Allahabad High Court
Ram Chand vs State Of U.P. on 10 July, 2026
Author: Santosh Rai
Bench: Santosh Rai
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Reserved on 07.05.2026 Delivered on 10.07.2026 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 2609 of 1986 Ram Chander alias Balbhadra ..Appellant(s) Versus State of U.P. ..Respondent(s) Counsel for Appellant(s) : Jai Prakash Mishra, S.a. Zilani Counsel for Respondent(s) : A.G.A. Court No. - 93 HON'BLE SANTOSH RAI, J.
1. Heard Sri Jai Prakash Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Purshottam Maurya, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.
2. This criminal appeal is preferred under Section 374 of Cr.P.C. by the accused appellant Ram Chander alias Balbhadra to set aside the judgment and order dated 02.09.1986, passed by Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Azamgarh in Session Trial No.234 of 1985 whereby he was convicted for the offence under Section 307/34 I.P.C. and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and he was further convicted for the offence under Section 323/34 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo three months.
3. Tersely, the facts of the prosecution case, in brief, are that on 14.03.1985, the informant Mahajan lodged a written report at Police Station Phoolpur, Azamgarh alleging that at about 7.30 p.m., when he returned to his house after completing his work at brick-kiln, he noticed that the accused Badri and Ram Chander alias Balbhadra were quarreling with his brother. In the meantime co-accused Badri instigated the appellant. Thereafter appellant Ram Chander assaulted father and brother of the informant with a knife, intending to cause their death. Hearing the commotion, nearby villagers assembled at the spot, whereupon the accused fled away. On the basis of the written report, a First Information Report was registered initially under Section 307 IPC. The Investigating Officer collected blood-stained half baniyan and plain earth separately from the place of occurrence. On disclosure of the appellant, one old iron Karoli (sharp-edged weapon) has been recovered. The recovery memo states that blood stains were found on the weapon. The Karoli was seized, sealed on the spot in the presence of witnesses. After investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted a charge-sheet against the accused for offences punishable under Sections 307, 323 and 324 IPC. Cognizance was taken and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. Learned V Addl. Sessions Judge, Azamgarh framed charges against accused appellant Ram Chander alias Balbhadra under Sections 307/34 and 323/34 IIPC to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
4. In support of the prosecution case, the prosecution examined four witnesses namely PW-1 Mahajan-the informant, P.W.2 Kumar-the injured, P.W.3 Ayodhya Prasad Pathak- the Investigating Officer and P.W.4 Dr. Abdul Moeed.
5. The statement of accused appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., where he denied the allegation levelled against him by the prosecution. The plea of the accused was that he was falsely implicated in this case.
6. PW-1 Mahajan, the informant stated that on 14.03.1985 at about 7:30 p.m., while he was returning from brick-kiln he saw his brother Kumar and accused Badri and Ram Chander engaged in a quarrel. In the meantime, his father reached the spot. According to the witness, co-accused Badri instigated whereupon accused-appellant Ram Chander alias Belchandra, armed with a knife, inflicted blows upon his father and brother with the intention of causing their death. On hearing the alarm raised by the witness, his mother and several villagers reached the place of occurrence and intervened. The injured were thereafter taken to the police station and subsequently to the hospital for medical examination
7. PW-2 Kumar, an injured witness, stated that at the relevant time he was present at the place of occurrence. He deposed that a dispute arose between the parties over the removal of the Naad situated in his field. During the altercation, co-accused Badri armed with lathi instigated. Ram Chander on his instigation, the appellant Ram Chander alias Belchandra assaulted him with a knife. When his father intervened to save him, the accused also assaulted his father with the knife.
8. PW-3 Ayodhya Prasad Pathak, the Investigating Officer, stated that after registration of the case he took up the investigation. He visited the place of occurrence, prepared the site plan at the instance of the informant and recorded the statements of the witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. He collected blood-stained and plain earth from the place of occurrence and prepared the recovery memos in accordance with law. The witness further stated that during investigation accused Ram Chander made a disclosure statement, pursuant to which the knife alleged to have been used in the commission of the offence was recovered from the place pointed out by him. The recovery memo and the site plan of the place of recovery were duly prepared. On completion of investigation, finding sufficient evidence against the accused person, he submitted the charge-sheet under Sections 307, 323 and 324 IPC.
9. PW-4 Dr. Abdul Moin deposed that on 15.03.1985, while posted as Medical Officer at the Primary Health Centre, Phoolpur, he medically examined the injured Kumar, who had been brought before him by the police. On examination, he found the following injuries on the person of the injured:
1. Incised wound measuring 3 cm 1 cm muscle deep on the right upper back, situated about 11 cm below the right shoulder joint and approximately 10 cm from the midline.
2. Abrasion measuring 1 cm 2 cm on the upper part of the right side of the back, situated about 5 cm above Injury No. 1. No scab was present.
3. Incised wound measuring 2 cm 5 cm muscle deep on the inner aspect of the left index finger, about 4 cm above the joint.
According to the doctor, Injury Nos. 1 and 3 were caused by a sharp-edged weapon, whereas Injury No. 2 was caused by friction. He proved the injury report prepared by him.
The witness further deposed that on 14.03.1985 at about 11:30 p.m., he had also medically examined the injured Khushhal, aged about 60 years, and found one incised wound measuring 2 cm 0.5 cm 5 cm (deep) on the left side of the back, situated about 3 cm below the seventh rib and about 2 cm lateral to the midline. The injury was caused by a sharp-edged weapon, was fresh and simple in nature, and the corresponding injury report was prepared by him.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that he has not committed any offence to commit murder. He has been falsely implicated in this case due to previous enmity. Trial court has not perused the material evidence available on record. In the medical evidence only one injury was found which is on the back of the injured. Injuries are not fatal to life. Appellant has no intention to commit murder in furtherance of common intention. Though the appellant was sentenced for severe punishment under Section 307 I.P.C. but there are material contradictions in the statements of the injured and other prosecution witnesses who have been examined before the trial court. Thus the accused appellant is liable to be acquitted in this case. Additionally he submits that if this Court finds the appellant guilty on the basis of nature of offence, accused appellant may be held guilty under Section 324 I.P.C. only and this criminal appeal is pending since 1986. The pendency of appeal is about 40 years before this Court. Considering the fact that the appellant has no previous criminal history etc. he may be released on probation.
11. Learned A.G.A. has vehemently opposed the submission of learned counsel for the appellant and submitted that the appellant has caused sharp-edged injury. On the basis of statement of the injured witness and medical evidence the trial court has rightly held guilty under Sections 307 and 323 I.P.C.. There is no major contradictions in the prosecution witnesses. Statements of the prosecution witnesses cannot be doubted on the basis of only minor variation in the statements. Trial court has not committed any legal error by passing the impugned order. Thus this criminal appeal is liable to be rejected.
12. There is no reason to discard the testimony of the injured witnesses PW-2 Kumar and PW-1 informant Mahajan whose presence at the place of occurrence stands firmly established. Their ocular testimony is duly corroborated by the medical evidence. Consequently, the participation of accused Ram Chander in causing injuries by a sharp-edged weapon stands proved beyond reasonable doubt.
13. However, the next question is whether the proved act constitutes an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC or only under Section 324 IPC. It is well settled that the mere use of a sharp-edged weapon or the fact that hurt has been caused, does not automatically attract Section 307 IPC. The prosecution must further establish that the act was committed with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that, if death had resulted, the offence would have amounted to murder. In the present case, the evidence reveals that accused Ram Chander inflicted only one incised wound upon PW-2 Kumar and one incised wound upon the other injured. No repeated blows were inflicted. Both injuries were on the back and not on any vital part of the body. The medical evidence does not show that either injury was dangerous to life or sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No internal organ was damaged. There is also no evidence of persistent attack even after the victims had fallen down.
14. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru & Another(2005) 5 SCC 554 Honble Apex court laid down principle explaining the essential ingredients of Section 307 IPC. The Court held that the nature of injury is only one of the relevant factors and is not the sole criterion for determining whether an offence under Section 307 IPC is made out. To attract Section 307 IPC, the prosecution must prove that the accused acted with such intention or knowledge that, if death had resulted, the act would have amounted to murder. Even if the injury is simple, a conviction under Section 307 IPC can be sustained if the requisite intention or knowledge is established from the facts & circumstances and evidence available on record such as: the weapon used, the part of the body targeted, the force employed, the circumstances of the attack, the motive and conduct of the accused. For conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The intention or knowledge of the accused is the determinative factor. In Sivamani & Another v. State represented by Inspector of Police2023 INSC 1027 :2023 14 SCR 849). The Supreme Court reiterated the law in State of M.P. v. Saleem but held that mere use of a knife or the existence of simple injuries does not automatically attract Section 307 IPC unless the prosecution proves the requisite intention to commit murder. Simple injuries do not automatically establish Section 307 IPC. Where both injured persons suffered only simple injuries and there was no evidence of repeated or forceful blows or attack on vital parts, the necessary intention to commit murder was not established. Intention must be inferred from the totality of circumstances. The Court must examine nature of injuries, seat of injuries, weapon used, number of blows, conduct of the accused, surrounding circumstances. Section 307 IPC should not be invoked merely because a dangerous weapon was used. The use of a knife by itself is insufficient; the prosecution must prove the requisite mens rea for murder.
15. On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court converted the conviction from Section 307 IPC to Sections 323 and 324 IPC, as the injuries were simple and the evidence did not establish an intention to kill. Though grievous injury is not indispensable for a conviction under Section 307 IPC, the prosecution must still prove intention nor knowledge to commit murder. Where only simple injuries are caused and the surrounding circumstances do not establish such intention, conviction under Section 307 IPC cannot be sustained.
16. For an appeal arising from an old conviction under Section 307 IPC wheres only one injury was caused to each injured witness, the injuries are simple, there was no repeated attack, the prosecution witnesses otherwise support the occurrence, Sivamani and State of M.P. v. Saleem (supra), provides authority for the proposition that the Court must examine the intention to commit murder from the overall circumstances. If such intention is not proved, the conviction may appropriately be altered from Section 307 IPC to Section 324 IPC, depending on the nature of the weapon and injuries.
17. Thus, although the prosecution has successfully proved voluntary causing of hurt by means of a dangerous weapon, the surrounding circumstances do not establish the requisite intention or knowledge necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 307 IPC. The facts rather indicate an intention to cause hurt and not an attempt to commit murder. Accordingly, while maintaining the finding that accused Ram Chander caused the injuries, this Court is of the considered opinion that his conviction deserves to be altered from Section 307 IPC to Section 324 IPC. This approach is consistent with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court that the decisive test is the intention or knowledge, which is gathered from nature of weapon, part of body chosen, severity of injuries, number of blows, surrounding circumstances, and not merely the nature of injury.
18. Sections 4 and 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 are reproduced below for ready reference:
4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct. (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is Ramexpedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:
Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond.
(2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case.
(3) When an order under sub-section (1) is made, the court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the offender.
(4) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with respect to residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender.
(5) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned.
5. Power of court to require released offenders to pay compensation and costs.(1) The court directing the release of an offender under section 3 or section 4, may, if it thinks fit, make at the same time a further order directing him to pay
(a) such compensation as the court thinks reasonable for loss or injury caused to any person by the commission of the offence; and
(b) such costs of the proceedings as the court thinks reasonable.
(2) The amount ordered to be paid under sub-section (1) may be recovered as a fine in accordance with the provisions of sections 386 and 387 of the Code.
(3) A civil court trying any suit, arising out of the same matter for which the offender is prosecuted, shall take into account any amount paid or recovered as compensation under sub-section (1) in awarding damages.
19. In Sitaram Paswan and Another vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 13 SCC 110, the Apex Court has held as under:
For exercising the power which is discretionary, the court has to consider the circumstances of the case, the nature of the offence and the character of the offender. While considering the nature of the offence, the court must take a realistic view of the gravity of the offence, the impact which the offence had on the victim. The benefit available to the accused under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act is subject to the limitation embodied in the provisions and the word “may” clearly indicates that the discretion vests with the court whether to release the offender in exercise of the powers under Section 3 or 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, having regard to the nature of the offence and the character of the offender and overall circumstances of the case. The powers under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act vest with the court when any person is found guilty of the offence committed, not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. This power can be exercised by the courts while finding the person guilty and if the court thinks that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, benefit should be extended to the accused, the power can be exercised by the court even at the appellate or revisional stage and also by this Court while hearing the appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
20. In Lakhanlal alias Lakhan Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 100, the Apex Court held as under:
10. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab AIR 1965 SC 444 while examining the provisions of the 1958 Act held that in case the offenders are below 21 years, an injunction is issued to the Court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act but in respect of offenders who were above age of 21 years, the Court has absolute discretion to release such offenders either after admonition or on probation of good conduct. The Court held as under:
“4. The Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. Broadly stated, the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years, absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct, subject to the conditions laid down in the appropriate provisions of the Act, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.”
11. This Court in Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar (1972) 2 SCC 633 explained the rationale of the provision as to prevent the conversion of youthful offenders into obdurate criminals as a result of their association with hardened criminals of mature age in case the youthful offenders are sentenced to undergo imprisonment in jail. The Court held as under:
“6. The Probation of Offenders Act was enacted in 1958 with a view to provide for the release of offenders of certain categories on probation or after due admonition and for matters connected therewith. The object of the Act is to prevent the conversion of youthful offenders into obdurate criminals as a result of their association with hardened criminals of mature age in case the youthful offenders are sentenced to undergo imprisonment in jail. The above object is in consonance with the present trend in the field of penology, according to which effort should be made to bring about correction and reformation of the individual offenders and not to resort to retributive justice. Modern criminal jurisprudence recognises that no one is a born criminal and that a good many crimes are the product of socio-economic milieu. Although not much can be done for hardened criminals, considerable stress has been laid on bringing about reform of young offenders not guilty of very serious offences and of preventing their association with hardened criminals. The Act gives statutory recognition to the above objective. It is, therefore, provided that youthful offenders should not be sent to jail, except in certain circumstances. Before, however, the benefit of the Act can be invoked, it has to be shown that the convicted person even though less than 21 years of age, is not guilty of an offenec punishable with imprisonment for life. This is clear from the language of Section 6 of the Act.”
21. In Mohd. Hashim vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2017) 2 SCC 198, the Apex reiterated the exercise of discretionary power of the court under Probation of Offenders Act as under:
21. In this regard, it is also seemly to refer to other authorities to highlight how the discretion vested in a court under the PO Act is to be exercised. In Ram Parkash v. State of H.P.9, while dealing with Section 4 of the PO Act in the context of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the Court opined that the word “may” used in Section 4 of the PO Act does not mean “must”. On the contrary, as has been held in the said authority, it has been made clear in categorical terms that the provisions of the PO Act distinguish offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age and offenders who are guilty of committing an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. Thereafter, the Court has proceeded to observe:
“7…. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years. absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the Court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. (Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab and Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar.)”
Be it noted, in the said case, keeping in view the offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the Court declined to confer the benefit under Section 4 of the PO Act.
22. We have referred to the aforesaid authority to stress the point that the court before exercising the power under Section 4 of the PO Act has to keep in view the nature of offence and the conditions incorporated under Section 4 of the PO Act. Be it stated in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana it has been held that Parliament has made it clear that only if the Court forms the opinion that it is expedient to release the convict on probation for the good conduct regard being had to the circumstances of the case and one of the circumstances which cannot be sidelined in forming the said opinion is “the nature of the offence”. The Court has further opined that though the discretion has been vested in the court to decide when and how the court should form such opinion, yet the provision itself provides sufficient indication that releasing the convicted person on probation of good conduct must appear to the Court to be expedient. Explaining the word “expedient”, the Court held thus:
9. The word “expedient” had been thoughtfully employed by Parliament in the section so as to mean it as “apt and suitable to the end in view”. In Black’s Law Dictionary the word “expedient” is defined as “suitable and appropriate for accomplishment of a specified object” besides the other meaning referred to earlier. In State of Gujarat v. Jamnadas G. Pabril a two-Judge Bench of this Court has considered the word “expedient”. The learned Judges have observed in para 21 thus:
21…. Again, the word “expedient” used in this provision, has several shades of meaning. In one dictionary sense, “expedient” (adj.) means “apt and suitable to the end in view”, “practical and efficient”: “politic”; “profitable”; “advisable”, “fit, proper and suitable to the circumstances of the case”. In another shade, it means a device “characterised by mere utility rather than principle, conducive to special advantage rather than to what is universally right” (see Webster’s New International Dictionary)’.
10. It was then held that the court must construe the said word in keeping with the context and object of the provision in its widest amplitude. Here the word “expedient” is used in Section 4 of the PO Act in the context of casting a duty on the court to take into account “the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence…”. This means Section 4 can be resorted to when the court considers the circumstances of the case, particularly the nature of the offence, and the court forms its opinion that it is suitable and appropriate for accomplishing a specified object that the offender can be released on probation of good conduct.”
22. In Chellammal and Another vs. State represented by the Inspector of Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 461, where the Sessions Judge has acquitted the appellants (mother-in-law and husband) of the charge under Section 304-B IPC but convicted them under Section 498-A, the Apex Court held as under:
Summing up the legal position, it can be said that while an offender cannot seek an order for grant of probation as a matter of right but having noticed the object that the statutory provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation and the several decisions of this Court on the point of applicability of Section 4 of the Probation Act, we hold that, unless applicability is excluded, in a case where the circumstances stated in subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are attracted, the court has no discretion to omit from its consideration release of the offender on probation; on the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon the court to consider whether the case before it warrants releasing the offender upon fulfillment of the stated circumstances. The question of grant of probation could be decided either way. In the event, the court in its discretion decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may upon considering the report of the probation officer impose such conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if the answer be in the negative, it would only be just and proper for the court to record the reasons therefor.
23. In this case, the occurrence took place in the year 1985, nearly four decades ago. The accused has remained under the shadow of criminal proceedings throughout this long period. Nothing has been brought on record to indicate that he has misused the liberty granted to him during the pendency of the appeal or that he has been involved in any subsequent criminal activity. The injuries suffered by the victims were simple in nature and no permanent disability has been proved. Considering the long lapse of time, the age of the litigation, the nature of injuries, the fact that only one injury each was caused, and the overall circumstances of the case, this Court is satisfied that instead of sending the appellant back to prison after about forty years, the ends of justice would be adequately served by extending to him the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
24. In view of the above, the appeal is, partly allowed with modification in conviction and sentence. The conviction of the appellant Ram Chander alias Balbhadra under Section 307 is modified and convicted him under Section 324 I.P.C. accordingly. Rest conviction awarded by the trial court is affirmed. However, the sentence awarded in this case is hereby set aside.
25. In view of the modification of conviction and sentence and release of the appellant on probation, the bail bonds and sureties furnished earlier during trial/appeal shall stand discharged.
26. Consequently, while maintaining the conviction under Sections 323/34 and 324 IPC, the appellant Ram Chander alias Balbhadra is directed to be released on probation of good conduct under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, on his executing a personal bond of Rs 50,000 with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court concerned with an undertaking to maintain peace and good behaviour for a period of one year.
(i) Invoking Section 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, the appellant Ram Chander alias Balbhadra shall pay compensation of Rs.50,000/-(Rupees fifty Thousand only), to the victim/injured persons within a period of one month from today. All the injured persons namely Kumar and Khushhal shall receive compensation equally. In case of death of injured/victim(s), the appellant shall pay the same to their legal heirs.
(ii) the appellant shall deposit above compensation amount before the trial court concerned within stipulated period, the trial court shall, after notice and verification, distribute the amount among the victim(s)/their legal heirs through bank accounts.
(iii) In the event of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions, the accused-appellants shall be liable to undergo the sentence as awarded by the trial court to serve the original sentence.
27. Trial court shall ensure compliance and seek report from the Probation Officer for supervision.
28. The trial court is directed to submit its compliance report within two months from the date of receipt of this order. Further more, the registry is also directed to place the compliance report on record.
29. Let trial court record along with copy of this judgment be transmitted forthwith to the court concerned for information and necessary compliance.
30. The Registrar (Compliance) is also directed to serve a copy of this order within 24 hours by FAX/e-mail to the concerned court through District & Sessions Judge, Allahabad for compliance
(Santosh Rai,J.)
July 10, 2026
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