Himachal Pradesh High Court
Ashish Sharma vs Anupam on 8 July, 2026
2026:HHC:27588
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 180 of 2026
Reserved on: 12.05.2026
.
Date of Decision 08.07.2026
Ashish Sharma ...Petitioner
Versus
Anupam ...Respondent
of
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? No.
rt
For the petitioner : In person.
For the respondents : Nemo
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
setting aside the order dated 04.11.2025, passed by learned
Additional Sessions Judge (CBI Court), Shimla, District
Shimla, H.P. (learned revisional Court) vide which the order
dated 28.03.2025, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First
Class, Court No. III, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned
Trial Court) was upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be
_____________________________
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the
learned trial Court for convenience).
.
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the complainant filed a complaint against the
accused for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 406, 420, 463, 468-471, etc. of the Indian Penal Code
of
(IPC). It was asserted that the accused is working in Dayanand
Public School, The Mall, Shimla, H.P. and was involved in
rt
unfair recruitment to the post of PGT (IP) in the year 2018.
The complainant brought this fact to the notice of higher
authorities. The higher authorities suspended the
complainant on 07.12.2019, instead of taking any action
against the accused. A list of witnesses was supplied in the
memorandum, in which the name of Mr R.C. Sharma was not
mentioned, but his document was attached with imputation
No.8. A false allegation of breach of conduct was made against
the complainant. An inquiry was conducted against the
complainant, but the cross-examination of Mr R.C. Sharma
was not conducted. Since there was no cross-examination,
hence, the inquiry was not a proper inquiry under the law. A
fake report was submitted by the Inquiry Officer, and the
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complainant was removed from his job on 07.12.2021. The
accused issued an experience certificate mentioning the
.
words suspension and removal of service after holding a
proper inquiry. The accused was aware of the fact that the
inquiry was not properly conducted because R.C Sharma was
not examined. The accused had created a fake experience
of
certificate to harass and defame the complainant; therefore, it
was prayed that an action be taken against the accused.
3.
rtThe learned Trial Court held that the complainant
should have complied with the provisions of Section 154 (1)
and 154 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) before
filing the complaint as per the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava vs State of UP 2015
AIRSCW 20175, but he had failed to do so; hence, the complaint
was dismissed.
4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned
Trial Court, the complainant filed a revision, which was
decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (CBI Court).
Shimla, District Shimla (learned revisional Court). The
learned revisional Court held that the complainant was
removed from service after a disciplinary inquiry. A letter
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written by the complainant’s father was the basis of the
charge. He was not cited as a witness, and he could not be
.
cross-examined. These allegations are to be adjudicated by
the competent authority examining the validity of the enquiry
and not by the Criminal Court. The Criminal Court cannot sit
over the findings of the departmental proceedings. Learned
of
Trial Court had dismissed the complaint after affording a
proper opportunity to the complainant. Therefore, the
rt
revision preferred by the complainant was dismissed.
5. Being aggrieved by the orders passed by the
learned Courts below, the complainant has filed the present
petition asserting that the learned Courts below erred in
appreciating the material placed on record. The accused had
created a fake experience certificate, containing false
information. The document was created to harass and defame
the complainant’s reputation. Anyone who makes a false and
disrespectful statement about another person can be held
liable for defamation; therefore, it was prayed that the orders
passed by the learned Courts below be set aside and the action
be taken against the accused.
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6. I have heard the petitioner, who appeared in
person.
.
7. The petitioner submitted that Mr R.C Sharma was
mentioned as a witness in the memorandum, but he was not
cross-examined. An inquiry conducted without examining all
the witnesses is not a proper inquiry. A fake experience
of
certificate was issued, mentioning that a proper inquiry was
conducted. Learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate
rt
the material placed before them; hence, he prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the orders passed by learned
Courts below be set aside.
8. I have given a considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the
records carefully.
9. The complainant filed the complaint on the
assumption that his father, Mr RC Sharma, was not examined,
and the inquiry was not proper. Learned Revisional Court had
rightly held that the remedy of the complainant was to
approach a proper forum to set aside the inquiry report
submitted by an Inquiry Officer, and a criminal Court cannot
sit in appeal over the findings recorded by an Inquiry Officer.
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10. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri
.
Manikoth, (1996) 1 SCC 435, that a decision rendered between
the parties cannot be said to be non-existent, and such an
order has to be avoided by challenging it in a higher forum. It
was observed: –
of
7….In our opinion, even a void order or decision
rendered between parties cannot be said to be non-
existent in all cases and in all situations. Ordinarily,
rtsuch an order will, in fact, be effective inter partes until
it is successfully avoided or challenged in a higher
forum. Mere use of the word ‘void’ is not determinative
of its legal impact. The word ‘void’ has a relative rather
than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that
the order is invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. There
are degrees of invalidity depending upon the gravity of
the infirmity, as to whether it is, fundamental or
otherwise and in this case, the only complaint about
the initiation of the suo motu proceedings by the Board
was, that it was not initiated on intimation by the State
Land Board about the non-filing of the statement as
required by Section 85(7) of the Kerala Land Reforms
Act. In our opinion, this is not a case where the
infirmity is fundamental. It is unnecessary to consider
the matter further.
8. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., (Re-issue)
Vol. 1(1) in para 26, p. 31, it is stated, thus:
“If an act or decision, or an order or other
instrument is invalid, it should, in principle, be null
and void for all purposes; and it has been said that
there are no degrees of nullity. Even though such an act
is wrong and lacking in jurisdiction, however, it::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:32 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:27588subsists and remains fully effective unless and until it
is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. Until
its validity is challenged, its legality is preserved.”
In the Judicial Review of Administrative Action, De Smith, Woolf
.
and Jowell, 1995 Edn., at pp. 259-60, the law is stated thus:
“The erosion of the distinction between jurisdictional
errors and non-jurisdictional errors has, as we have seen,correspondingly eroded the distinction between void and
voidable decisions. The courts have become increasingly
impatient with the distinction, to the extent that theof
situation today can be summarised as follows:
(1) All official decisions are presumed to be valid until
set aside or otherwise held to be invalid by a court
rt of competent jurisdiction.”
Similarly, Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law,
Seventh Edn., 1994, have stated the law thus at pp. 341-
342:
“… every unlawful administrative act, however invalid,
is merely voidable. But this is no more than the truismthat in most situations the only way to resist unlawful
action is by recourse to the law. In a well-known passage,
Lord Radcliffe said:
‘An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an
act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand ofinvalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary
proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of
invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, itwill remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as
the most impeccable of orders.’
This must be equally true even where the brand of
invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can
effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the
decision of the court. The necessity of recourse to the
court has been pointed out repeatedly in the House of::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:32 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:27588Lords and Privy Council without distinction between
patent and latent defects.”
The above statement of the law supports our view that
the order of the Board dated 28-6-1977, declining to
.
implead Respondents 3 and 4 (which stood confirmed
in revision), concludes the matter against Respondents
3 and 4.”
11. This position was reiterated in Nagar Parishad,
Ratnagiri v. Gangaram Narayan Ambekar, (2020) 7 SCC 275,
of
wherein it was observed: –
“16. Arguendo, the plaint as filed by Respondents 1 to
rt
19 also suffers from another fundamental deficiency.
Indeed, it is a cleverly drafted plaint, so as to give an
impression that the competent authority had not takenany decision in exercise of statutory powers until the
filing of the suit. However, in the written statement, a
clear assertion has been made by the defendants
(appellant and Respondent 20) that the decision toallot suit land to the appellant and for setting up the
Project was taken after due deliberation and
consultation with the Expert Committee, including theexercise of statutory powers of the authority concerned
in that regard. None of these decisions of thecompetent authority has been assailed by the
plaintiffs, nor has any declaratory relief been sought in
that regard. In such a case, it would not be enough toask for a permanent injunction simpliciter, and the suit
so filed ought to have been rejected at the threshold on
that count alone. We may usefully advert to the
exposition of this Court in Kandla Port v. Hargovind
Jasraj [Kandla Port v. Hargovind Jasraj, (2013) 3 SCC 182:
(2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 1]. In paras 26 to 31, the Court
observed thus: (SCC pp. 193-95)
“26. Mr Ahmadi next argued that the
termination of the lease being illegal and non est in::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:32 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:27588law, the respondent-plaintiffs could ignore the
same, and so long as they or any one of them
remained in possession, a decree for injunction
restraining the Port Trust from interfering with.
their possession could be passed by the court
competent to do so. We are not impressed by that
submission.
27. The termination of the lease deed was by an
order which the plaintiffs ought to get rid of by
having the same set aside, or declared invalid for
whatever reasons; it may be permissible to do so. No
of
order bears a label of its being valid or invalid on its
forehead. Anyone affected by any such order ought
to seek redress against the same within the period
permissible for doing so. We may, in this regard,
rt
refer to the following oft-quoted passage in Smith v.
East Elloe Rural District Council [Smith v. East Elloe
Rural District Council, 1956 AC 736: (1956) 2 WLR 888
(HL)]. The following are the observations regarding
the necessity of recourse to the Court for
establishing the invalidity of an order established:
‘… An order, even if not made in good faith, is
still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears
no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless thenecessary proceedings are taken at law to
establish the cause of invalidity and to get itquashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as
effective for its ostensible purpose as the most
impeccable of orders.’ [Smith case [Smith v. EastElloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 736: (1956) 2
WLR 888 (HL)], AC pp. 769-70]
This must be equally true even where the brand of
invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order
can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining
the decision of the court. The necessity of recourse
to the court has been pointed out repeatedly in the
House of Lords and Privy Council without
distinction between patent and latent defects. [Ed.:
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Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th Edn.,
1994.]
28. The above case was approved by this Court in
Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay
.
Environmental Action Group [Krishnadevi Malchand
Kamathia v. Bombay Environmental Action Group,
(2011) 3 SCC 363], wherein this Court observed: (SCC
pp. 369-70, para 19)
’19. Thus, from the above, it emerges that
even if the order/notification is void/voidable,
the party aggrieved by the same cannot decide
of
that the said order/notification is not binding
upon it. It has to approach the court for seeking
such a declaration. The order may be
rthypothetically a nullity, and even if its invalidity
is challenged before the court in a given
circumstance, the court may refuse to quash the
same on various grounds, including the standing
of the petitioner, on the ground of delay or on
the doctrine of waiver or any other legal reason.
The order may be void for one purpose or for one
person, it may not be so for another purpose or
another person.’
29. To the same effect is the decision of this
Court in Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of
Maharashtra [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of
Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 211] wherein this Court
discussed the need for determination of invalidity of
an order for public purposes : (SCC pp. 225-26,
paras 36 & 38-39)
’36. It is well settled that no order can be
ignored altogether unless a finding is recorded
that it was illegal, void or not in consonance with
law. As Prof. Wade states:
“The principle must be equally true even
where the ‘brand of invalidity’ is plainly
visible: for there also the order can effectively
be resisted in law only by obtaining the::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:32 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:27588decision of the court.” [H.W.R. Wade,
Administrative Law (6th Edn., Clarendon
Press, Oxford 1988) 352].
He further states:
.
“The truth of the matter is that the court
will invalidate an order only if the right
remedy is sought by the right person in theright proceedings and circumstances. The
order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the
court may refuse to quash it because of the
plaintiff’s lack of standing, because he doesof
not deserve a discretionary remedy, because
he has waived his rights, or for some other
legal reason. In any such case, the “void”
rt order remains effective and is, in reality,
valid. It follows that an order may be void for
one purpose and valid for another; and that it
may be void against one person but valid
against another.” [H.W.R. Wade,
Administrative Law (6th Edn., Clarendon
Press, Oxford 1988) 352-53]
***
38. A similar question came up for consideration
before this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh
[State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, (1991) 4 SCC 1: 1991
SCC (L&S) 1082]. …
39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the
courts and referring to several cases, this Court held
that if the party aggrieved by the invalidity of the
order intends to approach the court for a
declaration that the order against him was
inoperative, he must come before the court within
the period prescribed by limitation. “If the statutory
time of limitation expires, the court cannot give the
declaration sought for.” ‘
30. Reference may also be made to the decisions
of this Court in R. Thiruvirkolam v. Labour Court [R.
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Thiruvirkolam v. Labour Court, (1997) 1 SCC 9: 1997
SCC (L&S) 65], State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan
Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth [State of Kerala v. M.K.
Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, (1996) 1
.
SCC 435] and Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind
Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. [Tayabbhai M.
Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd.,
(1997) 3 SCC 443], where this Court has held that an
order will remain effective and lead to legal
consequences unless the same is declared to be
invalid by a competent court.”
of
12. Therefore, the order of the removal passed by the
competent authority is valid unless set aside. In the present
rt
case, the order has not been set aside by the competent
authority and the very basis of the complaint that the inquiry
was fake because the complainant’s father was not examined
is legally incorrect; hence, the complaint filed by the
complainant that a certificate containing a wrong mention of
the proper inquiry is a forged document created to cheat and
harm the complainant’s reputation is also without any basis.
13. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the
complainant was required to file a complaint before the
Station House Officer of the Police Station before approaching
the Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ranjit Singh Bath Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 2025 SCC
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OnLine 1479 that Section 154(1) requires that the information
regarding the commission of a cognizable offence has to be
.
furnished to an officer in charge of the Police Station. When
the complaint was not made to the officer in charge of the
Police Station but to some other officer, there is no
compliance with Section 154(1), and it is not permissible for
of
him to approach the learned Magistrate under Section 156(3)
of the Cr.PC. It was observed:
rt7. The requirement of sub-Section (1) of Section 154 is
that information regarding the commission of acognizable offence has to be furnished to an officer
Incharge of a Police Station. In this case, obviously, the
said compliance was not made. It is stated that the
Inspector General of Police forwarded a complaint tothe Economic Offences Wing. Sub-Section (3) of
Section 154 comes into picture only when, after a
complaint is submitted to the Officer In-Charge ofPolice Station or information is provided to the Officer
In-Charge of Police Station regarding the commissionof a cognizable offence, the Officer In-Charge refuses
or neglects to register a First Information Report.
8. Sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CrPC
are the two remedies available for setting the criminal
law in motion. Therefore, this Court held that before a
complainant chooses to adopt a remedy under Section
156(3) of the CrPC, he must exhaust his remedies
under sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the
CrPC, and he must make those averments in the
complaint and produce the documents in support.
However, in this case, the second respondent did not
exhaust the remedies. In this view of the matter, we
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find that both the learned Magistrate and the High
Court have completely ignored the binding decision of
this Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava (2015) 6
SCC 287.
.
9. We, therefore, quash and set aside both the
impugned orders and quash and set aside all the
further steps taken on the basis of the order dated 14th
June, 2017, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate.
14. It was submitted that the judgment of Priyanka
of
Srivastava (supra) does not apply to the present case because
the complaint was filed under Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha
rt
Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. This submission is only stated to be
rejected. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 2 SCC
622: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 238 that the requirements of Priyanka
Srivastava (supra) have been codified under BNSS. It was
observed at page 637:
34. A comparison of Section 175(3) BNSS with Section
156(3) CrPC indicates three prominent changes that
have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS asfollows:
(a) First, the requirement of making an application
to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the
officer in charge of a police station to lodge the FIR
has been made mandatory, and the applicant
making an application under Section 175(3) is
required to furnish a copy of the application made
to the Superintendent of Police under Section::: Downloaded on – 08/07/2026 20:35:32 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:27588173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the
application to the Magistrate under Section 175(3).
(b) Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to
conduct such an enquiry as he deems necessary.
before making an order directing registration of
FIR.
(c) Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider
the submissions of the officer in charge of the police
station as regards the refusal to register an FIR
before issuing any directions under Section 175(3).
35. The introduction of these changes by the
of
legislature can be attributed to the judicial evolution of
Section 156CrPC undertaken by a number of decisions
of this Court. In Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P.
[Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287:
rt
(2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 294: (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 153], this Court
held that prior to making an application to theMagistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC, the applicant
must necessarily make applications under Sections
154(1) and 154(3). It was further observed by the Court
that applications made under Section 156(3) CrPC mustnecessarily be supported by an affidavit sworn by the
applicant. The reason given by the Court for
introducing such a requirement was that applications
under Section 156(3) CrPC were being made in aroutine manner and in a number of cases only with a
view to causing harassment to the accused byregistration of FIR.
36. It was further observed in Priyanka Srivastava
[Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287:
(2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 294: (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 153] that the
requirement of supporting the complaint with an
affidavit would ensure that the person making the
application is conscious and also to see that no false
affidavit is made. Once an affidavit is found to be false,
the applicant would be liable for prosecution in
accordance with the law. This would deter him from
casually invoking the authority of the Magistrate under
Section 156(3).
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37. The relevant observations made by the Court are
reproduced hereinbelow: (Priyanka Srivastava case
[Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287:
(2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 294: (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 153], SCC pp.
.
305-306, paras 27-31)
“27. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation
of law, it needs to be reiterated that the learned
Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to the
allegations made and the nature of the allegations and
not to issue directions without proper application of
mind. He has also to bear in mind that sending the
of
matter would be conducive to justice, and then he may
pass the requisite order. The present is a case where
the accused persons are serving in high positions in
the Bank. We are absolutely conscious that the
rt
position does not matter, for nobody is above the
law. But the learned Magistrate should take note of
the allegations in entirety, the date of the incident
and whether any cognizable case is remotely made
out. It is also to be noted that when a borrower of
the financial institution covered under the SARFAESI
Act invokes the jurisdiction under Section 156(3)
CrPC, and also there is a separate procedure under
the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993, an attitude of more care,
caution, and circumspection has to be adhered to.
28. Issuing a direction stating “as per the application”
to lodge an FIR creates a very unhealthy situation in
society and also reflects the erroneous approach of the
learned Magistrate. It also encourages unscrupulousand unprincipled litigants, like Respondent 3, namely,
Prakash Kumar Bajaj, to take adventurous steps with
courts to bring the financial institutions to their knees.
As the factual exposition would reveal, Respondent
3 had prosecuted the earlier authorities, and after
the matter is dealt with by the High Court in a writ
petition recording a settlement, he does not
withdraw the criminal case and wait for some kind
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2026:HHC:27588the emperor of all he surveys. It is interesting to
note that during the tenure of Appellant 1, who is
presently occupying the position of Vice-President,
neither was the loan taken nor was the default.
made, nor was any action under the SARFAESI Act
taken. However, the action under the SARFAESI Act
was taken on the second time at the instance of the
present Appellant 1. We are only stating about thedevilish design of Respondent 3 to harass the
appellants with the sole intent to avoid the payment
of the loan. When a citizen avails a loan from aof
financial institution, it is his obligation to pay back
and not play truant or, for that matter, play possum.
As we have noticed, he has been able to do such
adventurous acts as he has the embedded conviction
rt
that he will not be taken to task because an application
under Section 156(3) CrPC is a simple application to the
court for the issue of a direction to the investigatingagency. We have been apprised that a carbon copy of a
document is filed to show compliance with Section
154(3), indicating it has been sent to the
Superintendent of Police concerned.
29. At this stage, it is seemly to state that power under
Section 156(3) warrants application of the judicial
mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police
taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A
litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of
the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen
with clean hands must have free access to invoke the
said power. It protects the citizens, but when pervert
litigations takes this route to harass their fellow
citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the
same.
30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this
country where Section 156(3)CrPC applications are to
be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the
applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of
the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the
learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the
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truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations.
This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible.
We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications
are being filed in a routine manner without taking any
.
responsibility whatsoever, only to harass certain
persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and
alarming when one tries to pick up people who are
passing orders under a statutory provision which can be
challenged under the framework of the said Act or
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it
cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal
of
court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores.
31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior
applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) while
filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both aspects
rt
should be clearly spelt out in the application, and the
necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The
warrant for giving a direction that an application under
Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that
the person making the application should be conscious
and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is
made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be
false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance
with the law. This will deter him to casually invoke the
authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That
apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the
same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate,
regard being had to the nature of the allegations of the
case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases
pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family
disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence
cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is
abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal
prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC
(Cri) 524] are being filed. That apart, the learned
Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging
of the FIR.” (emphasis supplied)
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38. In a recent pronouncement of this Court in Babu
Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka [Babu Venkatesh v. State
of Karnataka, (2022) 5 SCC 639 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 455],
the observations made in Priyanka Srivastava [Priyanka
.
Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287 : (2015) 3 SCC
(Civ) 294 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 153] were referred to and it
was held as follows: (Babu Venkatesh case [Babu
Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 5 SCC 639 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 455], SCC p. 646, paras 24-26)
“24. This Court has clearly held that a stage has come
where applications under Section 156(3) CrPC are to beof
supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the
complainant who seeks the invocation of the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate.
25. This Court further held that, in an appropriate case,
rt
the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify
the truth and also verify the veracity of the allegations.
The Court has noted that applications under Section
156(3) CrPC are filed in a routine manner without
taking any responsibility, only to harass certain
persons.
26. This Court has further held that, prior to the filing
of a petition under Section 156(3) CrPC, there have to
be applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) CrPC.
This Court emphasises the necessity to file an affidavit
so that the persons making the application should be
conscious and not make a false affidavit. With such a
requirement, the persons would be deterred from
causally invoking the authority of the Magistrate,
under Section 156(3) CrPC. Inasmuch as if the affidavit
is found to be false, the person would be liable for
prosecution in accordance with the law.” (emphasis
supplied)
39. In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution
of Section 156(3)CrPC by various decisions of this Court
as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes
introduced by Section 175(3) BNSS to the existing
scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural
practices and safeguards which have been introduced
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by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of
invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous
litigants for achieving ulterior motives.
40. Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider
.
the submissions made by the police officer concerned
before proceeding to issue directions under Section
175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the
police officer responsible for registering FIRs under
Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the
submissions of the police officer concerned also
ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially
of
while considering both the complaint and the
submissions of the police officer, thereby ensuring that
the requirement of passing reasoned orders is
complied with in a more effective and comprehensive
rt
manner.
15. In the present case, the complaint does not
mention that the complainant had approached the police
before filing the complaint, and the learned Trial Court was
justified in not acting upon it.
16. It was submitted that the judgment of Priyanka
Srivastava (supra) did not apply to the present case because
the complaint was not filed under Section 156 (3) of CrPC or
175 of BNSS. This submission will not help the petitioner. He
had made specific prayer that the ‘complaint be registered for
registering the FIR’ clearly showing that the intent was to get
the FIR registered.
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17. In view of the above, the orders passed by the
learned Courts below do not suffer from any infirmity, and
.
there is no reason to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction
vested with this Court in the present case.
18. This is not the first instance when the petitioner
has approached the Courts by filing these kinds of petitions.
of
Therefore, it is necessary to take effective steps to prevent the
petitioner from wasting the precious time of the Courts;
rt
hence, the present petition is dismissed with the cost of
₹10,000/-, which shall be deposited in the Chief Justice
Disaster Relief Fund within a period of four weeks, failing
which steps will be taken to recover it as per the law.
19. The present petition stands disposed of in the
aforesaid terms, so also the pending applications, if any.
20. Records of the learned Courts below be sent back
forthwith
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
08th July, 2026.
(ravinder)
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