Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Narapuram Shravan Kumar Shravan vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 1 July, 2026
Author: K.Suresh Reddy
Bench: K.Suresh Reddy
*THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURESH REDDY
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
+ REFERRED TRIAL No. 1 OF 2024
AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.604 and 608 OF 2024
%Dated: 01.07.2026
NARAPURAM SHRAVAN KUMAR SHRAVAN, S/O. VARA
PRASAD @ PRASAD, 26 YEARS, H.NO. 19-155-B, MEDAMVARI
VEEDHI, NANDYAL, NOW AT D.NO. 77/55-5-3-5,
CHINTALAMUNI NAGAR, KALLUR MANDAL.
NARAPURAM VARAPRASAD PRASAD, S/O. N.VENKATA
SUBBAIAH, 62 YEARS, D.NO. 77/55-5-3-5, CHINTALAMUNI
NAGAR, KALLUR MANDAL.
NARAPURAM KRISHNAVENI,, S/O. N. VARA PRASAD @
PRASAD, AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, H.NO. 19-155-B,
MEDAMVARIVEEDI, NANDYAL, D.NO.77/55-5-3-
5,CHINTALAMUNI NAGAR, KALLUR MANDAL.
... Appellants
AND
The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep. by its Public Prosecutor,
High Court of A.P.,
Amaravati. Respondent
!Counsel for the appellants : Sri V.Nitesh
^Counsel for the respondent: Learned Public Prosecutor
<GIST:
>HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred:
1.AIR 1980 SC 898
2.(2023) 2 SCC 353
2
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
REFERRED TRIAL No. 1 OF 2024
AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 604 and 608 of OF 2024
Between:
NARAPURAM SHRAVAN KUMAR SHRAVAN, S/O. VARA PRASAD @
PRASAD, 26 YEARS, H.NO. 19-155-B, MEDAMVARI VEEDHI, NANDYAL,
NOW AT D.NO. 77/55-5-3-5, CHINTALAMUNI NAGAR, KALLUR MANDAL.
NARAPURAM VARAPRASAD PRASAD, S/O. N.VENKATA SUBBAIAH, 62
YEARS, D.NO. 77/55-5-3-5, CHINTALAMUNI NAGAR, KALLUR MANDAL.
NARAPURAM KRISHNAVENI,, S/O. N. VARA PRASAD @ PRASAD, AGED
ABOUT 52 YEARS, H.NO. 19-155-B, MEDAMVARIVEEDI, NANDYAL,
D.NO.77/55-5-3-5,CHINTALAMUNI NAGAR, KALLUR MANDAL.
... APPELLANTS
AND
The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep. by its Public Prosecutor,
High Court of A.P.,
Amaravati. RESPONDENT
Date of Judgment Pronounced : 01-07-2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURESH REDDY
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes/No
2. Whether the copy of judgment may
be marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No
3. Whether Their Lordships wish to see the
fair copy of the judgment? Yes/No
___________________
K.SURESH REDDY, J.
___________________________
A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA,J
3
Date of reserved for Judgment: 08.05.2026
Date of pronouncement : 01.07.2026
Date of uploading : 08.07.2026
APHC010132732024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA
PRADESH
[3566]
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY, THE 1st DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K SURESH REDDY
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA
SARMA
REFERRED TRIAL NO: 1/2024
Between:
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY P.P., HIGH
COURT OF A.P. AMARAVATHI. REPRESENTED BY THE
INSPECTOR OF POLICE, KUMOOL IV TOWN P.S.,
...PETITIONER
AND
1. NARAPURAM SHRAVAN KUMAR SHRAVAN, S/O. VARA
PRASAD @ PRASAD, 26 YEARS, H.NO. 19-155-B,
MEDAMVARI VEEDHI, NANDYAL, NOW AT D.NO. 77/55-
5-3-5, CHINTALAMUNI NAGAR, KALLUR MANDAL.
2. NARAPURAM VARAPRASAD PRASAD, S/O. N.VENKATA
SUBBAIAH, 62 YEARS, D.NO. 77/55-5-3-5,
CHINTALAMUNI NAGAR, KALLUR MANDAL.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. LETTER
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. V NITESH
4
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 604/2024
Between:
1. NARAPURAM KRISHNAVENI,, S/O. N. VARA PRASAD @
PRASAD, AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, H.NO. 19-155-B,
MEDAMVARIVEEDI, NANDYAL, D.NO.77/55-5-3-
5,CHINTALAMUNI NAGAR, KALLUR MANDAL.
...APELLANT
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, Rep.by its Public
Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Amaravati. Through SHO
of IV Town Police Station, Kurnool Kurnool District.
...RESPODENT
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. V NITESH
Counsel for the Respondent:
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
5
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 608/2024
Between:
1. NARAPURAM SHRAVAN KUMAR @ SHRAVAN, S/O.
VARA PRASAD @ PRASAD, AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS,
H.NO. 19-155-B, MEDAMVARIVEEDI, NANDYAL,
D.NO.77/55-5-3-5,CHINTALAMUNI NAGAR, KALLUR
MANDAL.
2. NARAPURAM VARAPRASAD @ PRASAD,, S/O. N.
VENKATA SUBBAIAH AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
D.NO.77/55-5-3-5 CHINTALAMUNI NAGAR, KALLUR
MANDAL
...APPELLANT(S)
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, , Rep.by its Public
Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Amaravati. Through SHO
of IV Town Police Station, Kurnool Kurnool District.
...RESPODENT
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. V NITESH
Counsel for the Respondent:
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
The Court made the following:
Whether the order is :
Speaking Yes / Reasoned Yes
Reportable: Yes/ Non-Reportable: No
6
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH ::
AMARAVATI
WEDNESDAY, THE FIRST DAY OF JULY, TWO THOUSAND
AND TWENTY SIX
SPECIAL DIVISION BENCH
PRESENT
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K. SURESH REDDY
AND
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A.HARI HARANADHA SARMA
REFERRED TRIAL No. 1 OF 2024
AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 604 and 608 of 2024
COMMON JUDGMENT:
(per Hon’ble Sri Justice K.Suresh Reddy)
While awarding the sentence of death to Accused Nos.1
and 2 in Sessions Case No.254 of 2023, by judgment dated
16.02.2024, the learned IV Additional District and Sessions
Judge, Kurnool, made a reference to this Court under Section
366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for confirmation of the said
sentence. The Registry has numbered the same as Reference
Trial No.1 of 2024.
7
2. Criminal Appeal No.604 of 2024 has been filed by
Accused No.3 in the said Sessions Case, questioning her
conviction and sentence of imprisonment for „Life’ and rigorous
imprisonment for a period of ten (10) years imposed on her,
whereas Accused Nos.1 and 2 have preferred Criminal Appeal
No.608 of 2024 assailing the death sentence and imprisonment
for ‘Life’ awarded against them.
3. Since the Reference and the Appeals arise out of the
same Judgment, they are heard together and are being disposed
of by this common judgment.
4. All the three (3) accused were tried by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge under the following charges:
I charge was under Section 302 IPC against A1;
II charge was under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC against A2 and
A3;
III charge was under Section 302 IPC against A1 and A2;
IV charge was under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC against A3;
V charge was under Section 307 IPC against A2; and
Last charge was under Section 307 r/w 34 IPC against A1
and A3.
8
5. Substance of the charge is that on 14.03.2023, at
about 11:00 a.m., Accused No.1, stabbed his wife, Kotha Rukmini
(hereinafter referred to as “D1”), with a knife in their house
situated at Chinthalamuni Nagar of Kallur Mandal, causing her
death, and in the same process, Accused Nos.1 and 2, acting in
furtherance of their common intention, also stabbed the mother of
D1 by name Kotha Ramadevi (hereinafter referred to as “D2”),
with knives, resulting in her death, and further attempted to kill the
father of D1, who was examined as P.W.1, and that A3 shared
common intention in killing D1 and D2 and also attempt to kill
P.W.1, thereby committed offences under Sections 302 and 307
r/w 34 IPC.
6. After completion of trial, the learned Additional Sessions
Judge convicted Accused Nos.1 and 2 under Section 302 IPC
and awarded death sentence and directed them to pay a fine of
Rs.1,000/- each, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for
three months each.
Accused No.1 was further convicted under Section 302 IPC
and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for ‘Life’, and also to
pay a fine of Rs.1,000/, in default to undergo simple imprisonment
for three months.
9
Accused No.1 was also convicted under Section 307 r/w 34
IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for ‘Life’ and also to pay a
fine of Rs.500/-, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for
three months.
Further, Accused No.2 was convicted under Section 307
IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for ‘Life’, and also to pay a
a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for
three months.
The learned Additional Sessions Judge further convicted
Accused Nos.2 and 3 under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC and
sentenced both of them to imprisonment for ‘Life’ and to pay a
fine of Rs.500/- each, in default to undergo simple imprisonment
for three months each.
The learned Additional Sessions Judge also convicted A3
under Section 307 IPC and sentenced her to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for Ten (10) years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in
default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months.
7. Case of the prosecution in brief is thus:
All the accused are residents of Chinthalamuni Nagar of
Kallur Mandal, Kurnool District. Accused Nos. 2 and 3 are father
and mother of Accused No.1 respectively. P.W.1 is a resident of
10Wanaparthy Town and is the father of D1 and the husband of D2.
The marriage between A1 and D1 was solemnized on 01.03.2023
at Wanaparthy Town. After the marriage, A1 to A3 stayed in the
house of P.W.1 for a period of three days. During that period the
marriage between A1 and D1 was not consummated. Then P.W.1
and his family members questioned A1 to A3, which led to a
dispute. Thereafter, A2 and A3 left for Kurnool.
(ii) On 05.03.2023, A1, with his wife D1, his in-laws, who
are P.W.1 and D2 went to Kurnool to the house of the accused.
P.W.1 and D2 left D1 at the house of the accused and returned to
Wanaparthy. On 06.03.2023, A1 and D1 again came to
Wanaparthy, and A1 left D1 at the house of P.W.1 and proceeded
to Hyderabad, where he was employed. A1 is a B.Tech graduate
and was working in a call center at Hyderabad.
(iii) On the morning of 14.03.2023, A1 came to Wanaparthy
and requested P.W.1, D1, and D2 to accompany him to Kurnool
for discussions. At his request, P.W.1, along with D1 and D2,
went to Kurnool by 11:00 a.m. On their arrival, P.W.1 and D2
were asked by A2 to go to upstairs room, while A1 and D1 went
into a room situated in the ground floor in the house of accused.
After about 45 minutes, P.W.1 heard cries of D1. Then P.W.1 and
11
D2 tried to come down from the first floor. At that juncture, A2
stabbed D2 indiscriminately with a knife. When P.W.1 intervened,
he too was attacked and was stabbed indiscriminately by A2,
causing severe injuries. Thereafter, P.W.1 managed to come
down to the ground floor, where he found D1 lying dead in a pool
of blood. D2 was found dead in the upstairs room.
(iv) On hearing the cries of P.W.1, neighbours who are
P.Ws.2 to 4, rushed to the scene of offence and found P.W.1 with
severe injuries. Immediately, P.W.1 was shifted by the neighbours
to the Government Hospital in an ambulance. All the three
accused fled away from the scene of offence.
(v) On the same day, at about 12:45 p.m., P.W.13, the
Inspector of Police, Kurnool Police Station, received information
through Dial 100 that a murder had taken place at Chinthalamuni
Nagar of Kallur Mandal. Immediately, he, along with his staff,
proceeded to the scene of offence and found the dead bodies of
the deceased. On enquiry, he came to know that P.W.1 has
already been shifted to the Government General Hospital for
treatment. Thereupon, he posted guards at the scene of offence
and proceeded to the said hospital. At the hospital, he identified
P.W.1, who was undergoing treatment, recorded his statement
12
under Ex.P1, and obtained a certificate from the duty doctor
regarding his fitness. Thereafter, he returned to the Police Station
and registered a case in Crime No.62 of 2023 for the offences
punishable under Sections 498-A, 302 and 307 read with 34 IPC.
He issued copies of FIR to all the concerned. FIR is marked as
Ex.P8. P.W.13 also sent a requisition to the Tahsildar, Kallur
Mandal, to conduct inquest over the dead bodies. Pursuant
thereto, P.W.12, the Tahsildar, conducted inquest over the dead
body of D1 in the presence of mediators, and the inquest report is
marked as Ex.P7.
(vi) Thereafter, P.W.13 recorded statement of P.W.1 under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. He then returned to the scene of offence and
conducted inquest over the dead body of D2 in the presence of
mediators. The inquest report pertaining to D2 is marked as
Ex.P10. He also prepared a rough sketch of the scene of offence,
which is marked as Ex.P9, and seized material objects (M.Os.11
to 16) from the scene under a duly prepared seizure
panchanama. Subsequently, the dead bodies were sent for post-
mortem examination.
(vii) P.W.11, Assistant Professor in the Department of
Forensic Medicine, Kurnool Medical College, conducted autopsy
13
over the dead body of D1 and opined that the cause of death was
due to hemorrhage and shock resulting from multiple stab
injuries. The post-mortem certificate pertaining to D1 is marked as
Ex.P5. He also conducted autopsy over the dead body of D2 and
opined that the cause of death was due to hemorrhage and shock
as a result of multiple stab injuries. The post-mortem certificate
pertaining to D2 is marked as Ex.P6.
(viii) After completion of post-mortem examinations,
P.W.13 attempted to hand over the dead bodies of D1 and D2 to
L.W.9, the grandmother of D1. However, as she expressed her
inability to perform the last rites, P.W.13, along with his staff,
performed the last rites of D1 and D2.
(ix) On 15.03.2023, at about 3:45 p.m., P.W.13 arrested all
the three accused in the presence of mediators, P.W.9 and
another. During the course of arrest, P.W.13 seized M.Os.1 to 5
from the possession of A1 and A2 under the cover of a
panchanama, marked as Ex.P2. Pursuant to the confessional
statement made by A2, P.W.13 proceeded to the shop of P.W.8
and recorded his statement, wherein it was revealed that A2 had
purchased M.Os.1 and 2 (knives) from the said shop.
14
(x) P.W.13 further secured the CCTV footage from the said
shop and copied the same into a pen drive, which was marked as
Ex.P12. He also obtained a certificate under Section 65B of the
Indian Evidence Act from P.W.8 in respect of the said electronic
record. The material objects were thereafter forwarded to the
Regional Forensic Science Laboratory (RFSL), and the report
received therefrom was marked as Ex.P11. After completion of
investigation and after collecting all documents, P.W.13 laid the
charge sheet.
8. In support of its case, the prosecution examined
P.Ws.1 to 13 and got marked Exs.P1 to P15 apart from exhibiting
M.Os.1 to 16.
9. When the accused were examined under Section
313 Cr.P.C., they denied the incriminating evidence appearing
against them. On behalf of the defence Exs.D1 to D3 were
marked.
10. Accepting the evidence of prosecution witnesses, the
learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted all the three (3)
accused as aforesaid.
15
11. Heard Sri V.Nitesh, learned counsel appearing for
the appellants-accused, and Sri Marri Venkata Ramana, learned
Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State.
12. We have carefully analyzed the entire evidence
available on record.
13. P.W.1 is the sole injured eye-witness to the incident in
the present case. In his evidence, P.W.1 has categorically stated
that on 14.03.2023, he, along with D1 and D2, came to Kurnool
from Wanaparthy at the instance of A1, who had asked them to
come to his house for discussions. He further stated that A2
asked P.W.1 and D2 to go to a room on the first floor, while A1
took D1 into a room on the ground floor. After some time, P.W.1
and D2 heard the cries of D1 and then they tried to come down to
the ground floor. But, A2 attacked them and stabbed both of them
indiscriminately. As a result of the said assault, D2 died on the
spot. P.W.1, having sustained grievous injuries at the hands of
A2, managed to come down to the ground floor, where he found
D1 lying dead in a pool of blood. On hearing his cries, the
neighbours, P.Ws.2 to 4, rushed to the house of the accused and
shifted P.W.1 to the Government General Hospital, Kurnool.
16
14. The testimony of P.W.1 is clear and cogent in
establishing that A1 and A2 were responsible for causing the
death of D1 and D2 and for inflicting injuries on him. Insofar as A3
is concerned, P.W.1 has not attributed any overt act against her,
except stating that she was present in the house at the relevant
point of time.
15. Admittedly, except P.W.1, there is no other direct
eye-witness to the occurrence. P.Ws.2 to 4 are not
eye-witnesses, and their evidence is only to the effect that they
came to know about the incident. However, P.Ws.1 to 4 have
consistently deposed that the marriage between A1 and D1 was
performed on 01.03.2023 and that the incident occurred on
14.03.2023, i.e., within a short span of two weeks from the date of
marriage.
16. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution could able
to prove the guilt of A1 and A2 beyond reasonable doubt in
causing the deaths of D1 and D2 and also their attempt to commit
murder of P.W.1. However, insofar as A3 is concerned, in the
absence of any specific overt act attributed to her, the conviction
and sentences recorded against her are liable to be set aside.
17
17. Insofar as sentence is concerned, the trial Court
imposed death penalty against A1 and A2. It is settled law that
unless a case falls under rarest of rare cases, capital punishment
cannot be imposed. In Bachan Singh Vs. State of Punjab1, the
Hon’ble Apex Court held at paragraph Nos. 206 and 209 as
under:
“206. Dr Chitale has suggested these mitigating factors:
Mitigating circumstances–
In the exercise of its discretion in the above cases, the
court shall take into account the following circumstances:
(1) That the offence was committed under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.
(2) The age of the accused. If the accused is
young or old, he shall not be sentenced to
death.
(3) The probability that the accused would not
commit criminal acts of violence as would
constitute a continuing threat to society.
(4) The probability that the accused can be
reformed and rehabilitated. The State shall by
evidence prove that the accused does not
satisfy the conditions (3) and (4) above.
(5) That in the facts and circumstances of the
case the accused believed that he was
morally justified in committing the offence.
1
AIR 1980 SC 898
18
(6) That the accused acted under the duress or
domination of another person.
(7) That the condition of the accused showed
that he was mentally defective and that the
said defect impaired his capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct.
209. There are numerous other circumstances justifying
the passing of the lighter sentence; as there are
countervailing circumstances of aggravation. “We
cannot obviously feed into a judicial computer all
such situations since they are astrological
imponderables in an imperfect and undulating
society.” Nonetheless, it cannot be over-emphasized
that the scope and concept of mitigating factors in
the area of death penalty must receive a liberal and
expansive construction by the courts in accord with
the sentencing policy writ large in Section 354(3).
Judges should never be bloodthirsty. Hanging of
murderers has never been too good for them. Facts
and Figures, albeit incomplete, furnished by the
Union of India, show that in the past, courts have
inflicted the extreme penalty with extreme
infrequency — a fact which attests to the caution
and compassion which they have always brought to
bear on the exercise of their sentencing discretion in
so grave a matter. It is, therefore, imperative to
voice the concern that courts, aided by the broad
illustrative guide-lines indicated by us, will discharge
the onerous function with evermore scrupulous care
and humane concern, directed along the highroad of
19
legislative policy outlined in Section 354(3) viz. that
for persons convicted of murder, life imprisonment is
the rule and death sentence an exception. A real
and abiding concern for the dignity of human life
postulates resistance to taking a life through law’s
instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in
the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option
is unquestionably foreclosed.”
18. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-accused
places reliance on Manoj and others Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh2, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held at paragraph
Nos. 214 to 218 as follows:
“214. Capital punishment is prescribed in numerous IPC
offences, including murder, kidnapping for ransom,
rape and injury causing death or leaving a woman in
a vegetative state, rape or gang rape of a child below
12 years’ old, dacoity with murder, among other
offences. In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab
[Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC
684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] (hereafter “Bachan
Singh”), this Court had upheld the imposition of death
penalty as an alternate punishment under Section
302IPC on the strength of the 35th Report of the Law
Commission of India (1967), the judgment in
Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P. [Jagmohan Singh v.2
(2023) 2 SCC 353
20State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 169]
(which had also noted that the 35th Report
advocated for retention) and in several subsequent
cases decided by this Court, in which the death
penalty was recognized to be a deterrent. It laid
emphasis on the then recently added Sections
253(2) and 354(3) Cr.P.C. which provide for
bifurcated pre-sentence hearing and sentencing
procedure on conviction of capital offences, to
conclude that this form of punishment continued to
have legislative backing and thereby, represented
the will of the people.
215. It is undeniable that there have been shifts in how It
is undeniable that there have been shifts in how
punishment in capital offences are dealt with. This is
apparent when developments are looked at
holistically, or at a macro level: the amendments to
the Cr.P.C. by Parliament, the 35th and 262nd Law
Commission Reports which stand over 30 years
apart, and the precedents of this Court, across the
decades. Initially, the law imposed a requirement of
written reasons for not imposing death penalty, which
was removed in 1955. In 1973, through further
amendment to the CrPC and insertion of Section
354(3) — life imprisonment became the norm and
imposition of death penalty required “special
reasons”; and through Section 253(2) — sentencing
required separate consideration from the question of
21
conviction. In both phases i.e. post-1955 and post-
1973, capital punishment was upheld to be
constitutional by five-Judge Benches of this Court in
Jagmohan Singh [Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.,
(1973) 1 SCC 20 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 169] and Bachan
Singh [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2
SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] , respectively.
216. The 262nd Law Commission Report on Death
Penalty (2015) (hereafter “the 262nd Report”), is a
result of this Court’s references in primarily two
cases. Firstly, in Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan
Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra [Santosh Kumar
Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra,
(2009) 6 SCC 498, para 112 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri)
1150] (hereafter “Santosh Bariyar”) where, after
taking note of the UN General Assembly Resolution
62/149 [ Adopted on 18-12-2007.] it was pointed out
that credible research was required to shape an
informed discussion and debate, on the contentious
issue of death sentence. Secondly, the judgment in
Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra
[Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra,
(2013) 5 SCC 546, paras 148-149 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 402] tasked the Law Commission to resolve the
issue of whether death penalty is a deterrent
punishment, is retributive justice, or serves an
incapacitative goal; and to study the difference in
approach adopted by the judiciary (rarest of rare) and
22
the executive (what was termed as unknown) while
granting commutation. In attempting to fulfil this
mandate, the Commission discerned an urgent need
for re-examination of its own earlier
recommendations on the death penalty (in its 35th
Report, 1967), given the drastic change in social,
economic, and cultural contexts of the country since
the 35th Report, and arbitrariness which has
remained a major concern in the adjudication of
death penalty cases since Bachan Singh [Bachan
Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 580] laid down the foundational principle of
“rarest of rare”.
217. Reflective of changed circumstances and evolving
discourse, the Report marks a shift in the approach
towards the death penalty in India, going so far as to
recommend abolition in all offences, except those
relating to terrorism. A large part of the Report
focusses on courts’ discretion and judicial reasoning
when it comes to sentencing. It concludes that death
penalty sentencing in India has been based on an
arbitrary application of the Bachan Singh [Bachan
Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 580] principle, and has become Judge-
centric, based on the personal predilection of Judges
— a concern which was alluded to even by this Court
in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka
[Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka,
23
(2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113] and
analysed extensively again in Santosh Bariyar
[Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of
Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498, para 112 : (2009) 2
SCC (Cri) 1150] , followed by Sangeet v. State of
Haryana [Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC
452 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 611] , Mohd. Farooq Abdul
Gafur v. State of Maharashtra [Mohd. Farooq Abdul
Gafur v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 14 SCC 641:
(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 867], and more recently in
Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh
[Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019)
12 SCC 438 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 402] (hereafter
“Chhannu Lal Verma”).
The death penalty framework and how to apply
it for “principled sentencing”
218. This Court in Bachan Singh [Bachan Singh v.
State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC
(Cri) 580] while upholding the constitutionality of
capital punishment, categorically ruled that the
new CrPC of 1973 marked a shift as it
bifurcated the criminal trial to include a pre-
sentence hearing [under Section 235(2)], and
further mandated the sentencing court to outline
the “special reasons” [under Section 354(3)] or
absence of them, by considering circumstances
both of the crime and the criminal. The Court
also noted that while broad guidelines or
24
indicators may be given, they cannot be put into
water-tight compartments that curb discretion of
any Judge to do justice in a given individual
case: (SCC pp. 739 & 748, paras 163 & 201)
“163. … Now, Section 235(2) provides for a
bifurcated trial and specifically gives the
accused person a right of pre-sentence hearing,
at which stage, he can bring on record material
or evidence, which may not be strictly relevant
to or connected with the particular crime under
inquiry, but nevertheless, have, consistently with
the policy underlined in Section 354(3), a
bearing on the choice of sentence. The present
legislative policy discernible from Section 235(2)
read with Section 354(3) is that in fixing the
degree of punishment or making the choice of
sentence for various offences, including one
under Section 302 of the Penal Code, the court
should not confine its consideration “principally”
or merely to the circumstances connected with
the particular crime, but also give due
consideration to the circumstances of the
criminal.
***
201. … As we read Sections 354(3) and 235(2)
and other related provisions of the 1973 Code, it
is quite clear to us that for making the choice of
punishment or for ascertaining the existence or
25
absence of “special reasons” in that context, the
court must pay due regard both to the crime and
the criminal. What is the relative weight to be
given to the aggravating and mitigating factors,
depends on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. More often than not, these two
aspects are so intertwined that it is difficult to
give a separate treatment to each of them. This
is so because “style is the man”. In many cases,
the extremely cruel or beastly manner of the
commission of murder is itself a demonstrated
index of the depraved character of the
perpetrator. That is why, it is not desirable to
consider the circumstances of the crime and the
circumstances of the criminal in two separate
watertight compartments. In a sense, to kill is to
be cruel and therefore all murders are cruel. But
such cruelty may vary in its degree of culpability.
And it is only when the culpability assumes the
proportion of extreme depravity that “special
reasons” can legitimately be said to exist.”
(Emphasis in original)”
Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel
appearing for the appellants-accused submitted that the trial
Court has not even considered the possibility of reformation of the
accused and that the case on hand does not fall under rarest of
26rare cases to impose capital punishment and the mitigating
circumstances submitted by the authorities would suffice that
capital punishment is not warranted in the case on hand.
19. By order dated 22.12.2025, this Court directed the
District Collector, Kurnool District, the Superintendent of Police,
Kurnool District, and the Superintendent, Central Prison,
Rajamahendravaram, to submit their reports in terms of the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manoj and others (2nd
supra). In compliance thereof, the authorities concerned have
submitted their reports. Insofar as the sentence of death imposed
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is concerned, the
reports received from the Superintendent of Police, Kurnool; the
District Collector, Kurnool; and the Superintendent of Jails,
Central Prison, Rajamahendravaram, do not disclose any
adverse remarks against the accused. The District Collector and
the Superintendent of Police, Kurnool, have reported that
Accused No.1 is a B.Tech graduate who was previously
employed in a private company at Hyderabad. Accused No.2 was
eking out his livelihood by selling idlis on the streets of Kurnool
town. It is further reported that the family of the accused belongs
to the Below Poverty Line category and is having a small house
27bearing Door No.77-55-5-3, situated at Chinthalamuni Nagar of
Kallur Mandal, Kurnool Town. It is also reported that there are no
criminal antecedents against Accused Nos.1 and 2.
20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Manoj and others (2nd
supra) held at paragraph Nos. 234 to 236 as follows:
“Theories of punishment
234. The 262nd Report speaks extensively to the
penological justification of the death penalty. It finds that
there is inconclusive evidence that this form of punishment
has more of a deterrent effect, in comparison to life
imprisonment. Dismissing the retributive theory of
punishment on the ground that it suffers from lack of
guidance on quantifying the punishment that would be
appropriate to impose, it categorically states that:
“7.1.2. Capital punishment fails to achieve any
constitutionally valid penological goals.
7.1.3. Focusing on death penalty as the ultimate
measure of justice to victims, the restorative and
rehabilitative aspects of justice are lost sight of.
Reliance on the death penalty diverts attention from
other problems ailing the criminal justice system such
as poor investigation, crime prevention and rights of
victims of crime.”
235. While the 262nd Report recommends abolition
of the death penalty on this ground, in addition to
sentencing having become Judge-centric or arbitrary, it
28
has not prompted parliamentary intervention. Whether
the death penalty deserves a relook [as recommended
by Kurian Joseph, J. (dissenting) in Chhannu Lal Verma
[Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 12
SCC 438 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 402] ], in light of the
262nd Law Commission Report, evolving jurisprudence,
public discourse and international standards of human
rights, is outside the purview of this Court’s jurisdiction
given the Constitution Bench decision in Bachan Singh
[Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 :
1980 SCC (Cri) 580] , and a question best left for the
legislature to critically consider. In this backdrop, what
this Court can do, is try and bolster the existing
sentencing framework. This is possible only by giving
true meaning to the existing guidelines (without falling
into the trap of “categorizing” crimes that automatically
warrant death penalty). To do so, this Court finds it
necessary to lay out certain practical guidelines
(elaborated below) that can facilitate consideration of
mitigating circumstances as recognized in Bachan
Singh [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC
684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] , and consequently ensure
uniform application of this framework.
236. The 262nd Report recognized the paradigm
shift, in policy and discourse, towards a reformative and
rehabilitative response to crime, and the development
of jurisprudence such that adjudging a case to be
“rarest of rare” was not sufficient, and special emphasis
29
had to be placed in considering whether the offender is
amenable to reform. Implicit in this shift is the
understanding that the criminal is not a product of only
their own decisions, but also a product of the State and
society’s failing, which is what entitles the accused to a
chance of reformation. Thus, making life imprisonment
the norm, and death penalty the exception. In Lehna v.
State of Haryana [Lehna v. State of Haryana, (2002) 3
SCC 76 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 526] while deciding whether
the facts in that case were appropriate for death
penalty, traced this shift in approach : (SCC pp. 83-84,
para 14)
“14. … Section 302IPC prescribes death or life
imprisonment as the penalty for murder. While doing so,
the Code instructs the court as to its application. The
changes which the Code has undergone in the last
three decades clearly indicate that Parliament is taking
note of contemporary criminological thought and
movement. It is not difficult to discern that in the Code,
there is a definite swing towards life imprisonment.
Death sentence is ordinarily ruled out and can only be
imposed for “special reasons”, as provided in Section
354(3). There is another provision in the Code which
also uses the significant expression “special reason”. It
is Section 361. Section 360 of the 1973 Code re-enacts,
in substance, Section 562 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1898 (in short “the old Code”). Section 361 which
is a new provision in the Code makes it mandatory for
30
the court to record “special reasons” for not applying the
provisions of Section 360. Section 361 thus casts a duty
upon the court to apply the provisions of Section 360
wherever it is possible to do so and to state “special
reasons” if it does not do so. In the context of Section
360, the “special reasons” contemplated by Section 361
must be such as to compel the court to hold that it is
impossible to reform and rehabilitate the offender after
examining the matter with due regard to the age,
character and antecedents of the offender and the
circumstances in which the offence was committed.
This is some indication by the legislature that
reformation and rehabilitation of offenders and not mere
deterrence, are now among the foremost objects of the
administration of criminal justice in our country. Section
361 and Section 354(3) have both entered the statute
book at the same time and they are part of the
emerging picture of acceptance by the legislature of the
new trends in criminology. It would not, therefore, be
wrong to assume that the personality of the offender as
revealed by his age, character, antecedents and other
circumstances and the tractability of the offender to
reform must necessarily play the most prominent role in
determining the sentence to be awarded. Special
reasons must have some relation to these factors.
Criminal justice deals with complex human problems
and diverse human beings. A Judge has to balance the
personality of the offender with the circumstances,
31
situations and the reactions and choose the appropriate
sentence to be imposed.”
(Emphasis supplied)”
In view of the principle laid down in the aforesaid judgment,
with an advent of goal of reformation in the recent past, the
society must stride towards reformation and rehabilitation.
The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the process of
rehabilitation is not a simple one since it involves social
reintegration of the convict into society.
21. Criminal Justice System is more punitive than
intended. The system is touted to be reformable and
rehabilitative. The objectives of the Indian Criminal Justice
System include penalizing, reforming and rehabilitating the
offender. Reformation is its final goal as the system asserts to be
more rehabilitative than retributive.
22. When such is the view taken by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the recent past and having regard to the mitigating
circumstances stated supra, this Court is of the view that death
sentence imposed on the accused is harsh in the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
32
23. It is a settled principle of law that the imposition of the
death penalty is an exception, to be invoked only in cases that fall
within the ambit of the “rarest of rare” doctrine. The Court, while
adjudging the question of sentence, is required to undertake a
conscientious and principled balancing of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, keeping in view not only the nature and
gravity of the crime, but also the circumstances pertaining to the
offender. In this exercise, the possibility of reformation and
rehabilitation of the accused assumes paramount importance and
must be accorded due and substantive consideration.
24. In the case on hand, though the offence is grave and
heinous, resulting in the loss of two lives, the material on record
does not establish that the accused are beyond the possibility of
reformation. The reports placed before this Court indicate that the
accused have no prior criminal antecedents and belong to a
modest socio-economic background. There is no material to
suggest that they pose a continuing threat to society or that they
are incapable of being reformed and rehabilitated.
33
25. In the absence of any material to conclude that the
alternative option of life imprisonment is unquestionably
foreclosed, this Court is of the considered view that the present
case does not fall within the ambit of the “rarest of rare” category
warranting imposition of the death penalty.
26. For the aforementioned reasons, the sentence of death
imposed on Accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offence under Section
302 IPC is modified, and instead, they are sentenced to suffer
Rigorous Imprisonment for ‘Life’, without any remission, and
also to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- each, in default, to suffer simple
imprisonment for a period of three months each.
27. In all other respects, including the convictions and
sentences imposed for the remaining offences against Accused
Nos.1 and 2, the judgment of the trial Court shall stand confirmed
and remain unaltered. All the substantive sentences shall run
concurrently.
28. Insofar as A3 is concerned, the conviction and
sentence recorded against her are set aside, and she is acquitted
of all the charges. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No.604 of 2024 is
allowed. Consequently, the appellant/Accused No.3 shall be set
at liberty forthwith, if she is not required in any other case or crime
34
29. With the above modification in sentence, Criminal
Appeal No.608 of 2024 is partly allowed and the Reference is
answered accordingly. Criminal Appeal No.604 of 2024 is
allowed.
Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand
disposed of in consequence.
________________________
JUSTICE K.SURESH REDDY_________________________________
JUSTICE A.HARI HARANADHA SARMA
Date: 01.07.2026
GR
35HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K. SURESH REDDY
AND
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A.HARI HARANADHA SARMA
REFERRED TRIAL No. 1 OF 2024
AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 604 and 608 of 2024
(Per Hon’ble Sri Justice K. Suresh Reddy)
Date: 01.07.2026
GR
36
37
