence” and turn a summary
screening process into a full-blown trial and final hearing.
8. Furthermore, the Revenue pointed out that no formal caveats under
Section 148A of the CPC have been filed by respondents, nor are there
any delay-related issues that might otherwise trigger a necessity for
notice. In the absence of these, the Revenue asserts that the
Respondents have no locus standi to appear.
9. Finally, they remind us of our own decision in OCOT 06 of 2025,
asserting that the rule of judicial discipline and the principle of stare
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CUSTA 22 OF 2025
& CUSTA 25 OF 2025
decisis, adherence to the said legal doctrine require us to consistently
reject the intervention and proceed with the admission hearing in the
absence of the respondent as the issue has already been judicially
determined in favor of the ex-parte nature of the admission process.
10. The facts remain that these appeals are currently at the pre-admission
stage, where the Court, in its inquisitorial capacity, must satisfy itself as
to whether a substantial question of law arises. The Revenue, on the
other hand, contends that the statutory architecture of Section 130 is a
self-contained code which, by its very design, requires the admission
process to be conducted in the absence of the respondent.
11. We, therefore, called upon to determine a foundational procedural issue:
“whether, in a Customs Appeal filed under Section 130 of the Act, a
Respondent possesses the locus standi to be heard on the
maintainability of the appeal at the pre-admission stage or whether
such a right be statutorily deferred until the final hearing?”
12. In addressing the core of this dispute, we must first recognize that the
Customs Act, 1962, is not merely a collection of sections but a
meticulously crafted procedural ladder. The legislature, in its wisdom,
has designed Section 130 to be a specialized appellate path. When we
look at the sequence mandated by the Act, it becomes evident that the
admission stage is intended to be a swift, preliminary filter. The Court’s
primary duty at this juncture is to examine the memorandum of appeal
and determine if, on the face of it, a “substantial question of law” exists.
This is not the moment for a trial on the merits; it is a moment for the
Court to exercise its judicial mind in an inquisitorial capacity to ensure
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CUSTA 22 OF 2025
& CUSTA 25 OF 2025
that only appeals raising significant legal questions reach the final
hearing stage.
13. The Respondents’ reliance on Rule VI, Part XX, Chapter XXXVIII of the
High Court at Calcutta (Original Side) Rules, 1914, while persistent,
does not override the primary legislation. It is a fundamental principle of
jurisprudence that while internal court rules provide the mechanism for
the administration of justice, they cannot be used to circumvent the
express statutory sequence enacted by Parliament. We have examined
the discretionary power mentioned in the Rule VI, and we find that it is
intended to handle objective, non-merit-based defects, such as matters
of limitation or technical filings. It was never intended to be a vehicle for
a “mini-trial” where complex jurisdictional questions, which often involve
mixed questions of fact and law, are debated before the appeal is even
admitted. To allow such a practice would be to convert a threshold
screening into a protracted hearing, thereby clogging the judicial
pipeline and frustrating the very efficiency the Act seeks to preserve.
14. Furthermore, we must address the Respondents’ attempt to equate this
stage with the jurisdictional inquiries discussed in Asma Lateef v.
Shabbir Ahmad (supra) and Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties
(supra). Having reviewed these judgments, we find they are contextually
distinct. Those cases dealt with the inherent power of Civil Courts under
Section 9 of the CPC to determine their own jurisdiction. In contrast, the
High Court’s role under Section 130 of the Customs Act is that of an
appellate authority operating within a limited statutory framework. We
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& CUSTA 25 OF 2025
find the reasoning of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R. Nagaraj (Dead)
through LRs v. Rajmani & Ors. (supra) to be the guiding light here. The
Apex Court has explicitly underscored why the respondent is not a
necessary participant at this stage:
“The reason for giving this right to the respondent for raising such
objection at the time of hearing is because the High Court frames
the question at the stage of admission, which is prior to issuance
of notice of appeal to the respondent. In other words, the question
is framed ex parte and, therefore, sub-section (5) enables him to
raise such objection at the time of hearing…”
15. This observation confirms that the statutory scheme intentionally
segregates the “Admission” phase from the “Final Hearing” phase. The
Respondent’s right to challenge the maintainability, the jurisdiction, or
the “rate of duty” notification is not lost; it is merely deferred to the post-
admission hearing under Section 130(5). By appearing at the final stage
of hearing, the Respondent can fully argue that the substantial
questions of law framed by the Court do not actually arise or are barred
by law. This sequence ensures that the Court is not unnecessarily
distracted by protracted arguments before it has even satisfied itself that
the appeal is worth hearing.
16. Consistency is the bedrock of judicial practice. As we previously held in
OCOT 06 of 2025, the sanctity of this two-stage process must be
maintained. To allow the Respondents to intervene now, when no formal
caveats have been filed and the matter is within time, would be to
destabilize the appellate architecture envisioned by the legislature. The
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& CUSTA 25 OF 2025
procedural integrity of Section 130 must be honoured, and we are not
persuaded that the current circumstances warrant a departure from this
established sequence. Therefore, the Respondents’ presence at this bar
for the purpose of challenging maintainability is premature, and we
must proceed with the screening process as mandated by the Act.
17. Consequently, we reject the preliminary prayer of the Respondents to be
heard at this admission stage.
18. The Respondents are directed to withdraw from the Bar.
19. We shall now proceed to hear the learned Counsel for the Appellant ex-
parte on the question of admission and the prayers for ad-interim relief.
20. Let the appeal be listed on 21st July, 2026 under the heading “To Be
Mentioned”.
I AGREE
(RAJARSHI BHARADWAJ, J.) (UDAY KUMAR, J.)
