Delhi High Court
Rajendra Bharti vs The State Nct Of Delhi & Anr on 10 July, 2026
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 09.07.2026
Judgment Delivered on: 10.07.2026
+ CRL.A. 328/2026 & CRL.M.A. 10247/2026 & CRL.M.A.
10711/2026 & CRL.M.A. 10932/2026 & CRL.M.A. 14343/2026 &
CRL.M.A. 17912/2026
RAJENDRA BHARTI .....Appellant
versus
THE STATE NCT OF DELHI & ANR. .....Respondent
Memo of Appearance
For the Appellant: Mr. P. Chidambaram, Senior Advocate with Mr. Abhik Chimni
with Ms. Pranjal, Mr. Ayan Dasgupta, Ms. Moksha Sharma,
Advocates
For the Respondent: Mr. Raj Kumar, APP for the State/R-1
Mr. Mohit Mathur, Senior Advocate with Mr. Manish Kumar, Mr.
Amitabh Narendra, Mr. Ashish Ranjan, Ms. Aparajita Jha, Mr.
Vignesh, Advocates for R-2
Mr. Dama Seshadri Naidu, Senior Advocate with Mrs. Rohini
Prasad, Mr. Prateek Kumar, Mr. Deepak Sharma, Mr. Devansh
Rai, Mr. Kumar Utsav, Mr. Ashish Shukla, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN
JUDGMENT
MANOJ JAIN, J
1. The limited request of the appellant, at the moment, is to stay his
conviction.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. Let me narrate the factual background, albeit, in brief.
3. A complaint was filed by District Co-operative Agriculture & Rural
Development Bank, Datia, Madhya Pradesh alleging therein that, the then
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Chairman of their bank i.e. appellant herein influenced bank officials to
extend the term of a FD1 of Rs. 10 lacs from three years to fifteen years. It
was done with the objective and intention to extend benefit to a Trust2 so
that such Trust keeps on getting interest @ 13.5% per annum for additional
twelve years. His mother Mrs. Savitri (since deceased) was the President of
the aforesaid Trust.
4. The aforesaid complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C.3, filed way back in
the year 2015. It was directed against appellant and his mother.
5. After recording of pre-summoning evidence, when an application
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was filed, Mr. Raghuvir Sharan Prajapati (co-
convict) was summoned as accused. He was, earlier, appearing as a witness
in the aforesaid complaint case.
6. As per allegations, appellant used his such influential position to
pressurize the bank employees in order to facilitate unauthorized payment to
such Trust, thereby causing wrongful financial loss to the Bank.
7. Both the accused i.e. appellant herein and Mr. Prajapati were charged
for offences u/s 420 IPC4, alternatively u/s 420/120B IPC; u/s 467 IPC,
alternatively u/s 467/120B IPC; u/s 468 IPC, alternatively u/s 468/120B IPC
and u/s 471 IPC or alternatively u/s 471/120B IPC. Mr. Prajapati was also,
in addition to the above, charged u/s 409 IPC.
8. As per the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a Transfer
Petition5 filed by the appellant himself, the aforesaid complaint case was,
eventually, transferred to Delhi, with direction to conclude the trial in six
1
Fixed Deposit
2
Shri Shyam Sunder Public Unity & Community Development Organization Trust
3
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
4
Indian Penal Code 1860
5
Transfer Petition (Criminal) No.1120/2024; dated 07.10.2025
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months.
9. Learned Trial Court, after conclusion of trial, has held them guilty.
10. Appellant has been convicted under Section 120B IPC r/w Sections
420/467/468/471 IPC. As per order on sentence, he has been handed out
Simple Imprisonment for a period of three years for the aforesaid penal
provisions and has also been imposed fine of Rs. 1 lac, in default of payment
of which, to undergo SI for a period of three months. Since, Bank in
question, later on, went into liquidation, it was directed that the fine amount,
if realized, would go as compensation to M.P. Rajya Sahkari Krishi Avem
Gramin Vikas Bank Seemit, Bhopal.
11. Order of conviction is dated 01.04.2026 and order on sentence is of
02.04.2026.
12. It needs to be emphasized that the order on sentence has already been
suspended by the learned Predecessor Bench on 28.04.2026.
13. As noted above, the issue for consideration is whether the appellant
has been able to demonstrate any case for suspension of conviction or not.
14. Reason behind moving such application is obvious.
15. Appellant is an elected Member of Legislative Assembly from Datia
Constituency of Madhya Pradesh.
16. A bye-election to fill up the vacancies for three Assembly
Constituencies, has been notified by Election Commission of India.
17. Datia is, one of those, and is also to undergo poll.
18. Such vacancy for Datia has fallen on account of disqualification6 of
the appellant, consequent upon the aforesaid conviction and order on
sentence.
6
Order of disqualification issued by Vidhan Sabha Sachivalaya is of 02.04.2026.
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19. The Gazette Notification for holding bye-election has been issued on
06.07.2026. The last date for nomination is 13.07.2026 and election is
scheduled for 30.07.2026.
SUBMISSIONS OF APPELLANT
20. Mr. P. Chidambaram, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant
submits that the appellant was an elected Member of Legislative Assembly of
Datia, M.P. Datia Constituency and in view of impugned orders, he stands
disqualified from the Membership of Legislative Assembly as per Article
191(1)(e) of Constitution of India read with Section 8 of the Representation
of People Act, 1951. He submits that appeal raises arguable and critical
questions of facts and law, as the findings returned by the learned Trial
Court are not sustainable at all. Impugned judgment being flawed, appellant
would suffer irreparable injury if conviction is not stayed.
21. He submits that law has evolved in this regard and appellate courts
have ample power to suspend not only the sentence but the order of
conviction also. The crucial determining and decisive factors, for the
abovesaid purpose, would include factual aspects of given case, gravity of
the alleged offences, criminal antecedents of any such individual and wider
social impact. Reliance is placed upon Afjal Ansari vs. State of U.P.7, Abbas
Ansari vs. State of U.P.8, Dilip Ray vs. Central Bureau of Investigation,9
Mohammad Azam Khan vs. Election Commission of India & Ors 10. and
Rajesh Shantilal Adani and Another vs. State of Maharashtra and Another11.
22. Mr. Chidambaram submits that in the case in hand, all such conditions
7
(2024) 2 SCC 187
8
2025 SCC OnLine All 5119
9
2024 SCC OnLine Del 2522
10
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 980/2022
11
2025 SCC OnLine Bom 610
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co-exist, which necessitates immediate stay on conviction so as to ensure
that there is no irreversible damage. He asserts that though final arguments
would be advanced at a later stage, a cursory glance over the record and
impugned judgment would make it evident that the investigation was tainted
and motivated and there is no legally admissible evidence on record. He
states that conviction is based on statement of co-accused, which was, even
otherwise, subsequently retracted. Relying on Rajesh Shantilal Adani
(supra), he contends that since substantive charges could not be proved,
there was no occasion for the learned Trial Court to have held him guilty for
the same very offences, even if these were to be invoked in conjunction with
offence of conspiracy.
RIVAL STAND
23. All such contentions have been refuted.
24. Mr. Mohit Mathur, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No. 2
(complainant Bank) submits that there is no reason, much less a compelling
one to stay the order of conviction. He argues that appellant, who besides
being a sitting MLA was also Chairman of the complainant Bank, misused
his position and caused wrongful loss to the Bank and, consequently,
wrongful gain to a Trust, owned by his family. Thus, by the act in question,
he, unmistakably, tried to enrich himself and his family.
25. He submits that co-convict had, voluntarily, divulged all details on
affidavit and since thereafter he retracted, the Bank was left with no option
but to move an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and it was thereupon
that not only he was summoned as accused but was even held guilty. He
submits that the aspect of criminal conspiracy, and forging the record and
causing wrongful loss to the bank in consequence to such conspiracy is writ
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large and was duly proved.
26. While referring to Trial Court Record and impugned judgment, he
contends that the appellant has made a futile attempt to trivialize the entire
issue. He states that the learned Trial Court found him guilty for committing
criminal conspiracy for serious offences like cheating and forgery which are
evidently offences involving moral turpitude. Relying on The State Bank of
India & Others vs. P. Soupramaniane12, he contends that to assess whether
the offence involves moral turpitude or not, the Court has to see whether the
act in question could, inter alia, shock the moral conscience of the society in
general or not. The appellant was at the helm of the affairs of the Bank and
it was only at his instructions and the influence exerted by him that the bank
records were tinkered and forged. The beans had earlier been spilled by his
co-convict Mr. Parjapati, who, categorically, divulged everything on
affidavit against him and merely because, subsequently, he retracted, his
earlier statement would not get effaced. The contention that appellant could
not have been held guilty for committing conspiracy without being held
guilty for the substantive offences, is, according to Mr. Mathur, nothing but
a fallacious one. He submits that learned Trial Court was fully justified in
relying upon Sheila Seastian vs. R. Jawaharaj13 as in that case also, though
forgery had been committed in terms of conspiracy, there was nothing to
indicate that the concerned accused was himself responsible for the same so
as to make him “maker” of such document. Relying on Bimbadhar Pradhan
vs. State of Orissa14 and State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Sheetla Sahai and
12
Civil Appeal No. 7011/2009
13
(2019) 7 SCC 581
14
(1956) 1 SCC 349
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Ors.15, he asserts that criminal conspiracy is a standalone and independent
offence and, therefore, there is no illegality in the impugned order.
Referring to Antony Raju vs. State of Kerala & Anr.16, it is stated that
application of appellant needs to be dismissed, outrightly, as he has failed to
indicate any palpable, manifest and apparent error in the impugned
judgment.
27. Lastly, Mr. Mathur also submits that the process of mid-term poll has
already been initiated, which now cannot be reversed.
28. Mr. Raj Kumar, learned Addl. P.P. for State/R-1 has also echoed the
same and his arguments are also same and similar.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
29. Undeniably, in a given situation, order of conviction can be stayed but
at the same time, such use of power has to be under exceptional
circumstances.
30. Instead of rule, it is more of an exception.
31. Undoubtedly, Section 389 Cr.P.C. provides a statutory remedy and
the Court has ample power to suspend sentence. However, with the passage
of time, the principle of suspension of conviction has also evolved. Any
sentence, as would be evident, flows from the order of conviction only. If
the order on sentence is stayed, such order becomes non-operational, albeit,
temporarily, thereby entitling any such accused to come out of the jail, if
inside. Whereas, exercise of power to direct suspension of order of
conviction is on a higher pedestal. If order of conviction is stayed, naturally,
sentence would get stayed, automatically. In Rama Narang vs. Ramesh
15
Crl. Appeal No. 1417/2009
16
2026 SCC OnLine Ker 3573 (Upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 27.04.2026)
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Narang and Others17, three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court recognized
the power vested with the Appellate Court to suspend even an order of
conviction by observing that there was no reason to give a narrow
interpretation to Section 389 Cr.P.C. and to not extend it to an order of
conviction in a fit case. Thus, the scope of Section 389 Cr.P.C. has been
enlarged and widened with the aforesaid evolution of law but at the same
time, it is the duty of the Court to maintain due caution while exercising
such jurisdiction which is extraordinary in nature.
32. Obviously, once any order of conviction, which incorporates the
reasons for holding someone guilty, is stayed, any disqualification attached
with such guilt is also bound to be stayed and, therefore, exercise of such
power needs to be done with utmost circumspection.
33. Reference be made to K.C. Sareen v. CBI18, Chandigarh wherein it
has been observed as under: –
“11. The legal position, therefore, is this: though the power to suspend an
order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to
Section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very
exceptional cases. Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in
challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend the operation of
the order of conviction. The court has a duty to look at all aspects
including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is in
the light of the above legal position that we have to examine the question
as to what should be the position when a public servant is convicted of an
offence under the PC Act. No doubt when the appellate court admits the
appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and sentence for the offence
under the PC Act, the superior court should normally suspend the sentence17
(1995) 2 SCC 513
18
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of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof
would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard
soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the
offence under the PC Act, dehors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel
thereto, is a different matter.”
34. In Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali19 while recognising the
power to stay conviction, Hon’ble Supreme Court has cautioned and
clarified that such power should be exercised only in exceptional
circumstances where failure to stay the conviction would lead to injustice
and irreversible consequences.
35. Afjal Ansari vs. State of U.P. (supra) sums up the factors relevant for
consideration of any such request. The majority view goes on to hold that
the very notion of irreversible consequences is centered on factors, including
the individual’s criminal antecedents, the gravity of the offence with
emphasis on moral turpitude, and its wider social impact, while
simultaneously considering the facts and circumstances of the case. It
observed that societal interest was an equally important factor which ought
to be zealously protected and preserved by the Courts and it was, thus, held
that it would be appropriate for the Courts to balance the interests of
protecting the integrity of the electoral process on one hand while also
ensuring that the constituents are not bereft of their rights to be represented,
merely based on a threshold opinion which is open to further judicial
scrutiny.
36. In Antony Raju (supra), the conviction was for offences under
Sections 120-B, 420, 201, 193, 217 r/w Section 34 IPC and when an appeal
19
2006 SCC OnLine SC 1214
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was preferred before the Sessions Court, the concerned accused prayed for
suspension of conviction. Such application was dismissed on 17.02.2026
which was impugned before Kerala High Court. Petitioner therein also was a
sitting Member of Legislative Assembly and while arguing that there was
dearth of evidence in the matter and if conviction was not stayed, he would
not get opportunity to contest the election due to interdiction contained in
Section 8 of Representation of Peoples Act, 1951. It was also agitated that
denial of opportunity would visit him with irreversible consequences and
hardship. Such argument was countered by claiming that there was sufficient
material to uphold the conviction and that right to contest election was not,
even otherwise, a fundamental right and, therefore, suspension was not
warranted, unless the impugned judgment suffered from a perceivable
serious infirmity. Hon’ble Kerala High Court, eventually, did not find any
serious infirmity and illegality in the impugned judgment and observed that
when it comes to suspension/stay of conviction, in the context of interdiction
under Section 8 of Representation of Peoples Act, 1951, Courts of law
should be slow and doubly cautious in ensuring that such suspension is
granted only in benefiting cases since it, virtually, overturns a statutory
mandate. Relevant observations read as under : –
“……..
11. Now, this Court will look into the special requirements of suspension
of conviction. Relying on Rama Narang (supra), the Supreme Court held
in A. Jaganathan (supra), that conviction can be suspended only if, non-
grant of such relief would result in damage which could not be undone, if
the appeal is ultimately allowed. Trifling matters, involving slight
disadvantage to the convicted person, cannot be recognised for the
purpose of suspension of conviction. In K.C. Sareen (supra), it was held
that the power to suspend the conviction, traceable to Section 389 CrPC,
should be exercised in very exceptional cases. The Court has to look into
all aspects, including the ramification of keeping such conviction in
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corruption charges against a public servant, the Order of conviction
cannot be suspended, pending Appeal. Gajanan (supra) restated that
suspension of conviction can only be in exceptional cases. In Ravikanth S.
Patil (supra), the Supreme Court summarized the legal position and
cautioned that the power has to be exercised only in exceptional
circumstances, where failure to stay the conviction would lead to injustice
and irreversible consequences. In Balakrishna Duttatrya Kumbhar
(supra), the Supreme Court held that the applicant must satisfy the Court
the evil which is likely to befall, if the conviction is not suspended. In Afjal
Ansari (supra), a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court was divided in
their opinion. Per majority, it was held that the peculiar facts of each case
will be the primary factor to be looked into. The likelihood of injustice or
irreversible consequences centered on factors including the criminal
antecedents, the gravity of the offence, its wider social impact, etc. were
also taken stock of. In that case, the Supreme Court undertook a prima
facie analysis of the merits of the judgment of the trial court, to hold that
there is no cogent evidence to establish that the appellant therein was
indulging in antisocial activities and crimes. Absence of corroborative
evidence that the appellant was responsible for influencing witnesses, etc.
was also taken into consideration. The Supreme Court went on to hold that
the conviction, if allowed to operate, would lead to irreparable damage,
which cannot be compensated in any monetary terms or otherwise, on the
event of his acquittal later. That, by itself, carves out an exceptional
situation, is the finding. The specific issue of the applicant’s right to
contest in the general election is seen considered in paragraph No. 17 of
the judgment. The effective disqualification, which may go up to a period
of ten years, was taken stock of as a relevant criteria falling under the
potential ramification to suspend the conviction. The fact that, unless the
conviction is stayed, the appellant therein would face disqualification in
the teeth of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act was taken
stock of. Ultimately, the Supreme Court, per majority judgment held that
since the appeal raises significant legal and factual issues, the appellant’s
future cannot be left hanging in the balance solely due to the conviction.
The conviction was suspended and the trial was directed to be expedited.
12. Having referred to the broad parameters of legal consideration for
suspension of conviction as propounded in the above dicta, this Court will
now address the specific issues involved in this case.
13. Although several grounds have been canvassed to attack the judgment
of conviction, it is trite that this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence
at this stage. As held in Rama Narang (supra), Sidhartha Vashisht (supra)
and Omprakash Sahni (supra), what could be looked into at this stage is a
palpable, manifest and apparent error in the judgment, so gross on the
face of the record, which, in turn, may render the judgment vulnerable for
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interference when the criminal appeal is finally heard. Even the above
exercise can only be within the parameters of ascertaining whether the
petitioner/accused has a fair chance of acquittal ultimately. Therefore, the
following two major aspects espoused by the learned Senior Counsel are
taken up for consideration, solely to ascertain whether the judgment
suffers from a manifest illegality, capable of casting a cloud on its
sustainability.
………….
………….
21. Now, coming to the irreversible consequence, specifically espoused for
the purpose of suspension/stay of conviction, it requires to be noticed that
a recent judgment of Supreme Court in Afjal Ansari (supra) recognised –
to a considerable extent – that depriving the right of the accused to
represent his constituency; the right of the constituency of its legitimate
representation in the legislature; and the embargo on the accused to
contest for future elections constitute irreversible consequences. However,
the first two situations hardly arises in the instant case, since on facts, the
period of the elected representatives had almost expired and a fresh
election is at the doorstep. Therefore, there arises no serious question of
the petitioner/A2 being deprived of his right to represent the constituency,
or for that matter, the constituency being deprived of its representation.
What is more significant to be considered is the interdiction to contest
future elections as per Section 8(3) of the R.P. Act, 1951.
22. Here, a distinction is liable to be drawn as between consequences
which follows as a result of a statutory mandate; and other consequences.
In the case of the former, the consequence is the very result created by the
statute makers, after due deliberation, in accord with the due process; and
hence it is doubtful, whether such a consequence can be propounded as
constituting sufficient cause for suspension of conviction under Section
389 CrPC Secondly, this Court may have to observe that a statutory
mandate in terms of Section 8(3) of the R.P. Act, has to be respected and
cannot be overturned by judicial interference, except to the limited extent
permissible by law and that too, for weighty and lofty reasons. One cannot
loose sight of the fact that the interdictory mandate under Section 8(3) of
the R.P. Act carries a definite purpose of keeping aloof from public life,
those persons whose credibility has been stained and tainted by a
conviction for specified offences or a sentence for a period more than two
years. To ensure purity of persons dabbling in public and political affairs
is the enviable object sought to be protected. The interpretation, for the
purpose of suspension of conviction, should necessarily sync with the
above laudable object. When the law is settled, that suspension/stay of
conviction, can only be in exceptional circumstances – as held in a catena
of decisions already referred above – I am of the opinion that, when it
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comes to a suspension/stay of conviction, in the context of the interdiction
under Section 8(3) of the R.P. Act, Courts of law should be slow and
doubly cautious in ensuring that such suspension/stay is granted only in
befitting cases, since it virtually overturns a statutory mandate.
23. Here, this Court also has to take stock of the legal position that the
initial presumption of innocence in favour of an accused is no longer
available, once he/she is convicted by a competent criminal court [see in
this regard Sidhartha Vashisht (supra) – quoted with approval in a recent
judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajendra Sadashiv Nikalje (supra)].
There cannot be any quarrel that a person convicted of an offence cannot
enjoy and exercise all the civil rights of an ordinary citizen. Necessary
fetters in terms of law is an inevitable consequence of conviction.
24. Having held so, I am of the definite opinion that a “very exceptional
circumstance” – as consistently coined in Ravikant S. Patil (supra),
Gajanan (supra), K.C. Sareen (supra) and Duttatrya Kumbhar (supra) –
should necessarily be borne out from the judgment impugned itself, that is
to say, a palpable perversity or patent unreasonableness writ large on the
face of the impugned judgment. The following excerpts from Omprakash
Sahni (supra) is apposite in this regard, though held in the context of
suspension of sentence:
“33….. However, while undertaking the exercise to ascertain
whether the convict has fair chances of acquittal, what is to be
looked into is something palpable. To put it in other words,
something which is very apparent or gross on the face of the
record, on the basis of which, the court can arrive at a prima facie
satisfaction that the conviction may not be sustainable……”
Therefore, it is neither in the interest of law, nor in public interest to
stay/suspend a conviction merely for the reason that the accused is an
M.L.A. or an M.P. and that his future chances of contesting election is in
jeopardy. Such jeopardy is nothing but a statutory legal consequence,
emanating from the judgment of conviction, duly entered into by a
competent court, in accord with the due process of law. Therefore, in the
absence of a serious infirmity or a fundamental flaw, probabilising
preponderently a possible interference with the judgment, ultimately
leading to the acquittal of the accused, the judgment of conviction is not
liable to be stayed/suspended. The existence of such a manifest and
palpable error, gross on the face of the record, in the instant facts, has
already been negated.”
37. Undoubtedly, if the conviction is not stayed, bye-election for Datia
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Constituency shall be held, as per the notified schedule.
38. Question is whether such factor, in itself, is compelling enough to
suspend the order on conviction.
39. The answer has to be in negative.
40. Reason is obvious.
41. Hardship has to be individual-centric i.e. specific to an individual.
42. A general and omnibus fallout cannot be taken as a case of individual
hardship.
43. Once any such elected representative is held guilty, he automatically,
in view of the legislative mandate, incurs disqualification, which, in turn,
can result in bye-election if the remainder period is substantial one. Thus,
any elected representative, in such a situation, would come up with a similar
prayer and, therefore, aspect related to irreversible consequence would,
generally speaking, be inherent. Viewed thus, the hardship is not classic to
an individual, but a universal and omnibus one, touching the entire class.
Such hardship is, thus, not for the appellant alone and would be true for all
others who held the seat and on pronouncement of guilt stand disqualified
and, therefore, in such a situation, the factual matrix of any given case
becomes the most dominant factor.
44. With the able assistance of learned counsel for both the sides, this
Court has gone through the relevant record and impugned judgment. The
same has been seen in the backdrop of rival contentions.
45. Indubitably, at the moment, there is no in-depth inquiry as
comprehensive arguments on the main appeal are yet to be advanced, but a
humble scrutiny does not reveal any palpable or manifest error in the
impugned judgment, suggesting findings of guilt to be absolutely
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unsustainable or unconscionable. The Trial Court Record has been received
which also contains the documents said to have been forged. What emerges
is that FD created for tenure of three years, came to be altered in stages, first
to ten years, and in due course to fifteen. It is the prosecution’s case that the
Trust, at the instance of the appellant and in conspiracy with his co-accused,
in a very systematic and calculated manner, continued to draw interest
wrongfully, thereby benefiting the appellant and his mother. The interest
@13.5% was drawn, year after year, for a stretch of thirteen years, from
1999 to 2011, long after the FD’s original three-year term had come to an
end. Reliance has also been placed on the fact that co-convict Prajapati, who
is said to have physically carried out these alterations, had himself, in a
departmental reply and a notarized affidavit given years before he was made
an accused, admitted to making the alterations and stated that he did so at
the instance of, and for the benefit of, his co-accused i.e. appellant herein
and his mother Savitri (since deceased). Such co-accused-Prajapati has been
held guilty for substantive offences under Sections 467, 468 r/w Section
120B IPC and also for Section 120B r/w Sections 420/467/468/471 IPC.
46. Thus, factual matrix, when analyzed on surface level, does not
persuade this Court to stay the order of conviction. No manifest illegality or
perversity, gross on the face of the record, so as to call for any interference,
at least, at this juncture.
47. Of course, the appellant does not have any prior involvement but the
facts presented before this Court do indicate that he abused his position and
failed to repose the faith that the people had in him. He was holding dual
responsibility. Besides being an elected representative, he was also
Chairman of the Bank in question. Despite the same, with apparent vested
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SONIA
THAPLIYAL
CRL.A. 328/2026 Page 15 of 16
Signing Date:10.07.2026
20:25:52
interest, he influenced the bank officials so that his own family Trust is
benefited. He has been held guilty for committing conspiracy related to
serious offences of forgery and cheating. These cannot be disregarded or
sidelined while taking prima facie view of the matter as these offences have
clear semblance to those concerning moral turpitude. Staying the conviction,
in the present factual scenario, would rather frustrate the very purpose, spirit
and objective behind incorporation of Section 8 of Representation of
Peoples Act, 1951.
48. Viewed thus, the present application seeking suspension of conviction
is, hereby, dismissed.
49. Needless to emphasize, observations appearing hereinabove are
tentative in nature and shall not prejudice the mind of this Court while
hearing final arguments in the main appeal.
(MANOJ JAIN)
JUDGE
JULY 10, 2026/dr/js/sa
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SONIA
THAPLIYAL
CRL.A. 328/2026 Page 16 of 16
Signing Date:10.07.2026
20:25:52
