Delhi District Court
Vijay Ghai vs State (Nct Of Delhi) on 8 July, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-019519-2025
CRIMINAL REVISION No.: 714/2025
VIJAY GHAI,
S/o. Late Shri. Darshan Singh,
R/o. 17/93, Geeta Colony,
Delhi-110031. ... REVISIONIST/
PETITIONER
VERSUS
STATE (GNCT OF DELHI),
Through SHO PS. Kotwali,
New Delhi. ... RESPONDENT
Date of e-filing : 16.12.2025
Date of institution : 18.12.2025
Date when judgment was reserved : 21.05.2026
Date when judgment is pronounced : 08.07.2026
JUDGMENT
1. The present revision petition has been preferred
under Sections 438/440 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’)/pari materia with
Sections 397/399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’), seeking setting aside of the
order dated 20.09.2025 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘impugned
order’), passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class-08/Ld.
JMFC-08, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘Ld. JMFC/Ld. Trial Court’), in case bearing, ‘State v.
Vijay Ghai, Cr. Case No. 6497/2019′, arising out of FIR No.
153/2018, PS. Kotwali, under Sections 304A of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC‘). Pertinently, by virtue
of the impugned order the Ld. Trial Court directed framing of
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.07.08
16:28:16 +0530
notice for the offence under Section 304A IPC against the
revisionist, namely, Vijay Ghai (hereinafter referred to as the
‘revisionist’) and the co-accused, namely, Sunil Kumar
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘co-accused’). Needless to mention
that the revisionist has further sought setting aside of the notice,
consequently framed against the revisionist on 20.09.2025 for the
said offence/under Section 304A IPC.
2. Succinctly, the case of the prosecution is that on
04.06.2018, PCR call vide DD No. 30A was received regarding
the admission of victim/deceased, namely, Mohan Singh
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘victim/deceased’) in Aruna Asaf Ali
Hospital in an unconscious state by one Attar Singh, owing to
electric shock at Shop No 442, Katra Choban, Chandani Chowk,
Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘spot/shop’) (समय 21:20 Hrs पर
दर्ज है कि इस समय Ct ब्रिजेन्द्र No N ने बजरिये टे लीफोन अरुणा आसफ अली
Hospital से इत्तला दी है कि मन मोहन सिंह S/o Unknown. Age -करीब 35 बर्ष पता
गली नं. 2, चांद बाग, दिल्ली जो करन्ट लगने पर Shop No 442 कटरा चौबान चांदनी
चौक दिल्ली से बेहोशी की हालत में अतर सिंह लेकर आया). Correspondingly,
it was determined that upon being medically examined vide MLC
No. 1517/18, the victim was declared, ‘brought dead’ (जिसे डाक्टर
साहब ने MLC No. 1517/18 पर check करने के बाद Brought Dead घोषित कर
दिया।). Consequently, the concerned police officials proceeded for
Aruna Asaf Ali Hospital and the MLC of the deceased was
obtained, wherein it was inter alia noted, “…A/H/o electric injury
at shop no. 442, Katra Choban, Chandni Chowk at 8:00 pm as told
by B/B… CPR, no any sign of reversal…straight line. Not
palpable pulse…In view of above finding, the patient declared
brought dead at 8:55 pm, 04/06/18…”. Thereafter, body of the
deceased was got preserved in the mortuary and in the facts and
circumstances brought forth, the instant FIR was got registered,
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.07.08
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and investigation ensued.
2.1. Remarkably, during the course of succeeding
investigation, spot was got examined by Crime Team, besides site
plan was prepared. Further, the gadgets deployed by the deceased
as well as the wire, etc., were seized from the spot (मौका पर से मृतक
मनमोहन द्वारा प्रयोग किये गये उपकरणों व् तार को फर्द बनाकर कब्ज़ा पुलिस में
लिया।). Correspondingly, relatives of the deceased were joined in
the investigation and their statements were recorded under Section
161 Cr.P.C. Thereafter, on conclusion of postmortem examination
of the deceased vide PM No. 834/2018, the body of the deceased
was handed over to his relatives (मृतक मनमोहन सिंह का PM No.
834/2018 पर पोस्टमार्टम करवाकर डेड बॉडी को उसके परिजनों के हवाले किया।).
Markedly, under the deceased’s postmortem examination report, it
was inter alia noted that the cause of deceased’s death was, ‘shock
as a result of antemortem electrocution’. At the same time, it was
noted that under her statement recorded under Section 161
Cr.P.C., deceased’s wife, namely, Sandhya attributed the cause
of the deceased’s demise to the negligence of deceased’s
employee, namely, Vijay Ghai (the ‘revisionist’ herein) and the
owner of the aforenoted shop/spot, namely, Sunil Kumar (संध्या ने
अपने बयानों में उसके पति मनमोहन की मृत्यु मनमोहन के मालिक विजय घई तथा
दूकान के मालिक सुनील कु मार की लापरवाही से होना बयान किया।).
2.2. Correspondingly, statement of eyewitness, Attar
Singh (hereinafter referred to as the ‘eyewitness’) was recorded
wherein the eyewitness inter alia avowed that he used to work with
his employer namely, Sunil Kumar’s shop at Chandni Chowk,
Delhi at relevant point in time. Further, as per the eyewitness,
Sunil Kumar had acquired a generator connection for one tubelight
as well as generator in his said shop and that the name of the
generator’s operator/owner as Vijay Ghai/the revisionist (सुनील
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.07.08
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कु मार ने अपनी दुकान पर एक पंखे और tubelite का जेनरे टर से कनेक्शन ले रखा
है। जेनरे टर वाले का नाम विजय घई है।). It was further avowed by Attar
Singh that the deceased, Manmohan Singh used to work at the
revisionist’s shop and that whenever there were issues with the
electricity connection, they used to call Manmohan
Singh/deceased, to address their concerns (मनमोहन सिंह जनरे टर वाले
के यहाँ काम करता था। जब भी कोई बिजली का फाल्ट होता तो हम मनमोहन को
बुलवाकर लाते थे।). Markedly, as per the eyewitness, on 04.06.2018,
since the tubelight at the shop/spot was not functioning properly,
he/Attar Singh had gone to the revisionist’s shop, where the
deceased as well as the revisionist were already present (दिनांक
04.06.2018 को हमारी दुकान की tubelite खराब थी तो सुनील कु मार दुकान
मालिक के कहने पर मैं जनरे टर वाले के यहाँ गया था । मनमोहन व जनरे टर वाला
वहां थे।). Upon reaching at the revisionist’s shop, Attar Singh
expressed his concerns and sought assistance from the deceased,
whereupon the revisionist asked the deceased to go to the spot
and return after the tubelight was repaired (मैं ने मनमोहन को ट्यूब
ठीक करने को बुलवाया तो जनरे टर वाले ने मनमोहन को कहा की जाओ जाओ ठीक
करके आ जाना।). Correspondingly, as per the eyewitness, when the
deceased asked the revisionist for plastic gloves, the revisionist
asked him to go without such gloves, proclaiming that nothing
would happen (मनमोहन ने विजय घई को बोला कि प्लास्टिक के दस्ताने दे दो
तो विजय घई ने कहा कि ऐसे ही काम कर आओ कु छ नहीं होता।). Subsequently,
when the deceased is proclaimed to have reached at the spot, Sunil
Kumar asked him/the deceased to remove his slippers outside the
shop. Further, when the deceased asked Sunil Kumar to switch off
the connection from main connection board, Sunil Kumar is
avowed to have refused for such request on the pretext that the
same would disrupt the work at the shop (सुनील जैन ने मनमोहन को
चप्पल बहार निकालने को कहा। मनमोहन ने सुनील जैन से कहा कि MC गिराकर
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.07.08
16:28:26 +0530
लाइट बंद करनी है तो सुनील जैन ने कहा कि बिना MC गिराए ठीक करो मेरा काम
distrub हो जायेगा।). As per the eyewitness, the deceased is asserted to
have repeated asked Sunil Kumar to switch off the said
connection, however, to no avail (मनमोहन ने कई बार request की लेकिन
सुनील जैन ने MC नही गिराने दी।). Thereafter, as per the eyewitness,
when the deceased was working on the tubelight, he suffered
electric shock, whereupon the eyewitness rushed and
disconnected to main connection (दुकान पर ट्यूब लाइट को ठीक करते
समय मनमोहन को करंट लग गयी। मैं ने भागकर लाइन काटी।). Consequently,
the victim was first shifted to Dr. Mathur, followed by his
admission in Aruna Asaf Ali Hospital, where the deceased was
declared as brought dead (हम मनमोहन को पहले डाक्टर माथुर के यहाँ ले
गए तथा फिर अरुणा आसफ अली ले गए जहाँ डाक्टरों ने उसे मृत घोषित कर
दिया।).
2.3. Consequently, on the basis of the aforenoted
statements, notice under Section 41A Cr.P.C. were issued to the
revisionist and Sunil Kumar, who were joined the investigation.
Subsequently, on conclusion of the investigation in the present
case, chargesheet was prepared and filed before the Ld. Trial
Court. Noticeably, upon such chargesheet being filed, cognizance
of the offence, as specified under the chargesheet was taken by
Ld. MM-12, Central, Tis Hazari Courts vide order dated
26.04.2019. Thereafter, on compliance of the provisions under
Section 207 Cr.P.C., arguments on the aspect of notice were inter
alia addressed by/on behalf of the revisionist as well as by Ld.
Addl. PP for the State. Consequently, on consideration of the said
arguments, Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 24.08.2024, directed
framing of notice under Section 304A IPC against the revisionist
and Sunil Kumar inter alia under the following observations;
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ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.07.08
16:28:29 +0530
“*** On the last of hearing, arguments were
advanced on the point of notice.
Since section 304A IPC is punishable upto 2 years
of imprisonment, it is summons triable in nature and
there is no stage of discharge.
The accused may invoke section 258 CrPC to stop
the proceedings if prima facie no grounds are
available on record to frame notice against them.
In the present matter, the eye witness, namely,
Attar Singh who was allegedly a co-worker with the
deceased has categorically stated that accused Vijay
Ghai did not provide plastic gloves to the deceased
despite asking for the same and had kept him as an
electrician without verification of expertise.
Qua accused Sunil Jain, he had stated that accused
Sunil Jain told the deceased to repair the tube light
without switching off the MC. The Inspection report
also states that PVC flexible wires were hanging from
the tube light fitting and found to be naked. The said
incident took place in shop no.442, Katra Chauban,
Chandni Chowk which is allegedly under the
ownership of Sunil Kumar Jain. Since, standard of
care required to have been observed by both the
accused persons was not met, rashness and negligence
can prima facie be presumed on their part. Further, the
post mortem report corroborates the fact that death of
deceased occurred due to electrocution. Hence,
prima facie the ingredients of section 304A IPC are
made out against the accused persons.
Let notice be framed accordingly on the next date
of hearing.
Put up for framing of notice on ***”
(Emphasis supplied)
2.4. Noticeably, it is further seen from the records of the
Ld. Trial Court that subsequently, on 03.05.2025, Ld. Trial Court
explicitly noted, “… Perusal of record reflects that orders for
framing of notice were passed on 24.08.2024, since then,
accused Sunil has not entered appearance due to which, the
judicial proceedings have been delayed immensely. It stands
clarified that in case any of the accused persons are absent on the
next date of hearing, cost of Rs.10,000/- shall be imposed unless
cogent evidence or document is produced to the contrary on the
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ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.07.08
16:28:32
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next date of hearing…”. Thereafter, the matter was taken up before
the Ld. Trial Court on 05.07.2025 and 20.09.2025. However, on
20.09.2025, Ld. Trial Court again proceeded to pass an order on
notice/impugned order, inter alia observing as under;
“*** It is submitted by Ld. Counsel for accused
that accused persons have been falsely implicated in
the present case.
Ld. APP for the State submits that there is enough
evidence on record to carve out a prima facie case
against the accused.
Heard. Perused and considered.
On going through entire record, prima facie
offence u/s 304A IPC is made out against the accused
persons. Hence, charge u/s 304A IPC is framed
against the accused persons to which they pleaded not
guilty and claimed trial.
Witnesses at serial no. 1 and 2 in the list of
witnesses be summoned alongwith MHCM for the
next date of hearing.
Put up for PE on ***”
(Emphasis supplied)
2.5. Apposite here to reproduce the notice, consequently
framed inter alia against the revisionist on 20.09.2025, pursuant to
the aforenoted order of the Ld. Trial Court, as under;
“…I, ***, JMFC-08/Central/Delhi, do hereby
charge you accused Vijay Ghai S/o Sh. Darshan Singh
as under :-
That on 04.06.2018, at about 8.00 p.m., at shop
no.442, Katra Chauban Chandni Chowk, Delhi falling
within the jurisdiction of PS: Kotwali, Mr. Manmohan
(since deceased), a technician had been working at
above-mentioned shop and repairing the tube light
and due to your rash or negligent act, he got
electrocuted by the electric current of the tube light
and thereby you you have committed offence
punishable u/s 304-A IPC and within my cognizance.
Show cause why you should not be punished for
the abovesaid offences or you have any defence to
make. ***”
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist submitted that the
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ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.07.08
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impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere
conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled cannons
of law, deserving the same to be set aside at the outset, as suffering
with gross illegality. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted
that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere
assumptions and that no sound and/or cogent reasons have been
delineated under the said order. Ld. Counsel further submitted that
while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court further
failed to appreciate that the entire story put forth by the
prosecution is concocted, false and unreliable. In this regard, Ld.
Counsel further submitted that the revisionist has been wrongly
charged for the offence under Section 304A, despite the fact that
the same is not even prima facie made out against him even if the
case of the prosecution is taken at its face value. As per the Ld.
Counsel, the case of the prosecution revolves around the allegation
that the revisionist failed to provide rubber gloves to deceased,
attributing charge/provisions under Section 304A IPC against the
revisionist. However, it was argued that while passing the
impugned order, Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that Section
304A IPC could only be invoked against the revisionist when it
could be brought on record that it was the revisionist’s duty to
provide the rubber gloves to the deceased, which is not
forthcoming in the instant case. In this regard, it was further
submitted that the deceased was an ex-employee of the revisionist,
who used to sit on the revisionist’s shop and the deceased went to
the shop of Sunil Kumar of his own volition, wherein the
revisionist has nothing to do with the said work. Correspondingly,
it was argued that the revisionist, at the relevant point in time, was
indulged in the business of providing backup electricity through a
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GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.07.08 16:41:41
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generator, at the time of failure of supply of electricity by BSES
and had no concern with the electric repair work which was
conducted/carried out by the deceased.
3.1. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist further reiterated that
since the electricity repair work, conducted by the deceased at the
shop of Sunil Kumar was not in the course of his employment, it
was never the duty of the revisionist to provide any rubber gloves
to the deceased. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, it is the
admitted case of the prosecution that the deceased was involved in
electric work since last 18-19 years, explicating that he was well
aware of the importance of the gloves in electric work. However,
the deceased, opted not to wear gloves on his own, belying any
rashness and/or negligence on the part of the revisionist.
Correspondingly, it was argued that even presuming that the
deceased was employed with the revisionist, still the
charges/provisions under Section 304A IPC cannot be brought
home/attracted against the revisionist as the work done by the
deceased was not a part of his employment, rather, the same was
privately conducted by him. Ergo, it was reiterated that no
negligence/rashness can be attributed to the revisionist as it was
not the duty of the revisionist to provide any safety equipment such
as robber gloves. etc., to the deceased as the deceased was not
working at the shop of co-accused, Sunil Kumar on the directions
of the revisionist. It was further submitted that the prosecution has
miserably failed to show that the revisionist was bound to provide,
safety gloves to the deceased and there is no iota of evidence to
show that the revisionist forced the deceased to go to his private
repair work, without the said safety gloves. As per the Ld.
Counsel, deceased’s own choice to work without any safety
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
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precaution was his own fault and the revisionist has nothing to do
either with the repair work or with the unfortunate death of the
deceased.
3.2. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist further submitted that
even as per the report prepared by the Electrical Inspector, Labour
Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, it is noted that the incident in
question could have been averted in case the deceased had taken
due safety precautions on his own. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel,
the incident of deceased’s electrocution was purely accidental, and
the revisionist was not even present on the spot when the said
incident happened. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel the revisionist
cannot be made liable even for active or contributory negligence,
due to which the incident in question happened. Consequently, it
was submitted that the charge under Section 304A IPC is not even
prima facie attracted against the revisionist. It was further
submitted that even otherwise, the deceased’s wife has been duly
compensated with a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs
only) by the revisionist through a life insurance policy, the
premium of which insurance policy was paid by the revisionist, in
the capacity of proposer. As per the Ld. Counsel, the revisionist
got the said policy issued for the deceased as he was previously
employed with the revisionist. It was further submitted that the Ld.
Trial Court also failed to give any sound, cogent or justified
reasons for passing the impugned order, which adversely affects
the rights of the revisionist. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the
Ld. Trial Court, miserably failed to apply its judicial mind aptly
and only acted as a mouthpiece of the prosecution, making the
impugned order liable to be outrightly set aside. Consequently, the
Ld. Counsel for the revisionist entreated that the impugned order,
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.07.08
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being passed in gross violation of law and settled judicial
precedents, deserves to be set aside, outrightly. In support of the
said contentions, reliance was placed upon the decisions in;
Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC
Online SC 520; Om Prakash v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC
Online Del 8234; Bishan Swaroop Sharma v. State, 2005 SCC
Online Del 150; and Guljeet Singh Kochar & Anr. v. State, Crl.
MC No. 1961/2004, dated 05.07.2005 (DHC).
4. Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that
the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due
appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the present case
and, as such, deserves no interference by this Court. It was further
submitted that no irregularity, impropriety, or incorrectness can be
attributed to the impugned order, which was passed by the Ld.
Trial Court, cognizant of the settled principles of law, as well as
wary of the facts and circumstances brought forth. As per the Ld.
Addl. PP for the State, the arguments contended by/on behalf of
the revisionist are in the nature of revisionist’s defence, which
cannot be considered by the Court at the stage of framing of notice.
Even otherwise, sufficiency of the material/evidence placed on
record, is not a fact which can be considered at the stage of framing
of notice. Consequently, Ld. Addl. PP for the State entreated that
the present petition deserves to be dismissed as malicious and
amounting to abuse of process of law.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist as
well as that of Ld. Addl. PP for the State have been heard as well as
the records, including the Ld. Trial Court records as well as the
case laws, relied, thoroughly perused.
6. Before proceeding with the determination of the
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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merits of the case/issues posed before this Court, i.e., ‘whether the
Ld. Trial Court erred in proceeding to frame notice for the offence
under Section 304A IPC against the revision?’ and/or ‘whether
there is any illegally, impropriety or error under the impugned
order?’, it would be apposite to outrightly make a reference to the
relevant provisions under law, in particular that under law/Section
438 BNSS1, as under;
“438. Calling for records to exercise powers of
revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge
may call for and examine the record of any proceeding
before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or
his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying
itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded
or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings
of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for
such record, direct that the execution of any sentence
or order be suspended, and if the accused is in
confinement that he be released on his own bond or
bail bond pending the examination of the record.
*** *** ***
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial
or other proceeding….”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Pertinently, from a perusal of the aforesaid, it is quite
evident that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be agitated
either suo motu or an application of parties, that too in a case(s)
where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the provision of
law, decision of Trial Court being completely erroneous or where
the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily. In this regard,
1
Pari materia with Section 397 Cr.P.C., which provides, “397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision-
(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior
Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any
proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence
or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending
the examination of the record.***Explanation – All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether
exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of
this sub-section and of Section 398.***(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised
in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding…” (Emphasis supplied)
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reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, wherein
the Hon’ble Court while explicating the various contours of the
provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. (pari materia with Section
438 BNSS), observed as under;
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as
to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
order made in a case. The object of this provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or
law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may
not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the
orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of
careful consideration and appear to be in accordance
with law. If one looks into the various judgments of
this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction
can be invoked where the decisions under challenge
are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the
provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on
no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These
are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative.
Each case would have to be determined on its own
merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should
not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The
Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to
injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the
question as to whether the charge has been framed
properly and in accordance with law in a given case,
it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially
falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing
of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings
under the CrPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Similarly, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in V.K.
Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC Online Del 1192, in a similar context
noted as under;
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“67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to test
the waters of what might happen in the trial. The
Revisional Court has to consider the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order
and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the court
below. While doing so, the Revisional Court does
not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the
case, rather it considers the material only to satisfy
itself about the legality and propriety of the findings,
sentence and order and refrains from substituting its
own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of
evidence. In the instant case, the Petitioner has failed
to make out a case for exercise of the revisional
jurisdiction since there is no patent error in the
impugned order on the face of record.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted, the
revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an order
of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it is a
settled law2 that trite law that in a case where the order of
subordinate Court does not suffer from any illegality, “merely
because of equitable considerations, the revisional Court has no
jurisdiction to re-consider the matter and pass a different order in a
routine manner.” Reference in this regard is made to the decision
in Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC Online Del 312, wherein the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi expounded as under;
“9. The scope of interference in a revision petition
is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section
397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions
Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order
and as to the regularity of the proceedings of any
inferior court. It is also well settled that while
considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a
finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court
does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of
the case. A court in revision considers the material2
Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC Online MP 4458; and Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC Online MP
958.
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only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of
the findings, sentence and order and refrains from
substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate
consideration of evidence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Notably in the context of the foregoing, it is further
apposite to observe here that the charges alleged/case against the
revisionist is summons triable, where under the erstwhile
provisions of law/Cr.P.C., there was no formal stage of framing
charge. Ergo, law provided for no stage of discharge in summons
case. Nonetheless, by virtue of Section 258 Cr.P.C., Magistrates
were empowered to stop proceedings in summons case instituted
otherwise than upon complaint, for the reasons to be recorded in
writing, at any stage, “…without pronouncing any judgment and
where such stoppage of proceedings is made after the evidence
of the principal witnesses has been recorded, pronounce a
judgment of acquittal, and in any other case, release the accused,
and such release shall have the effect of discharge.” . Reference in
this regard is made to the decision in Lalit Goel v. State (NCT of
Delhi), Crl. MC No. 7005/2025, dated 06.10.2025 , wherein the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, while evaluating the provisions
under Cr.P.C. inter alia, remarked as under;
“8. In the opinion of the Court, the impugned
order proceeds on well-established principles of
criminal jurisprudence governing the stage of notice
or charge. The revisional court has correctly observed
that the present case, being summons-triable, does not
envisage a formal charge-framing process or a
statutory provision for discharge. Under the scheme of
the Cr.P.C., the Magistrate, upon finding no case
made out, may acquit the accused after recording
evidence under Section 255, or in appropriate cases of
baseless prosecution, terminate proceedings under
Section 258.
9. The revisional court has also rightly recorded
that while premature termination of summons
proceedings may be justified in exceptional cases, to
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prevent abuse of process, such discretion is to be
exercised sparingly and only when the allegations
are inherently improbable or the prosecution is
demonstrably groundless. Thus, the dismissal of a
“discharge” plea in a summons case cannot be faulted
unless it reflects manifest non-application of mind or
results in manifest injustice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. However, it is further pertinent to note here that with
the coming into force of BNSS with effect from 01.07.2024, a
proviso has been added/introduced under Section 274 BNSS (pari
materia with Section 251 Cr.P.C.), permitting magistrate to release
an accused on the determination of case/accusation against such
an accused to be groundless, even at the stage of notice. Needless
to mention that the law now provides that such a release would
have an effect of discharge. Apposite here to reproduce the said
provision/provision under Section 274 BNSS, as under;
“274. Substance of accusation to be stated-When
in a summons-case the accused appears or is brought
before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of
which he is accused shall be stated to him, and he shall
be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence
to make, but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal
charge:
Provided that if the Magistrate considers the
accusation as groundless, he shall, after recording
reasons in writing, release the accused and such
release shall have the effect of discharge.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Here, it is further pertinent to note that quite
recently, the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Dr.
Manjot Singh Waraich & Anr. v. Rajinderpal Singh, CRM-
M-51624/2024 (O&M), Etc., dated 12.05.2025, held that the
provisions under Section 274 BNSS, in particular, proviso thereof
shall be available/applicable even to cases, initiated prior to
01.07.2024, where the notice was not yet framed, as one before
this Court. Needless to mention, the reason for the same was
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determined to be the Hon’ble Court’s determination that the
proviso to Section 274 BNSS is beneficial in nature, meant to
secure the ends of justice. Pertinent here to reproduce the relevant
extracts of the said dictate, as under;
“10. Concededly, all the five complaints were
filed in the year 2023. Now the question arises,
whether proviso to Section 274 BNSS can be pressed
into service to discharge the accused in an appropriate
case filed prior to 01.07.2024 or that the said proviso
can have a prospective effect?
*** *** ***
12. Concededly, in the present case, on
21.10.2024, the matter was posted to 26.11.2024 for
consideration on notice of accusation and the order
dated 21.10.2024 passed by learned JMIC reads as
under:-
*** *** ***
Bare perusal of aforesaid extract reveals that
notice of accusation is yet to be served upon the
petitioner(s).
13. In such a scenario, this Court is of the
considered opinion that proviso to Section 274 of
BNSS has been introduced as a beneficial measure;
thus, in order to secure the ends of justice, the same
can be applied to the pending complaint(s) as well,
where notice of accusation are yet to be
served/considered by the Court of competent
jurisdiction. Hence, taking into consideration the
factual position in the present case(s), learned JMIC
would be well empowered to consider the grounds of
accusation and in case, it is found that there is no
substance in the allegation(s), the accused can be
discharged at this stage.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Germane for the purpose(s) of present discourse to
now consider the principles governing framing of charge/framing
of notice. In this regard, it is relevant to outrightly note the settled
law3 that at the stage of framing of charge/discharge/notice, which
in the considered opinion of this Court, must apply with equal
vigor to framing of notice or discharge even under Section 274
3
State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018
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BNSS, neither can the truth, veracity and effect of the prosecution
case be meticulously4 judged, nor can any weight to be attached to
the probable defence of the accused. On the contrary, at such a
stage, only the sufficiency of ground for proceeding against the
accused, on a general consideration of materials placed before the
Court by the investigating police officer is relevant. Further,
though, sifting of evidence is permissible5, however, scanning of
evidence in detail is not. Quite understandably, the Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi in Reena v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2020 SCC Online
Del 630, iterated the said principles in unequivocal terms as under;
“12. Thus it is settled position of law that at the
time of framing of charge, the Court is not supposed to
look into the evidence of the case in detail and is
only to consider whether there is a strong suspicion
against the accused on the basis of the material that
comes before it. The court has the power to sift the
evidence for the limited purpose of finding out,
whether or not a prima facie case is made out against
the accused. However, the Court is not supposed to
delve deeply into the merits of the matter and start a
roving expedition into the evidence that is brought
forth it, as if conducting a trial. Further there is no
one fixed definition that may be ascribed to the term
prima facie’ nor can the term strong suspicion have a
singular meaning. While coming to the conclusion of
a strong prima facie case or strong suspicion, the
Court shall have to decide each case on the basis of its
own independent facts and circumstances.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Concomitantly, it is settled law6 that the
inconsistency in the material produced by the prosecution or the
defect in investigation7, cannot be looked into for discharge of an
accused, in the absence of full-fledged trial. In fact, the probative
value8 of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the
4
Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460.
5
State of Maharashta v. Priya Sharan Maharaj & Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 393.
6
Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476.
7
State of Tamil Nadu by Inspector of Police v. N. Suresh Ranjan & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 709.
8
Soma Chakravarty v. State, (2007) 5 SCC 403.
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material placed on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as
true at that stage. Reference in this regard is made to the decision
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of T.N. v. R. Soundirarasu,
(2023) 6 SCC 768, wherein the Hon’ble Court remarked as under;
“59. Reiterating a similar view in Sheoraj Singh
Ahlawat v. State of U.P. [Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v.
State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri)
21] , it was observed by this Court that while framing
charges the court is required to evaluate the materials
and documents on record to decide whether the facts
emerging therefrom taken at their face value would
disclose existence of ingredients constituting the
alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required
to go deep into the probative value of the materials on
record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground
for presuming that the accused had committed the
offence and it is not required to evaluate sufficiency of
evidence to convict the accused. It was held that the
court at this stage cannot speculate into the
truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and
contradictions and inconsistencies in the statement of
witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of
discharge.”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Relevant to further note that it is trite law9, at the stage
of framing of charge, only the police report is required to be
considered and the defence of the accused10 cannot be looked into.
Needless to mention that the superior courts11 have persistently
deprecated the practice of holding a mini trial at the time of
framing of charge. Relevantly, in this regard, reference is made to
the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharat Parikh v.
CBI, (2008) 10 SCC 109, wherein the Hon’ble Court enunciated
the judicial principle(s), as under;
“19. As observed in Debendra Nath Padhi case
[(2005) 1 SCC 568: 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] at the stage
of framing charge roving and fishing inquiry is9
State Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad & Anr. v. P. Suryaprakasam, (1999) SCC (Crl.) 373 and State of Orissa
v. Debendra Nath Padhi, 2005 (1) SCC 568.
10
State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294.
11
Indu Jain v. State of M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 341.
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impermissible and a mini trial cannot be conducted at
such stage. At the stage of framing of charge the
submissions on behalf of the accused have to be
confined to the material produced by the investigating
agency. The accused will get an opportunity to prove
the documents subsequently produced by the
prosecution on the order of the Court, but the same
cannot be relied upon to reopen the proceedings once
charge has been framed or for invocation of the High
Court’s powers under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.”
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Apposite to further emphasize12 that at the stage of
charge, court(s) is/are not even required to record detailed reasons
for framing charge, rather13, a very strong suspicion founded
upon materials placed before it, which leads the court to form a
presumptive opinion as to the existence of factual ingredients
constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of
charges. In fact14, it is only when no case is made out even after
presuming entire prosecution evidence, can an accused be
discharged. Needless to accentuate15, “at the stage of framing of
charge, the sufficiency of materials for the purpose of conviction is
not the requirement and a prayer for discharge can be allowed only
if the court finds that the materials are wholly insufficient for the
purpose of trial.” Notably, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Stree
Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1
SCC 715, while inter alia illuminating the principles as well as the
scope of enquiry for the purpose of charge/discharging an accused,
observed as under;
“14. … It provides that “the Judge shall
discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused”. The12
Bhawna Bai v. Dhanshyam & Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 217
13
Supdt. and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC 52 and Sajjan
Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368
14
Manjit Singh Virdi v. Hussain Mohammed Shattaf, (2023) 7 SCC 633
15
Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta & Ors., (2015) 3 SCC 424
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“ground” in the context is not a ground for conviction,
but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in
the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will
be determined and not at the time of framing of
charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an
elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the material.
Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects.
All that the court has to consider is whether the
evidentiary material on record if generally accepted,
would reasonably connect the accused with the crime.
No more need be enquired into.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Ergo, being mindful of the principles hereinunder
noted, this Court would now proceed with the determination of the
arguments raised by Ld. Counsel for the revisionist as well as by
Ld. Addl. PP for the State. Markedly, one of the primary
contentions of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist is that even
from the material placed on record prima facie ingredients of
offence, alleged against the revisionist are not made out. However,
in order to appreciate the said contention, this Court deems it
pertinent to reproduce the relevant provision(s) under law/IPC as
under;
“304-A. Causing death by negligence-Whoever
causes the death of any person by doing any rash or
negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide
shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years,
or with fine, or with both”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Notably, it is seen from above that the essential
ingredients to constitute offence/attract culpanbility under Section
304A IPC are causation of, “death of any person by doing any rash
or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide” . In this
regard, this Court deems it pertinent to make a reference to the
decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Ras Bihari Singh
v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2017 SCC Online Del 12290, wherein the
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Hon’ble Court, while inter alia explicating the ingredients of the
provisions/offence under Section 304A IPC, observed as under;
“13. Section 304A which deals with unintentional
death caused by doing any rash or negligent act of the
offender. The applicability of this Section is limited to
rash or negligent acts which cause death but fall
short of culpable homicide amounting to murder or
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. To bring
an offence within the ambit of Section 304A, the
prosecution is required to bring on record that the act
was done by an accused and the death was caused due
to rash and negligent act.”
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Germane for the purpose(s) of present discourse to
further make a reference to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Rathnashalvan v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 3 SCC 474 ,
wherein the Hon’ble Court, while explicating the contours of the
terms, ‘rashness’ and ‘negligence’, observed as under;
“7. *** Negligence and rashness are essential
elements under Section 304-A. Culpable negligence
lies in the failure to exercise reasonable and proper
care and the extent of its reasonableness will always
depend upon the circumstances of each case.
Rashness means doing an act with the consciousness
of a risk that evil consequences will follow but with
the hope that it will not. Negligence is a breach of duty
imposed by law. In criminal cases, the amount and
degree of negligence are determining factors. A
question whether the accused’s conduct amounted to
culpable rashness or negligence depends directly on
the question as to what is the amount of care and
circumspection which a prudent and reasonable man
would consider it to be sufficient considering all the
circumstances of the case. Criminal rashness means
hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the
knowledge that it is dangerous or wanton and the
further knowledge that it may cause injury but done
without any intention to cause injury or knowledge
that it would probably be caused.
8. As noted above, “rashness” consists in
hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the
knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury .
The criminality lies in such a case in running the risk
of doing such an act with recklessness or
indifference as to the consequences. Criminal
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negligence on the other hand, is the gross and culpable
neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and
proper care and precaution to guard against injury
either to the public generally or to an individual in
particular, which, having regard to all the
circumstances out of which the charge has arisen it
was the imperative duty of the accused person to have
adopted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Analogously, the Hon’ble Apex Court, earlier in
Mohd. Aynuddin v. State of A.P., (2000) 7 SCC 72 , while
cogitating on the meaning/connotation of culpable rashness and
culpable negligence, noted as under;
“9. A rash act is primarily an overhasty act. It is
opposed to a deliberate act. Still a rash act can be a
deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due
care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the
risk of doing an act with recklessness and with
indifference as to the consequences. Criminal
negligence is the failure to exercise duty with
reasonable and proper care and precaution guarding
against injury to the public generally or to any
individual in particular. It is the imperative duty of the
driver of a vehicle to adopt such reasonable and
proper care and precaution.”
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Ergo, it is quite intelligible16 that negligence is the
breach of a duty caused by omission to do something which a
reasonable man guided by those considerations, which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do or doing
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. In
contrast, a rash act is a negligent act done precipitately. In fact, it
is a settled law17, “Negligence is the genus, of which rashness is
the species.” Further, rashness consists18 in hazarding a dangerous
or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may
16
Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 9 SCC 284.
17
Prabhakaran v. State of Kerala, (2007) 14 SCC 269.
18
S.N. Hussain v. State of A.P., (1972) 3 SCC 18.
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cause injury. It is trite, the criminality lies in such a case in running
the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as
to the consequences.
22. Consequently, being mindful of the above, when
facts of the present case are conscientiously evaluated, in light of
aforenoted judicial precedents as well as the arguments addressed,
it is outrightly observed that the eyewitness of the incident, Attar
Singh as well as the deceased’s wife, Smt. Sandhya Singh have
levelled specific allegations against the revisionist herein. In
particular, it is seen from a conscientious perusal of the records
that the eyewitness/Attar Singh, inter alia explicitly proclaimed
under his statement dated 10.09.2018, recorded under Section 161
Cr.P.C. (pari materia with Section 180 BNSS) that his employer,
Sunil Kumar had obtained one fan and tueblight connection
through a generator and that the generator operator was Vijay
Ghai, the revisionist herein (सुनील कु मार ने अपनी दुकान पर एक पंखे और
tubelite का जेनरे टर से कनेक्शन ले रखा है। जेनरे टर वाले का नाम विजय घई है।).
Further, as aforenoted, as per the eyewitness, the deceased used to
work at, ‘generator wala’/revisionist and that whenever they
experienced electricity connection, they used to call for the
deceased, for repair works (मनमोहन सिंह जनरे टर वाले के यहाँ काम करता
था। जब भी कोई बिजली का फाल्ट होता तो हम मनमोहन को बुलवाकर लाते थे।).
Further, as aforenoted, Attar Singh further avowed that on
04.06.2018, as the tube light at their shop was not functioning
properly, on the directions of Sunil Kumar, he/Attar Singh went to
the shop of the revisionist, where both, the deceased and the
revisionist were present (दिनांक 04.06.2018 को हमारी दुकान की tubelite
ख़राब थी तो सुनील कु मार दुकान मालिक के कहने पर मैं जनरे टर वाले के यहाँ गया
था। मनमोहन व जनरे टर वाला वहां थे ।). Thereupon, when Attar Singh
asked the deceased to address his concerns, the revisionist is
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avowed to have asked the revisionist to go to their shop, however,
the revisionist refused to give gloves to the deceased, despite his
request. On the contrary, Attar Singh asserted that the revisionist
told the deceased that he should go for repair works without the
gloves and that nothing would happen to him (मैं ने मनमोहन को ट्यूब
ठीक करने को बुलवाया तो जनरे टर वाले ने मनमोहन को कहा की जाओ जाओ ठीक
करके आ जाना। मनमोहन ने विजय घई को बोला कि प्लास्टिक के दस्ताने दे दो तो
विजय घई ने कहा कि ऐसे ही काम कर आओ कु छ नहीं होता।).
23. Correspondingly, it is seen from a reading of the
statement of Smt. Sandhya Singh, deceased’s wife dated
10.09.2018, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., that Smt.
Sandhya Singh inter alia asserted therein that her husband was
working at Shubham Service @ Efco marketing Private for around
17-18 years and that the name of the decease’s employer was Vijay
Ghai, at the relevant point in time. Consequently, in conspectus of
above, both the aforenoted witnesses, unambiguously asserted
under their respective statements that the deceased was employed
with the revisionist at the relevant point in time. Further, as
aforenoted, Attar Singh further avowed that despite being
requested for supply of glove while attending to the request for
electricity issues/concerns at the shop from the revisionist, the
revisionist denied conceding to the deceased’s said request. On the
contrary, as aforenoted, as per Attar Singh, the revisionist avowed
at that point in time that the deceased should proceed for work
without such gloves and that nothing would happen (ऐसे ही काम कर
आओ कु छ नहीं होता।). Needless to mention that as per the deceased’s
MLC no. 1517/2018, the deceased was declared brought dead with
a history of electric injury at shop no. 442, Katra Choban, Chandni
Chowk at 8:00 pm. Correspondingly, it is seen from the record that
the deceased’s postmortem report bearing no. 834/2018, dated
CR. No. 714/2025 Vijay Ghai v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 25 of 29
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.07.08
16:42:35 +0530
05.06.2018, the cause of deceased’s demise was specifically noted
to be, “shock as a result of antemortem execution” . Ergo, under
such facts and circumstances and being wary of all the material
brought on record, this Court is in concurrence with the finding of
the Ld. Trial Court that prima facie case, strong suspicion and
sufficient material/ground(s) to proceed with the notice under
Section 304A IPC exists against the revisionist herein. In the
considered opinion of this Court, considering that the deceased
was avowed to be employed with the revisionist at the relevant
point in time, it was for the revisionist to provide all safety and to
take all the precaution to protect the deceased working with him
and directly engaged in electric repair activities, which the
revisionist is asserted to have undertaken, despite the explicit
request of the deceased.
24. Here, it is pertinent to deal with the contention of the
Ld. Counsel for the revisionist inter alia to the effect that there are
variations in the statements of the witnesses. However, as
aforenoted, law is trite that contradictions and inconsistencies in
the statement of witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of
charge/notice. In as much as the contention of the Ld. Counsel for
the revisionist pertaining to the revisionist’s false implication in
the present case or that of the deceased’s being an ex-employee of
the revisionist or that of deceased’s working on his own volition
at Sunil Kumar’s shop or that on revisionist not being obligated to
provide any safety gear to the deceased as he was working on his
own will are concerned, same, in the considered opinion of this
Court, are all subject matters of trial, which can only be determined
only once evidence is led before the Ld. Trial Court. Further, this
Court unambiguously observes that it is also not convinced withCR. No. 714/2025 Vijay Ghai v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 26 of 29
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.07.08
16:42:38 +0530
the contention of the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist that since the
material placed on record is insufficient to convict the revisionist,
he ought to be discharged. In fact, in this regard, it is reiterated that
at the stage of framing of charge/notice, sufficiency of materials
for the purpose of conviction is not the requirement and a prayer
for discharge can be allowed only if the court finds that the
materials are wholly insufficient for the purpose of trial, which is
not the case here. Congruently, this Court deems it apposite to
reiterate that mere defect in investigation, as alleged by the
revisionist/Ld. Counsel for the revisionist, cannot be a ground for
discharge in light of the aforenoted judicial dictates. On the
contrary, under circumstances, this Court reiterates that prima
facie case, strong suspicion and sufficient grounds exist to proceed
with the framing of notice under Section 304A IPC read with
Section 34 IPC against the revisionist.
25. Consequently, in conspectus of above, further being
wary of the aforenoted judicial principles, in light of the arguments
addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist as well as by Ld.
Addl. PP for the State, this Court observes that from the facts and
circumstances of the case, material and the documents placed on
record of the Ld. Trial Court, including inter alia the contents of
the chargesheet, statements of witnesses, MLC and postmortem
reports of the deceased, photographs as well as other reports,
documents and material placed on record, prima facie case under
Section 304A IPC exits against the revisionist herein, in as much
as the revisionist, despite being employed with the revisionist, was
refused necessary safety gear/gloves by the revisionist
notwithstanding explicit request by the deceased. Consequently,
the deceased got electrocuted on 04.06.2018, at about 8.00 p.m.,CR. No. 714/2025 Vijay Ghai v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 27 of 29
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.07.08
16:42:40 +0530
while working at shop no.442, Katra Chauban Chandni Chowk,
Delhi, and left for heavenly above, owing to such electrocution.
Needless to reiterate that the eyewitness and deceased’s wife both
asserted of deceased’s working with the revisionist at relevant
point in time, besides the eyewitness explicated of the incident, as
it transpired in the manner, hereinunder observed.
Correspondingly, the MLC and postmortem reports of the
deceased corroborate demise of the deceased owing to
electrocution, while working at the shop of co-accused, Sunil
Kumar.
26. Accordingly, in light of the aforesaid discussion, this
Court unswervingly records and reiterates that the Ld. Trial Court
did not commit any illegality and/or impropriety under the
impugned order, while directing framing of notice under Section
304A IPC against the revisionist herein. Consequently, in the
considered opinion of this Court the present revision petition
deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. As a corollary,
order dated 20.09.2025 passed by Ld. JMFC-08, Central, Tis
Hazari Courts, Delhi, in case bearing, ‘State v. Vijay Ghai, Cr.
Case No. 6497/2019′, arising out of FIR No. 153/2018, PS.
Kotwali, directing framing of notice under Section 304A IPC
against the revisionist, Vijay Ghai and the consequent notice so
framed, are hereby upheld/affirmed. Apposite at this stage for this
Court to further note that, though, it/this Court holds highest regard
for the decisions relied upon by Ld. Counsel for the revisionist,
however, the same would not, in the considered opinion of this
Court, come to the aid/rescue of the case put forth by the
revisionist in the manner as prayed for, as the facts and
circumstances of the present case as well as the stage of
CR. No. 714/2025 Vijay Ghai v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 28 of 29
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.07.08
16:42:43
+0530
proceedings before this Court, are clearly, distinguishable.
27. Trial Court Record along with a copy of this
order/judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial Court concerned for
information and compliance. Needless at this stage to note that
nothing stated hereinabove shall be construed as opinion on final
outcome of the case and the same shall be decided in accordance
with law upon conclusion of evidence.
28. Revision file be consigned to record room after due
compliance.
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.07.08
16:42:46 +0530Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 08.07.2026. ASJ-03, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, DelhiCR. No. 714/2025 Vijay Ghai v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page No. 29 of 29
