Piyush Chatterjee vs Abhijit Chowdhury @ Abhijit Chaudhury on 8 July, 2026

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    Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

    Piyush Chatterjee vs Abhijit Chowdhury @ Abhijit Chaudhury on 8 July, 2026

                                                                  2026:CHC-AS:995
                    IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                    CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
                            APPELLATE SIDE
    
    
    
    PRESENT:
    
    THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE
    
                              CRR 1137 of 2026
    
                            Piyush Chatterjee
                                   Vs.
                  Abhijit Chowdhury @ Abhijit Chaudhury
    
    
    For the petitioners   :          Mr. Kusal Kumar Mukherjee
                          :          Mr. Diptangshu Basu
                          :          Mr. Sayan Das
    
    
    Heard on              :          29.06.2026
    
    
    Judgment on           :          08.07.2026
    
    
    
    
    Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J.
    

    1. In the instant application the petitioner has raised an issue

    regarding the jurisdiction and inherent power of the High Court,

    SPONSORED

    which specifically directed to examine whether the High Court,

    while invoking its jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C.· read with

    section 528 of BNSS can invoke section 427 Cr.P.C./467 of BNSS

    to order that sentences awarded in three different cases shall run

    concurrently. The Petitioner Piyush Chatterjee has challenged

    sentence structure imposed in convictions seeking consolidation

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    of sentences to prevent undue hardship and to ensure justice.

    2. The ACJM, Bidhannagore passed three judgments of

    conviction and order of sentence on 28.11.2024 in

    connection with three separate complaint cases being C. Case

    No. 3014 of 2017, C. Case No. 3147 of 2018 and C. Case

    No. 139 of 2019 all are in connection with proceeding under

    section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act (in short N.I Act).

    The ordering portion of the aforesaid respective cases are as

    follows:-

    A. In complaint Case No. 3014 of 2017

    The Accused, Piyush Chatterjee is hereby sentenced to
    suffer simple imprisonment for a term of four months
    coupled with payment of fine of RS. 4,50,000/-( Four
    Lakhs Fifty thousands) only, within three months from
    filing of this order, out of which the entire amount shall
    be paid & disbursed as compensation u/s 357, Cr.P.C.
    to the complainant, in default of payment of the
    compensation amount, the complainant will be at
    liberty to proceed against the accused under proviso to
    section 421(1/b), CrPC in order to realize the said
    amount.

    B. In complaint Case No. 3147 of 2018

    The accused, Piyush Chatterjee is hereby sentenced to
    suffer simple imprisonment for a term of four months
    coupled with payment of fine of Rs. 3,50,000/-(three
    Lakhs fifty thousands) only, within three months
    from filing of this order, out of which the entire amount
    shall be paid & disbursed as compensation u/s 357,
    Cr.P.C. to the complainant, in default of payment of the
    compensation amount, the complainant will be at
    liberty to proceed against the accused under proviso to
    section 421(1/b), CrPC in order to realize the said
    amount.

    C. In complaint Case No. 139 of 2019

    The accused, Piyush Chatterjee is hereby sentenced to
    suffer simply imprisonment for a term of four months
    coupled with payment of fine of Rs. 1,50,000/-( One
    Lakh fifty thousands) only, within three months from
    filing of this order, out of which the entire amount

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    2026:CHC-AS:995
    shall be paid & disbursed as compensation u/s
    357, CrP.C. to the complainant, in default of
    payment of the compensation amount, the
    complainant will be at liberty to proceed against the
    accused under proviso to section 421(1/b), CrPC in
    order to realize the said amount.

    3. In all the above mentioned cases the complaint

    was lodged by the same complainant against the same

    accused person namely the petitioner herein. The Trial

    court passed the aforesaid conviction orders in three

    complaint cases on the same date and there is no finding

    in the order of sentences that the sentences shall run

    concurrently.

    4. The petitioner’s counsel herein argued that

    the petitioner was convicted for four months in respect of

    each of the complaint case and he was taken to custody

    on 06.09.2025 and since then he has been languishing

    in custody for about ten months. Even in the absence of

    passing order of sentence to run concurrently in all the

    three complain cases, the petitioner has already

    undergone more than 3/4th of the total sentence awarded

    for three cases, which can at best be 12 months.

    5. He further argued that it appears from the fact of

    complaint case no.139 of 2019 that the complainant gave

    a loan to the accused person due to their friendly

    relationship and the accused person issued a cheque

    for the part payment of the loan, amounting to Rs. 1

    lakh which got dishonoured on the ground of ‘account

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    2026:CHC-AS:995
    closed’. In respect of complaint case no. 3147 of 2018 the

    complainant filed complaint with the similar allegation

    that he gave loan to the accused person due to friendly

    relationship and the accused in course of part payment

    of the loan, issued a cheque of Rs. 2.5 lakhs which got

    dishonoured on the ground of ‘account closed’. In

    respect of C. Case no. 3014 of 2017 the allegations levelled

    in the complaint is that complainant gave loan to the

    petitioner due to friendly relationship and towards part

    payment of the said loan the accused had issued one

    cheque of Rs. 3 lakh which got dishonoured on the same

    ground ‘account closed’. Therefore in all the three

    complaint cases the allegation is that the cheques were

    given towards part payment of friendly loan advanced by

    the complainant to the petitioner. It is argued, that the

    aforesaid three complaint cases have arisen out of

    successive transactions in a series between the same

    parties and had been tried together on the basis of almost

    same set of evidence.

    6. He further argued that against the aforesaid three

    conviction orders, the petitioner herein preferred appeal

    before the learned Sessions Judge, against all the three

    conviction orders but the Appellate court had rejected the

    petitioners appeal on the ground of limitation and refused to

    dispose of the same on merit.

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    2026:CHC-AS:995

    7. While arguing the relationship between section 427(1)

    and 482, learned counsel for the petitioner emphasized that

    inherent power under section 482 is not confined or

    limited by specific provisions like section 427(1). Drawing

    from the Emperor Vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, reported in

    (1945) 47 Bom LR 245 and RP Kapoor Vs. State of Punjab,

    reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 he submits that the inherent

    power of the court are expansive and can be utilized to

    achieve just outcome, specially in a situation where trial

    court has failed to exercise discretionary power and when the

    Appellate court dismissed petitioners prayer on the ground of

    technicality and declined to decide the same on merit.

    Therefore, High Court’s inherent power can very well be invoked

    to run all the sentences passed in the aforesaid three criminal

    proceedings concurrently, even without explicit direction made

    by the Trial Court. He made a distinction between inherent

    power and those granted by specific sections, affirming that

    inherent power offers broad flexibility in ensuring justice and

    therefore he has prayed for direction for releasing the accused

    person namely petitioner herein, taking all the three aforesaid

    sentences be run concurrently.

    8. Before going further let me reproduce section 427 (1) of

    the Cr.P.C. and section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

    42 7. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another
    offence.

    (1) .When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is
    sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for
    life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the

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    expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced,
    unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently
    with such previous sentence :

    Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by
    an order under Section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst
    undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence
    committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall
    commence immediately.

    482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.

    – Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers
    of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to
    any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court
    or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

    9. Needless to say that it is well settled that inherent power

    of the high Court can be invoked sparingly and only when

    there is a clear failure in the legal process or. an inherent

    injustice, that cannot be rectified through existing statutory

    provisions. It is no doubt true that while inherent powers

    under section 482 Cr.P.C. are broad but they are not to

    be invoked to interfere with sentencing protocols delineated in

    other specific sections of the Cr.P.C. When a person is

    convicted in separate proceedings for multiple bounced cheques,

    generally each bounced cheques is treated as a distinct and

    separate offence.

    10. Recent judicial pronouncements have clarified that

    concurrent sentencing is not a matter of right, specially

    when dishonoured cheques arise for multiple commercial

    transaction spread over time. In such cases Courts are

    required to pass consecutive sentences. Section 427

    empowers court to direct whether a sentence imposed on a

    subsequent conviction should run concurrently or

    consecutively with an earlier sentence. This provisions does

    not create any presumption in favour of concurrency.

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    2026:CHC-AS:995
    Instead it vests pure discretion in the court to be exercised

    judicially based on the nature of the offence, the factual

    matrix, the conduct of the accused and overall ends of

    justice. In determining whether such relief can be granted,

    the High Court is to evaluate whether the cheques were part

    of the same transaction i.e. whether multiple cheques were

    given for a single transaction, the overall facts

    circumstances, severity of the cumulative punishment, the

    conduct of the accused.

    11. In V.K. Bansal Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 7 SCC

    211, the Supreme Court held in para 16 as follows:-

    16. In conclusion, we may say that the legal position favours exercise of
    discretion to the benefit of the prisoner in cases where the
    prosecution is based on a single transaction no matter different
    complaints in relation thereto may have been filed as is the position in
    cases involving dishonour of cheques issued by the borrower towards
    repayment of a loan to the creditor.

    12. In the said judgment it has also been made

    clear that the direction regarding concurrent running

    of sentence shall be limited to substantive sentences

    only. The .sentence which the convict has been directed to

    undergo in default of payment of fine/compensation, shall not

    be affected by the said direction.

    13. Therefore, it is clear from the aforesaid judgment

    that in order to pass an order that the judgment shall run

    concurrently, the petitioner must qualify ‘single transaction

    test’ which is the decisive test because the said judgement

    made it clear that multiple transactions mean multiple

    sentences.

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    2026:CHC-AS:995

    14. In a dismissal of the Special Leave petition in K

    Padamaja Rani Vs. State of Telangana and anr. arising

    out of Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) no. 6742 of 2023,

    decided on 28th July, 2023 the Supreme Court made it

    clear that only when the conviction arises out of the single

    transaction, concurrent sentence would be merited. Where

    there are several transaction over a period of time, the

    accused is not entitled to benefit of the ratio in VK Banshal’s

    Case (supra).

    15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of

    Shyam Pal Vs. Dayawati Besoya and another reported in

    (2016) 10 SCC 761 has held as follow:-

    9. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that as both the
    complaints filed by the respondents have arisen out of successive
    transactions in a series between the same parties and had been tried
    together on the basis of same set of evidence, the sentences awarded ought
    to run concurrently, the High Court had failed to appreciate the same. It has
    been submitted that the appellant is in custody since 25-2-2015 and if the
    two substantive sentences are construed to run concurrently, he has served
    not only the substantive sentences but also the sentence in default of fine as
    on date. That the appellant comes from a poor financial background, as well
    as is the sole bread earner of the family and that if the two sentences are to
    run consecutively, he would suffer grave injustice, has been emphasised. No
    argument, noticeably has been advanced, as abandoned before the High
    Court as well, impeaching the conviction.

    10. We have extended our required consideration to few facts and the
    submissions made. The materials on record leave no manner of doubt that
    the complaints filed by the respondents stem from two identical transactions
    between the same parties where under the respondent had advanced a loan
    of Rs 5 lakhs each to the appellant on two different dates against which the
    latter had issued cheques to discharge his debt and that the cheques had
    been dishonoured. The facts pleaded and proved do unassailably
    demonstrate that the loans advanced had been in the course of a series of
    transactions between the same parties on same terms and conditions.

    Significantly in both the cases, following the conviction of the appellant
    under Section 138 of the Act, the same sentences as well have been
    awarded. There is thus an overwhelming identicalness in the features of
    both the cases permitting, the two transactions, though undertaken at
    different points of time, to be deemed as a singular transaction or two
    segments of one transaction. This deduction understandably is in the
    singular facts of the case. (emphasis added)

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    2026:CHC-AS:995

    16. Therefore, it is clear that though under section 427

    (1) of the Cr.P.C the court has the power of discretion to issue a

    direction that a subsequent sentence shall run concurrently

    with the previous sentence, the very nature of the power so

    conferred predicates that the discretion would have to be

    exercised along with judicial precedents and not in a mechanical

    pedantic manner. The discretion is to be exercised strictly and

    not sympathetically. In fact there is no cut and dried formula

    for the court to follow in exercise of such power and the

    justifiability or otherwise of the same would depend on the

    nature of the offence or offences committed and the attending

    facts and circumstances. It was however postulated that the

    legal position favours the exercise of the discretion to the benefit

    of the prisoners in cases where the prosecution is based on a

    single transaction, no matter even if different complaints in

    relation thereto might have been filed. Such benefit cannot be

    extended to transactions which are distinctly different,

    separate and independent of each other and amongst others,

    where the parties are not the same.

    17. Coming back to the present complaint, it appears

    from the certified copy of three judgments that the

    complainant provided friendly loan to the accused/petitioner

    and in all the three complaint cases, it has been alleged

    that the cheques were issued towards par payment of the loan

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    2026:CHC-AS:995
    advanced to the accused. Therefore, the petitioner issued three

    separate cheques to discharge his burden in respect of the

    same loan which was given by the complainant. The

    complaints filed by the opposite party stem from three

    identical transactions between the same parties where under

    the opposite party had advanced a loan, though the loan

    amount has not been mentioned in any of the complaint. The

    petitioner issued three cheques on three different dates to

    discharge his debts, which got dishonoured. Therefore, the

    argument made on behalf of the petitioner demonstrates that

    the loans advanced had been in the course of a series of

    transactions between the same parties. The petitioner is in

    custody since 06.09.2025 i.e. for about 10 months and

    therefore, considering overall facts and circumstances of the

    case, it appears to me that the cheques were the part of the

    same singly transaction and considering the facts that the

    total imprisonment time becomes disproportionately harsh for

    essentially one underlying loan transaction, I find that this is a

    fit case where involving jurisdiction of this court under section

    482 Cr.P.C., the prayer of the petitioner is required to be

    allowed in order to secure the ends of justice.

    18. Therefore, CRR 1137 of 2026 is allowed.

    19. Substantive sentences awarded to the petitioners

    by the Trial Court in complaint case no. 3014 of 2017

    and complaint case no. 3147 of 2018 and complaint

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    2026:CHC-AS:995
    case no. 139 of 2019 treated to have been run

    concurrently. Since the petitioner has already undergone

    imprisonment for much more than the maximum

    sentence awarded in a particular case, the trial court is

    directed to issue release order at once in favour of the

    petitioner/convict.

    20. However, this order shall be limited in respect of the

    substantive sentences awarded to the petitioner and this will

    have no concern in respect of the order passed in connection

    with the payment by way of compensation awarded under

    section 357 Cr.P.C. to the complainant, in default of which

    the trial Court has given liberty to the complainant to proceed

    against the convict/petitioner under the provision of section

    421 (1) (b) of Cr.P.C. in order to realize the compensation

    amount.

    Urgent Xerox certified photocopies of this Judgment, if

    applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of the

    requisite formalities.

    (DR. AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE, J.)

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