Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Khem Lal Sahu on 7 July, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
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CGHC010206172026 2026:CGHC:27889-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 557 of 2026
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department of Forest,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Raipur Chhattisgarh (Resp.
No. 1)
2 - Principle Chief Conservator of Forest Head Quarter Jail Road Raipur
Chhattisgarh (Resp. No. 2)
3 - Chief Conservator of Forest Durg Circle Durg, District Durg
Chhattisgarh (Resp. No. 3)
4 - Divisional Forest Officer Balod District Balod Chhattisgarh (Resp.
No. 4)
5 - Divisional Forest Officer Forest Division Balod/ Chairman Scrutiny
Committee Balod District Balod Chhattisgarh (Resp. No. 5)
... Appellants
versus
Khem Lal Sahu S/o Shri Dhiraji Ram Sahu Aged About 53 Years R/o
Village House No. 164, Ward No. 8 Sath Para, Rengadabari, Tahsil
Doundi Lohara, District Balod Chhattisgarh
... Respondent
For State/ Appellant(s) : Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Dy. Advocate General
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
ROHIT
KUMAR
CHANDRA
Digitally signed
07.07.2026
by ROHIT
KUMAR
CHANDRA
1. Heard Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the appellant/State on I.A. No. 01/2026, which is an application for
condonation of delay of 217 days in preferring the appeal.
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2. The State/appellants have filed this writ appeal against an order
dated 28.08.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.
8915/2019 (Khem Lal Sahu Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and
Others), by which the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ
petition filed by the writ petitioner / respondent herein.
3. Learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the
State/appellants submits that immediately after passing the order
impugned dated 28.08.2025 the appellants/State authorities had
sought an opinion from the Office of the Advocate General in
respect to the further recourse to be taken by the State
Government on 15.01.2026. Upon which the Office of the
Advocate General accorded opinion for filing appeal on
03.02.2026 and thereafter proposal has been sent to the Law and
Legislative Affairs Department through the Department of Medical
Education for sanction on 25.03.2026 and accordingly the
sanction for filing appeal has been accorded on 28.04.2026 and
thereafter OIC is appointed vide order dated 04.05.2026 by the
concerned Department, who had contacted the Office of Advocate
General on 14.05.2026 and thereafter, the present appeal is being
drafted and filed before this Hon’ble Court. He further submits that
the State is a multi-functioning body and it has to follow the rules
of obtaining sanction etc. for filing an appeal. It took some time for
the State to obtain sanction etc. from the highest authorities of the
State for preferring this appeal. The delay, if any, in filing the
appeal by the State may kindly be condoned on the basis of
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principles as laid down in case of State of Nagaland Vs. LipokAo
reported in (2005) 3 SCC page 372.
4. The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of
1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for
condonation of delay.
5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General
and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3
SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned
were well aware or conversant with the issues
involved including the prescribed period of limitation
for taking up the matter by way of filing a special
leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation when the
Department was possessed with competent persons
familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of
plausible and acceptable explanation, we are
posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a
party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of
bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to
advance substantial justice, we are of the view that
in the facts and circumstances, the Department
cannot take advantage of various earlier
decisions. The claim on account of impersonal
machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be
accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including the
4Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable
and acceptable explanation for the delay and there
was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the
usual explanation that the file was kept pending for
several months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red-tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to
ensure that they perform their duties with diligence
and commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an anticipated
benefit for government departments. The law
shelters everyone under the same light and should
not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper
explanation offered by the Department for the delay
except mentioning of various dates, according to us,
the Department has miserably failed to give any
acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to
condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the
appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of
delay.”
6. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932 ,
while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed
as follows:-
“5. The legal position is that where a case has been
presented in the Court beyond limitation, the
petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was
the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and
enough reason which prevented him to approach the
Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy
Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by
this Court that even though limitation may harshly
affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with
all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference
was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay
5Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein,
it was held as follows:
“13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14
SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause
has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient cause” which means an
adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court within
limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bona fide on his
part in the facts and circumstances of the
case, or found to have not acted diligently
or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No
court could be justified in condoning such
an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to
be decided only within the parameters laid
down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that the High Court did not commit any mistake in
dismissing the delay condonation application of
the present appellant.”
Thus, it is crystal clear that the
discretion to condone the delay has to be
exercised judiciously based on facts and
circumstances of each case and that, the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be
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liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction
or lack of bona fides is attributed to the
party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC
262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a
member, after referring to various decisions on
the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed
by this Court that delay should not be excused as
a matter of generosity and rendering substantial
justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite
party. The relevant passage of the same is
profitably extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we
made it very clear that we are not going to
look into the merits of the matter as long as
we are not convinced that sufficient cause
has been made out for condonation of such a
long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India
when it comes to condoning the gross delay
of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses
to approach the court long after the lapse of
the time prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot turn
around and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being
condoned. This litigation between the parties
started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024.
Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till
date the respondent has not been able to
reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a
mockery of justice if we condone the delay of
12 years and 158 days and once again ask
the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of
the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the
delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it
appears that they want to fix their own period
7of limitation for instituting the proceedings for
which law has prescribed a period of
limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost
his right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a long,
it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate
delay and in such circumstances of the case,
he cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred
as against the technical considerations.
While considering the plea for condonation of
delay, the court must not start with the merits
of the main matter. The court owes a duty to
first ascertain the bona fides of the
explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of
the other side is equally balanced that the
court may bring into aid the merits of the
matter for the purpose of condoning the
delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should not
keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over
the head of the respondent for indefinite
period of time to be determined at the whims
and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have
reached to the conclusion that the High Court
committed no error much less any error of
law in passing the impugned order. Even
otherwise, the High Court was exercising its
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it
has been said that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to
the opposite party. The appellants have failed
8to prove that they were reasonably diligent in
prosecuting the matter and this vital test for
condoning the delay is not satisfied in this
case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal
fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be
no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the
facts of the present case, we are of the
opinion that the High Court correctly refused
to condone the delay and dismissed the
appeal by observing that such inordinate
delay was not explained satisfactorily, no
sufficient cause was shown for the same,
and no plausible reason was put forth by the
State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this
petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside
the delay occurred in preferring the second
appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude
on the part of the officials functioning in the State
machinery. Though the Government adopts
systematic approach in handling the legal issues
and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals
well within the time, due to the fault on the part of
the officials in merely communicating the
information on time, huge revenue loss will be
caused to the Government exchequer. The present
case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay
of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second
appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials
functioning under the State, though valuable
Government lands were involved. Therefore, we
direct the State to streamline the machinery
touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion,
filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix
the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and
penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for
delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of
the loss caused to the Government. Such
direction will have to be followed by all the States
scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we
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must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we
have noticed that whenever there is a plea for
condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private
litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained
right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a
delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end
of the same. For example if the period of limitation is
90 days then the party seeking condonation has to
explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings
within that period of limitation. What events occurred
after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence.
The court is required to consider what came in the
way of the party that it was unable to file it between
the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is
entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing
an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire
and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal
earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that
because of some event or circumstance arising before
the limitation expired it was not possible to file the
appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising
after the expiry of limitation can constitute such
sufficient cause. There may be events or
circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation
which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But
that the limitation has been allowed to expire without
the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause
arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh
Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR
1981 SC 733).”
7. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra) and
Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that Government
departments are under a special obligation to discharge their
duties with due diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay
is an exception, not the rule, and cannot be claimed as a matter of
right or anticipated privilege by Government entities. The law casts
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its protection equally upon all litigants and cannot be distorted to
confer undue advantage upon a select few.
8. Very recently on 12.09.2025, the Supreme Court in the matter of
Shivamma (dead) by LRS Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors., 2025 INSC 1104 categorically held that the High Courts
ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State
authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-
authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the
apathy and pangs of a private litigant.
9. Upon considering the matter in its entirety and also applying the
well settled principles of law to the facts of the present case, we
find that the State has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory
explanation for the delay in filing the present appeal. The only
reason cited is that immediately after passing the order impugned
dated 28.08.2025 the appellants/State authorities had sought an
opinion from the Office of the Advocate General in respect to the
further recourse to be taken by the State Government on
15.01.2026. Upon which the Office of the Advocate General
accorded opinion for filing appeal on 03.02.2026 and thereafter
proposal has been sent to the Law and Legislative Affairs
Department through the Department of Medical Education for
sanction on 25.03.2026 and accordingly the sanction for filing
appeal has been accorded on 28.04.2026 and thereafter OIC is
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appointed vide order dated 04.05.2026 by the concerned
Department, who had contacted the Office of Advocate General on
14.05.2026 and thereafter, the present appeal is being drafted and
filed before this Hon’ble Court, however, some delay was occurred
due to fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working
of the Government machinery. Thus, the State has miserably
failed to demonstrate sufficient cause warranting the condonation
of an inordinate delay of 217 days.
10. Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary
power under the law to condone such extraordinary delay. The
learned counsel for the State has not been able to establish any
convincing or bona fide reason for the delay. Therefore, there is no
justification for condoning the delay of 217 days in filing the writ
appeal.
11. In view of the above, the instant writ appeal is hereby dismissed
on the ground of delay and laches.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Chandra
