Himachal Pradesh High Court
Sunil Kumar vs State Bank Of India on 10 July, 2026
2026:HHC:28007
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 534 of 2024
.
Reserved on: 30.06.2026
Date of Decision: 10.07.2026
Sunil Kumar ...Petitioner
of
Versus
State Bank of India ...Respondents
Coram
rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1No
For the Petitioner : Mr Rakesh Kumar, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Ms Kiran Sharma, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the judgment
dated 30.04.2024 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge
Chamba, Division Chamba, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide
which the judgment of conviction dated 13.07.2023 and order of
sentence dated 25.08.2023 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate
First Class Dalhousie, District Chamba (learned Trial Court) were
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same
manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for
.
convenience)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the
learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an
of
offence punishable under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the
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complainant is a body corporate constituted under the State Bank
of India Act and is engaged in banking activities. The complainant
advanced a home loan of ₹6,00,000/- to the accused on
28.09.2015. The accused undertook to repay the amount along with
the interest and other charges. The accused failed to honour the
agreement, and the loan account became a Non-Performing Asset
(NPA). The complainant demanded the money, and the accused
issued a cheque of ₹5,95,000/- to repay the money. The
complainant presented the cheque for encashment, but it was
dishonoured with an endorsement “insufficient funds”. The
complainant served a notice upon the accused, asking him to repay
the money within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice.
The notice was duly served upon the accused, but the accused
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failed to repay the money. Hence, a complaint was filed before the
Court for taking action as per the law.
.
3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon
the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation
was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and
of
claimed to be tried.
4. The complainant examined Sunil Sharma (CW1) to
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prove its complaint.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), admitted that the
complainant had advanced a house loan of ₹6,00,000/- to him. He
denied the rest of the complainant’s case. He stated that he was
paying regular instalments to the bank. He had not issued any
cheque in favour of the bank. He failed to produce any evidence,
and the learned Trial Court closed the evidence by the order of the
Court on 27.04.2023.
6. Learned Trial Court held that there is a presumption
attached to the cheque that it was issued for consideration to
discharge the debt/liability. The accused admitted in his statement
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recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that he had taken the loan
of ₹6,00,000 from the complainant. He claimed that he was
.
repaying the money as per the instalments. However, he did not
produce any evidence to establish this defence. Even if the cheque
was issued as a security, it would attract the provisions of Section
138 of the NI Act. The cheque was dishonoured with an
of
endorsement “insufficient funds”, and the accused failed to repay
the money despite the receipt of a valid notice of demand. Hence,
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the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of
an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and
sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months and
pay a compensation of ₹6,50,000/- to the complainant.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned
Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chamba, Division Chamba
(learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with
the findings recorded by Learned Trial Court that a cheque carries
with it a presumption that it was issued for consideration to
discharge the debt/liability. The accused failed to rebut this
presumption by leading any satisfactory evidence. The cheque was
dishonoured with the endorsement “insufficient funds”. The
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notice was duly served upon the accused, and he failed to repay the
amount. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court is not
.
excessive. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by
the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision
asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the
of
material on record. The complainant’s witness did not say that he
had personal knowledge of the transaction. The complaint was not
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filed by an authorised officer. The learned courts below failed to
appreciate this aspect. Hence, it was prayed that the present
revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the
learned Courts below be set aside.
9. I have heard Mr Rakesh Thakur, learned counsel for the
petitioner/accused, and Ms Kiran Sharma, learned counsel for the
respondent/complainant.
10. Mr Rakesh Thakur, learned counsel for the
petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred
in appreciating the material on record. The complainant had failed
to prove the existence of a debt/liability. Sunil Sharma (CW1) was
not authorised to make the statement on behalf of the
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complainant, and the learned Courts below erred in relying upon
his testimony. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be
.
allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts
below be set aside.
11. Ms Kiran Sharma, learned counsel for the
respondent/complainant, submitted that both the learned Courts
of
below have concurrently held that the accused had issued a cheque
in favour of the complainant and that the accused had failed to
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rebut the presumption attached to the cheque. This is a pure
finding of fact, and this Court should not interfere with the pure
finding of facts recorded by the learned courts below. The accused
admitted the taking of the loan and learned Court’s below had
rightly held that the cheque was issued for consideration to
discharge the debt/liability. Hence, she prayed that the present
revision be dismissed.
12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3
SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not
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an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of
jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: –
.
“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the
outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings
of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed
appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record.
The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not
supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court,
and the scope of interference in revision is extremelyof
narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short
“CrPC“) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
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order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any
proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the
provision is to set right a patent defect or an error ofjurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that
is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is
also well settled that while considering the same, theRevisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and
evidence of the case to reverse those findings.
14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under
Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to
call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the
purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities
of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this
provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of
jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such
proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court
in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4::: Downloaded on – 10/07/2026 20:47:07 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:28007SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where the scope of
Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as
under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the.
power to call for and examine the records of an inferior
court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the
legality and regularity of any proceedings or ordermade in a case. The object of this provision is to set
right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law.
There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not beof
appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders,
which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful
consideration and appear to be in accordance with law.
If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it
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emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked
where the decisions under challenge are grosslyerroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions
of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence,
material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is
exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are notexhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case
would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional
jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuiltrestrictions is that it should not be against an interim or
interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that theexercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to
injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the
question as to whether the charge has been framed properly
and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be
reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the
categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a
much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”
15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC
165: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High
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Court to re-appreciate the evidence and draw its conclusions in the
absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
.
“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of
Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the
revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v.
Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452:
1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid
down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)of
5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can
call for and examine the record of any proceedings to
satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety
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of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the
jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercisedby the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of
justice. But the said revisional power cannot be
equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it
be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for
the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come
to its conclusion on the same when the evidence hasalready been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as
the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaringfeature is brought to the notice of the High Court
which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage
of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment ofthe High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have
no hesitation in concluding that the High Court
exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the
conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral
evidence. …”
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and
relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in
Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke,
(2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that
the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction,
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shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it
is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-
consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be
set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible.
.
The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)
“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is
perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly
unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any
relevant material or there is palpable misreading of
records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting
of
aside the order, merely because another view is possible.
The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate
court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is
to preserve the power in the court to do justice in
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accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.
The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to
401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal.
Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought
to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law
or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or
where the decision is based on no material or where the
material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the
courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of
their revisional jurisdiction.”
16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh
Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)
309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:
“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity,
upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional
Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.
Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is::: Downloaded on – 10/07/2026 20:47:07 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:28007a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court
will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court
having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.
The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the.
negative.”
17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.
Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:
“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional
of
jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of
perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh
(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the
Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence
rt
on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.
Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is
a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court
will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court
having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.
28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the
absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in
the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the
concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions
Court.”
18. The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
19. Sunil Sharma (CW1) reiterated the contents of the
complaint in his affidavit. He stated in his cross-examination that
the loan was taken by the accused in the year 2015. He admitted
that the payments were being made regularly till 2017, and the loan
account became NPA in the year 2018. He denied that security
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cheques were taken at the time of disbursal of the loan. The cheque
was issued on 01.05.2018. He admitted that he had not filed the
.
complaint, and the complaint was filed by Mr Nagesh Sood, who
was still posted as a Manager.
20. It was submitted that the complaint was filed through
Mr Nagesh Sood, but he did not appear before the Court, and an
of
adverse inference should have been drawn against the complainant
for withholding him. This submission cannot be accepted. The
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accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of
the Cr.P.C. that he had taken the house loan from the complainant.
Thus, the loan transaction was not in dispute. There is nothing in
the cross-examination of Sunil Sharma (CW1) that he was not
aware of the facts of the case. An adverse inference can be drawn
when the evidence on record is insufficient 2. Therefore, the
submission that an adverse inference has to be drawn against the
complainant for withholding the best evidence cannot be accepted.
21. It was submitted that the complaint was filed without
any authority and was not maintainable. This submission cannot
be accepted. The cheque (Ext.C3) was issued in the name of State
Bank of India, Banikhet. The complaint was filed by State Bank of
2
Pandurang Jivaji Apte v. Ramchandra Gangadhar Ashtekar, (1981) 4 SCC 569, and Rattan Dev
v. Pasam Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 441
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India, Banikhet, represented by Branch Manager Nagesh Sood.
State Bank of India is a juristic person that is incapable of
.
personally filing the complaint and has to be represented by a
natural person. No question was asked in the cross-examination of
Sunil Sharma that the manager had no authority to institute the
complaint. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s
of
MMTC Limited versus M/s. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd.,
2001 STPL 14773 SC, that the complaint cannot be quashed simply
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because the authorisation was not proper. It was observed:
“11. This Court has, as far back as, in the case of Vishwa
Mitter v. O.P. Poddar, 1984(1) RCR (Crl.) 196: 1983(4) SCC 701,
held that it is clear that anyone can set the criminal law inmotion by filing a complaint of facts constituting an offence
before a Magistrate entitled to take cognisance. It has been
held that no court can decline to take cognisance on the soleground that the complainant was not competent to file the
complaint. It has been held that if any special statuteprescribes offences and makes any special provision for
taking cognisance of such offences under the statute, then
the complainant requesting the Magistrate to takecognisance of the offence must satisfy the eligibility
criterion prescribed by the statute. In the present case, the
only eligibility criterion prescribed by Section 142 is that the
complaint must be by the payee or the holder in due course.
This criterion is satisfied as the complaint is in the name and
on behalf of the appellant company.
12. In the case of Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand,
1998(1) RCR (Crl.) 309: 1998(1) SCC 687, it has been held by
this Court that the complainant has to be a corporeal person
who is capable of making a physical appearance in the Court.
It has been held that if a complaint is made in the name of an::: Downloaded on – 10/07/2026 20:47:07 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:28007incorporeal person (like a company or corporation), it is
necessary that a natural person represent such a juristic
person in the court. It is held that the court looks upon the
natural person to be the complainant for all practical.
purposes. It is held that when the complainant is a body
corporate, it is the de jure complainant, and it must
necessarily associate a human being as a de facto
complainant to represent the former in court proceedings. Ithas further been held that no Magistrate shall insist that the
particular person, whose statement was taken on oath at the
first instance, alone can continue to represent the companyof
till the end of the proceedings. It has been suggested that
there may be occasions when different persons can
represent the company. It has been held that it is open to the
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de jure complainant company to seek permission of the
court to send any other person to represent the company in
court. Thus, even presuming that initially there was noauthority, the Company can, at any stage, rectify that defect.
At a subsequent stage, the Company can send a person who
is competent to represent the company. The complaintscould thus not have been quashed on this ground.”
22. It was laid down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court
in SBI v. Kashmir Art Printing Press, 1981 SCC OnLine P&H 37: AIR
1981 P&H 188 that the branch manager of the State Bank of India
has the authority to file a plaint, written statement, petition and all
other documents in connection with the legal proceedings and sign
the vakalatnama on behalf of the bank. It was observed:
“In order to appreciate the point whether the branch
manager of a local branch of the State Bank of India has the
power to sign and verify the pleadings and to institute and
defend the legal proceedings in a court, it will be useful to
refer to the various provisions of the State Bank of India Act,
1955 (hereinafter called “the Act”), so that the scheme of the::: Downloaded on – 10/07/2026 20:47:07 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:28007Act can be noticed. Under s. 3(1) of the Act, the State Bank of
India was to be constituted to carry on the business of
banking and other business in accordance with the
provisions of the Act and for taking over the undertaking of.
the Imperial Bank. It is admitted that the State Bank of India
was constituted, and the State Bank of India so constituted
was to be a body corporate with perpetual succession and
was to sue and could be sued in that name as provided by s.
3(2) of the Act. According to s. 16(1) of the Act, the central
office of the State Bank was to be at Bombay, and according
to sub-s. (2), the local head offices in Bombay, Calcutta andof
Madras and at such other places in India as the Central Govt.
may provide in consultation with the Central Board. It
deserves to be mentioned here that a local head office was
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constituted at Chandigarh in accordance with s. 16(2). vide
notification dated 20th August, 1979, published on 1st
September, 1979, in Pt. II of the Gazette of the Governmentof India, p 99. The management of the affairs of the State
Bank has been entrusted to the Central Board by virtue of s.
17. The Central Board was to be guided by the directions of
the Central Government as required by s. 18. According to s.
21 of the Act, local boards are to be constituted at places
where the State Bank has a local head office which are toconsist of the members mentioned in the section. The “local
board” has been defined in s. 2(dd) to mean a local boardconstituted under s. 21. Section 21B defines the powers of the
local board in respect of the area served for which a local
head office is constituted and according to this section, thelocal board is to exercise all powers and perform all
functions and duties of the State Bank in relation to the
business of the banking and shall also exercise such other
powers and perform such other functions and duties as may
be conferred on or assigned to it by the Central Board as
otherwise prescribed and subject to any other general or
special instructtions which the Central Board may give from
time to time. The net result of the reading of the provision is
that for the area under the local head office, the Local Board
has full powers to do what the Central Board has. Under s. 30
of the Act, the Central Board has been authorised to::: Downloaded on – 10/07/2026 20:47:07 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:28007constitute an executive committee or other committees and
delegate to the executive committee or other committees
such powers as the Central Board may consider necessary.
This section deals with the delegation of powers of the.
Central Board to the executive committee or other
committees. Under s. 43(2), the Central Board has been
authorised to delegate such powers and duties as it deems
proper to the officers, advisers and employees of the StateBank. Regulations are to be framed under s. 50 of the Act.
Section 50(2)(m) and (n) provides for the framing of
Regulations regarding the conduct and defence of legalof
proceedings and the manner of signing proceedings, besides
providing the duties and conduct of the officers, other
employees, advisers and agents of the State Bank. Sub-s. (3)
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provides that the first regulations are to be made by the
Reserve Bank with the previous sanction of the Central Govt,
which shall be the regulations of the Central Board underthis provision and shall have force accordingly until they are
amended or repealed.
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s. (3) of Section
50 of the Act, the Reserve Bank of India, with the previous
sanction of the Central Govt, made certain regulations.
Regulation 77, which is relevant, deserves to be noticed forthe decision of the point involved in these cases and is as
follows:
“77. Plaints, written statements, petitions, and
applications may be signed and verified, affidavits may besworn or affirmed, bonds may be signed, sealed and
delivered, and generally all other documents connected
with legal proceedings whether contentious or non-
contentious may be made and completed on behalf of the
State Bank by the Chairman or by any officer or employee
empowered by or under regulation 76 to sign documents
for and on behalf of the State Bank.
A reading of the aforesaid regulation shows that the plaints,
written statements, petitions and applications can be signed
and verified, and similar other documents, including
documents connected with legal proceedings, could be made::: Downloaded on – 10/07/2026 20:47:07 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:28007and completed on behalf of the State Bank by the chairman
or by an officer or an employee empowered by and under the
regulation. 76. A reading of regln. 76 shows that the power of
signing the documents has been given to the vice-chairman,.
the managing directors, the deputy managing directors, the
chief general managers and such other officers or employees
of the State Bank as the Central Board or the executive
committee may authorise in this behalf by notification in theGazette of India. In pursuance of the powers conferred under
the regulations. 76, a notification dated 17th September,
1959, was published in the Govt of India Gazette, Part III,of
section 4, dated 26th September, 1959, by virtue of which it
authorised “agents” besides other persons, to sign the
documents mentioned in the regulation. 76 and, therefore,
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by virtue of regln. 77, an agent would be entitled to sign the
pleadings, verify the documents, etc., and also to sign
generally all other documents connected with the legalproceedings on behalf of the State Bank. Later on, the
designation of agents was redesignated as branch managers
by virtue of a notification dated 21st June, 1972, published inthe Govt. of India Gazette, Part III, section 4, dated 26th
August, 1972, which came into force with effect from 1st
September, 1972. The resultant effect was that on and after1st September, 1972, a branch manager was entitled to sign
and verify pleadings and was authorised generally tocomplete all other documents connected with legal
proceedings besides other matters. It is not disputed that the
present suits were instituted at the instance of the respectivebranch managers in respect of the matters arising in their
branches, and the plaints and vakalatnamas were signed by
them.
After hearing the parties at considerable length, I am of the
view that a branch manager had the authority not only to
sign the pleadings and verify them, but had the authority to
sign a vakalatnama to authorise an advocate to file a suit or
to file the same himself. This is amply borne out by looking
at the entire scheme of the Act and particularly s. 50(2)(m)
and (n), coupled with reglns. 76 and 77. According to the
counsel for the respondents, regulations could be framed on::: Downloaded on – 10/07/2026 20:47:07 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:28007three matters as enumerated in the clause. (m), that is, to
make a provision for the conduct of legal proceedings, for
the defence of legal proceedings and the manner of signing
pleadings. But, in the present case, regulation has been made.
only for the third purpose, i.e., for signing the pleadings and
not for the other two purposes. On the other hand, the stand
of the counsel for the State Bank of India is that the first
authority to act on behalf of the State Bank of India vests inthe Central Board and, in the case of local head offices, in the
local boards. In order to carry out the purposes of the Act, s.
50(1) provides for the making of regulations under the Actof
and under clauses. (m) and (n) specific powers have been
given for making regulations in regard to the conduct of the
legal proceedings and about other details and conduct of the
rt
officers of the State Bank. In furtherance of the aforesaid
power, regulations. 76 and 77 were framed, and according to
the learned counsel, these regulations have to be liberallyconstrued so as to convey that whatever was provided in the
clauses. (m) and (n) were to be regulated by regulations 76
and 77, and regulations. 77 could not be construed in alimited manner as was sought to be done by the counsel for
the defendants-respondents. I find merit in the contention
of the learned counsel for the State Bank of India. Regulation77 is quite comprehensive. If the words “generally all other
documents connected with legal proceedings, whethercontentious or non-contentions may be made and completed
on behalf of the State Bank” had not been mentioned in the
regulations. 77, something might have been said for thedefendants, but the use of the aforesaid words clearly goes to
show that the authorised officer has been given power to
sign all documents connected with the legal proceedings,
and one of the documents would be a vakalatnama, which
the concerned officer could sign in favour of an advocate. It
cannot be disputed that a vakalatnama is a document
connected with the legal proceedings, and when, admittedly,
in the present cases, the concerned branch managers had
executed vakalatnamas in favour of the counsel, who
presented the plaints, it cannot be said that the presentation::: Downloaded on – 10/07/2026 20:47:07 :::CIS
19
2026:HHC:28007of the plaints in court by the advocates was not a proper
presentation.
The aforesaid view of mine finds full support from a Privy
Council decision in Delhi and London Bank Ltd. v. A. Oldham.
[1893] ILR 21 Cal 60 (PC), Chandra Sekhar Zamindari Co. Ltd. v.
Ram Kumar Haidar, AIR 1914 Cal 782, M.C.S. Rajan and
Company v. National Nail Industries [1975] ILR 2 Mad 486,United Bank of India v. Prabhas Ch. Deb, AIR 1977 Cal 55 and a
decision of the Delhi High Court in Suit No. 653 of 1974, State
Bank of India v. Sawhney Finance Company, decided on 25thof
October, 1978 (reported in (1982) 52 Comp Cas 430).
Even apart from the aforesaid reasoning, I am of the view
that the larger authority granted to the branch manager to
sign the plaints, written statements, petitions and
rt
applications and all other documents connected with the
legal proceedings, should include the power to file suits,written statements and other documents in court. I cannot
lose sight of the fact that the State Bank of India has
branches all over the country and a special statute, namely,
the Act, was framed for its working. The bankingtransactions are taken up in every branch office and if one
were to accept the argument of the defendants, even if suits
can be filed within limitation after getting the sanction fromthe Central Board or the local board, at least the first appeals,
which will lie before the district judge, would always betime-barred because I do not think it would be possible to
get instructions from the Central Board or the local board toinstitute an appeal within the period of thirty days.
For the reasons recorded above, I hold that the suits were not
only properly filed and instituted by the branch managers,
but they had the authority to engage counsel and sign the
vakalatnamas, and the presentation of the plaints by the
advocates is a proper institution of the suits. Accordingly,
the findings to the contrary recorded by the courts below in
all four cases are set aside.
23. It was held in SBI v. Indian Utility Products, 2000 SCC
OnLine Del 363: ILR (2000) 2 Del 60 that the words all other
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documents connected with the legal proceedings are quite
comprehensive and would include all the documents signed in
.
connection with legal proceedings. It was observed at page 63:
“5…Regulation No. 77 of the State Bank of India General
Regulations, 1955 provides that the plaints, writtenstatements, petitions, and applications may be signed and
verified, affidavits may be sworn or affirmed, bonds may be
signed, scaled and delivered, and generally all otherof
documents connected with legal proceedings whether
contentious or non-contentious may be made and completed
on behalf of the State Bank by the Chairman or by any officer
rt
or employee empowered by or under Regulation, 76 to sign
documents for and on behalf of the State Bank. In pursuance
of the powers conferred under Regulation 76, a notificationdated 17th September, 1959 was published in the
Government of India Gazette, Part-III, Section 4, dated 26th
September, 1959 by virtue of which, besides other persons,Agents were authorised to sign the documents mentioned in
Regulation 76. Later on, the designation of Agents was
redesignated as Branch Managers by virtue of a notificationdated 21st June, 1972, published in the Government of India
Gazette, Part-III, Section 4, dated 26th August, 1972, whichcame into force w.e.f. 1st September, 1972. Thus, w.e.f. 1st
September, 1972, a Branch Manager was entitled to sign and
verify the pleadings and authorised generally to complete allother documents connected with legal proceedings, besides
other matters. In the decision in State Bank of
India v. Kashmir Art Printing Press, (1983) 54 Comp Cas 56 it
was held that the use in said Regulation of the words
‘generally all other documents connected with legal
proceedings whether contentious or non-contentious, may
be made and completed on behalf of the State Bank’, are
quite comprehensive and the authorised officer has been
given power to sign all documents connected with legal
proceedings and one of such documents would be a
vakalatnama and the presentation of plaints in Court by an::: Downloaded on – 10/07/2026 20:47:07 :::CIS
21
2026:HHC:28007advocate in whose favour vakalatnama has been executed,
would be a proper presentation…..”
24. Therefore, the submission that the complaint was filed
.
by an unauthorised person cannot be accepted. The complaint was
filed on behalf of the payee, a juristic person, by a natural person,
and cannot be said to be bad.
of
25. The complainant’s witness Sunil Sharma (CW1) denied
in his cross-examination that the cheque was taken as security,
rt
which means that his statement in the examination-in-chief
contained in the affidavit (Ext.C1) that the cheque was issued by the
accused is not in dispute. The accused claimed in his statement
recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that he had not issued any
cheque. However, he never appeared in the witness box to establish
this version and relied upon his statement recorded under Section
313 Cr.P.C. to prove his defence. It was held in Sumeti Vij v.
Paramount Tech Fab Industries, (2022) 15 SCC 689: 2021 SCC OnLine
SC 201 that the accused has to lead defence evidence to rebut the
presumption and mere denial in his statement under Section 313 of
Cr.P.C. is not sufficient. It was observed at page 700:
“20. That apart, when the complainant exhibited all these
documents in support of his complaints and recorded the
statement of three witnesses in support thereof, the
appellant recorded her statement under Section 313 of the::: Downloaded on – 10/07/2026 20:47:07 :::CIS
22
2026:HHC:28007Code but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the
presumption in support of her defence available under
Section 139 of the Act. The statement of the accused recorded
under Section 313 of the Code is not substantive evidence of.
defence, but only an opportunity for the accused to explain the
incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution’s case
against the accused. Therefore, there is no evidence to rebut the
presumption that the cheques were issued for consideration.”
(Emphasis supplied)”
26. Therefore, the statement of the accused recorded under
of
Section 313 of Cr.P.C. was not a legally admissible statement, andthe accused cannot derive any advantage from it.
rt
27. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held
that the issuance of the cheque and the signatures on the cheque
were duly proved.
28. Learned Courts below had rightly held that once
issuance of the cheque and signatures on the cheque are admitted,
a presumption would arise that the cheque was issued for
consideration to discharge the debt/liability. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti
International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724, that when the
issuance of a cheque and signature on the cheque are not disputed,
a presumption would arise that the cheque was issued in discharge
of the legal liability. It was observed: –
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“9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and because
the accused has admitted the issuance of the cheques and his
signature on the cheque and that the cheque in question was
issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were.
dishonoured and that even according to the accused some
amount was due and payable, there is a presumption under
Section 139 of the NI Act that there exists a legally
enforceable debt or liability. Of course, such a presumption is
rebuttable. However, to rebut the presumption, the accused
was required to lead evidence that the full amount due and
payable to the complainant had been paid. In the present
of
case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The story
put forward by the accused that the cheques were given by
way of security is not believable in the absence of further
rt
evidence to rebut the presumption, and more particularly,
the cheque in question was issued for the second time after
the earlier cheques were dishonoured. Therefore, both the
courts below have materially erred in not properly
appreciating and considering the presumption in favour of
the complainant that there exists a legally enforceable debt
or liability as per Section 139 of the NI Act. It appears that
both the learned trial court as well as the High Court have
committed an error in shifting the burden upon the
complainant to prove the debt or liability, without
appreciating the presumption under Section 139 of the NI
Act. As observed above, Section 139 of the Act is an example
of a reverse onus clause and therefore, once the issuance of
the cheque has been admitted and even the signature on the
cheque has been admitted, there is always a presumption in
favour of the complainant that there exists legally
enforceable debt or liability and thereafter, it is for the
accused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence.”
29. A similar view was taken in N. Vijay Kumar v. Vishwanath
Rao N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873, wherein it was held as under:
“6. Section 118 (a) assumes that every negotiable instrument
is made or drawn for consideration, while Section 139 creates
a presumption that the holder of a cheque has received the::: Downloaded on – 10/07/2026 20:47:07 :::CIS
24
2026:HHC:28007cheque in discharge of a debt or liability. Presumptions
under both are rebuttable, meaning they can be rebutted by
the accused by raising a probable defence.”
30. This position was reiterated in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.
.
Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:
“ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED,
PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI ACT
ARISEof
15. In the present case, the cheque in question has
admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1-Accused.
This Court is of the view that once the execution of the
cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of the
rt
NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for
consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of theNI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said cheque
in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability arises
against the accused. It is pertinent to mention that
observations to the contrary by a two-Judge Bench inKrishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC
54, have been set aside by a three-Judge Bench in Rangappa
(supra).
16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this
presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques as
a mode of payment in commercial transactions.
17. Needless to mention that the presumption contemplated
under Section 139 of the NI Act is rebuttable. However, the
initial onus of proving that the cheque is not in discharge of
any debt or other liability is on the accused/drawer of the
cheque [See: Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197].
31. Thus, the learned Courts below were justified in raising
the presumption that the cheque was issued in discharge of the
liability for consideration.
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2026:HHC:28007
32. The accused claimed in his statement recorded under
Section 313 of the Cr.P.C that he was regularly paying the loan
.
instalment to the bank. This is not established by the copy of the
statement of Account (Ext.C2) in which the payments of ₹8,000/-
each are shown to have been made on 23.10.2017, 08.12.2017, and
15.01.2018. Thus, only an amount of ₹24,000/- out of an amount of
of
₹6,00,000/- has been returned. The accused did not produce any
evidence to establish that he had regularly paid the loan
rt
instalments to the bank. The statement of account shows that an
amount of ₹5,95,919.39/- was due on 30.04.2018. The cheque was
issued on 01.05.2018 for a consideration of ₹5,95,000/-. Therefore,
it was duly proved on record that the cheque was issued to repay
the debt taken by the accused.
33. It was submitted that the person in whose presence the
loan was advanced to the accused was not examined, and Sunil
Sharma (CW1) was not posted in the branch at the time of disbursal
of the loan. This submission will not help the accused. As already
stated, the accused has not disputed the taking of the loan.
Therefore, the disbursal of the loan was not in question. The only
question was whether the loan had been returned by the accused.
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Thus, no adverse inference can be drawn for withholding the
person in whose presence the loan amount was disbursed.
.
34. There is no other evidence to rebut the presumption
attached to the cheque. Sunil Sharma (CW1) denied the suggestions
given to him in the cross-examination that the accused is not
liable to pay anything to the bank or that the cheque was issued as
of
security. A denied suggestion does not amount to any proof, and
the learned Courts below were justified in not relying upon the
rt
denied suggestions of the accused.
35. Sunil Sharma (CW1) stated that the cheque was
dishonoured with an endorsement “insufficient funds”. This is
duly corroborated by the memo of dishonour (Ext.C2), in which the
reason for return has been mentioned as “funds insufficient”.
Section 146 of the NI Act provides a presumption of correctness to
the memo of dishonour. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore, (2010)
3 SCC 83: (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 625: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1: 2010 SCC
OnLine SC 155 that the memo issued by the Bank is presumed to be
correct and the burden is upon the accused to rebut the
presumption. It was observed at page 95:
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2026:HHC:28007
“24. Section 146, making a major departure from the
principles of the Evidence Act, provides that the bank’s slip
or memo with the official mark showing that the cheque was
dishonoured would, by itself, give rise to the presumption of.
dishonour of the cheque, unless and until that fact was
disproved. Section 147 makes the offences punishable under
the Act compoundable.”
36. In the present case, no evidence was produced to rebut
the presumption, and the learned Courts below had rightly held
of
that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement
‘insufficient funds.’
37.
rt
Sunil Sharma (CW1) stated that the notice was duly
served upon the accused. This part of his testimony was not
disputed in the cross-examination, and the learned Courts below
had rightly accepted the same. The accused claimed that he had not
received the notice, but this plea will not help him. It was laid down
in C.C. Allavi Haji vs. Pala Pelly Mohd. 2007(6) SCC 555, that the
person who claims that he had not received the notice has to pay
the amount within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the
summons from the Court and in case of failure to do so, he cannot
take the advantage of the fact that notice was not received by him.
It was observed:
“It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving
notice is a clear departure from the rule of Criminal Law,
where there is no stipulation of giving notice before filing a::: Downloaded on – 10/07/2026 20:47:07 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:28007complaint. Any drawer who claims that he did not receive the
notice sent by post, can, within 15 days of receipt of summons
from the court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of
the Act, make payment of the cheque amount and submit to the.
Court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of
summons (by receiving a copy of the complaint with the
summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be rejected.
A person who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of thesummons from the Court, along with the copy of the complaint
under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that there
was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138, byof
ignoring the statutory presumption to the contrary under Section
27 of the G.C. Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In our
view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat
rt
the very object of the legislation. As observed in Bhaskaran’s
case (supra), if the giving of notice in the context of Clause
(b) of the proviso was the same as the receipt of notice, a
trickster cheque drawer would get the premium to avoid
receiving the notice by adopting different strategies and
escape from the legal consequences of Section 138 of theAct.” (Emphasis supplied)
38. The accused did not claim that he had repaid the
amount to the complainant; therefore, it was duly proved on record
that the accused had failed to repay the amount despite the receipt
of the notice.
39. Thus, it was duly proved before the learned Trial Court
that the accused had issued a cheque to discharge his legal liability,
the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient
funds’, and the accused failed to pay the money despite the receipt
of a notice of demand. Hence, all the ingredients of the offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied, and
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the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused for the
commission of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI
.
Act.
40. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 6 months and pay a
compensation of ₹6,50,000/-. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
of
Supreme Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197:
(2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 138
rt
that the penal provision of section 138 is deterrent in nature. It wasobserved at page 203:
“6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable instruments,
including cheques, and to encourage and promote the use of
negotiable instruments, including cheques, in financialtransactions. The penal provision of Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act is intended to be a deterrent tocallous issuance of negotiable instruments such as cheques
without serious intention to honour the promise implicit inthe issuance of the same.”
41. Keeping in view the deterrent nature of the punishment,
the sentence of six months cannot be said to be excessive.
42. The cheque was issued on 01.05.2018, and the learned
Trial Court imposed the sentence on 25.08.2023 after the lapse of
nearly 5 years from the date of issuance of the cheque. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalamani Tex v. P.
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Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2
SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75 that the Courts should
.
uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with
simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. It was observed at
page 291: –
19. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf of
of
the respondent, we are conscious of the settled principles
that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not only punitive but
also compensatory and restitutive. The provisions of NIA
envision a single window for criminal liability for the
rt
dishonour of a cheque as well as civil liability for the
realisation of the cheque amount. It is also well settled thatthere needs to be a consistent approach towards awarding
compensation, and unless there exist special circumstances,
the courts should uniformly levy fines up to twice the cheque
amount along with simple interest @ 9% p.a. [R. Vijayan v.
Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260, para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1
SCC (Cri) 520]”
43. The complainant had to engage a counsel and file the
complaint before the learned Trial Court. It lost the interest that it
would have gained by advancing the loan to another person and
was entitled to be compensated for the loss. Hence, a
compensation of ₹55,000/- awarded on the cheque amount of
₹5,95,000/- cannot be said to be excessive, requiring an
interference from the Court.
44. No other point was urged.
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45. In view of the above, there is no infirmity in the
judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the
.
present revision fails and is dismissed.
46. The present revision stands disposed of, and so are the
pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.
47. The record of the learned Courts below be returned with
of
a copy of the judgment.
rt (Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
10th July, 2026
(Nikita)
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