Delhi District Court
Anil Arora vs State Through Sho Io on 8 July, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No. DLCT01-013325-2025
CRIMINAL REVISION No.: 498/2025
ANIL ARORA,
S/o. Shri. Harbans Lal Arora,
R/o. Plot No. G-44/A, 1st Floor,
G-Block, Sector-50,
Gurugram, Haryana. ... REVISIONIST/
PETITIONER
VERSUS
STATE (NCT OF DELHI),
Through SHO/IO,
PS. IP Estate, Delhi. ... RESPONDENT
Date of filing : 03.09.2025
Date of institution : 04.09.2025
Date when judgment was reserved : 15.05.2026
Date when judgment is pronounced : 08.07.2026
JUDGMENT
1. The present revision petition has been filed under
Sections 438/442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
(hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’)/pari materia with Sections
397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘Cr.P.C./Code’), against the order dated 30.07.2025
(hereinafter referred to as ‘impugned order’), passed by learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class-03/Ld. JMFC-03, Central, Tis
Hazari Court (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Ld. Trial Court/Ld.
JMFC’), in case bearing as; ‘State v. Anil Arora, Cr. Case
8084/2023′, in a proceeding emanating out of FIR No. 99/2008,
PS. IP Estate, under Sections 420, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC‘). Pertinently, by virtue
of the impugned order, Ld. Trial Court while inter alia discharging
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.07.08
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the revisionist of the offences under Sections 420/468/471/120B
IPC, directed the concerned SHO to depute a responsible officer to
conduct further investigation, regarding the role of the revisionist
in filing a false complaint and to file an appropriate kalandra under
Section 182 IPC against the revisionist, if so required.
2. Pithily put, the genesis of the present proceedings is a
complaint dated 25.01.2007, filed by the revisionist, namely, Anil
Arora (herein after referred to as the ‘revisionist/complainant’)
inter alia before the concerned Assistant Commissioner of Police,
alleging commission of the offences under Sections 166, 167, 420,
465, 468, 471, 506 IPC read with Section 120 IPC by, Sh. Vinay
Kumar (hereinafter referred to as ‘accused no. 1’), General
Manager (Civil), Indraprastha Power Generation Company
Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPGCL’) and Sh. Deepak
Kumar (hereinafter referred to as ‘accused no. 2’; hereinafter
accused no. 1 and accused no. 2 are collectively referred to as the
‘accused persons’), Manager (Civil), IPGCL. Markedly, under his
complaint, the revisionist inter alia proclaimed that
his/revisionist’s company, i.e., MJ Bricks Private Limited
(hereinafter referred to as ‘MJ Bricks’) was entitled to
manufacture fly ash bricks at Rajghat Power House, pursuant to a
valid contract and Letter of Intent/LOI dated 21.09.1999,
acknowledged and signed by the competent authority by/on behalf
of IPGCL, and with the assistance from IPGCL. Further, as per
the revisionist, prior to expiration of the term of the said contract,
IPGCL issued, notice inviting tender/NIT in the month of
November, 2022. However, as per the revisionist, he/the
revisionist was directed by IPGCL to continue with the
contractual responsibility, even after the expiration of the term of
the said contract on 14.01.2003, until further directions from
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.07.08
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IPGCL vide letter dated 09.12.2003, Ref. No. DGM(C) 2003,
executed by the concerned Deputy General Manager, Civil,
IPGCL. Consequently, as per the revisionist, MJ Bricks continued
performing its erstwhile contractual responsibility of
manufacturing fly ash bricks, even after the expiration of the
period of the said contract. Further, as per the revisionist, though,
IPGCL, continued to accept royalties from MJ Bricks on regular
basis (as per Clause 16 of LOI) as acknowledgment to the
extension of said contractual relationship, however, failed to
supply electricity to MJ Bricks on concession rates (Clause 6 of
the LOI), despite its counter obligation.
2.1. Markedly, it was further proclaimed by the revisionist
under his aforesaid complaint that MJ Bricks subsequently
participated and applied for award of new tender in the year 2003,
which was accepted/awarded to the said company and licence
dated 30.06.2003 vide LOI DGM(C)/P14/2003/46, was also
issued to MJ Bricks inter alia specifying the execution of work
under the said award/license as on 14.11.2003. Consequently, as
per the revisionist, for the period between 15.01.2003 till
14.11.2003, MJ Bricks continued to manufacture fly ash bricks for
IPGCL, duly authorized by IPGCL. Concurrently, it is the case of
the revisionist that MJ Bricks paid royalties to a tune of Rs.
2,75,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Seventy Five Thousand only),
which were accepted by IPGCL for the said interim period,
substantiating and approving the extension of their contractual
relationship. Further, the said complaint chronicles that accused
no. 1 vide letter dated 15.11.2002, directed the revisionist to sell
the said bricks in open market, dishonestly inducing/deceiving MJ
Bricks by citing that in terms of LOI, electricity against the said
of said bricks would be supplied on concessional rates to the said
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ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.07.08
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company. Ergo, as per the revisionist, acting on such inducement,
MJ Bricks manufactured and supplied bricks in open market.
However, the revisionist avowed in the said complaint that it was
only when the royalties were collected by accused no. 2 on behalf
of IPGCL, he/accused no. 2 withdrew from said contractual
obligation and commenced making unjust demands, to enable
issuance of sanction letter for concession on tariff. It was further
proclaimed by the revisionist that despite significant lapse of time,
when MJ Bricks again requested accused no. 2 for concession in
electricity tariff, accused no. 2 advised the revisionist to meet
accused no. 1. However, upon such meeting, it was determined by
the revisionist that accused no. 1 and accused no. 2 had ulterior
expectations from MJ Bricks and it was informed to the revisionist
that such concessional tariff would be sanctioned only when
requisite share/money would be paid to the said accused persons.
2.2. Relevantly, it was further avowed by the revisionist
under his complaint that owing to the illegal acts of the accused
persons MJ Bricks, incurred heavy monetary loss. Further, as per
the revisionist, when he expressed inability to pay the aforenoted
accused persons, the sought bribed amount, he/the revisionist was
criminally intimidated and threatened of dire consequences. It is
further the case of the revisionist that the accused persons, while
acting in connivance and in furtherance to their criminal
conspiracy, forged/fabricated documents as well as deployed the
said documents to get revisionist’s company’s/MJ Brick’s
electricity connection disconnected via BSES inter alia professing
that MJ Bricks had no contractual relationship with IPGCL and
that MJ Brick’s electricity connection, ought to be consequently,
disconnected. Further, as per the revisionist, he confronted the
accused persons regarding their said conducts, however, to no
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ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.07.08
16:48:53
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avail. Consequently, aggrieved by the actions of the said
officials/accused persons, the revisionist filed/issued the
aforenoted complaint. Appositely, under aforenoted facts and
circumstances and on the basis of the revisionist’s complaint, the
instant FIR came to be registered under Sections 420/468/471 IPC,
and investigation ensued.
2.3. Noticeably, during the course of ensuing
investigation, the concerned police official(s)/Investigating
Officer/IO, obtained the various documents, agreements, etc.,
from the revisionist and analysed the clauses thereof. In particular,
it was determined by the concerned IO that on the basis of contract
between IPGCL and MJ Bricks Company (hereinafter referred to
as ‘MJ Bricks Co.’), temporary electricity connection was
provided to MJ Bricks Co. on 16.12.1999. Subsequently, as per
the IO, the term of the said contract was extended for a further
period of 01 (one) year, till 14.01.2003 vide letter bearing no.;
XCP-1/2569, dated 09.03.2001. Correspondingly, it was
determined that on 01.07.2002, owing to privatization of Delhi
Vidyut Board/DVB and conveyance of right of distribution of
electricity to BSES Yamuna, in-house consumption of fly ash
bricks dropped drastically. Consequently, as per the IO, it was
ascertained that vide letter dated 15.11.2002, issued the concerned
Executive Engineer (Civil), IPGCL, MJ Bricks Co. was asked to
sell the entire production of fly ash bricks in open market, which
was also a part and parcel of the contract, extended up to
14.01.2003. However, as per the IO, since the said LOI/contract
was expiring on 14.01.2003, MJ Bricks Co./the revisionist
conspired with one Sh. Mahijit Dutta, the then Superintendent
Engineer (Civil), IPGCL and got document dated 24.12.2002,
executed permitting the said company to continue with
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signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.07.08
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manufacture of fly ash bricks even after the said period,
notwithstanding the fact that Sh. Mahijit Dutta was conferred with
no such power to issue such an order/direction. Concomitantly, it
was determined by the IO that the revisionist, while acting in
furtherance of his criminal conspiracy, got issued
correspondence/letter dated 05.06.2002, extending the aforesaid
temporary connection for a period of 12 (twelve) months,
notwithstanding the fact that the agreement/LOI/contract was due
to expire on 14.01.2003. Needless to mention that IO further
determined that the said letter was issued by Sh. Mahijit Dutta,
notwithstanding the fact that he had no authority to issue such a
correspondence.
2.4. Further, it is the case of the prosecution that it was
established during the ensuing investigation that subsequently, the
contract of MJ Bricks Co. was extended by IPGCL vide letter no.
DGM(C)/F-14/2003/46, dated 13.05.2003 on 30.06.2003.
However, with the extension of the terms of contract, the erstwhile
benefit of getting electricity at the concessional rate was no longer
available with MJ Bricks Co., rather, the revisionist/MJ Bricks Co.
was to apply to BSES for new electricity connection.
Subsequently, vide letter dated 14.04.2004, the revisionist is
professed to have informed IPGCL regarding the proposed change
of MJ Bricks Co. from a proprietorship concern to a private limited
company and the consequently, approval of name of company as
MJ Bricks Pvt. Ltd., seeking issuance of license in the name of the
said company, which was duly issued vide letter bearing no.;
DGM(C) RPH/28, dated 20.04.2004. It was further determined
during the investigation that MG Bricks Co, did not apply to BSES
for new electricity connection and continued to consume
electricity from the old temporary connection, leading to
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.07.08
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accumulation of huge quantum of arrears against electricity
charges. However, as per the prosecution, the revisionist, while
acting in connivance/criminal conspiracy with Sh. Mahijit Dutta,
prepared a forged/fabricated document dated 09.12.2003,
asserting/permitting electricity at concessional rates w.e.f.
15.01.2003, contrary to the LOI/contract and extended term
thereof by IPGCL.
2.5. Concurrently, the IO, conducted investigation from
Sh. Mahijit Dutta, who inter alia proclaimed that he retired from
his services of IPGCL w.e.f. 01.02.2004 and that letter dated
09.12.2003 was not issued from his office. Ergo, it was determined
by the IO that pursuant to the investigation that the revisionist,
professing as owner/person in charge of MJ Bricks and MJ Bricks
Co., hatched criminal conspiracy with Sh. Mahijit Dutta to
prepare forged/false documents dated 15.06.2002, 09.12.2003 and
30.06.2003, as well as deployed the same to file false complaints
against the accused persons as well as to cheat IPGCL for their
wrongful gain and wrongful loss to IPGCL and its officials.
Consequently, on conclusion of investigation in the instant case,
chargesheet came to be filed before the Ld. Trial Court against the
revisionist and Sh. Mahijit Dutta.
2.6. Markedly, upon such chargesheet being filed before
the Ld. Trial Court, vide order dated 19.03.2024, Ld. Trial Court
took cognizance of the offences, specified under the chargesheet
and issued summons against the accused persons, including the
revisionist herein. Subsequently, on 25.04.2024, the revisionist
entered appearance before the Ld. Trial Court and was admitted to
bail. However, during the course of proceedings, it was determined
that co-accused, Sh. Mahijit Dutta, left for heavenly abode on
19.06.2021. Consequently, vide order dated 02.09.2024,
CR No. 498/2025 Anil Arora v. State Page No. 7 of 28
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by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
ABHISHEK
Date:
GOYAL 2026.07.08
16:49:01
+0530
proceedings qua Sh. Mahijit Dutta were abated, upon receipt of
report regarding verification of such demise, from the concerned
SHO/IO. Thereafter, upon arguments on charge/discharge having
been addressed by/on behalf of the revisionist and State, Ld. Trial
Court vide order dated 30.07.2025/impugned order, discharged the
revisionist of revisionist of the charges/allegations/offences under
Sections 420/468/471/120B IPC, however, directed the concerned
SHO to depute a responsible officer to conduct further
investigation, regarding the role of the revisionist in filing a false
complaint and to file appropriate kalandra under Section 182 IPC
against the revisionist, if required. Apposite here to reproduce the
relevant extracts of order dated 30.07.2025/impugned order, as
under;
“*** Arguments on charge/ discharge heard.
*** *** ***
Before proceeding further, undersigned is
required to clarify that the accused Anil Arora was
originally the complainant, and FIR was registered on
the basis of his complaint. The accused in his
complaint alleged that his company MJ Bricks Pvt.
Ltd. had a valid contract and LOI dated 21.09.1999
with IPGCL. It is further stated that the contract were
further extended vide letter dated 09.12.2003 by
IPGCL. and the status quo was extended on the basis
of letter dated 09.12.2003. It is further stated that MJ
Bricks Pvt. Ltd. performed contractual responsibility
even after expiry of contract on 15.01.2003 and
IPGCL continuously accepted royalties from MJ
Bricks Pvt. Ltd. even after 14.01.2003. It is further
stated that MJ Bricks Pvt. Ltd. was granted new tender
on 30.06.2003 and with effect from 14.11.2003. It is
further stated that in the interim period from
15.01.2003 to 14.11.2003, MJ Bricks Pvt. Ltd.
continued to manufacture fly ash brick for IPGCL. It
is further stated that Sh. Deepak Kumar posted as
Manager Civil under Sh. Vinay Kumar(GM), Civil
through letter dated 15.11.2002 directed MJ Bricks
Pvt. Ltd. to sell bricks in open market and dishonestly
induced MJ Bricks Pvt. Ltd. citing the LOI that the
electricity for these bricks would be supplied on
concessional rates and therefore, persuaded and
deceived MJ Bricks Pvt. Ltd. to manufacture bricks
CR No. 498/2025 Anil Arora v. State Page No. 8 of 28Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.07.08
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and sell them in open market. It is further alleged
that both the officers of IPGCL. were guilty of offence
u/s 420 IPC.
After the registration of FIR, IO altogether took a
different route and ignored all the basic tenets of
criminal jurisprudence by making the complainant as
accused in the same FIR without filing any separate
kalandra u/s 182 IPC.
It was observed by the IO that one valid contract
and LOI dated 21.09.1999 was came into force
between MJ Bricks Pvt. Ltd. and Rajghat Power
House to manufacture fly ash bricks at Rajghat Power
House and MJ Bricks Pvt. Ltd. was entitled to
consume electricity at a concessional rate during the
contract period which was valid upto 14.01.2003. It is
further observed that on 01.07.2002 Delhi Vidyut
Board was privatized, and distribution of electricity
went to BSES Yamuna and generation/production of
power was entrusted to IPGCL due to which in house
consumption of fly ash bricks dropped drastically.
Therefore, vide letter dated 15.11.2002 IPGCL asked
MJ Bricks Pvt. Ltd. to sell the entire production in
open market as per clause 4 and 16 of LOI dated
21.09.1999.
IO further observed that since the contract was
expiring or 14.01.2003, MJ Bricks Pvt. Ltd. conspired
with Sh. Mahijeet Dutta, the then Superintendent
Engineer (Civil) and got document dated 24.12.2002
stressing that he be allowed to continue after
15.01.2003. On this, he got an endorsement dated
24.12.2002 (allowed to continue) signed by Mahijeet
Dutta but he had no power to issue such orders. It is
further observed that another letter dated 15.06.2002
was fabricated by accused Anil Arora in connivance
with Sh. Mahijeet Dutta for the simple reason that on
15.06.2002, Mr. Dutta was never posted as S.E.(Civil)
in Rajghat Power House. In the meantime, IPGCI,
invited tender in year 2002 and MJ Bricks Pvt. Ltd.
got the tender on 30.06.2003 but clause 6 of the
original contract was deleted and the benefit of getting
electricity at concessional rate was not made available
to MJ Bricks Pvt. Ltd. and it had to apply to the
BSES for new electricity connection but MJ Bricks
Pvt. Ltd. did not apply to BSES for new electricity
connection and continued to consume electricity from
the old temporary connection. It was further
observed that one another letter dated 30.06.2003 was
written by MJ Bricks Pvt. Ltd. to DGM Civil asking to
clarify the period of contract to which Mahijeet
Dutta made a note stating that approved and certified
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2026.07.08
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the date of start as 13.05.2003 and five years of
contract. It was further observed that another letter
dated 09.12.2003 was got prepared by accused by
forging the signatures of Mahijeet Dutta who denied
to sign on any such letter.
Submissions heard. Records perused.
IO has filed present charge-sheet only on the basis
that accused Anil Arora conspired with Mr. Mahijeet
Dutta and both of them forged and fabricated letter
dated 15.06.2002, 19.12.2003 and 30.06.2003 with a
sole aim to get electricity at concessional rate to which
MJ Bricks Pvt. Ltd. was not entitled after 14.01.2003.
It is matter of record that co-accused Mahijeet Dutta
(since deceased) admitted to have written letter dated
09.12.2003. In this regard, one letter dated 21.09.2005
written by Mr. Mahijeet Dutta to Director, IPGCL is
of utmost importance wherein he did not dispute that
he wrote letter dated 09.12.2003. Further, the record
reflects that in the departmental enquiry conducted
against co-accused Mahijeet Dutta, it was observed by
the Vigilance Department that the letter dated
09.12.2003 written by Mahijeet Dutta, was written to
give undue benefit to MJ Bricks Pvt. Ltd. Therefore, it
is not in dispute that letter dated 09.12.2003 was
written by Mahijeet Dutta. When the record reflects
that the letter dated 09.12.2003 was written by
Mahijeet Dutta, the ingredients of forgery could not
have been fulfilled. Further, what was the loss caused
to the complainant or the IPGCL is not explained. It
was merely a contractual dispute turned into a
criminal litigation. Even if, Anil Arora managed to
have got letter dated 09.12.2003 issued from Mahijeet
Dutta illegally, it could not have been a case of forgery
but a case of misuse of power by accused Mahijeet
Dutta. Admittedly, IPGCL did not make any
complaint to the IO regarding wrongful loss or the
forgery of any of the letters on the basis of which
contract was extended. Furthermore, IO could not
have filed charge-sheet u/s 420/468/471/120-B/182
IPC against Anil Arora. On one hand, he has filed
charge-sheet u/s 420/468/471/120-B IPC against Anil
Arora on the basis of his complaint and on the other
hand, he has added section 182 IPC in the same
charge-sheet against him. The correct procedure
would have been to file cancellation in present FIR
and file kalandra u/s 182 IPC against Anil Arora and
would have got separate FIR registered against Anil
Arora on the basis of material available on record.
However, in these circumstances, the trial cannot be
permitted to proceed against accused and in view of
aforesaid observations, accused Anil Arora is
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.07.08
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discharged u/s 420/468/471/120-B IPC.
With respect to charge u/s 182 IPC, SHO PS
concerned is directed to depute a responsible officer
who can conduct further investigation regarding the
role of accused Anil Arora in filing a false complaint
and file appropriate kalandra u/s 182 IPC against
accused Anil Arora, if the IO thinks fit.
A copy of this order be sent to SHO PS concerned
for compliance.
Put up for compliance on ***”
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist vehemently contended
that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere
conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled
principles of law, deserving the same to be outrightly set aside as
amounting to abuse of process of law. As per the Ld. Counsel,
though, while passing the impugned order, Ld. Trial Court duly
recorded that the allegations under the final report, conspicuously
demonstrated absence any practice of deception or dishonest
intention by/on behalf of the revisionist and were categorically
accepted by the Ld. Trial Court, however, the Ld. Trial Court
exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the prosecution to file
kalandra for the offence under Section 182 IPC against the
revisionist. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further vehemently argued
that even if it is assumed that the case/complaint of the revisionist
was false, no investigation was conducted by the IO in this regard.
Even otherwise, it was submitted that the material placed on record
belie even the prima facie ingredients of offence under Section 182
IPC against the revisionist. It was further submitted by the Ld.
Counsel that even the allegation against the revisionist that he did
not disclose of the pendency of civil proceedings against IPGCL,
are belied by the fact that the revisionist duly, verbally informed
the concerned IO of the said facts during the course of recording
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ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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of his statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as well as by providing
copy of the said suit to the concerned IO. Consequently, Ld.
Counsel reiterated that the entire case put forth against the
revisionist stands disproved from the material brought on record,
entitling the directions of registration of kalandra against the
revisionist to be outrightly set aside.
3.1. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist further submitted that
the Ld. Magistrate, hastily passed the impugned order, in utter
violation of the settled law as well as judicial dictates, without
application of mind and failing to consider that whether such
directions for further investigation could have been issued by the
Ld. Trial Court, while discharging the revisionist. In this regard, it
was submitted that the Ld. Trial Court became functus officio,
after passing an order of revisionist’s discharge and had no
power/jurisdiction to pass either an order of further investigation
in the present case or for the registration of kalandra against the
revisionist. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court
ignored the basic tenets/primary rule that it is the prerogative of an
IO to conduct further investigation, in cases where after filing of
the final report, IO is of the opinion that further evidence is
obtained regarding the incident in question. However, as per the
Ld. Counsel, no such power is conferred with the courts to direct
IO to conduct further investigation, more so when an accused has
already been discharged. Correspondingly, it was argued that
while passing the impugned order, Ld. Trial Court even failed to
appreciate that the limitation to file kalandra in the case related to
Section 182 IPC, which deals with providing false information to
public servant, is only one year from the date when public servant
receives such false information, in terms of the provisions under
Section 468 Cr.P.C. Ergo, it was contended that the direction for
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ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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registration of such kalandra, under the impugned order
contradicts the settled law and judicial precedents, governing the
field.
3.2. Ld. Counsel for the revisionist further submitted that
the Ld. Trial Court erred and misdirected itself in proceeding
with a preconceived notion/predetermined mindset, while passing
the impugned order to the gross prejudice of the revisionist.
Further, it was submitted that while passing the impugned order,
Ld. Trial Court further did not consider that the investigation in the
present case was grossly motivated, unilateral and aimed to falsely
implicate the revisionist in the present proceedings. In this regard,
it was argued that the IO did not conduct proper investigation
regarding the roles of accused persons, namely, Deepak and Vinay
who issued false advice for disconnection, besides fabricated
various documents. Correspondingly, it was submitted that the IO
did not even investigate the matter properly, and relied on
misleading documents, furnished by the accused persons, which
were contrary to each other. As per the Ld. Counsel, IO worked
under pressure to chargesheet the revisionist, without there being
any material, evidence, documents and/or facts of any cogent
nature against him, solely to coerce the revisionist to submit to the
unjust demands of the accused persons. Congruently, as per the
Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court erred in passing the impugned order
without due consideration to the facts of the case as well as
settled judicial dictates. Consequently, it was prayed that the
impugned order is liable to be set aside as violative of both law and
facts, as well as in contravention to the principles of natural justice.
In support of the said contents, reliance was placed upon the
decisions in; Sharad Kumar Sanghi v. Sangita Rene, (2015) 12
SCC 781; Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609; Sheila
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signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.07.08
16:49:19
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Sebastian v. R. Jwaharaj, (2018) 7 SCC 581; S.K. Alagh v. State of
Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 5 SCC 662; Maksud Saiyad v. State of
Gujrat, (2008) 5 SCC 668; Bikash Ranjan Rout v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2019) 5 SCC 542; Asoke Basak v. State of Maharashtra,
(2010) 10 SCC 660; Thermax Limited v. K.M. Johny, (2011) 13
SCC 412; Saloni Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 3 SCC
286; Popular Muthiah v. State, (2006) 7 SCC 296; Sudershan
Singh Wazir v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC Online SC 461;
Rashmi Sundrani v. State, 2024 AHC 193580; Krishan Chander
Singh v. State of Haryana, CRM-M-17449-2011 (O&M), dated
22.09.2023 (P&H); Gammi @ Gama v. State of Punjab, Criminal
Misc. No. 9909/2004, dated 11.09.2008 (P&H); Harbhajan Singh
Bajwa v. Senior Superintendent of Police, 2000 Cri. LJ 3297; and
Moti Pathak & Ors. v. State of U.P., (1988) 12 ACR 235.
4. Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that
the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, after due
appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the present case
and, as such, deserves no interference by this Court. It was further
submitted that no irregularity, impropriety, and/or incorrectness
can be attributed to the impugned order, which was passed by the
Ld. Trial Court, being cognizant of the principles of law, as well
as facts and circumstances brought forth. Ergo, Ld. Addl. PP for
the State reiterated that the impugned order was passed by the
Ld. Trial Court, in consonance with law, deserving no interference
from this Court.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist and
that of Ld. Addl. PP for the State have been heard as well as the
record(s), including the records of the Ld. Trial Court, case laws
and other material placed on record, thoroughly perused.
CR No. 498/2025 Anil Arora v. State Page No.14 of 28
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Date:
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6. Before proceeding with the determination of the
merits of the case/issues posed before this Court, i.e., ‘whether the
Ld. Trial Court erred in directing further investigation against the
revisionist, while correspondingly, discharging the revisionist of
the charges under Sections 420, 468, 471, 120B IPC vide
impugned order?’ and/or ‘whether the Ld. Trial Court committed
any illegality, impropriety and/or irregularity under the
impugned order, directing further investigation while
concomitantly passing an order of discharge of the revisionist?’, it
would be apposite to outrightly make a reference to the relevant
provisions under law, in particular that under law/Section 438
BNSS1, as under;
“438. Calling for records to exercise powers of
revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge
may call for and examine the record of any proceeding
before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or
his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying
itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded
or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings
of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for
such record, direct that the execution of any sentence
or order be suspended, and if the accused is in
confinement that he be released on his own bond or
bail bond pending the examination of the record.
*** *** ***
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial
or other proceeding….”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Pertinently, from a perusal of the above, it is quite
manifest that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be
1
Pari materia with Section 397 Cr.P.C., which provides, “397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision-(1)
The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal
Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior
Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the
accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the
record.***Explanation – All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate
jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section
398.***(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory
order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding…” (Emphasis supplied)
CR No. 498/2025 Anil Arora v. State Page No.15 of 28
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invoked either suo motu or an application of parties, that too in a
case(s) where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the
provision of law, decision of Trial Court being completely
erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9
SCC 460, wherein the Hon’ble Court while explicating the various
contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. (pari materia
with Section 438 BNSS) observed as under:
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as
to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
order made in a case. The object of this provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or
law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may
not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the
orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of
careful consideration and appear to be in accordance
with law. If one looks into the various judgments of
this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction
can be invoked where the decisions under challenge
are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the
provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on
no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These
are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative.
Each case would have to be determined on its own
merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should
not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The
Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to
injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the
question as to whether the charge has been framed
properly and in accordance with law in a given case,
it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially
falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing
of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings
under the CrPC.”
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(Emphasis supplied)
8. Correspondingly, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in
V.K. Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC Online Del 1192, in a similar
context noted, as under;
“67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to test
the waters of what might happen in the trial. The
Revisional Court has to consider the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order
and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the court
below. While doing so, the Revisional Court does
not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the
case, rather it considers the material only to satisfy
itself about the legality and propriety of the findings,
sentence and order and refrains from substituting its
own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of
evidence. In the instant case, the Petitioner has failed
to make out a case for exercise of the revisional
jurisdiction since there is no patent error in the
impugned order on the face of record.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted, the
revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an order
of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it is a
settled law2 that in a case where the order of subordinate Court
does not suffer from any illegality, “merely because of equitable
considerations, the revisional Court has no jurisdiction to re-
consider the matter and pass a different order in a routine manner.”
Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Taron Mohan v.
State, 2021 SCC Online Del 312, wherein the Hon’ble High Court
of Delhi expounded the law, as under;
“9. The scope of interference in a revision petition
is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section
397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions
Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness,2
Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC Online MP 4458; and Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC Online MP 958.
CR No. 498/2025 Anil Arora v. State Page No.17 of 28
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order
and as to the regularity of the proceedings of any
inferior court. It is also well settled that while
considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a
finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court
does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of
the case. A court in revision considers the material
only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of
the findings, sentence and order and refrains from
substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate
consideration of evidence…”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Ergo, in light of the foregoing, however, before
proceeding with the assessment of the rival contentions of Ld.
Counsel for the parties, this Court deems it apposite to reproduce
the relevant provisions under law/Cr.P.C., as under;
“173. Report of police officer on completion of
investigation-(1)3 Every investigation under this
Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary
delay.
*** *** ***
(2) (i) As soon as it is completed, the officer-in-
4
charge of the police station shall forward to a
Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the
offence on a police report, a report in the form
prescribed by the State Government, stating -***
*** *** ***
(ii) The officer shall also communicate, in such
manner as may be prescribed by the State
Government, the action taken by him, to the person, if
any, by whom the information relating to the
commission of the offence was first given.
*** *** ***
(8)5 Nothing in this section shall be deemed to
preclude further investigation in respect of an
offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been
forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such
investigation, the officer-in-charge of the police
station obtains further evidence, oral or
3
Section 193 BNSS provides, “Report of police officer on completion of investigation-(1) Every investigation under this
Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay.***” (Emphasis supplied)
4
Pari materia with Section 193 (3) BNSS.
5
Section 193(9) BNSS provides, “*** Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of
an offence after a report under sub-section (3) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the
officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a
further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form as the State Government may, by rules, provide; and the
provisions of sub-sections (3) to (8) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation
to a report forwarded under sub-section (3): *** Provided that further investigation during the trial may be conducted with
the permission of the Court trying the case and the same shall be completed within a period of ninety days which may be
extended with the permission of the Court.” (Emphasis supplied)
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a
further report or reports regarding such evidence in
the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-
sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in
relation to such report or reports as they apply in
relation to a report forwarded under sub-section
(2)***”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Notably, it is observed from a conscientious perusal
of the aforesaid provisions, in particular, of the provisions under
sub-Section (2) and (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. (pari materia with
Section 193(3) and Section 193(9) BNSS, respectively) that even
after submission of police report before the concerned Magistrate,
police has a right to further investigate a case under Section
173(8) Cr.P.C./pari materia with Section 193(9) BNSS. However,
‘fresh investigation’ or ‘reinvestigation’ is impermissible by the
police official, even under the said provision. In fact, power to
conduct/carrying out of further investigation, even after filing of
the chargesheet, has persistently been avowed by superior courts to
be a statutory right of the police officials/IO, the only prohibition is
on, ‘reinvestigation’ or ‘fresh investigation’, which cannot be
carried out, without the prior permission of court. Reference in
this regard is made to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (2009) 6 SCC 346, wherein
the Hon’ble Court unambiguously, observed, as under;
“15. *** A mere reading of the above provision
makes it clear that irrespective of report under sub-
section (2) forwarded to the Magistrate, if the officer
in-charge of the police station obtains further
evidence, it is incumbent on his part to forward the
same to the Magistrate with a further report with
regard to such evidence in the form prescribed. The
above said provision also makes it clear that further
investigation is permissible, however, reinvestigation
is prohibited.
16. The law does not mandate taking of prior
permission from the Magistrate for further
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
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investigation. Carrying out a further investigation
even after filing of the charge-sheet is a statutory right
of the police. Reinvestigation without prior
permission is prohibited. On the other hand, further
investigation is permissible.
17. From a plain reading of sub-section (2) and
sub-section (8) of Section 173, it is evident that even
after submission of police report under sub-section (2)
on completion of investigation, the police has a right
to “further” investigation under sub-section (8) of
Section 173 but not “fresh investigation” or
“reinvestigation”. The meaning of “Further” is
additional; more; or supplemental. “Further”
investigation, therefore, is the continuation of the
earlier investigation and not a fresh investigation or
reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping out the
earlier investigation altogether.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Correspondingly, the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay
in Sunil Tondon v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 SCC Online Bom
715, while carrying out an exhaustive review of the case
laws/judicial dictates governing the said field, expressed similar
sentimentalities, in the following terms;
“19. From perusal of the aforesaid judgments of
the Supreme Court, it is clear that the law does not
mandate taking of prior permission from the
Magistrate for further investigation. It is a statutory
right and duty of the police to further investigate as
often as necessary when fresh information came to
light after filing of the charge-sheet. These statutory
rights and duties of the police cannot be circumscribed
by any power of superintendence nor any sanction is
required from a Magistrate to empower the police to
investigate into a cognizable offence. However, it
would be desirable to keep the Court informed about
further investigation, more particularly where the
charge has been framed. The objective for keeping the
Court informed or for seeking formal permission to
make further investigation is that the Court should
know about it and should not proceed to hear the case.
Further investigation after filing of the charge sheet is
the continuation of the earlier investigation. sub-
Section (8) of Section 173 of Cr.P.C., envisages that
on completion of further investigation, the
investigating agency has to forward to the Magistrate
a further report regarding the further evidence
CR No. 498/2025 Anil Arora v. State Page No.20 of 28Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
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obtained during such investigation. Therefore, what is
necessary is only to keep the Magistrate informed
about further investigation. In the present case, the
prosecution has done so, and the learned Magistrate
vide the order dated 6.8.2009 has taken notice of the
same.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Quite evidently, it is seen from above that the power
of the police/investigating authorities to conduct further
investigation is not stifled with the filing of the chargesheet. In
fact, as aforenoted, law permits/grants a statutory right to the
police official(s) to further investigate, “as often as necessary
when fresh information came to light after filing of the charge-
sheet”. In fact, it is reiterated that what is barred under law is
‘reinvestigation’ or ‘further investigation’, which cannot be
carried out without prior permission of the Court(s). Here, this
Court deems it further pertinent to note that the superior courts
have tenaciously declared that there is even no embargo in court’s
suo motu invoking the provisions under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C.
(pari materia with Section 193(9) BNSS), in appropriate cases, by
directing further investigation, where serious lapses come to the
attention of the court. In this regard, reference is made to the
decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala in Abdul Latheef
v. State of Kerala, 2014 SCC Online Ker 28597 , wherein the
Hon’ble Court, unambiguously observed, as under;
“22. From all the above, it is evident that when a
final report has been filed under Section 173(2)
Cr.P.C. by the investigating officer, if the court on
applying its mind is satisfied that there is lapse or
defects in the investigation or if it is satisfied that a
further investigation has to be conducted, the Court in
its own motion can trigger a further investigation
under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. to be done by the
investigating officer. The investigating officer himself
can exercise such a jurisdiction under Section 173(8)
Cr.P.C., if he wants to conduct a further investigation
in case he receives some fresh facts or materials, after
CR No. 498/2025 Anil Arora v. State Page No.21 of 28
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
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the filing of the final report under Section 173(2)
Cr.P.C. He can conduct such a further investigation
and file a supplementary final report before Court
under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. At the same time, when
the investigating agency wants to conduct such a
further investigation, it is ordinarily desirable that the
investigating officer should inform the said matter to
the concerned court and seek formal permission for
conducting such an investigation, when the court has
already taken cognizance of the offences based on the
final report already filed in the matter. After informing
the court regarding the proposed further investigation
and seeking such a formal permission, the
investigating officer can continue with such further
investigation, even without waiting for any such
permission from the court.
*** *** ***
36. From all the above, it can safely be
concluded that when the court has the power to direct
the investigating agency to conduct further
investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C.in a matter
even after taking cognizance on the final report filed
by the investigating agency before it under Section
173(2) Cr.P.C., either the de facto complainant, who
is aggrieved on account of any lapse committed by
the investigating agency in conducting the
investigation or in not conducting the investigation in
another line to which it ought to have been conducted,
or the Public Prosecutor who notices serious lapse
committed by the investigating agency in not
conducting the investigation properly, can invite the
attention of the court through an application for
satisfying the court in respect of the necessity to
invoke the power of the court under Section 173(8)
Cr.P.C. Even without any such wake up call, the court
on its own can invoke its power under Section 173(8)
Cr.P.C.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Clearly, it is seen from above that the Hon’ble Court
in unambiguous terms noted that even courts can suo motu
exercise power, ‘even without any wakeup call’, where a necessity
of further investigation is felt, in a given case. Here, it is further
pertinent to make reference to the decision in Vinubhai Haribhai
Malaviya v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 17 SCC 1 , wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court unambiguously observed that Section 173(8)
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Cr.P.C. expressly preserves Magistrate’s power to direct further
investigation, even after cognizance, however, prior to framing of
charges. Apposite here to reproduce the relevant extracts from the
said dictate, as under;
“42. There is no good reason given by the Court in
these decisions as to why a Magistrate’s powers to
order further investigation would suddenly cease upon
process being issued, and an accused appearing before
the Magistrate, while concomitantly, the power of
the police to further investigate the offence continues
right till the stage the trial commences. Such a view
would not accord with the earlier judgments of this
Court, in particular, Sakiri [Sakiri Vasu v. State of
U.P., (2008) 2 SCC 409], Samaj Parivartan Samudaya
[Samaj Parivartan Samudaya v. State of Karnataka,
(2012) 7 SCC 407], Vinay Tyagi [Vinay Tyagi v.
Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762], and Hardeep Singh
[Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92];
Hardeep Singh [Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] having
clearly held that a criminal trial does not begin after
cognizance is taken, but only after charges are framed.
What is not given any importance at all in the recent
judgments of this Court is Article 21 of the
Constitution and the fact that the Article demands no
less than a fair and just investigation. To say that a fair
and just investigation would lead to the conclusion
that the police retain the power, subject, of course, to
the Magistrate’s nod under Section 173(8) to further
investigate an offence till charges are framed, but that
the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate
suddenly ceases midway through the pre-trial
proceedings, would amount to a travesty of justice,
as certain cases may cry out for further investigation
so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned as
an accused or that a prima facie guilty person is not so
left out. There is no warrant for such a narrow and
restrictive view of the powers of the Magistrate,
particularly when such powers are traceable to
Section 156(3) read with Section 156(1), Section
2(h) and Section 173(8) CrPC, as has been noticed
hereinabove, and would be available at all stages of
the progress of a criminal case before the trial actually
commences. It would also be in the interest of justice
that this power be exercised suo motu by the
Magistrate himself, depending on the facts of each
case. Whether further investigation should or should
not be ordered is within the discretion of the learned
Magistrate who will exercise such discretion on the
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facts of each case and in accordance with law. If, for
example, fresh facts come to light which would lead
to inculpating or exculpating certain persons,
arriving at the truth and doing substantial justice in a
criminal case are more important than avoiding
further delay being caused in concluding the criminal
proceeding, as was held in Hasanbhai Valibhai
Qureshi [Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of
Gujarat, (2004) 5 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1603].
***”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Germane for the purpose(s) of present discourse to
make reference to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Bikash Ranjan Rout v. State (NCT of Delhi), (Supra.) , where the
Hon’ble Court inter alia noted that where a Magistrate, “… in
exercise of the powers under Section 227 Cr.P.C. discharges the
accused, thereafter, it will not be open for the Magistrate to suo
motu order for further investigation and direct the investigating
officer to submit the report… However, once the learned
Magistrate, on the basis of the report and the materials placed
along with the report, discharges the accused, we are afraid that
thereafter the Magistrate can suo motu order further investigation
by the investigating agency. Once the order of discharge is passed,
thereafter the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to suo motu direct the
investigating officer for further investigation and submit the
report…”. Quite evidently, in the said decision the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, unambiguously noted that once an order of
discharge is passed, Magistrate has no jurisdiction to suo motu
direct investigation/further investigation in a case.
16. Pertinently, it is seen from a conscientious perusal
of the aforesaid decision that the aforesaid findings in Bikash
Ranjan Rout v. State (NCT of Delhi), (Supra.) were inter alia
premised on an understanding that stage of discharge is at post-
cognizance, where, as per the Hon’ble Court, no power to direct
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further investigation can be ordered by a Magistrate. In particular,
it was noted by the Hon’ble Court, “…such an order after
discharging the accused can be said to be made at the post-
cognizance stage. There is a distinction and/or difference between
the pre-cognizance stage and post-cognizance stage and the
powers to be exercised by the Magistrate for further investigation
at the pre-cognizance stage and post-cognizance stage. The power
to order further investigation which may be available to the
Magistrate at the pre-cognizance stage may not be available to the
Magistrate at the post-cognizance stage, more particularly, when
the accused is discharged by him…”. However, as noted herein,
the Hon’ble Apex Court, subsequently, in Vinubhai Haribhai
Malaviya v. State of Gujarat, (Supra.) explicated that such power
to suo motu direct further investigation can be exercised by
Magistrate at any stage, prior to the commencement of trial.
17. Nonetheless, when the aforesaid decisions are read
in conjunction with each other, this Court observes that the law is
now settled that a Magistrate is within his right to suo motu direct
further investigation in a given case, till the stage of
commencement of trial, i.e., till the state of charge-discharge.
However, once an order of discharge is passed, no such suo motu
direction for further investigation, in the considered opinion of this
Court, can be passed in such a case, considering that the law is trite
that Magistrate becomes functus officio6, with respect to the
accused so discharged. Reference in this regard is made to the
decision of the Hon’ble Assam and Nagaland High Court in State
v. Ganga Ram Kalita, 1964 SCC Online Gau 1 , wherein the
Hon’ble Court in an akin situation, while dealing with pari materia
6
Ramesh Ghanshamdas Aswani v. State of Maharashtra, 1990 SCC OnLine Bom 344.
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provisions under Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 inter alia
noted as under;
“4. Under Section 251-A(2) of the CrPC, if, upon
consideration of all the documents referred to in
section 173 and making such examination, if any, of
the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and
after giving the prosecution and the accused an
opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers
the charge against the accused to be groundless, he
shall discharge him. Assuming for the purpose of
this case that the discharge order has been validly
passed, the Magistrate becomes functus officio so far
as the case is concerned, and unless there was a fresh
complaint or a fresh charge-sheet, no action in the
matter could have been taken by the Sub-divisional
Magistrate. As the order passed is an order of
discharge and not one of acquittal, a fresh complaint
could under law have been entertained by the
Magistrate. But, in the absence of any such complaint,
any attempt to go back on the order of discharge
passed by him and to revive the case, as if the accused
had not been discharged, would amount in law to a
review of the judgment of the Magistrate, which is not
permissible having regard to Section 369 of the Cr PC,
which is as follows: ***”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Therefore, with the foregoing understanding, when
the facts of the present case are punctiliously evaluated, it is noted
that under the impugned order, Ld. Trial Court, while discharging
the revisionist of the offences/charges under Sections
420/468/471/120B IPC, directed the concerned SHO to depute a
responsible officer to conduct further investigation, regarding the
role of the revisionist in filing a false complaint and to file
appropriate kalandra under Section 182 IPC against the revisionist,
if required. However, as aforenoted, once an order of revisionist’s
discharge was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, it/Ld. Trial Court
became functus officio qua the revisionist and, in the considered
opinion of this Court, was not competent/bereft of jurisdiction to
pass any direction for further investigation with respect to the
CR No. 498/2025 Anil Arora v. State Page No.26 of 28
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2026.07.08
16:49:55 +0530
revisionist. Needless to further mention that once an order of
discharge was passed, revisionist ceased to be an accused, against
whom no further order, in the considered opinion of this Court,
could have been passed by the Ld. Trial Court. Apposite to further
note here that it is no longer res integra7 that an order of discharge
stands on a higher pedestal in as much as once an order of
discharge is passed, person ceases to be an accused in a given case.
19. Conclusively, in light of the foregoing discussion,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the present petition
deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. As a corollary, the
order dated 30.07.2025/impugned order, passed by Ld. JMFC-03,
Central, Tis Hazari Court in case bearing as; ‘State v. Anil Arora,
Cr. Case 8084/2023′, in a proceeding emanating out of FIR No.
99/2008, PS. IP Estate, in so far as it directs the concerned SHO to
depute a responsible officer to conduct further investigation,
regarding the role of the revisionist in filing a false complaint and
to file appropriate kalandra under Section 182 IPC against the
revisionist, if required, is hereby set aside. Needless to mention
that considering that this Court has refrained to proffering any
opinion/finding on the revisionist’s discharge under Sections
420/468/471/120B IPC under the impugned order, considering
that the present revision petition has been preferred by the
revisionist and no petition by/at the behest of the State or
otherwise, challenging such discharge has been brought to the
attention of this Court.
20. Trial Court Record be sent back to the Ld. Trial Court
along with a copy of this order/judgment.
7
Sudershan Singh Wazir v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC Online SC 461.
CR No. 498/2025 Anil Arora v. State Page No.27 of 28
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2026.07.08
16:49:59 +0530
21. Revision file be consigned to record room after due
compliance.
Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2026.07.08 16:50:02 +0530 Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 08.07.2026. ASJ-03, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
CR No. 498/2025 Anil Arora v. State Page No.28 of 28
