Delhi High Court
Arun Muthu vs State Of Nct Delhi on 7 July, 2026
Author: Prateek Jalan
Bench: Prateek Jalan
$~2
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on: 07.07.2026
+ BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024
ARUN MUTHU .....Petitioner
versus
STATE OF NCT DELHI .....Respondent
Appearance:-
Mr. Naveen Malhotra, Mr. Ritvik Malhotra, Advocates for petitioner.
Mr. Sanjay Jain, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Akhand Pratap Singh, SPP, Mr.
Nishank Tripathi, Ms. Harshita Sukhija, Ms. Rishika Agarwal, Mr.
Shreyan Srivastav, Ms. Samridhi Dobhal, Ms. Krishna Mohan Chandel,
Mr. Hritwik Maurya, Ms. Lisa Pagwal, Ms. Apoorv Paliya, Mr. Utkarsh
Singh, Advocates for State with ACP Virender Kadyan, Insp. Pradeep
Rai.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN
JUDGMENT
PRATEEK JALAN, J. (ORAL)
1. By way of the present application under Section 439 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 [“CrPC“] (corresponding to Section 483 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [“BNSS”]), the petitioner
seeks regular bail in connection with FIR No. 208/2021, dated
07.08.2021, registered at Police Station Special Cell, Delhi, under
Sections 170/384/385/388/419/420/506/120B of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 [“IPC“], and Section 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2000
[“IT Act“]. At the time of filing of the chargesheet, Sections 3 and 4 of
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 1 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 [“MCOCA”],
were also invoked.
2. This is the first bail application filed by the petitioner before this
Court. He had earlier applied for bail before the Special Court, which was
dismissed vide order dated 14.11.2022.
3. I have heard Mr. Naveen Malhotra, learned counsel for the
petitioner, and Mr. Sanjay Jain, learned Senior Counsel for the State. The
State has also filed a status report, which is on record.
4. At the outset, it may be mentioned that I have recently decided
three bail applications arising out of the same proceedings, filed by co-
accused Leena Paulose [hereinafter, “Leena”], Deepak Ramnani
[hereinafter, “Deepak”], and Pradeep Ramdanee [hereinafter, “Pradeep”].
The application filed by Leena1 was dismissed, whereas the applications
filed by Deepak2 and Pradeep3 were allowed.
I. PROSECUTION CASE:
5. The prosecution case, as it appears from the material on record, is
as follows:
a. FIR No. 208/2021, dated 07.08.2021, lodged at Police Station
Special Cell, Delhi, under Sections
170/384/385/388/419/420/506/120B of the IPC and Section 66D of
the IT Act, was registered at the instance of one Ms. Aditi Singh.
b. According to the complaint, on 15.06.2020, the complainant
received a call on her mobile phone from a landline number. The1
BAIL APPLN. 1802/2024, decided on 05.05.2026, [hereinafter, “Leena Paulose”]. An earlier
application for bail filed by Leena in the State proceedings [BAIL APPLN. 3706/2022] was also
rejected by judgment dated 11.07.2023.
2
BAIL APPLN. 4286/2024, decided on 05.06.2026 [hereinafter, “Deepak Ramnani”].
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 2 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
caller introduced himself as a senior officer in the Ministry of Law
and offered assistance in securing bail for her husband, who was in
judicial custody in cases related to M/s Religare Enterprises
Limited.
c. It is alleged that the caller demanded Rs. 50 crores in exchange for
facilitating the bail and explained the method of delivering the
money.
d. Subsequently, through his associates, the caller allegedly extorted
money from the complainant on multiple occasions between June
2020 and August 2021, amounting to a total of Rs. 217 crores.
There are further allegations with regard to impersonation of senior
officials, including the Home Secretary, Government of India, and
misrepresenting the involvement of other government
functionaries, including the Home Minister.
e. Acting on the said information, on 07.08.2021, the police laid a
trap and apprehended Pradeep, while he was receiving the extorted
amount. He was arrested on the same day. During interrogation, he
disclosed that he was acting on the instructions of his brother,
Deepak, who was subsequently arrested on 08.08.2021.
f. Using technical surveillance of the mobile phone used for making
the calls, and the statements of co-accused, the caller was identified
as one Sukesh Chandra Shekhar @ Sukash Chandra Shekhar
[hereinafter, “Sukesh”].
g. At this time, Sukesh was already lodged in Tihar Jail as an
undertrial prisoner in a separate case, involving allegations of3
BAIL APPLN. 4441/2024, decided on 05.06.2026.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 3 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
collecting money from a political leader on the pretext of helping
him retain a particular election symbol. He was later shifted to
Rohini Jail.
h. A raid was conducted on the intervening night of 07/08.08.2021 by
the Special Cell, during which two mobile phones were recovered
from Sukesh, while he was in custody, and he was formally
arrested in connection with the present FIR. His interrogation led to
the identification and arrest of other associates and co-conspirators.
The petitioner was arrested on 05.09.2021.
i. During investigation, it was found that Sukesh was involved in
multiple cases, including attempt to murder, criminal intimidation,
cheating, and extortion, often by impersonating high-ranking
officials.
j. Part of the extorted amount was allegedly transmitted by Sukesh,
through hawala channels, to his wife, Leena, in Chennai.
k. As far as the present petitioner is concerned, his role in the
aforesaid offences is summarised in the chargesheet as follows:
“6. Accusded Arun Muthu:
ï‚§ He and Dolby Samuel are the directors of M/s Stash wear Pvt.
Ltd.
ï‚§ He met Leena in Sept-2018 through its partner Dolby Samuel.
From Sept-2018 to Aug 2021, he used to provide help to Leena
and Sukash in buying properties and car. He helped Leena in
financial transactions for procuring high end cars and failed to
justify the source of payment.
ï‚§ He helped Leena and Sukash by opening proprietorship firm
namely LS film Corp in 2018.
ï‚§ From July 2020-Aug 2021, he facilitated Leena by providing
banks entries of approx. Rs three Crores from his associates i.e.
Sarvana, Muthaiya Entertainment and Goodtime Retail &
Marketing Pvt. Ltd.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 4 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
ï‚§ Directed and produced web series namely “The Instagramam”
along with Leena. The said series was allegedly sold to
Neestream for total consideration of Rs. three Crores. Out of
which Rs. 90 lakh was received from Nee Stream in bank
account of LS Film Corp maintained by him. He had transferred
Rs. 75 lakh in the account of Super car Artistry (owned by Leena
Paul) and rest Rs. 15 Lakh were retained by him as commission.
Bank account of Super car Artistry shows inward remittance of
Rs. 22.83 Lakh on 18.05.2021. Rest details of bank are being
verified.
ï‚§ On 11.08.2021, he received WhatsApp call from Leena and he
acted upon the same and helped Leena and parked her 7-8
Luxury cars at different locations and same were seized by ED.
ï‚§ He obtained commission of 2.5% on entire transactions.”
II. STATEMENTS UNDER SECTION 18 OF MCOCA:
6. In support of the above allegations, the State relied upon
confessional statements under Section 18 of MCOCA made by co-
accused Sukesh, B. Mohanraj [hereinafter, “Mohanraj”] and Sudheer.
7. In the status report filed on behalf of the State, the statements of
Sukesh and Mohanraj, insofar as they are relevant in respect of the
present petitioner, have been summarised as follows:
“Confessional statements u/s 18 MCOC Act of accused Sukash:
He told Leena to brief each of their aid. The said cash was received at
Sow carpet, Chennai and collected by Sudheer and Joel. Cash was
delivered to Mohan Raj and he further delivered to Kamlesh Kothari and
Arun Muthu. Arun deals in providing bank entries and Kamlesh deals in
purchasing high ends cars and house.
Confessional Statement U/s 18 MCOC Act of accused B. Mohanraj:
He was introduced to Arun Muthu, who is a friend of Sukash and Leena.
He came to know that Arun Muthu was running a Garment business in the
name of Stash Wear, in Chennai. In January, 2020, a case was registered
against Sukash while he was in Tihar Jail, Delhi by the C.B.I, Hyderabad
wherein he came to know that Sukash impersonated himself as a senior
CBI officer and extorted money from the victim. CBI raided the house of
Leena in Boat Club, Chennai which was taken on rent in the name of Arun
Muthu for Leena. He has facilitated the rent deal in which Arun Muthu
used to receive cash with huge commission.”
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 5 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
8. Additionally, Mr. Jain relied upon Sudheer’s Section 18 statement,
which is not referred to in the State’s status report. Sudheer inter alia
stated therein, that the petitioner used to visit Leena in Chennai, and was
also called by Sukesh, whenever he was on parole. He further stated that
the money derived by Leena and Sukesh from criminal activities was
adjusted through “Saloon Nail Artistry” and “Super Car company” by
Arun Muthu [the petitioner herein] and Mohanraj. Sudheer also stated
that he or co-accused Joel Daniel [hereinafter, “Joel”] used to collect cash
transmitted through hawala transactions, using token numbers provided
by Leena and Sukesh, and would deliver the cash to the petitioner and
Mohanraj. The amounts ranged from Rs. 50 lakhs to Rs. 5 crores, which
they would count and hand over either to Leena or, on her directions, to
the petitioner and Mohanraj. In August/September 2020, Leena had
purchased a new house on ECR Road, Sneha Garden, Chennai. The
petitioner, Mohanraj, and Kamlesh Kothari [hereinafter, “Kamlesh”]
helped her in purchasing the house. At the time of the purchase, on
Sukesh’s instructions, Sudheer collected more than Rs. 7 cores in cash
against a token, and delivered it to Kamlesh at his office in T-Nagar,
Chennai, in the presence of Mohanraj. The petitioner, Mohanraj, and
Kamlesh assisted Sukesh and Leena in purchasing the house and cars.
Leena and Sukesh used to assign different tasks to different members of
the group and pay them separately. Sukesh was released on parole often,
during which the petitioner, Mohanraj, Kamlesh, and Joel met him,
alongwith Leena, and discuss ways of adjusting the hawala money.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 6 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
III. SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES:
9. Mr. Malhotra’s principal submission relates to the prolonged
custody of the petitioner as an undertrial. The petitioner was arrested on
05.09.2021, and has thus remained in custody for a period of almost 4
years and 10 months. Charges have recently been framed, by an order of
the Special Court dated 03.06.2026. However, the State has cited 403
witnesses, and the chargesheets collectively exceed 10,000 pages.
Further, one of the co-accused, Navas KI, has been arrested recently, and
it is likely that a supplementary chargesheet will have to be filed in
relation to his case. Considering the aforesaid factors, Mr. Malhotra
submitted that the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial, guaranteed under
Article 21 of the Constitution, has been defeated, and his continued
custody pending trial is constitutionally unjustifiable.
10. With regard to the statutory restrictions on grant of bail, under
Section 21(4) of MCOCA, Mr. Malhotra referred to several judgments
and orders of Supreme Court4 as well as this Court5, in which bail has
nonetheless been granted to MCOCA accused on ground of prolonged
incarceration. Additionally, he referred to the judgment in Ranjitsingh
Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.6, wherein the
4
Rockysingh Jalindersingh Kalyani v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 176/2022, decided
on 03.02.2022]; Ranjana Tanaji Wanve v. State of Maharashtra [SLP (Crl.) No. 12740/2024, decided
on 22.10.2024]; Siddhant v. State of Maharashtra [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3798]; Vinod v. State of
Maharashtra [SLP (Crl.) No. 14166/2024, decided on 08.01.2025]; Vivek @ Vicky Janak Paneri v.
State of Maharashtra [SLP (Crl.) No. 2677-2678/2025, decided on 15.04.2025]; Kailash Ramchandani
v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [SLP (Crl.) No. 4276/2025, decided on 06.01.2026]; Jagruti Dhanesh
Thorat v. State of Maharashtra [SLP (Crl.) No. 17295/2025, decided on 13.01.2026].
5
Arun v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), BAIL APPLN. 3348/2023, decided on 07.04.2025;
Ashish @ Deva v. State (NCT of Delhi), BAIL APPLN. 1618/2024, decided on 29.04.2025; Rajesh
Kumar v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), BAIL APPLN. 2986/2023, decided on 08.05.2025;
Jitender Dixit @ Bantu v. The State (Government of NCT of Delhi), BAIL APPLN. 3831/2023, decided
on 19.05.2025.
6
(2005) 5 SCC 294, paragraph 38.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 7 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
Supreme Court held that such statutory restrictions should not be “pushed
too far”. He also relied upon the judgment in Suhail Ahmad Thokar v.
National Investigation Agency7, which arose under the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 [“UAPA”], to submit that, even
recently, the Supreme Court has granted bail in a UAPA case, on the
basis of period spent in custody, likelihood of prolonged trial, and parity
with other co-accused, all of which are applicable to the present case also.
11. Mr. Malhotra further submitted that the legal position with regard
to prolonged incarceration, vis-Ã -vis the restrictions on grant of bail under
Section 21(4) of MCOCA, has been considered at length in the judgments
in Leena Paulose and Deepak Ramnani. Applying the same yardstick to
the present case, he submitted that the Court is required to examine the
role attributed to the petitioner and the prima facie material supporting
the allegations against him, to adjudicate whether his further custody is
warranted. In this context, Mr. Malhotra argued that, even according to
the prosecution, the petitioner’s role was limited to financial planning and
handling in respect of the allegedly extorted funds. He played no role in
the planning or execution of the foundational offence of extortion, but
only in management of the funds sent by Sukesh to Leena in Chennai. To
this extent, he submitted that the petitioner’s role is, at the highest,
comparable to that of Deepak, who was granted bail by judgment of this
Court dated 05.06.2026. According to Mr. Malhotra, the alleged money
trail does not show that any part of the extorted funds were in the
petitioner’s hand at any time. With regard to the further allegations of
frequently meeting Leena and Sukesh, Mr. Malhotra submitted that such
7
SLP (CRL.) No. 83/2024, decided on 22.05.2026.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 8 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
“associative proximity” was also considered in Deepak’s case, and bail
was nonetheless granted.
12. Mr. Malhotra also submitted, without prejudice to the aforesaid
contentions, that the offences alleged against the petitioner are not made
out at all, even on the prosecution’s own showing, as the petitioner had
no knowledge or reason to believe that any of the activities in which he
participated were connected with a criminal offence. In the absence of
such mens rea, learned counsel submitted that the offences of assistance
and abetment in a MCOCA offence cannot be established. For this
purpose, he relied upon the judgments of the Madras High Court in
Kumar Ganesaperumal v. Directorate of Enforcement8 and VMT
Spinning Mills India Pvt. Ltd. v. Directorate of Enforcement9. Mr.
Malhotra also submitted that the petitioner has no prior criminal
involvements, including in any FIR involving Sukesh/Leena, and the
allegation of “continuing unlawful activity” under Section 2(1)(d) of
MCOCA cannot be made out against him.
13. Mr. Malhotra lastly submitted that the petitioner has also been
named as an accused in ECIR/54/DLZO-II/2021, dated 08.08.2021,
registered under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering
Act, 2002 [“PMLA”], arising out of the same factual allegations.
However, he has been granted bail in the said case, by judgment of this
Court dated 20.02.2025 in BAIL APPLN. 1821/2024. He submitted that
on similar considerations, the petitioner is also entitled to bail in the
present case.
8
2021 SCC OnLine Mad 8689.
9
2022 SCC OnLine Mad 9267.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 9 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
14. Mr. Jain, in contrast, submitted that the petitioner had a direct role
in handling of the extorted funds in Chennai, alongwith other accused
persons, with full knowledge of the illegal activities of the Organised
Crime Syndicate [hereinafter, “OCS”]. He was thus not only involved in
abetment of the activities of the OCS, but was also directly involved in
the “continuing unlawful activities”, within the meaning of Section
2(1)(d) of MCOCA, which reveals “membership” of the OCS under
Section 3(4) of MCOCA. He submitted that the petitioner and Mohanraj,
alongwith other Chennai based co-accused, participated in planning and
execution of the activities related to handling of the extorted funds sent
by Sukesh to Leena.
15. Mr. Jain urged the Court, at the stage of bail adjudication, to have
due regard to Section 21(4) of MCOCA, which places restrictions on the
grant of bail in such offences. According to him, grant of bail in such
cases cannot be determined solely by the length of custody, for which
purpose he reiterated the submissions recorded in Leena Paulose10 and in
Deepak Ramnani11.
IV. ANALYSIS
16. This case raises a question of the interplay between the
constitutional rights of an undertrial, who remains in custody for a
prolonged period, with the statutory restrictions on grant of bail, found in
several special statutes such as the UAPA12, the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 198513, MCOCA14, and PMLA15. I have
10
Paragraphs 15, 16, 24, and 25.
11
Paragraphs 9(a)-(c), 25, and 26.
12
Section 43-D (5).
13
Section 37.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 10 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
had the opportunity to consider the legal position governing this question,
both in Leena Paulose and Deepak Ramnani.
17. In Leena Paulose, upon consideration of the interpretation of the
three-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Gulfisha Fatima v.
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)16,which had interpreted an earlier three-
judge bench judgment in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb17, I had proceeded
on the following basis:
“29. The decision in Gulfisha Fatima, in my view, provides guidance on
the approach to be adopted while adjudicating bail application under
MCOCA also. Section 21(4) of MCOCA being on a “higher pedestal”
than Section 43D(5) of UAPA, I agree with Mr. Jain that, at the very least,
the same principles would govern the interplay between Section 21(4) of
MCOCA and the Article 21 rights of an accused. The apparently distinct
lines of authority cited above can, in my view, be reconciled, by applying
the ratio of Gulfisha Fatima.
30. The position which emerges therefrom is that statutory restrictions on
grant of bail cannot preclude constitutionally protected claims,
referrable to Article 21 of the Constitution. The ground of prolonged pre-
trial incarceration without likelihood of culmination of proceedings must
therefore be considered, even in cases involving special statutes. However,
these are not stand-alone considerations, but require to be analysed
alongwith the nature of the offence and the prima facie material on
record. Conversely, while adjudicating the satisfaction required in terms
of the statutory conditions, the material must be assessed through the lens
of the right under Article 21 of the Constitution. In order to adjudicate
such a question, the factors to be borne in mind include the length of
custody already undergone, the possible sentence for the offence, the
possibility of concluding the proceedings within a reasonable time,
whether delay in proceedings is attributable to the prosecution or the
defence, and the nature of the prima facie case made out against the
accused.
31. Haris Nisar Langoo, in my view, does not depart from the above
principles, but provides an example in which the Court was satisfied that
the petitioner was entitled to bail, even after applying Section 43D(5) of
UAPA. In fact, it may be noted that, even in Gulfisha Fatima, some of the
14
Section 21(4).
15
Section 45.
16
2026 SCC OnLine SC 10 [hereinafter, “Gulfisha Fatima”].
17
(2021) 3 SCC 713 [hereinafter, “K.A. Najeeb”].
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 11 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
accused were granted bail, having regard to the specific facts of their
18
cases.”
18. Soon after the judgment in Leena Paulose was delivered, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National
Investigation Agency19 expressed reservations, with regard to the
correctness of Gulfisha Fatima. This has led to a reference to a larger
bench of the Supreme Court in Tasleem Ahmad v. State Govt. of NCT of
Delhi20. Pending resolution of the issue by the larger Bench, this Court, in
Deepak Ramnani, considered it appropriate to adopt the following
approach:
“22. The question that arises before this Court, in light of the aforesaid
decisions, is to determine the approach which must be adopted in
adjudication of the present applications. Needless to say, the differing
approaches expounded by the Supreme Court in Gulfisha Fatima and
Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, are both binding upon this Court. Although the
question has been referred to a larger bench in Tasleem Ahmed 2, the
factum of reference itself does not denude a Supreme Court decision of its
binding authority21.
23. The possible course of awaiting an authoritative decision by the larger
bench of the Supreme Court does not commend to me, in the context of
these applications for bail, which by their very nature require expeditious
resolution. Instead, having considered the judgments cited by both sides,
which were rendered after Gulfisha Fatima, I am of the view that a
practical approach must be adopted, at least until the reference is
answered by a larger bench. In the present case, such an approach
requires this Court first to adjudicate upon Mr. Malik’s submission that,
even in terms of the interpretation of K.A. Najeeb in Gulfisha Fatima, as
understood by this Court in Leena Palouse-II, the petitioners are entitled
to bail. If this contention is accepted, it is unnecessary to delve further
into the exercise of reconciliation between the views expressed in Gulfisha18
Emphasis supplied.
19
2026 SCC OnLine SC 881 [hereinafter, “Andrabi”].
20
SLP (CRL.) No. 3867/2026, dated 22.05.2026.
21
Harbhajan Singh and Another v. State of Punjab, (2009) 13 SCC 608, paragraph 15; National
Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Union Territory of Ladakh and Ors.
v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference and Anr., (2024) 18 SCC 643, paragraph 35.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 12 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
Fatima and Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, with regard to the competing
interpretation of K.A. Najeeb.
24. Before embarking upon this exercise, I may only add that this course
is also not, in my view, inconsistent with the interpretation of K.A. Najeeb
in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi. The position of law laid down in Gulfisha
Fatima, as I have understood it in Leena Paulose-II, was that the
ground of prolonged incarceration without likelihood of culmination of
proceedings, must be considered even in cases involving statutory
restrictions on grant of bail. However, these must be analysed,
alongwith the nature of offence, and the prima-facie material available
against the accused. The articulation in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, is that
the statutory limitation on the grant of bail cannot override rights under
Article 21, but that “of course, in an appropriate case, bail can be
denied having regard to the facts of that particular case”22. Syed
Iftikhar Andrabi therefore also requires a factual examination, to
determine whether a particular accused is to be granted bail, despite an
argument based upon his/her Article 21 rights. It may be noted that, both
in Gulfisha Fatima and in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, the Supreme Court
examined the case of accused on merits, in the backdrop of period of
incarceration and the likely length of trial. In Gulfisha Fatima, five of the
seven accused were granted bail, as was the sole accused in Syed Iftikhar
23
Andrabi.”
19. I propose to adopt the same approach in the present case also. I
may also note that, in Khuram Parvez v. National Investigation Agency24,
which was rendered after the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court,
including the reference order in Tasleem Ahmad, a Division Bench of this
Court has adopted a similar approach. The case concerned an application
for bail in a UAPA offence. The Court’s approach is indicated by the
following observations:
“61. Keeping in view the above, we have proceeded to consider the case
of the appellant for releasing him on bail.
62. For the same, we would note that the appellant was taken into custody
in the present case on 22.11.2021, and has, therefore, undergone
prolonged incarceration of almost 4½ years. The stage of the trial is at
the arguments for framing of charge. We are further informed that the22
Andrabi, paragraph 35.
23
Emphasis supplied.
24
CRL.A. 1234/2024, decided on 10.06.2026.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 13 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
prosecution intends to examine 197 witnesses in case the charge is
framed against the appellant.
63. We shall also conduct a surface evaluation of the case alleged by the
prosecution against the appellant.
xxx xxx xxx
71. We have taken note of the above allegations and the defence of the
appellant, only to highlight that they must be tested against the long
period of incarceration of the appellant and the fact that there is no
likelihood of the trial ending soon as also against the yardstick of bail
being the rule, while denial thereof being an exception. The appellant’s
rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India need to be balanced
and may even trump the restriction imposed under Section 43D(5) of the
UAPA.
72. We are also mindful of the fact that one of the co-accused, namely,
Zafar Abbas (A-4), has been denied bail by this Court and the said order
has been upheld by the Supreme Court, however, we find that the
allegations against the said co-accused were very different from the one
25
against the appellant herein.”
20. Applying the same benchmarks to the present case, it may be noted
that the petitioner is not accused of participation in the alleged acts of
extortion, against the complainant or any other person. His role, as per the
prosecution, was in planning and management of the funds which were
sent by Sukesh to Leena, including facilitating accounting entries,
purchase of properties and luxury cars, arranging parking of the said cars,
and production of a film. It is alleged that he was renumerated for these
tasks by way of commission. It is in this context that he is accused of
frequent meetings with Leena as also with Sukesh, when he was on
parole. The statements of other co-accused, and of witnesses relied upon
by the prosecution, do not prima facie accord any higher role to the
petitioner than this.
21. As against this, the petitioner has already spent approximately 4
years and 10 months in custody as an undertrial. The offence under
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 14 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
Section 3(4) of MCOCA carries a sentence which may extend to
imprisonment of five years to life imprisonment. However, the factors
indicated above, including the number of accused [24], number of
witnesses [403], and the complexity of the case, make expeditious
conclusion of the proceedings unlikely. Having regard to the role ascribed
to the petitioner by the prosecution, I am of the view that his further
incarceration as an undertrial, is inappropriate. Although I have held, in
Leena Paulose26, that the delay in the present case cannot be attributed to
prosecutorial delays or court inaction alone, I am nonetheless of the view
that the facts of each case have to be examined on their own merits, with
due consideration of the specific roles ascribed to the individual in
question.
22. As I have held that the petitioner is entitled to bail even if the
prosecution case is taken at its highest, I do not consider it necessary to
address the other contentions raised by Mr. Malhotra.
V. CONCLUSION
23. For the aforesaid reasons, the application is allowed, and it is
directed that the petitioner be released on bail in connection with FIR No.
208/2021, dated 07.08.2021, registered at Police Station Special Cell,
Delhi, subject to furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 2,50,000/-, alongwith
two sureties in the like amount, to the satisfaction of the concerned
Special Court/Duty Magistrate, and subject to the following further
conditions:
a. The petitioner shall appear before the Special Court on each and
25
Emphasis supplied.
26
Paragraph 37.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 15 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
every date of hearing;
b. The petitioner shall surrender his passport before the Special Court,
and shall not leave the country without prior permission of the
concerned Court;
c. The petitioner shall provide his permanent address to the concerned
Court, as also the address where he is residing during the pendency
of the case. The petitioner shall intimate the Investigating Officer
[“IO”], and file an affidavit before the Special Court, regarding any
change in residential address;
d. The petitioner shall provide his mobile number to the concerned
IO/Station House Officer, which shall be kept in working condition
at all times. The mobile number shall not be switched off or
changed without prior intimation to the IO during the pendency of
the trial;
e. The petitioner shall not, directly or indirectly, make any
inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the
facts of the case or tamper with the evidence of the case, in any
manner whatsoever;
f. The petitioner shall not commit any offence during the period of
his release.
24. The bail application is disposed of in terms of the above.
25. It is clarified that any observations made in the present judgment
are solely for the purpose of deciding the present bail application, and
shall neither influence the trial proceedings, nor be construed as an
expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 16 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
26. Copy of the judgment be communicated to the concerned Jail
Superintendent electronically for information and necessary compliance.
PRATEEK JALAN, J
JULY 7, 2026
‘PV’/AD/KA/
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL BAIL APPLN. 1855/2024 Page 17 of 17
VASHIST
Signing Date:07.07.2026
20:54:04
