Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Vinod Kumar Garasiya on 2 July, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
CGHC010029062023 2026:CGHC:27116-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 286 of 2023
State Of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Mahila Thana, Ambikapur, District - Surguja (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Vinod Kumar Garasiya S/o Veer Singh Garasiya Aged About 45 Years
2 - Smt. Sarita Garasiya S/o Vinod Kumar Garasiya Aged About 43 Years
Both R/o Ward No. 2, Sewaniya, Police Station Kalinjar, District - Banswada,
Rajasthan
...Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Petitioner/State : Shri Ashish Shukla, Addl AG
For Respondents : None appears
———————————————————————————————————
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
02.07.2026
Heard Shri Ashish Shukla, learned Addl AG for the petitioner/State.
1. Petitioner has filed this petition with the following prayer:
“i) grant leave to appeal against he impugned judgment of
acquittal.
ii) be set-aside the impugned judgment of acquittal dated
28.07.2022 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC),
Surguja, Ambikapur (CG) in ST No.95/2018 and convict the
accused/respondents and award suitable punishment to the
accused/respondents.
Crmp 286 of 2023
2
iii) Proceed against the accused Respondent under Section 390
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, during the pendency of
the instant appeal.”
2. The state/petitioner has preferred the instant application for grant of
leave to appeal against the findings and judgment of acquittal dated
28.07.2022 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC),
Surguja, Ambikapur (CG) in S.T. No. 95/2018, whereby, respondent-1 has
been acquitted from charges punishable under sections 495, 471, 376(2)
(n), 323, 307, 420, 468,471, 506B of IPC, while respondent-2 has been
acquitted from charges punishable under sections
495,417,323,307,420,468,471,120B,506B of IPC.
3. Learned State counsel submits that though the scope of
interference with an order of acquittal is limited, the appellate Court
nonetheless possesses wide powers of re-appreciation of evidence, and
where such reappraisal reveals that the findings of acquittal are unjust,
perverse or against the weight of evidence, the appellate Court is fully
empowered to reverse the same. Learned State counsel submits that the
impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is patently
erroneous, perverse, and contrary to the settled principles of law. Despite
there being ample, cogent, and reliable evidence available on record
establishing the guilt of the accused/respondent, the learned Trial Court
has erroneously acquitted him on wholly insignificant, unreasonable, and
legally unsustainable grounds. The Court failed to appreciate that, the
charges leveled against the respondent are very serious in nature like
Crmp 286 of 2023
3
offence of rape and because of this reason the accused is not entitled for
any sympathy by this Court. Learned trial Court failed to appreciate the
circumstances and acquitted the respondent on account of minor
omissions and contradictions.
4. It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary
documents and information with respect to the case preferred the present
petition, however, some delay was occurred due to fulfillment of various
departmental formalities and working of the Government machinery
because the State Government is a multi functioning body, hence, at
times the fulfillment of departmental formalities takes unexpected long
time. Therefore, in some cases the State is prevented from filing the case
within the prescribed period of limitation, which is bonafide and not
deliberate. The instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 85
days from the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed
upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of
State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, (1996) 3 SCC 132, to
buttress his submissions. As such, the learned State counsel prays that
the delay of 85 days in preferring the petition may be condoned.
5. The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e.
the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for leave to appeal
from an order of acquittal.
Crmp 286 of 2023
4
6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General
and others vs. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3 SCC
563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well
aware or conversant with the issues involved including the
prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of
filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation when the Department
was possessed with competent persons familiar with court
proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because the Government or
a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has
to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view
that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot
take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on
account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in
view of the modern technologies being used and available.
The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including
the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government
bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they
have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and
there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual
explanation that the file was kept pending for several
months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape
in the process. The government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence
and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and
should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government
Crmp 286 of 20235
departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light
and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation
offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of
various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably
failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to
condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable
to be dismissed on the ground of delay.”
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932, while considering
the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:-
“5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in
the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court
as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate
and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court
within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC
Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though
limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be
applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference
was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare
Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows:
“13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an
application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that where a case has been presented in
the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the “sufficient
cause” which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in
the facts and circumstances of the case, or found
Crmp 286 of 20236
to have not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning
such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by
this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In
case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning
the delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an
order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High
Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay
condonation application of the present appellant.” Thus, it is crystal
clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and
that, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be liberally
interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is
attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through
his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala,
J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue,
it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay
should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party.
The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear
that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter
as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has
been made out for condonation of such a long and
inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or
a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the
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gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses
to approach the court long after the lapse of the time
prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then
he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This
litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981.
We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However,
till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits
of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we
condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once
again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the
legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the
court must take into consideration while considering
whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that
they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting
the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of
limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to
have the matter considered on merits because of his own
inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-
deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case,
he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the technical
considerations. While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the court must not start with the
merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the
party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other
side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid
the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the
delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not
merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation
are based on the principles of sound public policy and
principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of
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Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for
indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims
and fancies of the appellants.
XXXXXX
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the
conclusion that the High Court committed no error much
less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even
otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been
said that delay should not be excused as a matter of
generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause
prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed
to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting
the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not
satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is
hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the
present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court
correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the
appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not
explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for
the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the
State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at
the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay
occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in
the State machinery. Though the Government adopts
systematic approach in handling the legal issues and
preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the
time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely
communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss
will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present
case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days
Crmp 286 of 2023
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occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses
on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though
valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we
direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal
issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the
Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s)
concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible
for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss
caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be
followed by all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not
ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that
whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the
instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be
explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a
delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same.
For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party
seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute
the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events
occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The
court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that
it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is
true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for
filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and
pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the
sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or
circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not
possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance
arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient
cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the
expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal.
But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the
appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the
period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v.
State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).”
Crmp 286 of 2023
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8. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra) and Ramkumar
Choudhary (supra), it is evident that Government departments are under
a special obligation to discharge their duties with due diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and
cannot be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by
Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon all litigants
and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon a select few.
9. Upon considering the matter in its entirety, we find that the State
has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory explanation for the delay
in filing the present petition. The only reason cited is that the Law &
Legislative Affairs Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya,
Naya Raipur, had forwarded a proposal to the Office of the Advocate
General for initiating an appeal against the impugned acquittal order
dated 28.07.2022. Thereafter, the case was processed, and the present
petition was ultimately filed. However, this sequence of events, lacking in
specificity or justifiable cause, does not amount to a cogent or acceptable
explanation. Thus, the State has miserably failed to demonstrate
sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an inordinate delay of 85
days.
10. Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary
power under the law to condone such delay. The learned counsel for the
State has not been able to establish any convincing or bona fide reason
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for the delay. Therefore, there is no justification for condoning the delay of
85 days in filing the petition against acquittal.
11. Even otherwise, when we examined the merits of the case, we
found that the victim is a major girl. She acquainted with the
respondent/accused through Jeevan Sathi.com, a matrimonial site and
the victim herself had gone to Udaypur, Rajasthan, to meet the
respondent/accused and then they visited Mount Abu and Chittorgarh,
and ultimately, they had gone to Baswada, Rajsthan. They stayed
together in a room in the hotel, booked in name of the victim and she
herself, had paid the charges of the hotel. It also came in the evidence of
the victim, PW1 that she had gone to Baswada to meet the
respondent/accused but instead of taking her to his house, they stayed in
a hotel. There are frequent whatsapp chats between the
respondent/accused and the victim. From the evidence of the victim,
PW1, her brother-in-law, PW3 and her mother, PW9, marriage between
the accused and the victim on 25.12.2017 at Devri Chrch could not be
rebutted but there is no certificate of marriage.
12. From evidence of the Inspector of Police, PW8, certain documents
have been proved but there are manipulation and overwriting in the first
column of the documents issued by the Church, Baswada, which was to
be filled up before their marriage. The competent person of the said
church has also not been examined by the prosecution.
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13. Victim has also executed an affidavit on 12.01.2017, whereas, they
got married on 25.07.2017 at Devri Church. Though there are
photographs at Ex.P12 marriage card Ex.P10 and P11, has been
produced by the prosecution but its authenticity has not been proved by
the prosecution.
14. Considering the evidence produced by the prosecution, learned trial
Court observed that the prosecution could not produce any cogent and
clinching evidence that the respondent had married with the victim at
Devri Church by producing relevant record of the Church and only on the
basis of invitation card, and photos, it cannot be presumed that
respondent/accused and the victim had got married on 25.05.2017. There
are material discrepancies in the documents seized by the Police with
respect to their membership of the said Church and their marriage
ceremony.
15. Learned trial Court has further observed that the victim PW1 in her
cross -examination, had admitted that the document Ex.P9 has not been
given by her to the Police. She had the xerox copy of the said document
and its one copy has been given to the Police and the second copy she
retained with her. She has shown her ignorance about the document
Ex.P9. The victim has also stated that her brother had given Rs.6 lakhs
cash to the respondent/accused but they could not prove its source.
There is no cogent evidence about the cash transaction of Rs.6 lakhs to
the respondent /accused. No dates or details have been given about its
collection.
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16. The learned trial Court has considered the material discrepancies in
the evidence of the victim, PW1 and observed that she cannot be
considered to be a sterling witness and her evidence does not inspire
confidence of the Court. The manner in which the victim is alleged to be
suffered with the offence found suspicious by the learned trial Court, and
has acquitted the respondent/accused from the alleged offences.
17. The learned trial Court has also elaborately considered the
evidence available on record, and has acquitted the accused persons,
holding that the prosecution could not establish its case, and acquitted
them by giving them benefit of doubt.
18. Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal of
acquittal, Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case of State of Rajasthan Vs.
Kistoora Ram, 2022 SCC On Line SC 984, has held as under:
“8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very
limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or
perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal.
Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an
order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of
conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted
only if the view taken is not possible at all.”
19. Yet in other matter of Jafarudheen and Others Vs. State of
Kerala, 2022 (8) SCC 440, Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the
scope of interference in appeal against acquittal in paragraph-25 as
under:
“25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section
378 of the Cr.PC, the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial
Court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence
Crmp 286 of 202314
on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal
adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus,
the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the
Trial Court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of
the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a
double presumption that ensures in favour of the accused has to be
disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.”
20. After considering the material available on record, as well as the
elaborate judgment passed by the trial Court and being very much
conscious about the legal position as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in
cases of Kistoora Ram (supra), and Jafarudheen (supra), in an appeal
against the acquittal, if two views are possible on the basis of evidence
led by the prosecution, and the trial Court taking one view, revert the
accused, the version of the finding of acquittal by the appellate Court
taking the other possible view for consideration, is not permissible in the
law. This Court, therefore, of the considered opinion that the judgment
impugned, acquitting the accused respondents, is just and proper and
does not call for any interference.
21. Accordingly, the instant petition seeking leave to appeal to file
appeal against acquittal of the respondents is hereby dismissed and the
acquittal appeal is also dismissed.
22. Record of the trial court along with copy of this judgment be sent
back to the trial Court concerned.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
padma
Digitally signed by
V PADMAVATHI
Date: 2026.07.09
10:49:59 +0530
