Himachal Pradesh High Court
Nishant Sareen vs Directorate Of Enforcement on 9 July, 2026
Author: Virender Singh
Bench: Virender Singh
1 2026:HHC:27640
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr.MP(M) No. : 618 of 2026
Reserved on : 08.07.2026
Decided on : 09.07.2026
Uploaded on : 09.07.2026
Nishant Sareen .......Applicant
Versus
Directorate of Enforcement ...Respondent
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the applicant : Mr. Ajay Kochhar, Senior
Advocate assisted by Ms. Swati
Sharma, Advocate
For the respondent : Mr. Ajeet Singh Saklani,
Advocate.
Virender Singh, Judge
Applicant Nishant Sareen, has filed the present
application, under Section 483 of Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘BNSS), for releasing him on bail, during the pendency of the
trial, arising out of ECIR No.SHSZO/03/2023 7303-7307,
dated 31.03.2023, registered under Sections 3 and 4 of
Prevention of Money Laundering Act (hereinafter referred to
1
Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2 2026:HHC:27640
as ‘the PMLA’), with Sub-Zonal Office Directorate of
Enforcement, Shimla.
2. According to the applicant, the above ECIR has
been registered, under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA, on the
basis of the source information, as contained, in case FIR
No.004/2019, registered under Section 11 of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 2018, at SV & ACB, Solan, as well as, the
charge sheet filed by the investigating agency, which is
pending in the Court of learned Special Judge, Solan, H.P.
3. As per the allegations levelled, the applicant took
undue advantage to the tune of Rs.43,07,641/-, by misusing
his official position as Drugs Inspector and Assistant Drugs
Controller, whereas, case FIR No.215/2022, dated
29.10.2022, registered by Haryana Police at Police Station,
Sector-20, Panchkula against the applicant, by one Komal
Khanna, Vinay Aggarwal and others, under Sections 177,
195, 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 506 of the Indian
Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘the IPC‘), in which,
according to the applicant, the police, after investigation, has
submitted cancellation report.
3 2026:HHC:27640
4. It is the further case of the applicant that in case
FIR No.004/2019, the investigating agency, after completion
of the investigation, filed the challan against the applicant
and Dr. Komal Khanna, for committing the offence
punishable, under Sections 11 and 12 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, however, till the date of filing the application,
charges have not been framed.
5. As per the applicant that there is a reference of
another FIR, registered with Police Station SV&ACB, Shimla,
in the applications filed, from time to time, by the respondent-
department for ED custody, bearing FIR No.08/2025, dated
23.09.2025, under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, against the applicant. When the applicant came to know
about the registration of the said FIR, he, in order to know,
about the allegations, levelled therein, has sought the
information under the Right to Information Act, including the
copy of the FIR, but, the same has been refused. As such, the
applicant is not aware about the exact allegations, which have
been levelled, against him.
6. According to the applicant, FIR No.008 of 2025,
dated 23.09.2025, registered, under Section 13 of the
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Prevention of Corruption Act, after six years of previous FIR
No.004/2019 and the matter is stated to be under
investigation. Neither the applicant has been summoned in
that FIR, nor, any substantial progress, in the said case, has
been made.
7. It is the further case of the applicant, during
investigation of the case, FIR No.004/2019, the search was
conducted by the investigating agency, in the residential
houses and other places and an amount of Rs.7,50,000/- was
recovered and seized from the house search of the applicant.
Out of the said amount a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was returned
to Kalpana Sareen, wife of the applicant, and remaining
amount of Rs.6,50,000/- was seized.
8. On the basis of FIR No.215/2022, and FIR
No.004/2019, the present ECIR was registered by the
respondent-department.
9. According the applicant, the police authorities of
SV & ACB arrested the applicant during the investigation in
case FIR No.004/2019 and subsequently, he was released on
bail, by this Court, vide order dated 24.10.2019, while
deciding Cr.MP (M) No.1794 of 2019.
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10. It is the further case of the applicant that after
registration of the ECIR, the Enforcement Department, has
conducted the searches, under Section 17 of the PMLA, on
22.06.2025, at a various premises of the applicant, his in-
laws and the residential premises of his mother and took into
possession the numerous documents in connection with the
present ECIR. Thereafter, the applicant was summoned by
the investigating agency and he had cooperated with the on
going investigation. He has also submitted the documents, as
required, by the investigating agencies.
10. All these facts have been pleaded to demonstrate
that the applicant is cooperating with the investigation. His
statement, under Section 50 of the PMLA, was also recorded
and when he was summoned on 09.10.2025, he was arrested
by the ED.
11. Thereafter, he was produced before the Court,
from where, he was remanded to the ED custody. Thereafter,
he was remanded to judicial custody. ED has completed the
investigation and filed the complaint, which is pending before
the Court of learned Special Judge (PMLA), Shimla.
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12. All these facts have been pleaded to show that his
custodial interrogation of the applicant is no longer required,
in the present case.
13. It is the further case of the applicant that the trial
arising out of FIR No.04/2019, is still pending adjudication
before the learned Special Judge, Solan and charges have not
yet been framed and in FIR No.08/2025, investigation is still,
at the initial stage. This fact has been pleaded to
demonstrate that the complaint filed, against the applicant,
by the ED, cannot be decided, unless the cases pertaining to
the scheduled offence are decided.
14. In the bulky bail application, the applicant has
given the details/explanation of the allegations, which have
been levelled against him, which are not liable to be
considered, at the time of deciding the bail application, as the
same are based upon his defence.
15. In a nut shell, the applicant has submitted the
details of the property, held by him, by explaining the source
of the same.
16. The applicant had earlier tried his luck by moving
similar application before learned Special Judge, Shimla,
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however, his application has been dismissed by learned
Special Judge, Shimla, on 29.11.2025. Thereafter, he has
filed Cr.MP(M) No.2976 of 2025, before this Court, which was
dismissed as withdrawn on 05.01.2026. Thereafter, he has
filed another Cr.MP(M) No. 224 of 2026, before this Court,
which was also dismissed as withdrawn, on 24.03.2026.
17. The relief of bail has also been sought on the
ground that the co-accused Dr. Komal Khanna, has also filed
Cr.MP(M) No.2898 of 2025, in which, initially, interim
protection was given and subsequently, the same was
allowed, by this Court.
18. It has also been pleaded that Cr.MP(M) No.224 of
2026 has been withdrawn as during the pendency of the said
application, cancellation report has been filed in FIR
No.215/2022, registered with Police Station, Sector-20,
Panchkula.
19. On the basis of the above facts, Mr. Ajay Kochhar,
learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Swati Sharma,
Advocate, has prayed that during the pendency of the above
ECIR, the applicant may kindly be released on bail, for which,
he is ready to abide by any conditions imposed by this Court.
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20. When put to notice, the prayer for bail, as made,
in the application, has been contested, by taking the
preliminary objections that during the investigation of the
case, active and conscious role, in the commission of the
offences, against the applicant has been established.
20.1. The prayer, as made, in the application, has been
opposed on the ground that the applicant has miserably failed
to make out a case to satisfy the mandatory twin conditions
of Section 45 of the PMLA, in his favour.
20.2. On merits, the application has been contested on
the ground that FIR No.0004/2019 dated 21.08.2019 was
registered by the State Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau
(SV&ACB), Himachal Pradesh, under Section 11 of the
Prevention of the Corruption Act, 1988 against the applicant
and after investigation Charge-sheet/Challan was filed on
09.11.2021, before the learned Special Judge Solan, against
the applicant, under Section 11 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 201 of the IPC and against
co-accused Komal Khanna under Section 12 of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988.
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20.3. As per the ED, from the said charge-sheet, it has
been revealed that the applicant remain posted as a Drugs
Inspector, Nahan during 10.03.2014 to 25.02.2016, as
Assistant Drugs Controller, Nahan from 18.03.2018 to
07.06.2019 and as Assistant Drugs Controller, Baddi from
June to August 2019. While posted, as such, he had taken
undue advantages from the owners/partners/directors of
different pharmaceutical firms/units, for himself and for his
friends, in the form of hotel bookings, in JW Marriott/Taj etc.,
air tickets, household material and had received cash from
the owners/directors of pharmaceutical firms/units. Further,
he had also used the debit card of one Jagbir Singh for
shopping worth Rs.3,45,000/- and cash withdrawals
amounting to Rs.7,20,000/- during the years 2018 and 2019.
20.4. Thereafter, the SV&ACB, Himachal Pradesh had
conducted search operations at various residential and office
premises relating to the applicant and his associates, in
August 2019, which resulted into the recovery and seizure of
many properties related documents, seizure of digital devices
including laptops and hard disks etc. In addition to this, a
sum of Rs.7,50,000/- was also recovered and seized from
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House No.1514, Sector 38-B Chandigarh which was
registered in the name of Ms. Kalpna Sareen wife of the
applicant. The search operations were conducted by SV&ACB
at the following premises:
ï‚· House No. 1514, Sector 38-B, Chandigarh
registered in the name of Kalpna Sareen (Wife of
Mr. Nishant Sareen);
ï‚· Premises of Mr. Nishant Sareen at Diara Sector
near bus stand Bilaspur, H.P;
ï‚· Premises of Zhenia Pharmaceuticals (partnership
firm of Komal Khanna and Jagbir Singh) at Plot
No. 456, Phase-1, Industrial Area, Panchkula,
Haryana;
ï‚· Premises of Komal Khanna at Flat no. 404, C-2,
Maya Garden City situated at Zirakpur-Ambala
Highway;
ï‚· Premises of Komal Khanna at Flat no. 1203, Tower
No. 7A, Suncity Sector 20, Panchkula;
ï‚· Premises of Mr. Nishant Sareen near Tenzin
Hospital at Panthagathi, Shimla *(this premise
was searched post arrest of Mr. Nishant Sareen
since he was not found at any search premises
during search in August 2019);
ï‚· Office of Assistant Drug Controller, Baddi, Distt.
Solan, HP where Mr. Nishant Sareen was posted
as ADC in August 2019.
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20.5. As per the charge-sheet filed by SV&ACB, the
applicant has taken undue advantages to the tune of
Rs.43,07,641/-. In addition to this, the factual position
involved in FIR No.215/2022, dated 29.10.2022, was also
reiterated, however, the said details are not required to be
reproduced here, as it is admitted case of the parties that the
police had filed cancellation report, in the said case. It has
been pleaded that the filing of a closure report, in said FIR
does not ipso facto negate the existence of proceeds of crime,
particularly when other scheduled offences subsist and
remain under investigation.
20.6. It is the further case of the ED that the FIR
No.008/2025 dated 23.09.2025 has been registered, under
Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, by
SV&ACB, Shimla, against the applicant. As per the
allegations, the applicant has accumulated disproportionate
assets to the tune of Rs.1,66,05,470/- during the check
period 01.04.2002 to 21.08.2019 .
20.7. It is the further case of the ED that in the
aforementioned FIR the disproportionate assets are likely to
substantially increase, as he has also acquired huge assets
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after year 2019, including properties such at Omaxe Cassia,
New Chandigarh and others. The charge-sheet, in this FIR,
has not yet been filed.
20.8. It is the further case of the ED that in the present
ECIR, summons, under Section 50 of PMLA, 2002, were
issued to the applicant and his co-accused Ms. Komal
Khanna, Owners/Managers of pharmaceutical firms/entities,
who, as per the charge-sheet filed by SV&ACB, had given
favours to the applicant, including Mr. Jagbir Singh.
20.9. It is the further case of the ED that the searches,
under Section 17 of the PMLA, were conducted on 22.06.2025
and 23.06.2025 at the residential, official and business
premises of applicant Nishant Sareen and Ms. Komal Khanna
(accomplice of Mr. Nishant Sareen). During the said search
operations, various incriminating materials were recovered
and bank accounts/fixed deposits aggregating to ₹2.53 crore
were frozen. In addition to this, two vehicles, namely a Kia
Seltos and a Mahindra Scorpio-N, along with several digital
devices, were seized.
20.10. Not only this, searches, under Section 17 of the
PMLA, were conducted on 01.07.2025 and 04.07.2025, in
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respect of bank lockers, held in the names of Mrs. Saroj
Sareen (mother of applicant Nishant Sareen) and Mrs. Kalpna
Sareen (wife of applicant Nishant Sareen). During the said
search operations, gold ornaments valued of approximately
₹65 lakh were recovered and seized.
20.11. As per the investigation, it has been revealed that
applicant, while functioning as Drugs Inspector/Assistant
Drugs Controller in Himachal Pradesh, has abused his official
position to extort illegal gratification from pharmaceutical
companies, by threatening adverse regulatory action, such as,
suspension of licences, false objections and delay in
approvals, thereby generating proceeds of crime.
20.12. According to the ED, the applicant had received
unlawful benefits amounting to Rs.1,01,81,608/- from
various Pharma entities. Thereafter, as per the Provisional
Attachment Order No. 06/2025 dated 02.12.2025 passed
under Section 5(1) of the PMLA, 2002, his immovable
properties have provisionally been attached, as “value
thereof”, of the proceeds of crime (POC); namely (i) Flat No.
1203, Tower 7A, Suncity Parikarma, Panchkula, owned by
Ms. Komal Khanna, attached to the extent of ₹2,36,99,390/-,
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and (ii) land with construction at Sareen House, Panthaghati,
Shimla, owned by applicant Nishant Sareen, attached to the
extent of ₹21,04,703/-, aggregating to a total provisional
attachment of ₹2,58,04,093/-.
20.13. It is the further case of the ED that the ECIR is
not based solely on FIR No.215/2022, but, the same has been
founded upon FIR No.004/2019, as well as FIR No.008/2025.
It has been admitted that the charge sheet, in FIR
No.004/2019, dated 21.08.2019, registered with SV & ACB,
has been filed before the Court of learned Special Judge,
Solan. Reiterating the fact that FIR No.008/2025, dated
23.09.2025, registered with SV&ACB, Himachal Pradesh,
under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, is a
validly registered scheduled offence and forms an integral
part of the investigation, under the PMLA. The arrest of the
applicant was effected strictly, in accordance with the
provisions of Section 19 of PMLA, after formation of a reason
to believe based on material evidence.
20.14. The relief, as claimed, in the present application,
has been opposed on the ground that merely joining the
investigation does not amount to true and complete
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cooperation, as the applicant has not disclosed full and
correct facts and has attempted to conceal material
information regarding financial transactions and assets. The
investigation, qua the applicant is stated to be not completed
and still going on.
20.15. In reply to para 17 of the application, it has been
submitted that the complaint filed by the ED is based on
concrete evidence including bank records, statements
recorded under Section 50 PMLA, documentary evidence
seized during search operations, and not on assumptions.
Reasserting the fact that proceedings under the PMLA can
continue simultaneously with predicate offences, and the
stage of trial, in the scheduled offence, does not bar
prosecution under PMLA. The applicant has miserably failed
to satisfy the mandatory twin conditions under Section 45 of
the PMLA.
21. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been
made to dismiss the application.
22. The applicant, in the present case, was arrested
on 09.10.2025. Almost ten months have been elapsed. As
per the stand taken by the applicant, complaint against him
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has been filed before the Court of learned Special Judge
PMLA, Shimla. This fact has been pleaded in para 19 of the
application, which has been admitted by pleading that the
allegations against the applicant are supported by the
substantial documentary evidence and witness statements.
Even in reply to para 31, it is submitted that the prosecution
complaint has been filed after a detailed and thorough
investigation based on documentary evidence, financial
records, statements under Section 50 of the PMLA and other
corroborative material.
23. Another fact, which has also not been disputed, in
the present case, is that investigation in FIR No.004/2019,
has been completed and the charge-sheet has been filed
before the learned Special Judge, Solan. The charges, in the
said case, have not yet been framed, whereas, investigation in
the case FIR NO.08/2025, is still going on. The third case
FIR No.215 of 2022, the police has filed the cancellation
report, which admittedly has not been accepted by the
competent Court.
24. On the basis of the above admitted factual
position, it has been argued by the learned Senior Counsel
17 2026:HHC:27640
appearing for the applicant that in the absence of the decision
in the above cases, the present ECIR cannot be decided.
25. To buttress his contentions, learned Senior
counsel has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in V. Senthil Balaji versus Deputy Director,
Directorate of Enforcement, reported as 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 2626. Relevant para 21, of the judgment, are reproduced,
as under:
“21. Hence, the existence of a scheduled offence
is sine qua non for alleging the existence of
proceeds of crime. A property derived or obtained,
directly or indirectly, by a person as a result of
the criminal activity relating to a scheduled
offence constitutes proceeds of crime. The
existence of proceeds of crime at the time of the
trial of the offence under Section 3 of PMLA can
be proved only if the scheduled offence is
established in the prosecution of the scheduled
offence. Therefore, even if the trial of the case
under the PMLA proceeds, it cannot be finally
decided unless the trial of scheduled offences
concludes. In the facts of the case, there is no
possibility of the trial of the scheduled offences
commencing in the near future. Therefore, we see
no possibility of both trials concluding within a
few years.
26. Admittedly, the investigation in FIR No. 08/2025,
registered with SV & CB, Shimla is still going on. In para 16
of the bail application, the applicant has specifically pleaded
the fact that in FIR No. 08/2025, the applicant has neither
18 2026:HHC:27640
been called, nor, any record has been supplied to him, despite
best efforts made by him. The specific allegations, as levelled
in para 16 have not been dealt with by the ED.
27. Learned counsel appearing for the ED could not
satisfy the judicial conscience of this Court as unless or until
predicate offence has not been proved, how the trial under
PMLA can be decided.
28. At the cost of repetition, charges, in FIR
No.004/2019, have not yet been framed. The investigation in
FIR No.008/2025 has not yet been completed. From the
above facts, a judicial notice can be taken, by this Court that
the chances of conclusion of trial, in near future, against he
applicant, in the present case, are not so bright. He has also
spent about ten months in judicial custody.
29. The applicant, in this case, has been booked,
under Section 3 of the PMLA and the punishment has been
provided, under Section 4 of the PMLA. Section 4 of the
PMLA is reproduced, as under:
“4. Punishment for money-laundering. –
Whoever commits the offence of money-laundering
shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for
a term which shall not be less than three years but
which may extend to seven years and shall also be
liable to fine.
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Provided that where the proceeds of crime involved
in money-laundering relates to any offence
specified under paragraph 2 of Part A of the
Schedule, the provisions of this section shall have
effect as if for the words “which may extend to
seven years”, the words “which may extend to ten
years” had been substituted.”
30. It is not in dispute that before releasing the
accused on bail, in a case, registered under PMLA, it is
incumbent upon the Court to record the findings with regard
to the satisfaction of the twin conditions, as per Section 45 of
the PMLA, which are pari materia to provisions of Section 37
of the NDPS Act.
31. A three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in Union of India versus K.A. Najeeb, reported as
(2021) 3 Supreme Court Cases 713, has elaborately
discussed the statutory restrictions, provided under Section
43-D(5) of the UAPA. Relevant paras-10 to 19, of the
judgment, are reproduced, as under:
“10. It is a fact that the High Court in the instant
case has not determined the likelihood of the
respondent being guilty or not, or whether rigours
of Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA are alien to him.
The High Court instead of incarceration and the
unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime
appears to have exercised its power to grant bail
owing to the long period in the near future. The
reasons assigned by the High Court are
20 2026:HHC:27640apparently traceable back to Article 21 of our
Constitution, of course without addressing the
statutory embargo created by Section 43-D(5) of
the UAPA.
11. The High Court’s view draws support from a
batch of decisions of this Court, including in
Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2
SCC 616, laying down that gross delay in
disposal of such cases would justify the
invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution and
consequential necessity to release the undertrial
on bail. It would be useful to quote the following
observations from the cited case: (SCC p. 622,
para 10)“10. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime
and the need to protect the society and the
nation, TADA has prescribed in Section
20(8) stringent provisions for granting bail.
Such stringent provisions can be justified
looking to the nature of the crime, as was
held in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab,
(1994) 3 SCC 569, on the presumption that
the trial of the accused will take place
without undue delay. No one can justify
gross delay in disposal of cases when
undertrials perforce remain in jail, giving
rise to possible situations that may justify
invocation of Article 21.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. Even in the case of special legislations like
the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1987 or the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 (“the NDPS Act“) which too
have somewhat rigorous conditions for grant of
bail, this Court in Paramjit Singh v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (1999) 9 SCC 252, Babba v. State of
Maharashtra, (2005) 11 SCC 569 and Umarmia v.
State of Gujarat, (2017) 2 SCC 731, enlarged the
accused on bail when they had been in jail for an
extended period of time with little possibility of
early completion of trial. The constitutionality of
harsh conditions for bail in such special
21 2026:HHC:27640
enactments, has thus been primarily justified on
the touchstone of speedy trials to ensure the
protection of innocent civilians.
13. We may also refer to the orders enlarging
similarly-situated accused under UAPA passed
by this Court in Angela Harish Sontakke v. State
of Maharashtra, (2021) 3 SCC 723. That was also
a case under Sections 10, 13, 17, 18, 18-A, 18-B,
20, 21, 38, 39 and 40(2) of the UAPA. This Court
in its earnest effort to draw balance between the
seriousness of the charges with the period of
custody suffered and the likely period within
which the trial could be expected to be completed
took note of the five years’ incarceration and over
200 witnesses left to be examined, and thus
granted bail to the accused notwithstanding
Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA. Similarly, in Sagar
Tatyaram Gorkhe v. State of Maharashtra, (2021)
3 SCC 725, an accused under UAPA was
enlarged for he had been in jail for four years and
there were over 147 witnesses still unexamined.
14. The facts of the instant case are more
egregious than these two abovecited instances.
Not only has the respondent been in jail for much
more than five years, but there are 276 witnesses
left to be examined. Charges have been framed
only on 27-11-2020. Still further, two
opportunities were given to the appellant NIA who
has shown no inclination to screen its endless list
of witnesses. It also deserves mention that of the
thirteen co-accused who have been convicted,
none have been given a sentence of more than
eight years’ rigorous imprisonment. It can,
therefore, be legitimately expected that if found
guilty, the respondent too would receive a
sentence within the same ballpark. Given that
two-third of such incarceration is already
complete, it appears that the respondent has
already paid heavily for his acts of fleeing from
justice.
15. This Court has clarified in numerous
judgments that the liberty guaranteed by Part III
22 2026:HHC:27640
of the Constitution would cover within its
protective ambit not only due procedure and
fairness but also access to justice and a speedy
trial. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee
(Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of
India, (1994) 6 SCC 731, it was held that
undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained
pending trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer
adverse consequences of his acts unless the
same is established before a neutral arbiter.
However, owing to the practicalities of real life
where to secure an effective trial and to
ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential
criminal is left at large pending trial, the courts
are tasked with deciding whether an individual
ought to be released pending trial or not. Once it
is obvious that a timely trial would not be
possible and the accused has suffered
incarceration for a significant period of time, the
courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge
them on bail.
16. As regards the judgment in NIA v. Zahoor
Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1, cited by the
learned ASG, we find that it dealt with an entirely
different factual matrix. In that case, the High
Court had reappreciated the entire evidence on
record to overturn the Special Court’s conclusion
of their being a prima facie case of conviction and
concomitant rejection of bail. The High Court had
practically conducted a mini-trial and determined
admissibility of certain evidence, which exceeded
the limited scope of a bail petition. This not only
was beyond the statutory mandate of a prima
facie assessment under Section 43-D(5), but it
was premature and possibly would have
prejudiced the trial itself. It was in these b
circumstances that this Court intervened and
cancelled the bail.
17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of
statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the
UAPA per se does not oust the ability of the
constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of
violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed,
23 2026:HHC:27640
both the restrictions under a statute as well as
the powers exercisable under constitutional
jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at
commencement of proceedings, the courts are
expected to appreciate the legislative policy
against grant of bail but the rigours of such
provisions will melt down where there is no
likelihood of trial being completed within a
reasonable time and the period of incarceration
already undergone has exceeded a substantial
part of the prescribed sentence. Such an
approach would safeguard against the possibility
of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA
being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or
for wholesale breach of constitutional right to
speedy trial.
18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are
conscious of the fact that the charges levelled
against the respondent are grave and a serious
threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case at
the threshold, we would have outrightly turned
down the respondent’s prayer. However, keeping
in mind the length of the period spent by him in
custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being
completed anytime soon, the High Court appears
to have been left with no other option except to
grant bail. An attempt has been made to strike a
balance between the appellant’s right to lead
evidence of its choice and establish the charges
beyond any doubt and simultaneously the
respondent’s rights guaranteed under Part III of
our Constitution have been well protected.
19. Yet another reason which persuades us to
enlarge the respondent on bail is that Section 43-
D(5) of the UAPA is comparatively less stringent
than Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Unlike the NDPS
Act where the competent court needs to be
satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty
and that he is unlikely to commit another offence
while on bail; there is no such precondition under
UAPA. Instead, Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA
merely provides another 9 possible ground for the
24 2026:HHC:27640
competent court to refuse bail, in addition to the
well-settled considerations like gravity of the
offence, possibility of tampering with evidence,
influencing the witnesses or chance of the
accused evading the trial by absconsion, etc.”
(self emphasis supplied)
32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Petition for
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 3205 of 2024, titled as
Ramkripal Meena versus Directorate of Enforcement, vide
order, dated 30th July, 2024, has held that the rigors of
Section 45 of the PMLA can be suitably relaxed to afford
conditional liberty to the accused, who has spent
considerable time in custody and there being no likelihood of
the trial being concluded, in the short span. Relevant paras-6
and 7, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:
“6. The only scheduled offence against the
petitioner is the one under Section 420 IPC, which
is in relation to the leakage of REET question
paper, and in which the petitioner has already
been enlarged on regular bail by this Court.
7. Adverting to the prayer for grant of bail in the
instant case, it is pointed out by learned counsel
for ED that the complaint case is at the stage of
framing of charges and 24 witnesses are
proposed to be examined. The conclusion
proceedings, thus, will take some reasonable
time. The petitioner has already been in custody
for more than a year. Taking into consideration
the period spent in custody and there being no
likelihood of conclusion of trial within a short
span, coupled with the fact that the petitioner is
25 2026:HHC:27640already on bail in the predicate offence, and
keeping in view the peculiar facts and
circumstances of this case, it seems to us that the
rigours of Section 45 of the Act can be suitably
relaxed to afford conditional liberty to the
petitioner. Ordered accordingly.
33. Considering the stage of the trial, in case FIR
No.004/2019 and the stage of investigation, in FIR
No.008/2025, this Court can foresee the fact that in near
future, chances of conclusion of the trial, against the
applicant, are not so bright.
34. The said findings can be recorded, in view of the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case titled as
Mahesh Joshi versus Directorate of Enforcement, Neutral
Citation No. 2025 INSC 1377. Relevant paras-10 to 14, of
the said judgment, are reproduced, as under:
10. Furthermore, attention is drawn to the
documentary nature of the case, wherein large
number of pages, witnesses and documents are
cited by the prosecution, and that the matter
remains at the stage of supply of copy of the
police report and other documents under Section
207, Code of Criminal Procedure (for short,
“CrPC“). It is urged that the trial is unlikely to
commence in the near future, and prolonged
incarceration would be inconsistent with Article
21 of the Constitution of India.
11. On the contrary, the learned ASG submits
that the allegations relate to serious economic
offences. He refers to what the agency describes
as a financial trail involving movement of funds
26 2026:HHC:27640through M/s Mugdog Packaging India LLP, M/s
Maxclenz Retail Pvt. Ltd., and M/s Jay The
Victory, before reaching the firm of the
Appellant’s son, M/s Sumangalam LLP.
According to the respondent, the layering of
transactions is consistent with money-laundering
methods.
12. Reliance is placed on statements of certain
co-accused recorded during the investigation,
with the submission that the later retractions are
belated. It is contended that the Rs. 50 lakh
entry is not isolated and forms part of a larger
financial pattern which, according to the agency,
totals Rs. 2.01 crore. The learned ASG submits
that the Appellant, being a senior political figure,
may influence witnesses who were departmental
officials or contractors. Continued custody is
therefore sought.
13. In V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director,
Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 2626, of which, one of us was a member
(Augustine George Masih, J.,), this Court,
particularly in para 27, held that where a trial
cannot be reasonably concluded and
incarceration becomes prolonged, constitutional
courts must intervene to safeguard the right to
personal liberty under Article 21. The Court
further emphasised that Section 45(1)(ii) of the
PMLA cannot be interpreted to justify indefinite
detention in cases involving voluminous,
document-heavy material where trial is unlikely
to begin promptly. The present case, in our view,
stands on a similar footing. Para 27 of V. Senthil
Balaji (supra) reads as follows:
“27. Under the Statutes like PMLA, the minimum
sentence is three years, and the maximum is
seven years. The minimum sentence is higher
when the scheduled offence is under the NDPS
Act. When the trial of the complaint under PMLA
is likely to prolong beyond reasonable limits, the
Constitutional Courts will have to consider
exercising their powers to grant bail. The reason
27 2026:HHC:27640is that Section 45(1)(ii) does not confer power on
the State to detain an accused for an
unreasonably long time, especially when there is
no possibility of trial concluding within a
reasonable time. What a reasonable time is will
depend on the provisions under which the
accused is being tried and other factors. One of
the most relevant factor is the duration of the
minimum and maximum sentence for the offence.
Another important consideration is the higher
threshold or stringent conditions which a statute
provides for the grant of bail. Even an outer limit
provided by the relevant law for the completion
of the trial, if any, is also a factor to be
considered. The extraordinary powers, as held in
the case of K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713], can
only be exercised by the Constitutional Courts.
The Judges of the Constitutional Courts have
vast experience. Based on the facts on record, if
the Judges conclude that there is no possibility
of a trial concluding in a reasonable time, the
power of granting bail can always be exercised
by the Constitutional Courts on the grounds of
violation of Part III of the Constitution of India
notwithstanding the statutory provisions. The
Constitutional Courts can always exercise its
jurisdiction under Article 32 or Article 226, as the
case may be. The Constitutional Courts have to
bear in mind while dealing with the cases under
the PMLA that, except in a few exceptional cases,
the maximum sentence can be of seven years.
The Constitutional Courts cannot allow
provisions like Section 45(1)(ii) to become
instruments in the hands of the ED to continue
incarceration for a long time when there is no
possibility of a trial of the scheduled offence and
the PMLA offence concluding within a reasonable
time. If the Constitutional Courts do not exercise
their jurisdiction in such cases, the rights of the
undertrials under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India will be defeated. In a given case, if an
undue delay in the disposal of the trial of
scheduled offences or disposal of trial under the
PMLA can be substantially attributed to the
accused, the Constitutional Courts can always
28 2026:HHC:27640decline to exercise jurisdiction to issue
prerogative writs. An exception will also be in a
case where, considering the antecedents of the
accused, there is every possibility of the accused
becoming a real threat to society if enlarged on
bail. The jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs is
always discretionary.”
14. Upon considering the material placed before
us, we find that several co-accused, whose
alleged roles will ultimately be evaluated at trial,
have already been granted bail. The Appellant
has remained in custody for over seven months.
The record is entirely documentary, as of now
there are 66 witnesses, 184 documents, and
more than 14,600 pages are involved, and the
proceedings are still at the stage of supply of
copy of the police report and other documents
under Section 207, CrPC. In our view, these
circumstances indicate that the commencement
of trial is not imminent and that the trial itself is
not likely to conclude once started in the near
future. The continued detention of the Appellant
requires closer scrutiny in light of constitutional
considerations.
(self emphasis supplied)
35. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manish Sisodia
versus Directorate of Enforcement, reported as 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 1920, has elaborately discussed the provisions of
PMLA, viz-a-viz, offences, which are punishable for death,
imprisonment for life, ten years or more like offences under
the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, murder,
cases of rape, dacoity, kidnapping for ransom, mass violence,
29 2026:HHC:27640
etc. Relevant paras-28 and 49 to 57 of the judgment, are
reproduced, as follows:
“28. Before considering the submissions of the
learned ASG with regard to maintainability of the
present appeals on account of the second order of
this Court, it will be apposite to refer to certain
observations made by this Court in its first order,
which read thus:
“26. However, we are also concerned about
the prolonged period of incarceration
suffered by the appellant – Manish Sisodia.
In P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of
Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791, the
appellant therein was granted bail after
being kept in custody for around 49 days [P.
Chidambaram v. Central Bureau of
Investigation, (2020) 13 SCC 337], relying on
the Constitution Bench in Shri Gurbaksh
Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC
565, and Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau
of Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40, that even
if the allegation is one of grave economic
offence, it is not a rule that bail should be
denied in every case. Ultimately, the
consideration has to be made on a case to
case basis, on the facts. The primary object
is to secure the presence of the accused to
stand trial. The argument that the appellant
therein was a flight risk or that there was a
possibility of tampering with the evidence or
influencing the witnesses, was rejected by
the Court. Again, in Satender Kumar Antil v.
Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10
SCC 51, this Court referred to Surinder Singh
Alias Shingara Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2005) 7 SCC 387 and Kashmira Singh
versus State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 291, to
emphasise that the right to speedy trial is a
fundamental right within the broad scope of
Article 21 of the Constitution. In Vijay
Mandanlal Choudhary (supra), this Court
while highlighting the evil of economic
30 2026:HHC:27640
offences like money laundering, and its
adverse impact on the society and citizens,
observed that arrest infringes the
fundamental right to life. This Court referred
to Section 19 of the PML Act, for the in-built
safeguards to be adhered to by the
authorised officers to ensure fairness,
objectivity and accountability. (See also
Pankaj Bansal v Union of India, 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1244] Vijay Madanlal Choudhary
(supra), also held that Section 436A of the
Code can apply to offences under the PML
Act, as it effectuates the right to speedy trial,
a facet of the right to life, except for a valid
ground such as where the trial is delayed at
the instance of the accused himself. In our
opinion, Section 436A should not be
construed as a mandate that an accused
should not be granted bail under the PML Act
till he has suffered incarceration for the
specified period. This Court, in Arnab
Manoranjan Goswami v. State of
Maharashtra, (2021) 2 SCC 427, held that
while ensuring proper enforcement of
criminal law on one hand, the court must be
conscious that liberty across human eras is
as tenacious as tenacious can be.
27. The appellant – Manish Sisodia has
argued that given the number of witnesses,
294 in the prosecution filed by the CBI and
162 in the prosecution filed by the DoE, and
the documents 31,000 pages and 25,000
pages respectively, the fact that the CBI has
filed multiple charge sheets, the arguments
of charge have not commenced. The trial
court has allowed application of the accused
for furnishing of additional documents,
which order has been challenged by the
prosecution that the said petition under
Section 482 will be withdrawn. It was also
stated at the Bar, by the prosecution that the
trial would be concluded within next six to
eight months.
31 2026:HHC:27640
28. Detention or jail before being pronounced
guilty of an offence should not become
punishment without trial. If the trial gets
protracted despite assurances of the
prosecution, and it is clear that case will not
be decided within a foreseeable time, the
prayer for bail may be meritorious. While the
prosecution may pertain to an economic
offence, yet it may not be proper to equate
these cases with those punishable with
death, imprisonment for life, ten years or
more like offences under the Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985,
murder, cases of rape, dacoity, kidnapping
for ransom, mass violence, etc. Neither is this
a case where 100/1000s of depositors have
been defrauded. The allegations have to be
established and proven. The right to bail in
cases of delay, coupled with incarceration for
a long period, depending on the nature of the
allegations, should be read into Section 439
of the Code and Section 45 of the PML Act.
The reason is that the constitutional mandate
is the higher law, and it is the basic right of
the person charged of an offence and not
convicted, that he be ensured and given a
speedy trial. When the trial is not proceeding
for reasons not attributable to the accused,
the court, unless there are good reasons,
may well be guided to exercise the power to
grant bail. This would be truer where the
trial would take years.
29. In view of the assurance given at the Bar
on behalf of the prosecution that they shall
conclude the trial by taking appropriate steps
within next six to eight months, we give
liberty to the appellant Manish Sisodia to
move a fresh application for bail in case of
change in circumstances, or in case the trial
is protracted and proceeds at a snail’s pace
in next three months. If any application for
bail is filed in the above circumstances, the
same would be considered by the trial court
on merits without being influenced by the
32 2026:HHC:27640
dismissal of the earlier bail application,
including the present Judgment.
Observations made above, re. right to speedy
trial, will, however, be taken into
consideration. The appellant Manish Sisodia
may also file an application for interim bail in
case of ill health and medical emergency due
to illness of his wife. Such application would
be also examined on its own merits.”
xxx xxx xxx
49. We find that, on account of a long period
of incarceration running for around 17
months and the trial even not having been
commenced, the appellant has been deprived
of his right to speedy trial.
50. As observed by this Court, the right to
speedy trial and the right to liberty are
sacrosanct rights. On denial of these rights,
the trial court as well as the High Court
ought to have given due weightage to this
factor.
51. Recently, this Court had an occasion to
consider an application for bail in the case of
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of
Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693,
wherein the accused was prosecuted under
the provisions of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967. This Court surveyed
the entire law right from the judgment of this
Court in the cases of Gudikanti Narasimhulu
v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra
Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240, Shri Gurbaksh
Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC
565, Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. Home
Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81,
Union of India v. K.A Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC
713, and Satender Kumar Antil v Central
Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51.
The Court observed thus:
33 2026:HHC:27640
“19. If the State or any prosecuting agency
including the court concerned has no
wherewithal to provide or protect the
fundamental right of an accused to have a
speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of
the Constitution then the State or any other
prosecuting agency should not oppose the
plea for bail on the ground that the crime
committed is serious. Article 21 of the
Constitution applies irrespective of the nature
of the crime.”
52. The Court also reproduced the
observations made in Gudikanti
Narasimhulu (supra), which read thus:
10. In the aforesaid context, we may remind
the trial courts and the High Courts of what
came to be observed by this Court in
Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor,
High Court reported in (1978) 1 SCC 240. We
quote:
“What is often forgotten, and therefore
warrants reminder, is the object to keep a
person in judicial custody pending trial or
disposal of an appeal, Lord Russel, C.J., said
[R v. Rose, (1898) 18 Cox]:
“I observe that in this case bail was refused
for the prisoner. It cannot be too strongly
impressed on the, magistracy of the country
that bail is not to be withheld as a
punishment, but that the requirements as to
bail are merely to secure the attendance of
the prisoner at trial.””
53. The Court further observed that, over a
period of time, the trial courts and the High
Courts have forgotten a very well-settled
principle of law that bail is not to be withheld
as a punishment. From our experience, we
can say that it appears that the trial courts
and the High Court attempt to play safe in
matters of grant of bail. The principle that
34 2026:HHC:27640
bail is a rule and refusal is an exception is,
at times, followed in breach on account of
non-grant of bail even in straightforward
open and shut cases, this Court is flooded
with huge number of bail petitions thereby
adding to the huge pendency. It is high time
that the trial court ad the High Courts should
recognize the principle that ” bail is rule and
jail is exception”.
54. In the present case, in the ED matter as
well as the CBI matter, 493 witnesses have
been named. The case involves thousands of
pages of documents and over a lakh pages of
digitized documents. It is thus clear that
there is not even the remotest possibility of
the trial being concluded in the near future.
In our view, keeping the appellant behind the
bars for an unlimited period of time in the
hope of speedy completion of trial would
deprive his fundamental right to liberty
under Article 21 of the Constitution. As
observed time and again, the prolonged
incarceration before being pronounced guilty
of an offence should not be permitted to
become punishment without trial.
55. As observed by this Court in the case of
Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra), the objective
to keep a person in judicial custody pending
trial or disposal of an appeal is to secure the
attendance of the prisoner at trial.
56. In the present case, the appellant is
having deep roots in the society. There is no
possibility of him fleeing away from the
country and not being available for facing the
trial. In any case, conditions can be imposed
to address the concern of the State.
57. Insofar as the apprehension given by the
learned ASG regarding the possibility of
tampering the evidence is concerned, it is to
be noted that the case largely depends on
documentary evidence which is already
35 2026:HHC:27640
seized by the prosecution. As such, there is
no possibility of tampering with the evidence.
Insofar as the concern with regard to
influencing the witnesses is concerned, the
said concern can be addressed by imposing
stringent conditions upon the appellant.”
(self emphasis supplied)
37. Mr. Ajeet Singh Saklani, learned counsel
appearing for the ED has argued that the period of custody,
in the present case, is only ten months, as such, the
applicant cannot take the benefit of the decision of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Manish Sisodia‘s case supra. The said
arguments are devoid of merits, as it is the stage of the trial,
which has to be considered for determining the fact whether
there are chances of commencement and conclusion of the
trial, within a reasonable period. The said fact can be
foreseen by this Court, on the basis of the stage of trial/
investigation in cases/FIRs, pertaining to predicate offence
and compelling the applicant to undergo a particular period of
the custody to seek relief of bail, would be nothing, but,
fallacy of law.
36 2026:HHC:27640
38. Considering all these facts, this Court is of the
view that the bail application is liable to be allowed and is
accordingly allowed.
39. Consequently, the applicant is ordered to be
released on bail, during the pendency of the trial, in case No.
ECIR No.SHSZO/03/2023 7303-7307, dated 31.03.2023,
registered with the Enforcement Directorate Office (ED),
Sub-Zonal Office, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, on his
furnishing personal bail bond, in the sum of ₹ 2,00,000/-,
with two sureties of the like amount, to the satisfaction of the
learned trial Court. This order, however, shall be subject to
the following conditions:
a) The applicant shall regularly attend the trial
Court on each and every date of hearing and if
prevented by any reason to do so, seek
exemption from appearance by filing
appropriate application;
b) The applicant shall not tamper with the
prosecution evidence nor hamper the
investigation of the case in any manner
whatsoever;
c) The applicant shall not make any inducement,
threat or promises to any person acquainted
with the facts of the case so as to dissuade
them from disclosing such facts to the Court or
the Police Officer;
37 2026:HHC:27640
d) The applicant shall not leave the territory of
India without the prior permission of the Court;
and
e) The applicant shall furnish an affidavit by
tenth day of every month, before the learned
trial Court, disclosing therein that he has not
been named, as accused, in any other case,
during that period.
40. Any of the observations, made hereinabove, shall
not be taken as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the
case, as these observations, are confined, only, to the disposal
of the present bail application.
41. It is made clear that the respondent-ED is at
liberty to move an appropriate application, in case, any of the
bail conditions, is found to be violated by the applicant.
42. The Registry is directed to forward a soft copy of
the bail order to the Superintendent of Jail, District Jail
Solan, through e-mail, with a direction to enter the date of
grant of bail in the e-prison software.
43. In case, the applicant is not released within a
period of seven days from the date of grant of bail, the
Superintendent of Jail, District Jail, Solan, is directed to
inform this fact to the Secretary, DLSA, Solan. The
Superintendent of Jail, District Jail, Solan, is further directed
38 2026:HHC:27640
that if the applicant fails to furnish the bail bonds, as per the
order passed by this Court, within a period of one month from
today, then, the said fact be submitted to this Court.
( Virender Singh )
Judge
July 09, 2026 (ps)
