Allahabad High Court
Laloo @ Sanjay And Another vs State Of U.P. on 2 July, 2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:42787
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 246 of 2013
Laloo @ Sanjay And Another
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
B.P. Nigam
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Govt. Advocate
[A.F.R.] Court No. - 14
HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.
1. Heard Shri B.P. Nigam, the learned counsel for the appellant and Shri G.D. Bhatt, the learned AGA-I for the State U.P.
2. By means of the instant appeal, the appellant had challenged the validity of the judgment and order dated 07.02.2013 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 12, Hardoi in Session Trial No. 226/2011 arising out of Case Crime No. 424/2010, under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 302 of IPC and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Manjhila, District Hardoi lodged against the appellant No.1- Laloo @ Sanjay, the appellant No.2 Hardwari and mother of the appellant No.1.
3. The complainant- Asha Ram Agnihotri gave a written complaint to the police on 27.07.2010 stating that he had got his niece married to the appellant No.1- Laloo @ Sanjay, son of Hardwari (the appellant No.2), about one year ago. The complainant’s niece used to tell through mobile phone that the appellant No.2 Hardwari and his wife used to demand additional dowry. On 27.06.2010, he got a telephonic information that his niece had got burnt and upon reaching there, he found her lying dead. The complainant expressed a suspicion that his niece had been killed by setting her ablaze for demanding dowry.
4. A 3 liters’ plastic container having smell of kerosene, some burnt clothes and other articles were recovered from the spot.
5. The postmortem examination report mentions burning from first to third degree burns in patches present all over the body except both soles, line of redness was present, vasicles present at places, skin peels at places, burn was about 95%. The cause of death was opined to be ante-mortem burn injuries.
6. After investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted a charge-sheet dated 03.08.2010 against the appellants and involvement of Premwati (mother of the appellant No.1 and wife of the appellant no. 2) could not be established during investigation.
7. The complainant was examined as PW-1. He stated that he had got his niece married to the appellant No.1 about two years ago. The accused persons were not satisfied with the dowry given at the time of marriage. Her husband Laloo @ Sanjay (the appellant No.1), his mother Premwati, father Hardwari, Fufa Jai Prakash, Bua Sukkho, sister Ranu etc. used to demand a motor-cycle, a color television and a gold chain as dowry. The complainant, his wife and some other family members tried to persuade the accused persons that they could not give additional dowry but the accused persons pressed their demand of dowry even in presence of the persons who had gone with the complainant. He stated his niece was killed because of his failure to give additional dowry.
8. Bhure Shukla, a maternal uncle of the deceased, was examined as PW-3. He stated that the appellant and their family members were not happy with the dowry given in the deceased’s marriage and they were demanding a motor-cycle, a color television and a gold chain. He had gone to the matrimonial home of the deceased about two months after the wedding and the demand of the aforesaid articles was made in his presence. PW-3 had tried to persuade the appellant No.1 but he did not agree.
9. DW-1 Amit Kumar and DW-2 Ashok Kumar stated that the appellant did not harass his wife. Her mental balance was not normal. She had gone away from her matrimonial home on 3-4 occasions without informing any person. The appellant No.1 and his family members used to search her out and bring her back. DW-2 Ashok Kumar stated that a day before the incident, the deceased had gone away without informing any person. The appellant No.2 Hardwari had brought her back. He stated that the appellants and their family members did not harass the deceased for demanding dowry. Both the defence witnesses stated that the appellant No.2 Hardwari was not present in the village and he had gone to visit a satsang along with several other villagers, on a tractor driven by DW-1. The appellant No.1 was breaking stones for the road outside the village.
10. The trial Court held that the accused persons did not give information of death of the deceased to her family members. The deceased died within seven years of her marriage in unnatural circumstances due to burn injuries. She had been harassed soon before her death. The trial Court held that all the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC were established. The presumption under Section 113-B IPC was also attracted against the appellants. The accused persons had failed to adduce evidence to prove that the deceased committed suicide. They did not make any submission and lead any evidence to establish that before the incident also the deceased had tried to commit suicide. The aforesaid material proves the appellants guilty of the offences under Sections 304-B/34, 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The charges under Sections 302 IPC and 306 IPC were not proved.
11. Assailing validity of the aforesaid order, the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that there is no evidence to establish that the deceased had been harassed for demanding dowry soon before her death. He has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Major Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab: (2015) 5 SCC 201 and State of Uttarakhand v. Sanjay Ram Tamta @ Sanju @ Prem Prakash: (2025) 3 SCC 433.
12. Per contra, the learned AGA-I has submitted that the trial court has rightly come to the conclusion that the accused persons used to demand dowry from the family members of the deceased and that the deceased had been harassed soon before her marriage. Therefore, the trial court has rightly convicted the appellants for offences under Section 304-B, 498-A and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
13. Section 304-B IPC reads as follows: – “304B. Dowry death.?
(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.? For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”
14. When we examine the evidence in the present case, it appears that the complainant PW-1 stated that she had got her niece married to the appellant No.1. The appellant’s family members were not satisfied with the dowry given at the time of marriage. They were demanding a motorcycle, a colour TV, and a gold chain and for this reason, they killed the victim by pouring kerosene on her and setting her ablaze. During cross-examination, PW-1 stated that the pair-pujai ceremony of the deceased was performed in the house of the appellant. No dowry had been settled at the time of the marriage. The Bhawar (Saptpadi) was performed in the village of the appellants. After the deceased had stayed in the house of the appellant for eight days, her mother had gone to bring her from her matrimonial home. The mother of the deceased had told this witness that the family members of the appellant No.1 were demanding dowry. PW-1’s brother Maya Prakash (father of the deceased) was alive at that time. PW-1 Maya Prakash, Suresh, Ved Prakash, Dharmendra and Bhure had gone to the house of the appellant to convince his family members, but they did not agree and demanded a motorcycle, a gold chain, and a color television. The marriage was performed in the month of Asadh and the deceased died in the month of Poos (after about 7 months). PW-1 stated that after the marriage of his niece and before the death of his brother, he had visited the matrimonial home of his niece on 6-7 occasions. He always found his niece unhappy in her matrimonial home. She was beaten up in her matrimonial home. However, she did not make any complaint to any authority in this regard. PW-1 stated that before her death, the appellants, Hari Prakash and two other persons had happily taken her to her matrimonial home 14 days prior to her death. Thereafter, he got telephonic information regarding her death.
15. After the death of his brother- Maya Prakash. PW-2 visited the matrimonial home of his niece on two occasions, along with the mother of the deceased but at that time, the deceased was not there, she was at her maika. Some altercation had taken place between PW-1 and the family members of the appellant No.1. After 8-10 days, the appellants had come to take the deceased to their home. They have taken the deceased with the consent of PW-1. PW-1 stated that the deceased was found in the house of Amarnath in village Dhighia a day prior to her death because the accused persons had beaten her up about three days ago. She was limping. She was sitting in front of the house of Ramnath in village Dhighia. Ramnath had telephonically informed and thereafter, the family members of the appellants had taken her away. The deceased had asked to save her life.
16. The deceased’s mother was examined as PW-9 and she gave a similar statement. She stated that pair-pujai ceremony of her daughter was performed in the house of the appellants because she was not in a position to host a feast for the baraat. Her daughter used to visit her from her matrimonial home once a month and thereafter, she used to go back. Whenever the appellant No.1 came to take her daughter, she used to send her. She also stated that after she had sent her daughter to her matrimonial home, she never visited her father’s home. PW-9 also stated that her husband and his elder brother Asha Ram (the complainant) did not have good relations. The complainant did not want the deceased to get married to the appellant No.1 but PW-9 and her husband got her married to the appellant No.1 against the wishes of the complainant. She stated that quarrels had taken place between her husband and his elder brother on 1-2 occasions and the complainant had assaulted her husband with a lathi. The PW-1 had caught hold of the lathi.
17. The doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination, was examined as PW-6. He proved the postmortem examination report and stated that the deceased had approximately 95% burns and smell of kerosene was present over the body. During the cross-examination, PW-6 stated that if a person pours kerosene and sets himself/herself ablaze, 95% burn injuries are possible.
18. From the aforesaid statements, it is established that the marriage ceremony of the deceased was performed in the house of the appellants, because her family’s financial condition was poor and they were not in a position to even host a feast for the baraat. No dowry was settled and no dowry was given at the time of the marriage. The prosecution witnesses alleged that after the marriage, the accused persons started demanding a motorcycle, a color television and a gold chain as dowry. The witnesses have stated that they used to demand dowry whenever the deceased’s uncle and mother visited the appellants’ place. They also alleged that the deceased was harassed for demanding dowry. However, none of the prosecution witnesses have stated the date and time of the alleged demand of dowry. The prosecution witnesses have stated that the deceased was staying at the residence of the complainant for some time. 14 days prior to the incident the appellants themselves had gone to bring her back to her matrimonial home. She was sent with the appellants willingly, without there being any dispute. There is absolutely no evidence that the deceased was harassed for demanding dowry at any time soon before her death.
19. For making out the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC, it is necessary that soon before her death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment on account of any demand for dowry in connection with any demand for dowry. In absence of evidence to establish that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative or husband for or in connection with any demand for dowry, the offence under section 304-B IPC is not made out.
20. The trial Court has referred to Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which provides as follows:
“113-B. Presumption as to dowry deathWhen the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.Explanation. – For the purpose of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)].”
21. In Major Singh (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: –
“10. If any death is caused in connection with dowry demand, Section 113-B of the Evidence Act also comes into play. Both these Sections 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B reads as follows:-
“113-B: Presumption as to dowry death-the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation. For the purposes of this Section, ‘dowry death’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 304B, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)”
It is imperative to note that both these sections set out a common point of reference for establishing guilt of the accused person under Section 304-B, which is “the woman must have been ‘soon before her death’ subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with the demand of dowry”
22. In State of Uttarakhand v. Sanjay Ram Tamta: (2025) 3 SCC 433, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: –
“10. That the death was suicidal is very clear from the expert evidence, which however would not absolve the accused under Section 304-B IPC. This Court in Surender Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. [(2009) 17 SCC 243] considered the effect of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act on Section 304-B IPC. It was held that Section 304-B IPC presupposes several factors for its applicability, which are: (i) the death of a woman caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (ii) such death having occurred within seven years from the date of the marriage; (iii) soon before her death, the woman having been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and (iv) such cruelty or harassment being in connection with the demand of dowry. It was categorically held that if one of the ingredients is absent, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act would not be available to the prosecution and the onus of proof would not shift to the defence.”
23. Section 113-B Evidence Act would apply when it is shown that soon before her death, the woman had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry. When the prosecution has failed to establish that the deceased had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for demanding dowry, the ingredients of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act are not made out and therefore, no presumption can be drawn against the appellants under section 113-B of the Evidence Act.
24. The learned AGA-I has placed reliance upon a judgment of a Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Paranagouda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka: (2024) 18 SCC 793, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: –
“We are aware that the word “soon” finds place in Section 304-B, but we would prefer to interpret its use not in terms of days or months or years, but as necessarily indicating that the demand for dowry should not be stale or an aberration of the past, but should be the continuing cause for the death under Section 304-B or the suicide under Section 306 IPC/Once the presence of these concomitants is established or shown or proved by the prosecution, even by preponderance of possibility, the initial presumption of innocence is replaced by an assumption of guilt of the accused, thereupon transferring the heavy burden of proof upon him and requiring him to produce evidence dislodging his guilt, beyond reasonable doubt. It seems to us that what Parliament intended by using the word “deemed” was that only preponderance of evidence would be insufficient to discharge the husband or his family members of their guilt. This interpretation provides the accused a chance of proving their innocence. This is also the postulation of Section 101 of the Evidence Act. The purpose of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC, in our opinion, is to counter what is commonly encountered the lack or the absence of evidence in the case of suicide or death of a woman within seven years of marriage. If the word “shown” has to be given its ordinary meaning then it would only require the prosecution to merely present its evidence in court, not necessarily through oral deposition, and thereupon make the accused lead detailed evidence to be followed by that of the prosecution. This procedure is unknown to common law systems, and beyond the contemplation of CrPC.”
25. It is correct that the phrase “soon before her death” cannot be put in a straight jacket formula and interpreted strictly but it has to be adjudged keeping in view the entire facts and circumstances of the case. PW-9, mother of the deceased, has stated that the deceased had stayed in her parental house for 8-10 days and thereafter the appellant had gone to take her back to her matrimonial home. PW-9 had sent her back with the appellants amicably and congenially. The deceased died 14 days thereafter and no demand of dowry was made during this period. Therefore, it cannot be said that the deceased was harassed for demanding dowry soon before her death.
26. The prosecution witnesses PW-2 and PW-9 have established that no dowry was given at the time of the marriage but the appellants used to harass the deceased and this harassment of the deceased drove her to commit suicide. Therefore, the offence under Section 498-A IPC is made out and the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the said offence. Further, the prosecution witnesses have categorically stated about the demand of dowry made by the appellants and therefore, the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is also established.
27. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is allowed in part. Conviction and sentence of the appellants for the offence under section 304-B IPC is unsustainable in law and the same is set aside. However, there is no error or illegality in the conviction of the appellants for the offences under Sections 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
28. The offence under Section 498-A carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment up to 3 years and the trial court had awarded the maximum sentence.
29. The accused ? appellants had submitted before the trial Court on the point of sentence that the appellant No. 2, Hardwari is an old person and the appellant No.1- Laloo @ Sanjay, has the responsibility to look after his old parents. The trial Court discarded these mitigating circumstances without assigning any reason and awarded the maximum sentence of three years’ imprisonment to the appellants.
30. In K. Pounammal v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1784, the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to numerous precedents on the question of reduction of sentence and held that: –
“6. The conviction and sentence have their respective realms. While the conviction would be recorded on the basis of evidence adduced before the Court which would establish the implication of the accused in the offence, the guilty person or the convicted when to be awarded a sentence, a host of factors would operate to govern.
6.1. In determining the final sentence and the nature thereof, variety of factors that would operate would include the intervening time between the commission of offence and the actual award of the sentence, age of the accused, the stress which he or she might have suffered because of passage of time during each case has remained pending and undecided, the family circumstance and such other factors, without becoming exhaustive.
7. The process of sentencing by the courts is guided by theories such as punitive, deterrent or reformative. Each school of thought has its own object and purpose to explain awarding of sentence and its utility. Amongst these theories, reformative approach has become increasingly acceptable to the modern jurisprudence. Reformation is something always considered progressive. When there are mitigating circumstances, the court would lean towards reducing of the sentence. The focus would be on the crime, and not on the criminal. The society and system would nurture the guilt with positivity, while selecting the sentence.
8. In light of the above principles guiding the sentencing process, the submission of learned advocate for the appellant could be countenanced that in the case on hand the incident had taken place on 23.09.2002. Since then, more than two decades have passed by. The appellant underwent imprisonment for 31 days. The appellant is a widow lady. It was stated that she is now 75 years of age. The appellant has been staying alone, the husband having died, stated her learned counsel. She belongs to scheduled caste and has been spending her life negotiating all hardships.
9. The prolongation of a criminal case for an unreasonable period is in itself a kind of suffering. It amounts to mental incarceration for the person facing such proceedings. For a person who is convicted and who has appealed against his or her conviction and sentence and who everyday awaits the fate of litigation, spends time in distress. In the present-day system of administration of justice, in which proceedings have often go on protracted unreasonably and therefore unbearably, the passage of long time itself makes the person suffer a mental agony.”
(Emphasis added)
31. In V.K. Verma v. CBI: (2014) 3 SCC 485, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: –
“7. In imposing a punishment, the concern of the court is with the nature of the act viewed as a crime or breach of the law. The maximum sentence or fine provided in law is an indicator on the gravity of the act. Having regard to the nature and mode of commission of an offence by a person and the mitigating factors, if any, the court has to take a decision as to whether the charge established falls short of the maximum gravity indicated in the statute, and if so, to what extent.
8. The long delay before the courts in taking a final decision with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the accused is one of the mitigating factors for the superior courts to take into consideration while taking a decision on the quantum of sentence. As we have noted above, the FIR was registered by CBI in 1984. The matter came before the Sessions Court only in 1994. The Sessions Court took almost ten years to conclude the trial and pronounce the judgment. Before the High Court, it took another ten years. Thus, it is a litigation of almost three decades in a simple trap case and that too involving a petty amount.
9. In Ashok Kumar v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1980) 2 SCC 282], the commission of offence of theft was committed in 1971 and the judgment of this Court was delivered in 1980. The conviction was under Section 411 IPC. This Court having regard to the purpose of punishment and “the long protracted litigation”, reduced the sentence to the period already undergone by the convict.
10. In Sharvan Kumar v. State of U.P. [(1985) 3 SCC 658], the commission of offence was in 1968 and the judgment was delivered in 1985. The conviction was under Sections 467 and 471 IPC. In that case also, the long delay in the litigation process was one of the factors taken into consideration by this Court in reducing the sentence to the period already undergone.
12. The appellant is now aged 76. We are informed that he is otherwise not keeping in good health, having had also cardiovascular problems. The offence is of the year 1984. It is almost three decades now. The accused has already undergone physical incarceration for three months and mental incarceration for about thirty years. Whether at this age and stage, would it not be economically wasteful, and a liability to the State to keep the appellant in prison, is the question we have to address. Having given thoughtful consideration to all the aspects of the matter, we are of the view that the facts mentioned above would certainly be special reasons for reducing the substantive sentence but enhancing the fine, while maintaining the conviction.”
(Emphasis added)
32. The incident took place in the year 2010. The appellant No.1 has already spent about 1 years and 9 months 10 days in custody and the appellant No.2 has spent about 1 year and 5 months 6 days in custody. The appellant No.2 is presently aged about 68 years. Making the appellants undergo the remaining part of the sentence of three years’ imprisonment will not serve any purpose of incarceration – either deterrence or reformation. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts, the sentence of three years’ imprisonment imposed upon the appellants is reduced and modified to the period of custody already undergone by them. The amount of fine shall remain unaltered.
33. The appeal is partly allowed in terms of the aforesaid order.
34. The appellant shall furnish a personal bond and two sureties to the satisfaction of the trial Court within two weeks from today in compliance with Section 446 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In case an appeal against this judgment/order is preferred before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and notice is issued to the appellant therein, the appellant shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in accordance with such notice.
(Subhash Vidyarthi,J.)
Whether the judgment is speaking ? Yes/No Whether the judgment is speaking – Yes/No
July 2, 2026
-Amit K-
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