Telangana High Court
B. Chakrapani vs Boda Satyakumari And 3 Others on 7 July, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
M.A.C.M.A.Nos.3447 AND 3734 of 2012
Date: 07.07.2026
M.A.C.M.A.No.3447 of 2012
Between:
B.Chakrapani ....Appellant
AND
Boda Satyakumari and others ...Respondents
M.A.C.M.A.No.3734 of 2012
Between:
Boda Satyakumari and others ....Appellants
AND
B. Charkarapni and another ....Respondents
COMMON JUDGMENT:
These two appeals arise out of the order and decree dated
30.08.2012 passed by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal
(Judge, Family Court-cum-Additional District Judge), Khammam
(for short, “the learned Tribunal”) in M.V.O.P. No.54 of 2010.
2. M.A.C.M.A. No.3447 of 2012 has been filed by respondent
No.1 before the learned Tribunal, being the owner of the offending
vehicle, questioning the liability fastened upon him to satisfy the
award passed by the learned Tribunal, whereas M.A.C.M.A.
No.3734 of 2012 has been preferred by the claimants seeking
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enhancement of the compensation awarded by the learned
Tribunal.
3. Since both the appeals arise out of the same order and
decree and pertain to the same motor vehicle accident and the
award passed thereon, they were head together and are being
disposed of by this common judgment.
4. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter be
referred to as they were arrayed before the learned Tribunal.
BRIEF FACTS:
5. The brief facts of the case, as borne out from the available
record are as under:
A) The claimants being the wife, un-married daughter and
mother of late Boda Soloman Raju (hereinafter referred to as “the
deceased”), filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 against the respondents claiming compensation
of Rs.8,00,000/- on account of the death of the deceased in a
motor vehicle accident that occurred on 28.05.2005.
B) The deceased was employed as a General Mazdoor in the
Senior Auto Workshop of Singareni Collieries Company Limited
(‘SCCL’), Kothagudem. On 28.05.2005, at about 7.45 PM, while the
deceased was proceeding from his residence on a Hero Honda
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Macma_3447 & 3734_2012Splendor Motorcycle bearing registration No.AP-20-T/R-AA-5410,
to deliver food to his mother, and when he reached near the
C.M.P.F. Office of the SCCL, Kothagudem on B.T Road, another
Hero Honda Splendor Motorcycle bearing registration No.AP-20/H-
3486 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the offending vehicle’), ridden by in
a rash and negligent manner and at a high speed came from the
opposite direction and collided with the motorcycle of the deceased.
As a result of the impact, the deceased sustained grievous injuries,
injuries to his right forehead, fracture of right frontal bone above
the right eye, fracture of skull and multiple bleeding injuries all
over the body.
C) Immediately after the accident, the deceased was shifted to
Singareni Collieries Company Limited, Main Hospital, Kothagudem
for treatment. While undergoing treatment, he succumbed to the
injuries on the same day at about 11.45 P.M. The motorcycle of
the deceased was also completely damaged and the pillion rider of
offending vehicle by name Suresh Kumar, also sustained grievous
injuries.
D) On the basis of complaint, the Police Kothagudem Town-I
Police Station, registered a case vide Crime No.82 of 2005 for the
offences under Sections 304 (A) and 337 of the IPC. Accordingly to
the claimants, the deceased was a hale and healthy prior to the
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accident and was contributing his earnings towards the
maintenance of the family. His untimely death caused them
immense mental agony and financial hardship. Accordingly, the
claimants sought compensation of Rs.8,00,000/-, jointly and
severally from opposite party Nos.1 and 2, who are the
owner/insured and insurer of the offending vehicle respectively.
6. Before the learned Tribunal, respondent No.1 did not file any
counter and whereas respondent No.2/Insurance Company
contested the claim by filing a counter inter alia contending that
the claim made by the claimants was excessive and also disputed
the age, occupation, avocation, earning capacity, medical
expenditure incurred and manner of the accident. It was further
argued that the driver of the offending motorcycle did not possess
valid driving license at the time of the accident and committed
breach of conditions, as such, prayed to dismiss the claim petition.
7. Upon considering the rival contentions and the evidence
adduced on behalf of both sides, the learned Tribunal partly
allowed the claim petition awarding compensation of Rs.8,00,000/-
with 7.5% interest per annum fastening liability upon respondent
No.1/owner of the offending vehicle alone, while dismissing the
claim against the respondent No.2/Insurance Company. Aggrieved
thereby, the claimants filed MACMA No.3734/2012 seeking
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enhancement of compensation and the respondent N.1/owner of
the offending vehicle filed MACMA No.3447/2012 challenging the
liability imposed against him to pay the compensation.
8. Heard Sri M. Srinivasa Rao, learned counsel representing Sri
M. Surender Rao, learned counsel for the respondent No.1/owner
of the offending vehicle, Sri Palle Sriharinath, learned counsel for
the claimants and Sri Srinivasa Rao Vutla, learned counsel for the
respondent No.2/Insurance Company. Perused the material
available on record.
POINTS FOR DETERMINATION:
9. In the light of the rival submissions, the following points
arise for determination:
(i) Whether the learned Tribunal was justified in holding that
the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent riding of the
offending motorcycle?
(ii) Whether the Tribunal was justified in exonerating
respondent No.2/Insurance Company from its liability?
(iii) Whether the compensation awarded by the learned
Tribunal is just and reasonable, and if not, whether it calls for
enhancement?
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ANALYSIS:
Point Nos. (i) to (iii)
10. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1
contended that the learned Tribunal failed to see that there is no
evidence on record to show that respondent No.1 driven the vehicle
with rash and negligent manner and hit the vehicle of the
deceased, more particularly, when there is no other eyewitness to
speak about the alleged accident except the claimants, who are
interested witnesses. In this connection, the respondent No.1 filed
I.A.No.1 of 2025 to receive the copy of the judgment in
C.C.No.1855/2006 passed by the learned II Additional Judicial
Magistrate of I Class, Kothagudem, wherein the accused, who is
the driver of the offending vehicle herein was acquitted of the
offences alleged against him under Sections 304-A and 338 of the
Indian Penal Code.
11. In order to establish that the deceased died in the accident
due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by its
driver, the claimants placed reliance upon the oral evidence of PWs
1 and 2. PW1 is claimant No.1, who is none other than the wife of
the deceased. The chief examination affidavit of PW1 is replica of
the averments made in the claim petition. Though PW1 deposed
about the manner of the accident that occurred on 28.05.2005, she
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admitted in her cross-examination that she has not witnessed the
accident. Thus, PW1 is not an eyewitness to the accident. PW2 is
alleged to be the eyewitness to the accident that occurred on
28.05.2005 and he categorically deposed about the manner of the
accident as stated in the claim petition and also as deposed by
PW1. PW2 deposed that on 28.05.2005 at about 7.45 PM when he
was proceeding towards CM PF office, SCCL, Kothagudem, he had
stopped his motorcycle and was talking with his friend by the side
of the road. He further deposed that while the deceased Solmon
Raju was proceeding on his motorcycle bearing registration No. AP
20 T/R AA 5410, a Hero Honda Motorcycle bearing No. AP 20 H
3486 coming from Kothagudem going towards Ramavaram dashed
the motorcycle of the deceased in a rash and negligent manner
without taking precautionary measures. It was elicited in the cross
examination of PW2 that he does not know the number of both the
motorcycles, which were involved in the accident. A suggestion
was given to PW2 that he was not an eyewitness. Merely because
an eyewitness could not disclose the registration numbers of the
vehicles involved in the accident, his evidence cannot be brushed
aside totally. Moreover, the respondent No.1 did not place any
record to show that he was not responsible for the occurrence of
the accident.
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12. Furthermore, the claimants placed reliance upon
documentary evidence under Exs.A1 to A4, which are certified
copies of FIR, charge sheet, postmortem examination report of the
deceased and report issued by the Motor Vehicle Inspector
respectively. Ex.A2 discloses the name of PW2 (J. Ram Prasad) as
eyewitness {List Witness No.5 (LW5)}. Thus, it is clear that PW2
was an eyewitness to the accident. Though a suggestion was given
to PW2 that he was not an eyewitness to the accident, he denied
the said suggestion. As can be seen from Ex.A2, it is clear that the
Police, Kothagudem I – Town, after due investigation, filed a charge
sheet against the driver of the offending vehicle i.e., respondent
No.1 for the offence under Sections 304-A and 338 of the Indian
Penal Code holding that the accident occurred due to rash and
negligent driving of the Hero Honda Splendor motorcycle bearing
registration No. AP 20 H 3486 by its driver. It was further
observed in Ex.A2 that the accused/respondent No.1 also received
simple injuries in the said accident.
13. Further, the respondents have not even made any efforts to
challenge the charge sheet filed by the concerned police. Moreover,
it is not mandatory to examine the eyewitness listed in the charge
sheet to establish the negligence of the offending vehicle in these
type of cases. It is settled law that charge sheet and FIR are
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sufficient evidence to prove the negligence, as these type of cases
are decided on the “preponderance of probabilities,” but not
“beyond reasonable doubt”. Though the driver of the offending
vehicle was acquitted of the charges leveled against him vide
judgment dated 16.07.2007 in C.C.No.1855 of 2006, it is pertinent
to note that the accused therein was acquitted by extending benefit
of doubt by considering the contradictory statements given by the
eyewitnesses. Thus, the judgment dated 16.07.2007 in
C.C.No.1855 of 2006 is not a clear acquittal case declaring the
driver of the offending vehicle as innocent.
14. Even otherwise, it is settled law that strict rules of evidence
as applicable in a criminal trial are not attracted to proceedings
under the Motor Vehicles Act. In N.K.V. BROS. (P) LTD. v. M.
Karumai Ammal and others 1 the Honourable Supreme Court held
as under:
“The plea that the criminal case had ended in acquittal and
that, therefore, the civil suit must follow suit, was rejected and
rightly. The requirement of culpable rashness under section
304A I.P.C. is more drastic than negligence sufficient under the law of
tort to create liability. The quantum of compensation was moderately
fixed and although there was, perhaps a case for enhancement, the
High Court dismissed the cross-claims also. Being questions of fact,
we are obviously unwilling to re-open the holdings on culpability and
compensation.
Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country,
specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This
proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been
observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption
in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents1 (1980) 3 Supreme Court Cases 457
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Macma_3447 & 3734_2012Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not
suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because
of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases,
culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly
reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities
and mystic maybes. We are emphasising this aspect because we are
often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to
judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient
disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving.
The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport
must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their ‘neighbour’.
Indeed, the State must seriously consider no- fault liability by
legislation.”
15. The above view was reiterated by the Honourable Apex Court
in Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited 2, wherein it
was held that the standard of proof in motor accident claims is
preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Even if the accused is acquitted in criminal case, the
Tribunal is competent to independently assess the negligence. The
Court held as follows:
“Suffice it to observe that the exposition in the judgments
already adverted to by us, filing of charge sheet against respondent
No.2 prima facie points towards his complicity in driving the
vehicle negligently and rashly. Further, even when the accused were
to be acquitted in the criminal case, this Court opined that the same
may be of no effect on the assessment of the liability required in
respect of motor accident cases by the Tribunal.”
16. Similarly, in Sunita and others v. Rajasthan State Board
Transport Corporation and others 3 the Honourable Supreme Court
while re-affirming the principles referred above observed as under:
“It is thus well settled that in motor accident claim cases, once
the foundational fact, namely, the actual occurrence of the accident,
has been established, then the Tribunal’s role would be to calculate
the quantum of just compensation if the accident had taken place
by reason of negligence of the driver of a motor vehicle and, while2 (2018) 5 SCC 656
3 (2020) 13 Supreme Court Cases 486
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Macma_3447 & 3734_2012doing so, the Tribunal would not be strictly bound by the pleadings of
the parties. Notably, while deciding cases arising out of motor
vehicle accidents, the standard of proof to be borne in mind must
be of preponderance of probability and not the strict standard of proof
beyond all reasonable doubt which is followed in criminal cases.”
17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it can be held that the
learned Tribunal while answering the issue No.1 had meticulously
examined the oral and documentary evidence and rightly
concluded that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent
driving of the driver of the offending vehicle.
18. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 contended that the
learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that the deceased was not having
the driving licence.
19. At the outset, the respondent No.1 did not adduce any
evidence to establish that the deceased was not having the driving
licence. If at all the deceased was not holding driving license as on
the date of the accident, certainly the concerned Police, who
conducted a thorough investigation, would have incorporated the
said aspect in the charge sheet but there is no such instance in the
instant case. To establish that the deceased was not holding
driving license, the respondent No.1 ought to have examined the
concerned regional transport authorities, who are the only
competent officials to decide the said aspect. Hence, it can be
safely held that the respondent No.1 failed to establish that the
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deceased was not holding driving license as on the date of the
accident.
20. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 contended that
the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that the OP was filed with
inordinate delay.
21. Admittedly, the accident occurred on 28.05.2005, whereas
the claim petition came to be filed in the year 2010. It is pertinent
to note that the plea regarding delay has been raised for the first
time before this Court. No such objection was taken before the
learned Tribunal. In fact, despite service of notice, respondent No.1
did not choose to file a counter before the learned Tribunal raising
any objection as to the maintainability of the claim petition on the
ground of delay. Therefore, the respondent cannot ordinarily be
permitted to raise such a factual objection for the first time in
appeal. Even otherwise, the contention is devoid of merit. By
virtue of the omission of Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act
with effect from 14.11.1994, no statutory period of limitation was
prescribed for filing a claim petition under Section 166 during the
relevant period. Since both the accident (2005) and the institution
of the claim petition (2010) occurred after the omission of Section
166(3), the claim petition cannot be held to be barred by limitation.
Mere delay in approaching the Tribunal, in the absence of any
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statutory bar or demonstrated prejudice to the respondents, is not
by itself a ground to reject the claim.
22. The prime contention of the learned counsel for the
respondent No.1 is that the learned Tribunal ought not to have
granted compensation against the appellant/respondent No.1
alone.
23. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the claimants
contended that the Police, Kothagudem registered a case against
the driver of the Hero Honda Splendor bearing No. A.P. 20 H-3426,
U/s. 304-A IPC, hence, the Respondent No.2 ought to have been
made liable to pay compensation, more particularly, when the
deceased was the third party. It was further contended that the
policy issued by Respondent No.2 covers the risk of third parties as
additional premium was paid and this itself is sufficient to cover
the risk of a third parties, as such, Respondent No.2 is liable to
pay the compensation indemnifying the owner of the offending
vehicle i.e., Respondent. No.1. It was urged that according to Ex.A-
2 i.e., charge sheet filed by the Police the rider of the crime vehicle
was not charge-sheeted for any violation of provisions of Motor
Vehicle Act. It was further contended that even the driver or the
owner of the offending vehicle was not examined with regard to
breach of terms and conditions of the insurance policy, as alleged
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by Respondent No.2 and that the evidence of Rw-2 is not
conclusive enough to hold that the Respondent No.1 was not
holding a driving licence at all. As such the Insurance company
i.e., 2nd Respondent is liable to pay the compensation
indemnifying the owner of the offending vehicle i.e., Respondent
No.1.
24. As seen from the impugned order, the learned Tribunal fixed
the liability to pay the compensation to the claimants on
respondent No.1 alone mainly on the ground that the driver of the
offending vehicle was not having a valid driving license. The
learned Standing Counsel for the respondent No.2 placed reliance
upon the oral evidence of RWs 1 and 2 and documentary evidence
under Exs.X1 and X2. RW1, who is the Senior Assistant working
in Respondent No.2 Company, deposed that driver of the offending
vehicle had no valid driving license. RW2, who is the
Administrative Officer – cum – Additional Licensing Authority,
Office of the Regional Transport Authority, Khammam, deposed
that their office issued driving license to B. Pavan Raja, S/o.
Chakrapani on 22.05.2006, which is valid upto 21.05.2026. Ex.X2
is the extract of driving license. RW2 further deposed that driver of
the offending was not possessing driving license as on the date of
accident. Admittedly, the accident occurred on 28.05.2005, which
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is prior to the date of issuance of driving license in favour of B.
Pavan Raja. It is pertinent to note that B. Pavan Raja was the
driver of the offending vehicle at the relevant point of time. Though
RW2 was cross-examined at length, nothing was elicited to
disbelieve his evidence or Ex.X2.
25. Thus, the evidence placed on record by the respondent No.2
establishes that the driver of the offending vehicle was not holding
any driving license as on the date of the accident. Hence, the
terms and conditions of policy under Ex.B1 were violated by the
insured by giving the vehicle to a person, who had no driving
license at all.
26. The learned counsel for the claimants contended that the
learned Tribunal ought to have noted that the Apex Court
categorically held that in case of covering the risk of the third
parties, if there was any violation of terms and conditions of the
insurance policy, the Insurance Company should first pay and
recover from the owner, as such the court below ought to have
awarded compensation as against Respondents 1 & 2. In this
connection, reliance was placed on the decision of the Honourable
Supreme Court in Rama Bai v. M/s. Amit Minerals and another 4,
wherein it was observed as under:
4 2025 INSC 1162
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Court ought to have applied the “pay and recover” principle rests on
the decision of this Court in Shamanna1 (supra) and Parminder
Singh2 (supra). In Shamanna1 (supra) this Court dealt with the claim
of compensation by third party victim of the motor accident. In para 5
of the judgment, this Court referred to its own earlier decision
in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh and Others4 to
reiterate that the insurer [(2004) 3 SCC 297] has to pay the
compensation amount payable to the third party and the insurance
company may recover the same thereafter from the insured.
5.1 In Shamanna1 in which the doctrine of “pay and recover”
was considered, the driver had no valid licence and the insurance
policy was violated. Similar principle, as applied in Parminder
Singh2 in which the driver of the offending vehicle was found driving
the vehicle in breach of the policy conditions, the insurance company
was absolved and the principle of ‘pay and recover’ was applied.’
27. It is to be seen that in Manager, National Insurance Company
Limited v. Saju P.Paul and another 5, Manuara Khatun and others v.
Rajesh Kr. Singh and others 6, Akula Narayana v. The Oriental
Insurance Company Limited and another 7, and Kaminiben and
others v. The Oriental Insurance Company Limited and others 8 the
Honourable Supreme Court while keeping in view the benevolent
object of the Motor Vehicles Act and other relevant factors, issued
the directions against the Insurance Company to pay the awarded
sum to the claimants and then to recover the said sum from the
insured in the same proceedings by applying the principle of “pay
and recover”. It is settled law that in third-party claims, the
insurer ordinarily cannot be completely exonerated merely because
of the absence or invalidity of the driver’s licence. The appropriate
5 (2013) 2 SCC 41
6 (2017) 4 SCC 796
7 2025 SCC Online SC 2377
8 Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 21802 of 2023) decided on 11.02.2026
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course is generally to direct the insurer to pay the compensation
and recover the same from the insured, provided the insurer has
established the statutory defence. Even in the instant case,
though the insurer had established that the insured had violated
the terms and conditions of the insurance policy under Ex.B1 by
giving the vehicle to a person, who had no driving license as on the
date of the accident, it cannot be a sole ground to exonerate the
insurance company entirely from the liability to pay the
compensation. Thus, the learned Tribunal erred in fixing the
liability to pay entire compensation on owner of the offending
vehicle. Hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that it is a
fit case to invoke the principle of “pay and recover”.
28. Now coming to the quantum of compensation, the learned
counsel for the claimants contended that the learned Tribunal
ought to have noted that the deceased died at an young age and
his wife, parents and minor daughters, are dependents on him for
their livelihood, as such the learned Tribunal ought to have
awarded compensation as claimed for.
29. It is to be seen that the claimants filed the claim petition
seeking compensation of Rs.8,00,000/-. The learned Tribunal
awarded Rs.8,00,000/- as claimed by the claimants. Thus, the
above contention of the learned counsel for the claimants that the
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learned Tribunal ought to have awarded compensation as claimed
for, remains unsustainable.
30. Though the learned Tribunal calculated the compensation at
Rs.8,63,000/-, the said compensation was restricted to
Rs.8,00,000/- by considering the claim amount mentioned in the
claim petition. In this connection, the learned counsel for the
claimants placed reliance upon the decisions of the Honourable
Supreme Court in Chandramani Nanda v. Sarat Chandra Swain
and another 9, Ningamma and another v. United India Insurance
company Limited 10. It is well settled by the decision of the
Honourable Supreme Court in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh and
others 11 that the Tribunal or Court is not precluded from awarding
compensation more than the amount claimed, provided the
claimant is otherwise found entitled to such compensation on the
basis of the evidence available on record. Thus, the learned
Tribunal erred in restricting the compensation amount to
Rs.8,00,000/-, despite calculating the compensation at
Rs.8,63,000/-.
31. The age of the deceased was claimed to be 43 years. The
learned counsel for the respondent No.1 contended that the
9 2025 AAC 830
10 2009 (8) JT 262
11 2003 ACJ 12
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learned Tribunal ought to have seen that there is no evidence on
record (documentary) to show that the age of the deceased was 43
years except the statements of interested witnesses (PW1 to
PW3/Claimants).
32. Admittedly, the claimants have not filed date of birth
certificate of the deceased to ascertain his age. In the absence of
any documentary evidence, postmortem examination report can be
considered as reliable document to assess the age of the deceased.
As can be seen from Ex.A3 postmortem examination report, the age
of the deceased was shown as 43 years.
33. The deceased alleged to have been drawing Rs.9,000/- per
month as a General Mazdoor in the Senior Auto Workshop of
Singareni Collieries Company Limited, Kothagudem. The
claimants placed reliance upon oral evidence of PW3 and
documentary evidence under Exs.A5 to A9. PW3, who is the in-
charge AGM of Singareni Collieries Company Limited, deposed that
salary slips under Exs.A5 to A9 were issued by them. Though, it
was elicited in the cross-examination that the net salary of the
deceased under Exs.A5, A7 to A9 was Rs.3,620/-, 4,300/-, 4,600/-
and 3,820/- per month respectively, it is settled law that only
statutory deductions have to be deducted from the gross salary of
the victim. However, there is no evidence to establish as to how
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much amount is being deducted from the gross salary of the
deceased towards professional tax and income tax. The gross
salary of the deceased for the month of May, 2005, as per Ex.A5 is
shown as Rs.8,050/-. In such circumstances, the learned Tribunal
rightly fixed the monthly salary of the deceased at Rs.7,000/-,
which is appearing to be just and reasonable, more particularly,
when there is no material with regard to statutory deductions from
the gross salary of the deceased.
34. There is no material on record to establish that the deceased
was a permanent or regular employee in the Senior Auto Workshop
of Singareni Collieries Company Limited, Kothagudem. Thus, the
deceased can be considered as self-employed. Since the deceased
was aged about 43 years, future prospects at 25% is required to be
considered. Thus, the monthly income of the deceased along with
future prospects comes to Rs.8,750/- (Rs.7,000/- + Rs.1,750/-).
The annual income of the deceased comes to Rs.1,05,000/-
(Rs.8,750/- x 12 months). Since there are three claimants
depending on the earnings of the deceased, 1/3rd has to be
deducted from the income of the deceased towards his personal
and living expenses. Thus, after deducting personal and living
expenses of the deceased, the annual income of the deceased
comes to Rs.70,000/- (Rs.1,05,000/- – Rs.35,000/-).
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35. A perusal of the impugned order discloses that the learned
Tribunal while relying upon the decision of the Honourable
Superme Court in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation12
fixed the multiplier ’15’. However, as per the decision in Sarla
Verama‘s case (supra), the relevant multiplier for the persons
belonging to age group of 41 to 45 years is ’14’ but not ’15’. After
multiplying the annual income of the deceased with relevant
multiplier ’14, the loss of dependency would come to Rs.9,80,000/-
(Rs.70,000/- x 14).
36. The learned Tribunal awarded Rs.10,000/- towards loss of
estate, Rs.10,000/- towards loss of consortium and Rs.3,000/-
towards funeral and transportation charges. However, as per the
decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi’s case
(supra), the claimants are entitled to Rs.77,000/- (Rs.70,000/- +
10% enhancement) under conventional heads (loss of estate –
Rs.15,000/-, funeral expenses – Rs.15,000/- and loss of spousal
consortium at Rs.40,000/-). Since the claimant No.2 is an
unmarried daughter, who had attained the age of majority, she is
not entitled for any compensation under the head ‘parental
consortium’. Thus, in all the claimants are entitled to
Rs.10,57,000/- (Rs.9,80,000/- + Rs.77,000/-) towards just
compensation.
12 2009 ACJ 1298 (SC)
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CONCLUSION:
37. In view of the foregoing discussion and for the reasons
recorded hereinabove, this Court holds that the Tribunal rightly
concluded that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent
riding of the offending motorcycle. However, the Tribunal was not
justified in exonerating respondent No.2/Insurance Company from
its liability solely on the ground that the rider of the offending
vehicle did not possess a valid and effective driving licence. Having
regard to the settled legal position governing third-party risks
under the Motor Vehicles Act, respondent No.2/Insurance
Company is liable to satisfy the award in the first instance, with
liberty to recover the amount so paid from respondent No.1, the
owner of the offending vehicle, in accordance with law. This Court
is also of the considered opinion that the compensation awarded by
the Tribunal warrants enhancement. Accordingly, the following
order is passed.
RESULT AND DIRECTIONS:
38. In the result:
(i) M.A.C.M.A. No.3447 of 2012, filed by the owner of the
offending vehicle, stands dismissed.
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(ii) M.A.C.M.A. No.3734 of 2012, filed by the claimants, stands
partly allowed by enhancing the compensation awarded by the
Tribunal from Rs.8,00,000/- to Rs.10,57,000/-, together with
interest thereon at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of
filing of the claim petition till the date of realization.
(iii) Respondent No.2/Insurance Company shall deposit the
entire compensation amount, together with accrued interest and
costs, after giving due credit to the amount, if any, already
deposited, before the Tribunal within a period of eight (08) weeks
from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.
(iv) Upon such deposit, respondent No.2/Insurance Company
shall be at liberty to recover the amount so deposited from
respondent No.1, the owner of the offending vehicle, in accordance
with law.
(v) Upon deposit of the compensation amount, the Tribunal
shall disburse the same as follows:
(a) Claimant No.1 shall be paid Rs.5,00,000/-, together with
proportionate interest and costs;
(b) Claimant No.2 shall be paid Rs.3,00,000/-, together with
proportionate interest and costs; and
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(c) Claimant No.3 shall be paid Rs.2,57,000/-, together with
proportionate interest and costs.
(vi) The claimants shall be entitled to withdraw their respective
shares, together with accrued interest, upon payment of the
requisite deficit court fee, if any, without furnishing any security.
39. There shall be no order as to costs.
40. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand
closed.
____________________________________
VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J
Date: 07.07.2026
AS
