Madras High Court
P.Rajarathinam vs State Rep. By on 1 July, 2026
Author: G.K.Ilanthiraiyan
Bench: G.K.Ilanthiraiyan
Crl.O.P.Nos.8077 of 2025 & 1190 of 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on : 22.06.2026
Pronounced on: 01.07.2026
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G.K.ILANTHIRAIYAN
Crl.O.P.Nos.8077 of 2025 & 1190 of 2026 and
Crl.MP.Nos.5260, 5262 of 2025, & 721 of 2026
Crl.OP.No.8077 of 2025
S.Venkatraman ... Petitioner
Vs.
ADDITIONAL SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT,
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
ECONOMIC OFFENCES WING,
III FLOOR,
‘A WING’, RAJAJI BHAVAN,
BESANT NAGAR,
CHENNAI 600 090
(REF CRIME.NO. RC. 5(E) AND 6(E)
DATED.19.12.2001) ... Respondent
Prayer:
Criminal Original petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
praying to call for the records and quash the final report in connection
with CC.no.9825 of 2005 pending trial on the file of the Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate Court at Egmore, Chennai for offences under
sections 120-B r/w 406 & 420 IPC and substantive offences under
sections 406 and 420 IPC.
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For Petitioner : Mr.C.Arun Kumar
For Respondent : Mr.B.Mohan,
Special Public Prosecutor for CBI
Crl.OP.No.1190 of 2026
P.Rajarathinam ... Petitioner
Vs.
State rep. By
ADDITIONAL SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
ECONOMIC OFFENCES WING,
III FLOOR,
‘A WING’, RAJAJI BHAVAN,
BESANT NAGAR,
CHENNAI 600 090
(REF CRIME.NO. RC. 5&6/E/2001/CBI/
EOW/Chennai) ... Respondent
Prayer:
Criminal Original petition filed under Section 528 of BNSS
praying to call for the entire records connected with the charge sheet
dated 01.04.2005 in CC.no.9825 of 2005(now split up CC.No.1387 of
2006) on the file of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
Court at Egmore, Chennai against the petitioner and quash the same
insofar as the petitioner is concerned.
For Petitioner : Mr.M.Radhakrishnan
for Mr.K.Jayaraman
For Respondent : Mr.B.Mohan,
Special Public Prosecutor for CBI
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COMMON ORDER
The criminal original petition in Crl.OP.No.8077 of 2025 has
been filed praying to quash the final report in connection with
CC.no.9825 of 2005 pending trial on the file of the Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate Court at Egmore, Chennai for offences under
sections 120-B r/w 406 & 420 IPC and substantive offences under
sections 406 and 420 IPC; the criminal original petition in
Crl.OP.No.1190 of 2026 has been filed praying to quash the charge sheet
dated 01.04.2005 in CC.no.9825 of 2005(now split up CC.No.1387 of
2006) on the file of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
Court at Egmore, Chennai against the petitioner.
2. The petitioner in Crl.OP.No.8077 of 2025 has been arrayed
as A1 whereas the petitioner in Crl.OP.No.1190 of 2026 has been arrayed
as A5, who is a split up accused from CC.No.9825 of 2005. The case of
the prosecution is that the defacto complainant had matured deposit of
Rs.30,00,000/- during the year 1997-1998 with M/s.Synergy Financial
Exchange Limited, Chennai (in short ‘SFEL’) in the fixed deposit scheme
for which the company issued post dated cheque and the same was
dishonoured, thereby the company and Directors have cheated the
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complainant. They were evasive of any commitment to repay the
deposits. Further, another victim P.S.B.Rajan invested a sum of Rs.9.25
lakhs in the fixed deposit schemes. The company and the other Directors
failed to discharge their responsibilities in repaying the deposited
amounts and committed wilful act of cheating and fraud after luring the
public to invest through their repeated advertisements. After completion
of investigation, the respondent filed final report and the trial court had
taken cognizance in CC.No.9825 of 2005. There are totally 9 accused, in
which the petitioner in Crl.OP.No.8077 of 2025 is arrayed as A1 whereas
the petitioner in Crl.OP.No.1190 of 2026 has been arrayed as A5.
However, due to absence, red corner notice was issued against A5 and he
was also declared as proclaimed offender and the case has been split up
against him and new case is assigned in CC.No.1387 of 2006.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner in Crl.OP.No.8077 of
2025 submits that the company in which the deposits were collected is
not arrayed as an accused. Though the petitioner floated the company in
the name of SFEL, the petitioner was one of the Directors and without
adding the company, no prosecution can be initiated as against the
Directors. Under the penal code, there is no provision to punish the
directors by way of vicarious liability for the offence committed by the
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company. The prosecution arrayed the ninth accused, which is a sister
concern of SFEL represented by the official liquidator. Now the company
is liquidated and has been taken over by official liquidator of this Court.
Further, the post dated cheques issued by the company were dishonoured.
The fixed deposits were also opened for the customers in the name of the
company. In fact, the company board passed order against the company to
settle the amount due with interest. The petitioner is not arrayed as
accused in his individual capacity, but only as Director of the company.
All the documentary evidences produced by the prosecution pertain to the
company and not the Directors of the company. The vicarious liability is
unknown to criminal jurisprudence unless specifically provided by
statute. Therefore, if the company is not made as an accused, then the
instrumentalities i.e. the Directors cannot be prosecuted. There are
specific provisions making the Directors of the company liable to be
punished for the offence committed by the company. But in the Indian
Penal Code, there is no such provision that makes the Directors of the
company vicariously liable for punishment for the offence committed by
the company. Therefore, when the company is not arrayed as an accused,
it is fatal to the case of the prosecution and the petitioner cannot be
prosecuted in the capacity of Directors.
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3.1 In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the
petitioner in Crl.OP.No.8077 of 2025 relied upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of S.K.Alagh Vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others reported in (2008) 5 SCC 662, in which the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that a person in charge of the affairs
of the company and in control thereof has been made vicariously liable
for the offence committed by the company along with the company but
even in a case falling under Section 406 of IPC, vicarious liability has
been held to be non extendable to the Directors or officers of the
company. In the absence of any provision laid down under the statute, the
Director of a company or an employee cannot be held to be vicariously
liable for any offence committed by the company. He also relied upon the
judgment of this Court in the case of B.Jagadeesh and others Vs. The
Deputy Superintendent of Police, EOW-II, Namakkal reported in 2011
(2) MWN (Cr.) 494, wherein this Court held that under IPC, there can be
no vicarious liability fastened on the Directors of the company for the
offence committed by the company for want of any penal provision
making the Directors also vicariously liable for punishment. Therefore,
the prosecution against the Directors is not maintainable.
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4. The learned counsel for the petitioner in Crl.OP.No.1190 of
2026 submits that even according to the case of the prosecution,
P.Rajarathnam & Associates represented by M.V.Subramanian and
S.Venkataraman and others represented by Venkataraman entered into
memorandum of understanding dated 26.02.1999. Accordingly, one of the
obligations of the petitioner is that he took over SFEL, in which the
petitioner was not a signatory to the said memorandum of understanding.
There was no connection whatsoever between the petitioner and the said
memorandum of understanding. Therefore, the obligations or liabilities
arising out of the said memorandum of understanding cannot fasten any
liability over the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner is in no way
connected with SFEL since he was not a signatory to the memorandum of
understanding.
5. Heard, the learned counsel appearing on either side and
perused all the materials placed before this Court.
6. On perusal of the counter filed by the respondent and on
hearing the submissions of the learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI
appearing for the respondent, it is revealed that in compliance to the
orders of this Court dated 31.08.2001, the Case
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RC.5/E/2001/CBI/EOW/Chennai under Sections 409 & 420 r/w 34 of
IPC was registered on 19.12.2001 by CBI, EOW, Chennai for further
investigation in Crime No.1216 of 1999 of Central Crime Branch,
Chennai City. The gist of allegations in the FIR of Chennai City, Central
Crime Branch in Crime No. 1216 of 1999 is that the complainant had
matured deposit of Rs.30 lakhs during 1997-98 with SFEL in the Fixed
Deposit Scheme and that post dated cheques issued by the Company for
this purpose were dishonoured by the company’s bankers. The officials of
the company were totally evasive of any commitment to repay the
deposits and thereby committed offences punishable under Sections 409,
420 r/w 34 of IPC. The case i.e. RC.6/E/2001/CBI/EOW/Chennai under
Section 409 IPC was registered on 19.12.2001 by CBI, EOW, Chennai in
compliance to the orders of this Court for further investigation of the case
in crime No.277 of 1999 of Central Crime Branch, Chennai. The gist of
allegations in the FIR in crime No.277 of 1999 of Chennai City Central
Crime Branch is that the complainant invested a total sum of Rs.9.25
lakhs in his name and his family members in the fixed deposit schemes of
SFEL during 1997-98. They have not discharged their responsibility in
repaying the depositors and committed willful act of cheating and fraud
after luring the public to invest in their company through their repeated
advertisements and thereby committed the offence punishable under
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Section 409 IPC. During investigation, one, Rajarathinam was arrayed as
accused in the case. In compliance of the order dated 31.08.2001 of this
Court, to apprehend the absconding accused, CBI requested NCB-
INTERPOL, CBI, New Delhi, to open Red Corner Notice (RCN) against
him. Since a Red Corner Notice (RCN) had already been issued against
him vide File No.2002/8857, Control No.A-288/4-2002 dated 08.04.2002
on the request of the Commissioner of Police, Madras City, an
Addendum/Corrigendum was issued by the IPSG in the RCN Control
No.A-288/4-2002 by including the details of the cases RC.5 & 6/(E)/2001
of CBI, EOW, Chennai, It was also mentioned in the
Addendum/Corrigendum that the Arrest Warrant in CP No.322 of 1999,
issued on 19.10.2001 by this Court has been cancelled and replaced by an
Arrest Warrant in Criminal Case No.5/(E)/2001 issued on 12.03.2002 by
the Metropolitan Magistrates Court in Egmore, Chennai, India. On
completion of investigation, based on the evidence collected, a combined
charge sheet dated 14.05.2004 was filed against nine accused persons and
charge sheet was taken cognizance by the trial court.
7. The only ground raised by the first accused is that the
company was not arrayed as accused and as such, he is not vicariously
liable for the offence committed by the company in the capacity of the
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Director of the company. The fifth accused raised only one ground that he
was not a signatory to the aforementioned memorandum. Therefore, the
obligations or liabilities arising from the memorandum of understanding
cannot be considered to be the obligations or liabilities of him. The
memorandum of understanding is not found to have been entered into
between the petitioner representing the said P.Rajarathinam and
Associates and S.Venkatraman and others represented by S.Venkatraman.
8. Insofar as the petitioner in Crl.OP.No.1190 of 2026 is
concerned, he is not entitled for any relief under Section 528 of BNS
since red corner notice is pending against him pursuant to the
non- bailable warrant issued against him. He was also declared as a
proclaimed offender. However, it was set aside on condition that he will
appear before the trial court. In a company petition in CP.No.322 of 1999
filed by Raghuraman and Sita before this Court against SFEL to wind up
the company under the Companies Act, this Court passed an order for
winding up of the company SFEL and directed the respondent to register
FIR and proceed with the investigation. In pursuant to the direction
issued by this Court, the respondent registered FIR in crime No.1216 of
1999 and another crime was also registered in crime No.277 of 1999.
This court while adjudication in CP.No.322 of 1999, issued non bailable
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warrant against A5 and also a proclamation order was issued under
Section 82 of Criminal Procedure Code. Further, the Commissioner of
Police was directed to form a special squad to secure and produce the
petitioner who had been absconding for several months. Further, the
National Central Bureau- Interpol, CBI, New Delhi also sought for
direction before this Court to open red corner notice against the petitioner
who was reported to be in England. In OSA.Nos.339 and 371 of 2001, by
order dated 26.09.2005, the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court passed
the following order:
i) The appellant P.Rajarathinam shall make him
available for recording any evidence before the Master’s
Court, within a period of four months from today.
ii) The appellant shall also appear before the
appropriate investigating agency, i.e.C.B.I, within the said
period.
iii) The appellant shall appear either before the
Official Liquidator or Administrator, within the said
period of four months.
iv) The investigations pertaining to the issue and
shall make appellant shall cooperate in all available of all
relevant documents.
v) Since the Counsel has submitted that he will
appear, the direction issued by the Court from time to time
for arrest shall be kept in abeyance. If, however, the
appellant fails to appear before the authority, as directed
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above, it would be open to the appropriate authorities to
take appropriate action in accordance with law to secure
his presence.
vi), Since Section 82 of Cr.P.C. is not applicable to
such matter, the direction regarding issuance of
proclamation under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. shall stand
quashed.
vii) If the appellant appears, as directed above,
such order shall be taken as complied with and no further
coercive course are required to be taken against him
9. However, the petitioner failed to appear before the trial
court. That apart, there are specific allegations against the petitioner in
Crl.OP.No.1190 of 2026 to attract the charges under Sections 120(b) r/w
420, 406 of IPC. The petitioner is the proprietor of M/s.P.Rajarathinam
Associates, who took over the company through a memorandum dated
26.02.1999 and appointed the sixth accused as its advisor. As per the
memorandum, it is expressly understood that PR Associates will take all
the steps to ensure that all the investors in the company are fully
protected and taken care of. After such take over, the petitioner collected
money from the debtors of company and misappropriated such amounts
by converting it to his own use to the tune of Rs.23.04 lakhs. Further, he
had collected amounts due to the company from its debtors through his
associates without bringing them into the credit of the company’s account
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and diverted the amounts to his other associate company, thus depriving
the genuine investors from receiving their deposit amount and cheated
them. At last, the petitioner filed petition to recall the non-bailable
warrant before the trial court in Crl.MP.No.6497 of 2024 without his
presence and the same was dismissed and aggrieved by the same, the
petitioner preferred criminal revision before this Court in Crl.RC.No.543
of 2024 and the same was also dismissed by an order dated 23.08.2024 as
withdrawn. Therefore, as of now, the non bailable warrant and also the
red corner notice are pending against him.
10. It is true there is no specific provision in the Indian Penal
Code to prosecute the Directors of the company vicariously without
prosecuting the company. In the case on hand, already the company was
wound up and the properties of the company are dealt with by official
liquidator. Therefore, the prosecution did not bring the company as
accused. In this regard, the respondent relied upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme court of India rendered by the three-judge-bench in the
case of Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka Vs. Tourism Finance
Corporation of India Limited reported in 2023 4 Supreme 711, wherein
it was held that by operation of provisions of Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code, the criminal prosecution initiated against the natural persons under
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Section 138 and r/w 141 of NI Act r/w Section 200 of Cr.P.C. not
terminated. It was further held as follows:
49. It is true that by virtue of Section 238 of the
IBC, the provisions of the CrPC shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained
in any other law for the time being in force or any
instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. But, no
provision of the IBC bars the continuation of the criminal
prosecution initiated against the directors and officials.
50. It is equally true that once the corporate debtor
comes under the resolution process, its erstwhile
managing director(s) cannot continue to represent the
company. Section 305(2) of the CrPC states that where a
corporation is the accused person or one of the accused
persons in an inquiry or trial, it may appoint a
representative for the purpose of the inquiry or trial and
such appointment need not be under the seal of the
corporation. Therefore, it is only the Resolution
Professional who can represent the accused company
during the pendency of the proceedings under IBC. After
the proceedings are over, either the corporate entity may
be dissolved or it can be taken over by a new management
in which event the company will continue to exist. When a
new management takes over, it will have to make
arrangements for representing the company. If the
company is dissolved as a result of the resolution process,
obviously proceedings against it will have to be
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terminated. But even then, its erstwhile directors may not
be able to take advantage of the situation. This is because,
this Court in Aneeta Hada (supra), even while overruling
its decision in Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd. reported in
(2000) 1 SCC 1, as not laying down the correct law in so
far as Anil Hada (supra) states that the director or any
other officer can be prosecuted without impleadment of
the company, proceeded to hold that the matter would
stand on a different footing where there is some legal
impediment as the doctrine of lex non cogit ad
impossibilia gets attracted. It was specifically observed
that the decision in Anil Hada (supra) is overruled with
the qualifier as stated in para 51. Considering the same,
the ratio of the decision of this Court in Ajit Balse (supra)
upon which strong reliance is placed on behalf of the
appellant is of no avail.
51. What follows from the aforesaid is that for
difficulty in prosecuting the corporate debtor
under Section 138 of the NI Act after the approval of the
resolution plan under the IBC, we need not let the natural
persons i.e., the signatories to the cheques/directors of the
corporate debtor escape prosecution. How can one allow
the natural persons to escape liability on such specious
plea? In such a situation the Latin maxim Lex Non Cogit
Ad Impossibilia is attracted which means law does not
compel a man to do which he cannot possibly perform.
Broom’s “Legal Maxims” contains several illustrative
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cases in support of the maxim. This maxim has been
referred to with approval by this Court in State of
Rajasthan v. Shamsher Singh reported in 1985 supp SCC
416.
52. Thus, where the proceedings under Section
138 of the NI Act had already commenced and during the
pendency the plan is approved or the company gets
dissolved, the directors and the other accused cannot
escape from their liability by citing its dissolution. What is
dissolved is only the company, not the personal penal
liability of the accused covered under Section 141 of the
NI Act. They will have to continue to face the prosecution
in view of the law laid down in Aneeta
Hada (supra). Where the company continues to remain
even at the end of the resolution process, the only
consequence is that the erstwhile directors can no longer
represent it.
FEW OF THE ABSURD SITUATIONS THAT MAY ARISE
IF SECTION 138 PROCEEDINGS IN RELATION TO
THE SIGNATORIES/DIRECTORS ARE HELD TO BE
NOT MAINTAINABLE AFTER THE RESOLUTION PLAN
IS APPROVED
11. Thus, it is clear that pending proceedings, if the company
gets dissolved, the signatories / Directors cannot escape from their penal
liability by citing its dissolution or wind up. What is dissolved is only the
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company and not the personal penal liability of the accused. The above
case is arising out of the Negotiable Instruments Act, where there is
specific provision under Section 141 of NI Act to prosecute the Directors
of the company and fast upon them vicarious liability once the company
gets dissolved and despite the said provision, the Directors and the other
accused cannot escape from their liability by citing its dissolution or
liquidation. That apart, he already filed petition to discharge himself from
the charges and the same was dismissed and the charge sheet was
confirmed by this Court in Crl.RC.No.1632 of 2024. Immediately after
the dismissal of the criminal revision case, the petitioner filed this
petition to quash the entire proceedings, that too after a period of 21 years
from the date of filing the charge sheet. During the course of hearing of
the company petition for winding up of the company, this Court in
CP.No.322 of 1999 and CP.No.349 of 1999 directed the respondent to
take charge of the crime No.277 of 1999 registered in crime No.1216 of
1999 registered by the Central Crime Branch, Chennai. Thereafter, the
respondent re-registered the FIR in RC.Nos.5 and 6 of 2001. After
completion of investigation, joint charge sheet was filed against nine
accused persons and the same has been taken cognizance by the trial
court.
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12. The petitioner and other accused are full time Directors of
the company and also the third accused is the authorised signatory to
operate the accounts of the company. The petitioner along with other
accused persons published advertisements in the newspapers calling for
deposits from the public and offered interest at the rate of 18% to 24%
per annum for their deposits. Thus, they mobilized the deposit of
Rs.14.73 crores in the name of the company. The petitioner also floated
ninth accused company along with his wife and other accused persons
and he was instrumental in diverting the deposits collected in the name of
the company to the ninth accused company which were shiphone off,
leading to fiscal crisis of the company resulting in non-payment of the
deposits to the depositors. Further, there was transfer of funds through
cheques from the account of the company to the petitioner and other
accused persons’ personal bank accounts. Therefore, there are specific
allegations against the petitioner in his personal capacity as a director as
well. Further, the company was wound up as per the order passed by this
Court. The petitioner and other accused persons fraudulently diverted the
entire amount which was received in the name of the company to their
personal accounts and the A9’s account. Further, the petitioner is not
prosecuted merely because he was the Director of the company but based
on the role played by him in the offence in his personal capacity. The
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petitioner and other accused persons are full time Directors of the
company and also the authorised signatories of the company to operate
the bank accounts of the company as well as the ninth accused.
13. That apart, the petitioner along with other accused persons
published advertisements in the newspapers calling for deposits and
thereby offered interest at the rate of 18% to 24% per annum and thereby
collected a sum of Rs.14.73 crores in the name of the company and
thereafter floated the ninth accused company. Therefore, the petitioner is
not only held liable by way of vicarious liability but also in his personal
capacity. Therefore though the company is not arrayed as accused since it
was already wound up, the petitioner and other Directors under their
personal capacity can be prosecuted for the aforementioned offences.
14. At this juncture, it is relevant to rely upon the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in 2019 (4) SCC 351 in the
case of Devendra Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Anr.,
(Crl.A.No.579 of 2019 dated 02.04.2019) wherein it was held that while
dealing with the petition to quash the entire criminal proceedings held
that the High Courts have no jurisdiction to appreciate the statement of
the witnesses and record a finding that there were inconsistencies in their
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statements and therefore, there was no prima facie case made out as
against the accused. It could be done only by the trial Court while
deciding the issues on the merits or/and by the Appellate Court while
deciding the appeal arising out of the final order that the charge sheet has
been laid on the basis of the inconsistency statement under Section 161 of
Cr.P.C.
15. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the judgment
reported in 2019 (10) SCC 686 in the case of Central Bureau of
Investigation Vs. Arvind Khanna, (Crl.A.No.1572 of 2019 dated
17.10.2019) held that the High Courts cannot record the findings on the
disputed facts. The defence of the accused is to be tested after
appreciation of evidence by the trial Court during the trial. Therfore, this
Court has no power to consider the disputed facts under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C.
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in another judgment
dated 02.12.2019 passed in Crl.A.No.1817 of 2019 in the case of
M.Jayanthi Vs. K.R.Meenakshi & anr, held that while considering the
petition for quashment of complaint or charge sheet, the Court should not
embark upon an enquiry into the validity of the evidence available. All
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that the Court should see is as to whether there are allegations in the
complaint which form the basis for the ingredients that consititue certain
offences complained of. Further, the Court can also see whether the
preconditions requisite for taking cognizance have been complied with or
not and whether the allegations contained in the complaint, even if
accepted in entirety, would not consititue the offence alleged. Whether
the accused will be able to prove the allegations in a manner known to
law would arise only at a later stage i.e., during trial.
17. Further this Court cannot observe at this stage as to whether
the initiation of criminal proceeding itself is malicious or not. The same is
required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. Therefore, the
grounds raised by the petitioner to quash the final report/charge sheet
cannot be entertained.
18. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds no grounds
to quash the impugned proceedings. As such, both the criminal original
petitions are dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions
are closed.
01.07.2026
Index : Yes/No
Neutral citation : Yes/No
Speaking/non-speaking order
lok
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Crl.O.P.Nos.8077 of 2025 & 1190 of 2026
G.K.ILANTHIRAIYAN, J.
lok
To
1.Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court at Egmore, Chennai
2.ADDITIONAL SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT,
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
ECONOMIC OFFENCES WING,
III FLOOR,
‘A WING’, RAJAJI BHAVAN,
BESANT NAGAR,
CHENNAI 600 090
3.The Public Prosecutor,
High Court of Madras
Crl.O.P.Nos.8077 of 2025 & 1190 of 2026
01.07.2026
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