Karnataka High Court
Smt. Narayanamma vs The State Of Karnataka on 8 July, 2026
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WP No. 17588 of 2024
C/W WA No. 200260 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 8TH DAY OF JULY, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA
WRIT PETITION NO. 17588 OF 2024 (GM-RES)
C/W WRIT APPEAL NO. 200260 OF 2025 (GM-RES)
IN WP No. 17588/2024
BETWEEN:
1. SMT. NARAYANAMMA
W/O. S. GOPALAIAH
D/O. LATE D. RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS
R/AT ITTASANDRA VILLAGE
NANDAGUDI HOBLI
HOSKOTE TALUK
BENGALURU RURAL - 562 122
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI K.N. PHANINDRA, SENIOR ADVOCATE,
SRI VIVEK REDDY, SENIOR ADVOCATE,
SRI D.R. RAVISHANKAR, SENIOR ADVOCATE &
Digitally SRI ROHITH R. KUMAR, ADVOCATE)
signed by
VEERENDRA
KUMAR K M
AND:
Location:
High Court of 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
Karnataka THROUGH ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS
AND LEGISLATION, VIDHANA SOUDHA
BANGALORE - 560 001
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI KIRAN V. RON, AAG A/W MS. NILOUFER AKBAR, AGA)
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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DECLARE THE
NOTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
DTD. 19.06.2024 FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2023 PUBLISHED IN THE PART IVA OF
KARNATAKA SPECIAL STATE GAZETTE DTD. 19.06.2024 AT NO. 292
AND NOTIFIED AT No.DPAL 46 SHASANA 2023, BENGALURU DTD
19.06.2023 VIDE ANNEXURE-A AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ULTRA
VIRES TO ARTICLE 14 & ETC.
IN WA NO. 200260/2025
BETWEEN:
1. BABU RAO
S/O SAIBANNA
OCC: AGRI & BUSINESS AND SOCIAL SERVICE
R/O H.NO.1-8-75, BRAMANWADI STATION ROAD
RAICHUR - 584 101
2. GURULINGAPPA
S/O NEELKANTHARAO B. PATIL
R/O KOKANALLI VILLAGE,
SEDAM TALUK, KALABURAGI DISTRICT
(AMENDED AS PER ORDER DATED 30-10-2025)
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI AMEETKUMAR DESHPANDE, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI AMEET J. HATTI., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS AND
LEGISLATION, VIDHANA SOUDHA, BENGALURU
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI KIRAN V. RON, AAG A/W MS. NILOUFER AKBAR, AGA)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO ALLOW PRESENT
APPEAL AND MODIFY THE FINAL ORDER DATED: 24.09.2025
PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF HIGH COURT OF
KARNATAKA, KALABURAGI BENCH, IN W.P.NO 201536/2024
(GM-RES) TO THE EXTENT OF HOLDING THE IMPUGNED
AMENDMENT i.e THE KARNATAKA CIVIL COURTS (AMENDMENT)
ACT, 2023 (ACT NO.33 OF 2024) AND THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
(AMENDMENT) ACT, 2023 (ACT NO. 32 OF 2024) PUBLISHED IN
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PART IVA OF KARNATAKA STATE SPECIAL GAZETTE DATED 19TH
JUNE 2024 AT NO. 291 AND NO.292 RESPECTIVELY ARE ULTRA-
VIRUS THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA AND CONSEQUENTLY ARE
VOID AND INEFFECTIVE.
THIS WRIT PETITION & WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD
AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS PRONOUNCED AS
UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA
C.A.V. JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE)
INDEX
PREFATORY FACTS ...................................................................................... 4
THE IMPUGNED LEGISLATIONS................................................................... 7
SUBMISSIONS: ..............................................................................................11
I. ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS AND THE PETITIONER ..................................11
II. ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE ....................................................20
REASONS AND CONCLUSION .....................................................................23
I. RE: SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE ..................23
II. RE: LACK OF CONSULTATION .......................................................................29
III. RATIONALE FOR ENACTING THE IMPUGNED LEGISLATION .............................30
IV. LEGISLATIVE WISDOM NOT AMENABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW ..........................34
V. RE: RETROSPECTIVITY ...............................................................................38
VI. FORUM OF APPEAL - A MATTER OF PROCEDURAL LAW ...............................40
VII. EXPRESS RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION - SECTION 4 OF THE CIVIL COURTS
AMENDMENT ACT ...................................................................................48
VIII. RULE OF PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION ....................................................49
IX. RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF SECTION 4 EXCLUDES PRIOR PROCEEDINGS66
X. RE: DOCTRINE OF READING DOWN .............................................................77
XI. RE: DISCRIMINATION .................................................................................85
XII. RE: ORDER DATED 24.06.2024 ................................................................86
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................86
*************
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1. The Appellants have filed the present appeal
(W.A.No.200260/2025) impugning the judgment dated 24.09.2025
[‘impugned order’] passed by the learned Single Judge of this
Court in W.P.No.201536/2024 (GM-RES). Appellant No.2 is
similarly aggrieved. His appeal, RFA No.200009/2025, arising from
the judgment and decree dated 27.09.2024 passed by the learned
Senior Civil Judge & JMFC, Sedam in O.S.No.49/2018, is stated to
be pending before the Kalaburagi Bench of this Court. He was
impleaded in the present appeal by an order dated 30.10.2025.
2. The Appellants and Writ Petitioner have filed their respective
appeal and petition, inter alia, praying that the Karnataka Civil
Courts (Amendment) Act, 2023 [‘Civil Courts Amendment Act‘]
and the Karnataka High Court (Amendment) Act, 2023 [‘High Court
Amendment Act’] be declared as ultra vires the Constitution of
India. The Civil Courts Amendment Act and the High Court
Amendment Act are collectively referred to as ‘the impugned
legislations’.
PREFATORY FACTS
3. The Appellant No.1’s writ petition, W.P.No.201536/2024, was
filed in the context of the Appellant No.1 being relegated to agitate
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his appeal before the competent District Court. The Appellant No.1
had filed a suit, being O.S.No.98/2016, before the II Additional
Senior Civil Judge, Raichur, which was dismissed by a judgment
and decree dated 23.04.2021 passed by the II Additional Senior
Civil Judge & JMFC, Raichur. Appellant No.1 preferred an appeal
against the said judgment and decree (which was numbered as
RFA No.200060/2021). The Defendants in the suit had also filed a
cross-appeal (numbered as RFA CROB. No.200005/2022). These
appeals were pending before the Kalaburagi Bench of this Court
when the impugned legislations were published on 19.06.2024
resulting in Appellant No.1 filing W.P.No.201536/2024 on
22.06.2024 before a Single Judge of this Court.
4. The Civil Courts Amendment Act and the High Court
Amendment Act were published in the Karnataka Gazette
(Extraordinary) on 19.06.2024. By virtue of the said amendments,
the appeals pending before the High Court (RFA No.200060/2021
and RFA CROB. No.200005/2022) would be transferred to the
competent District Court.
5. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge partly
allowed the said petition. Whilst the learned Single Judge upheld the
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constitutional validity of the impugned legislations, the retrospective
effect given to the amendments to the Karnataka Civil Courts Act,
1964 [‘the 1964 Act’] with effect from 28.08.2007 was set aside and
the said amendments were held to operate prospectively. The
learned Single Judge further held that the judgments rendered
under the unamended provisions would remain valid and the
impugned legislations would not affect such proceedings that were
already concluded. However, the pending Regular First Appeals
were directed to be transferred to the competent appellate courts in
accordance with the impugned legislations.
6. The Writ Petitioner in W.P.No.17588/2024 (GM-RES) also
seeks to impugn the impugned legislations as being ultra vires
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is relevant to note that by an
order dated 03.07.2024 passed in W.P.No.17588/2024, the
operation and implementation of the impugned legislations was
stayed.
7. The controversy in W.P.No.17588/2024 (GM-RES), is
covered by the judgment dated 24.09.2025, which is impugned in
W.A.No.200260/2025. However, another learned Single Judge of
this Court, by an order dated 19.11.2025, while examining the
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challenge in W.P.No.17588/2024, expressed reservations as to the
correctness of the Co-ordinate Bench’s decision in
W.P.No.201536/2024, formulated points for reference to a Larger
Bench and referred the matter for posting before a Larger Bench.
Accordingly, the said writ petition came to be tagged along with
W.A.No.200260/2025.
THE IMPUGNED LEGISLATIONS
8. A tabular statement setting out Sections 17 and 19 of the
1964 Act, as they stood prior to the amendment, and the
corresponding amendments introduced by the Civil Courts
Amendment Act, is set out below:
THE KARNATAKA CIVIL COURTS ACT 1964
Section Pre Amendment Post Amendment
17 Jurisdiction of Court of a Civil In section 17 of the Karnataka Civil
Judge– Courts Act, 1964 (Karnataka Act 21 of
1964) (hereinafter referred to as the
The jurisdiction of Court of a Civil Principal Act), for the words, “five lakh
Judge shall extend to all original rupees” the words “fifteen lakh rupees”
suits and proceedings of a civil shall be substituted.
nature, not otherwise excluded
from the Civil Judge jurisdiction,
of which the amount or value of
the subject-matter does not
exceed five lakh rupees.
19 Appeals from Senior Civil For section 19 of the Principal Act, the
Judge– following shall be substituted, namely,-
Appeals from the decrees and
orders passed by a Senior Civil
Judge in original suits and “19. Appeals from Senior Civil Judge.-
proceedings of a civil nature, Appeals from the decrees and orders
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allowed by law, lie,– original suits and proceedings of a civil
nature, shall, when such appeals are
(1) to the District Court, when the allowed by law, lie to the District Court.”
amount or value of the subject-
matter of the original suit or
proceeding does not exceed ten
lakh rupees.
(2) to the High Court, in other
cases.
9. It is also relevant to refer to Section 4 of the Civil Courts
Amendment Act, which reads as under:
4. Power to remove difficulty. All amendments
made to the Karnataka Civil Courts Act, 1964
(Karnataka Act 21 of 1964), by this amendment Act
shall come into force retrospectively with effect
from 28.08.2007. If any difficulty arises in giving
effect to the provisions of the Karnataka Civil
Courts Act, 1964, as amended by this Act, the
State Government may, as occasion arises, by an
order published in the Official Gazette, do anything,
not inconsistent with the provisions of the
Karnataka Civil Courts Act, 1964 amended by this
Act, which appears to it to be necessary or
expedient for the purpose of removing the difficulty:
Provided that, no such order shall be made
after the expiry of a period of two years from the
date of commencement of this Act.”
10. By virtue of the Karnataka High Court (Amendment) Act,
2023, Sections 2 and 5 of the Principal Act (The Karnataka High
Court Act, 1961) [‘the 1961 Act’] were amended. The said sections,
as they stood prior to and post amendment, are set out in the
following tabular statement:
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THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT
Section Pre Amendment Post Amendment
2 Definitions.–In this Act,– In section 2 of the Karnataka
High Court Act, 1961
(1) “Chief Justice” means the Chief Justice (Karnataka Act 05 of 1962)
of the High Court of the State of Karnataka; (herein after referred to as the
Principal Act),-
(2) “Criminal Appeal” means an appeal
which, under any law for the time being in (i) for sub-section (3), the
force, lies to the High Court from an order following shall be substituted,
or sentence passed by a subordinate namely,-
criminal court in the exercise of its original
criminal jurisdiction; “(3) “First Appeal” means an
appeal which, under any law
(3) “First Appeal” means an appeal which, for the time being in force, lies
under any law for the time being in force, to the High Court, from a
lies to the High Court, from a judgment, Judgment, Decree or an Order
decree or order, made by a subordinate made by a City Civil Judge in
civil court in the exercise of its original civil the exercise of Original
jurisdiction; Jurisdiction including any
orders appealable under
(4) “Full Bench” means a Bench consisting
Section 104 of the Code of
of not less than three Judges of the High
Civil Procedure (CPC) by a
Court;
subordinate Civil Court.”
(5) “High Court” means the High Court of
(ii) for sub-section (6), the
the State of Karnataka;
following shall be substituted,
(6) “Second Appeal” means an appeal namely,-
which, under any law for the time being in
“(6) “Second Appeal” means
force, lies to the High Court from a
an appeal which, under any
judgment, decree or order passed by a
law for the time being in force,
subordinate civil court in the exercise of its
lies to the High Court, from a
appellate civil jurisdiction.
Judgment, Decree or an Order
made by a Senior Civil Judge
or District Judge in the
exercise of Appellate
Jurisdiction."
5 First appeals.--Save as otherwise In section 5 of the Principal
provided in this Act,-- Act, for clause (i), the following
shall be substituted, namely,-
(i) all First Appeals against a decree or
order passed in a suit or other “(i) All First Appeals shall be
proceedings, the value of subject matter of heard by a Single Judge of the
which exceeds fifteen lakh rupees shall High Court.”
be heard by a Bench consisting of not less
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than two Judges of the High Court and
other First Appeals shall be heard by a
Single Judge of the High Court. (ii)all
Criminal Appeals against Judgments in
which sentence of death or imprisonment
for life is passed and against Judgements
of acquittal in cases in which offences are
punishable with death or imprisonment for
life shall be heard by a Bench consisting of
not less than two Judges of the High Court
and other Criminal Appeals shall be heard
by a Single Judge of the High Court.
11. It is also relevant to refer to Section 4 of the High Court
Amendment Act. The same is reproduced below:
“4. Power to Remove Difficulty.- If any difficulty
arises in giving effect to the provisions of the
Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, as amended by
this Act, the State Government may, as occasion
arises, by an order published in the Official
Gazette, do anything, not inconsistent with the
provisions of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961,
amended by this Act, which appears to it to be
necessary or expedient for the purpose of removing
the difficulty:
Provided that, no such order shall be made after
the expiry of a period of two years from the date of
commencement of this Act.”
12. The effect of the amendments to the 1964 Act has been
summarised in the impugned order as under:
“i. All appeals from the decrees and orders of
Senior Civil Judges will now lie to District Court
without any pecuniary limits.
ii. This removes the earlier distinction where appeal
from suits valued above Rs.10,00,000/- had to be
filed in the High Court.
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iii. The amendment is given retrospective effect
from 28.08.2007.”
13. The import of the amendments to the 1961 Act is has been
observed by the impugned order as under:
“i. First Appeal to the High Court will now mean
only those appeals arising from the judgment and
decree passed by City Civil Judges and excludes
the judgment and decree passed from Senior Civil
Judges in Districts.
ii. All First Appeals to High Court shall now be
heard by a Single Judge, irrespective of the
pecuniary limits.”
14. It is in the aforesaid background that we have heard the
learned counsel for the parties.
SUBMISSIONS:
I. On behalf of the Appellants and the Petitioner
15. Mr. K.N. Phanindra, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Vivek
Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, advanced arguments on behalf of
the writ Petitioner while Mr. Ameetkumar Deshpande, learned
Senior Counsel, advanced arguments on behalf of the Appellants.
They contended that the impugned legislations violate Article 14 of
the Constitution of India as they are manifestly arbitrary. It is also
contended that the impugned amendment to the 1964 Act is
manifestly arbitrary as it divests the High Court of its jurisdiction to
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entertain Regular First Appeals and confers the same on the
competent District Courts with retrospective effect. They pointed out
that the impugned legislations do not have any saving clause and
therefore, the import of the said enactments would render all the
Regular First Appeals decided by the High Court from 28.08.2007
as without jurisdiction. They state that this rendered the impugned
legislations manifestly arbitrary and therefore, the same are liable to
be set aside.
16. It is also contended that although the State Government had
issued an order dated 24.06.2024 purportedly in exercise of powers
under Section 4 of the Civil Courts Amendment Act, clarifying that
the amended provisions would be operative prospectively with effect
from 19.06.2024, the same was without jurisdiction as the State
Government has no power to amend a legislative enactment by any
executive or administrative order.
17. Next, they contended that the impugned enactments would
not address the issue of expeditious disposal of Regular First
Appeals pending before this Court. The only effect would be to
overburden the District Judiciary (Karnataka Higher Judicial
Service). It was further submitted that the impugned legislations
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were made without any consultation with the High Court on the
administrative side and, therefore, the impugned legislations are
liable to be set aside.
18. The learned Counsel referred to Section 13 of the 1964 Act,
which requires the State Government to consult the High Court for
any change in the local limits of jurisdiction of any District Court or a
Court of any Civil Judge. It is contended that similar consultation
would also be required for changing the appellate jurisdiction or for
varying the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Courts. They also submitted
that the failure to engage in prior consultation strikes at the
foundation of constitutional governance and, therefore, the
impugned legislations must be struck down as violative of the
Constitution of India.
19. Mr. Vivek Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
writ Petitioner, contended that the right of an appeal is vested with
the parties on the institution of the suit or, if not, on the date of filing
the appeal. He referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in
Shyam Sunder and Others v. Ram Kumar and Another1 in
support of his contention that an appeal is the continuation of the
1
(2001) 8 SCC 24
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suit and that any statutory amendment that amends substantive
rights during the pendency of the suit would not affect the vested
rights of the parties. He referred to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Neena Aneja and Another v. Jai Prakash Associates
Limited2 and submitted that the change in jurisdiction during the
pendency of the proceedings would not affect the pending
proceedings. He also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court
in National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of
India and Another v. Union of India and Others3 and drew
attention to paragraph 15 of the said decision which reads as under:
“The Legislative power either to introduce
enactments for the first time or to amend the
enacted law with retrospective effect, is not only
subject to the question of competence but is also
subject to several judicially recognized limitations
with some of which we are at present concerned.
The first is the requirement that the words used
must expressly provide or clearly imply
retrospective operation. The second is that the
retrospectivity must be reasonable and not
excessive or harsh, otherwise it runs the risk of
being struck down as unconstitutional. The third is
apposite where the legislation is introduced to
overcome a judicial decision. Here the power
cannot be used to subvert the decision without
removing the statutory basis of the decision.”
20. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that retrospective
application of the impugned legislations is harsh and onerous. And,
2
(2022) 2 SCC 161
3
(2003) 5 SCC 23
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on the strength of the aforesaid decisions, contended that the
impugned legislations, to the extent that they are implemented with
retrospective effect, are liable to be struck down.
21. Mr. Phanindra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ
Petitioner referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in
Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Classic Credit
Limited4 and contended that a change in forum would cease to be a
matter of procedural law in the context of pending appeals;
therefore, retrospective operation of the impugned legislations
would deprive the litigants of their vested rights.
22. He submitted that not only the right to appeal, but also the
right to pursue an appeal before the given forum, is a vested right.
And, any change in the forum with retrospective effect would affect
vested rights. He earnestly contended that, in view of the aforesaid,
the impugned legislations are liable to be struck down.
23. We also consider it apposite to set out the submissions of Mr.
S.M. Chandrashekar, learned Senior Counsel, who was appointed
as Amicus Curiae by an order dated 18.07.2024, as encapsulated in
the order dated 19.11.2025. The same are set out below:
4
(2018) 13 SCC 1
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“7. Learned Amicus Curiae, would submit that the
impugned Legislation is arbitrary, illegal and
illogical and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. He would elaborate his
submissions as under:
a) The judgment of the co-ordinate Bench of this
Court in W.P.No.201536/2024, the co-ordinate
Bench has not assigned valid or cogent reasons for
the purpose of upholding the impugned
amendments. It was also pointed out that having
come to the conclusion that the subsequent order
dated 24.06.2024 purporting to exercise the powers
of removal of difficulties was illegal, the co-ordinate
Bench would not have given prospective effect by
setting aside the retrospective effect of the said
provision which is tantamounts to legislating which
is impermissible in law.
b) The amendments by way of substitution, if
construed as being retrospective, all judgments
rendered by courts prior to the amendments would
be rendered void and in the absence of a saving
clause / provision, the impugned Amendments
were impractical and deserves to be quashed.
c) If the amendments were upheld, the same would
result in carving out two categories of appeals
under Section 96 CPC i.e., appeals arising from
Senior Civil Judges would lie to the respective
District Courts while appeals arising from decrees
passed by the City Civil Court, Bangalore, would lie
to the High Court, that too only at the Bangalore
Bench which amounts to discrimination and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
d) Merely because the respondents – State
admitted before the Co-ordinate Bench that they
had committed a mistake, it was not permissible in
law for the courts to correct the mistakes, albeit
admitted by the respondents.
e) The impugned Amendments are manifestly
arbitrary and do not sub-serve the object to be
achieved, particularly when before ousting the
jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with First
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Appeals arising out of decrees of the Senior Civil
Judge, the important consultation procedure has
been deviated from inasmuch as there has not
been effective consultation with the High Court on
the administrative side on an important jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court thereby affecting the
principle of independence of judiciary which is now
recognised as a basic feature of the Constitution of
India.
f) It was therefore submitted that since the issues
involved in the present petition would affect larger
public interest, the matter may be referred to a
Larger Bench of this Court for consideration.
8. Similarly, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner would assail the impugned Amendments
and make the following submissions:-
(i) That the amendment brought about to the City
Civil Courts Act under the impugned Amendment
Act by giving it retrospective effect from
28/08/2007, is totally arbitrary in nature and takes
away the vested right of the petitioner and other
similarly situate litigants in prosecuting their appeal
/ right of legal remedy and is hence liable to be set
aside. Judicial Review will extend to scrutinizing
whether the law is manifestly arbitrary in its
encroachment of fundamental liberties. The
concept of vested right is not confined to a property
right. A right of action, should conditions otherwise
exists, can also be a vested right.
(ii) That the impugned Karnataka City Civil Courts
Amendment Act, 2023 is discriminatory in nature
and offends Article 14 of the Constitution in that
while First Appeals under Sec.96 of CPC provided
directly to the Karnataka High Court from those
Judgments and decrees passed in Bengaluru
Urban (in view of Bangalore City Civil Courts Act,
1979), the First Appeals, irrespective of pecuniary
value, in respect of the remaining Urban & Rural
Areas in Karnataka State, are provided to District
Judges which is not a case of reasonable
classification and hence the amendment is liable to
be set aside.
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(iii) The law enacted by the Legislature may
apparently seem to be within its competence but
yet in substance, it is an attempt to interfere with
the judicial process and hence, the impugned
amendments are liable to be invalidated.
(iv) Manifest Arbitrariness is a ground to invalidate
a Legislation as being violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. The principle of
reasonableness is an essential element of equality
or non-arbitrariness.
(v) Every human being is entitled to arrange his
affairs by relying on existing law and should not find
that his plans have been retrospectively upset. The
principle of fairness is basis of the principle against
retrospectively.
(vi) It is a well settled principle of interpretation of
Statutes that ‘Substitution’ always has to be
understood as an existing one in the parent Act.
When a Section or a Statute is amended, the
original ceases to exist and new Section
supersedes it and becomes a part of the law just as
if the amendment had always been there.
(vii) If substitution provision contains substantive
provisions, it cannot be retrospective in nature.
Nature of Amendment to be seen to determine if
amendment is procedural or substantial.
(viii) The reading of the impugned Amendments
would clearly reveal that there is no Saving Clause
provided in the send Amendments. Thus, not only
pending Regular First Appeals shall stand
transferred to the District Courts but the Impugned
Amendments would also render the judgments
already passed in Regular First Appeals as being
void and without jurisdiction since the impugned
amendments have been declared to have come
into effect from 28.08.2007.
(ix) The co-ordinate Bench has rendered the Final
Order dated 24.09.2025 in W.P.No.201536/2024
and has upheld the validity of the impugned
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Amendment Acts. The co-ordinate Bench has set
aside the retrospective effect given to amendment
from 28/08/2007 to the Karnataka Civil Courts Act
and declared that the amendment shall be given
prospective effect; declared as ‘Invalid’ the
Notification dated 24/06/2024 issued by the State
Government (Removal of Difficulties), giving
prospective effect to the impugned Amendment by
holding that the same amounts to amendment to
Statute and is impermissible; directed that pending
First Appeals shall be transfer the jurisdictional
Court as per the impugned Amendment Act;
declared that all judgments rendered under un
amended provisions shall be saved and acted
upon. ”
24. It is also noted that the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner had relied on the following decisions in support of his
submissions; Manish Kumar v. Union of India5; Secretary to
Government of Kerala v. James Varghese6; Association for
Democratic Reforms v. Union of India7; Natural Resources
Allocation in Special Reference No.1 of 20128; Andhra Pradesh
Dairy Development Corporation Federation v. B. Narasimha
Reddy9; CIT v. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd.10; Sangappa v. State of
Karnataka11;Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects
5
(2021) 5 SCC 1
6
(2022) 9 SCC 593
7
(2024) 5 SCC 1
8
(2012) 10 SCC 1
9
(2011) 9 SCC 286
10
(2015) 1 SCC 1
11
ILR 2002 KAR 3603
– 20 –
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Pvt. Ltd.12; Child in Conflict with Law v. State of Karnataka13 and
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Subhash Chandra Jaiswal14.
II. On behalf of the Respondent-State
25. Mr. Kiran V. Ron, learned Additional Advocate General
advanced submissions on behalf of the State. He contended that
the impugned legislations were enacted pursuant to the
observations made by this Court in Smt Thirakavva and another v.
Smt Ratnavva and others15. He contended that this court had
noted the alarming pendency of the Regular First Appeals and had
suggested certain changes, including that the first appeals be heard
and adjudicated by the competent district courts. He submitted that
a copy of the said judgment was forwarded to the Chief Secretary of
the State Government and the Principal Secretary, Department of
Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Karnataka.
Thereafter, an opinion was sought from the Karnataka Law
Commission. The Karnataka Law Commission concurred with the
court’s suggestions in Smt Thirakavva (supra) and, based on the
said opinion, the bills for enacting the impugned legislations were
12
(2023) 1 SCC 355
13
(2024) 8 SCC 473
14
(2017) 5 SCC 163
15
2023 SCC OnLine Kar 15
– 21 –
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introduced before the State Legislature. He contended that the
object of the legislation was to provide “Justice at the doorstep”. He
also referred to the legislative history regarding increase in the
pecuniary value. He pointed out that Section 4 of the Civil Courts
Amendment Act expressly provided that the amendments would
come into force retrospectively with effect from 28.08.2007 to
harmonise with the text of Section 5 of the Amendment Act 26 of
2007 which expressly provided that pending cases as on
28.08.2007 would not be affected by the Amendment Act 26 of
2007.
26. Next, he contended that there was a presumption as to the
constitutional validity and reasonableness, and unless it was
established that the impugned legislations were beyond the
legislative competence or violated the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India, the impugned
legislations could not be set aside. He referred to the decisions of
the Supreme Court in Karnataka Bank Ltd. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh16; Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving
Co. Ltd.17; Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan and another
16
(2008) 2 SCC 254
17
(2001) 4 SCC 139
– 22 –
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v. Union of India and others18; Seth Nand Lal and another v.
State of Haryana and others19; Murthy Match Works v.
Assistant Collector of Central Excise20; and Hari Prasad
Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju21.
27. Next, he contended that enacting a law with retrospective
effect does not, by itself, infringe the fundamental rights. He
submitted that there was no vested right in the forum of an appeal.
He contended that while the right of an appeal is a matter of a
substantive law, the forum of appeal is a part of procedural law and,
therefore, it is presumed that the same would be applicable
retrospectively.
28. He contended that Section 4 of the Civil Courts Amendment
Act ought not to be interpreted to mean that all concluded
proceedings would become null and void in the absence of any
savings clause. He referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in
Union of India v. Hansoli Devi22 and British Airways PLC v.
Union Of India23 as well as the decision of the Constitution Bench
18
1959 SCC OnLine SC 38
19
1980 Supp SCC 574
20
(1974) 4 SCC 428
21
(1974) 3 SCC 415
22
(2002) 7 SCC 273
23
2002 (2) SCC 95
– 23 –
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of the Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of
Bihar and others24 in support of his contentions. He submitted that
even if it is held that there is anomaly in the impugned legislations
which have the effect of nullifying a final and concluded proceedings
by another court, the Court is not powerless to correct the obvious
error as it is not the legislative intent to reopen the proceedings that
have been finally concluded. He submitted that the impugned
legislations are applicable retrospectively only to pending
proceedings.
REASONS AND CONCLUSION
I. Re: Scope of Judicial Review and Legislative
Competence
29. It is well settled that the constitutional validity of a legislative
enactment can be challenged only on limited grounds. First, that it
lacks legislative competence; and second, that it violates the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution of
India or falls foul of any other provision of the Constitution of India.
The legislation cannot be struck down merely because the court
does not concur with the wisdom of enacting it or doubts its efficacy.
24
AIR 1955 SC 661 (7J)
– 24 –
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It is equally impermissible for the court to test the validity of the
legislation on the ground that there may be measures which would
perceivably better serve the object of the legislation.
30. In State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co.25, the Supreme Court
observed that:
” the power of Parliament or for that matter, the
State Legislatures is restricted in two ways. A law
made by Parliament or the legislature can be
struck down by courts on two grounds and two
grounds alone, viz., (1) lack of legislative
competence and (2) violation of any of the
fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the
Constitution or of any other constitutional
provision. There is no third ground. It is enough for
us to say that by whatever name it is
characterised, the ground of invalidation must fall
within the four corners of the two grounds
mentioned above. In other words, say, if an
enactment is challenged as violative of Article 14,
it can be struck down only if it is found that it is
violative of the equality clause/equal protection
clause enshrined therein. Similarly, if an
enactment is challenged as violative of any of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by sub-clauses (a)
to (g) of Article 19(1), it can be struck down only if
it is found not saved by any of the clauses (2) to
(6) of Article 19 and so on.”
31. The Supreme Court also held that “no enactment can be
struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary”. However, in a later
25
(1996) 3 SCC 709
– 25 –
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decision in Shayara Bano v. Union of India26, the Supreme Court
did not concur with the said view, as it found that the view
disregarded earlier binding precedents. The court held that
legislation could be struck down if it was manifestly arbitrary. We
consider it apposite to refer to the following passage from the
opinion authored by Justice R.F. Nariman :
“101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of
this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay)
(P) Ltd. v. Union of India [Indian Express
Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India,
(1985) 1 SCC 641: 1985 SCC (Tax) 121] stated
that it was settled law that subordinate legislation
can be challenged on any of the grounds available
for challenge against plenary legislation. This being
the case, there is no rational distinction between
the two types of legislation when it comes to this
ground of challenge under Article 14. The test of
manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in
the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate
legislation as well as subordinate legislation under
Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must
be something done by the legislature capriciously,
irrationally and/or without adequate determining
principle. Also, when something is done which is
excessive and disproportionate, such legislation
would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of
the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest
arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would
apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.”
32. There is no cavil that the State Legislature has the
competence to enact the impugned legislations. The extent of the
legislative competence of the State to enact laws affecting
26
(2017) 9 SCC 1
– 26 –
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jurisdiction of the courts, fell for consideration of the Constitution
Bench of the Supreme Court in Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of
Maharashtra and Others27 in the context of a challenge to the
validity of the Bombay City Civil Court and Bombay Court of Small
Causes (Enhancement of Pecuniary Jurisdiction and Amendment)
Act, 1986 [‘the 1987 Act’] and the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing
of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent
Appeals) Act, 1986 [‘the 1986 Act’], and also the decision of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court striking down the Madhya Pradesh
Uchcha Nyayalaya (Letters Patent Appeals Samapti) Adhiniyam,
1981, whereby the said Acts abolishing the Letters Patent Appeal
were declared as invalid. The Supreme Court referred to the
relevant entries in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India
and rejected the contention that Parliament alone had exclusive
competence to invest the High Court with general jurisdiction
referable to the Constitution and the organisation of the High Court.
The Supreme Court also referred to a decision of the Division Bench
of the Mysore High Court in Shivarudrappa Girimallappa Saboji
and another v. Kapurchand Meghaji Marwadi and Others28, and
noted that in the said decision, the High Court had, inter alia,
27
(2005) 2 SCC 591
28
AIR 1965 Mys 76
– 27 –
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observed that “it is for the legislature of the State to define the
frontiers of the power or jurisdiction exercisable by its High Court.”
33. The Supreme Court also referred to various earlier decisions
and held as under:
“72. In the light of the various decisions referred to
above, the position is clear that the expression
“administration of justice” has wide amplitude
covering conferment of general jurisdiction on all
courts including High Court except the Supreme
Court under Entry 11-A of List III. It may be also
noticed that some of the decisions rendered dealing
with Entry 3 of List II prior to 3-1-1977 touching
“administration of justice” support the view that
conferment of general jurisdiction is covered under
the topic “administration of justice”. After 3-1-1977
a part of Entry 3 namely “administration of justice”
is shifted to List III under Entry 11-A. This only
shows that the topic “administration of justice” can
now be legislated both by the Union as well as the
State Legislatures. As long as there is no Union
legislation touching the same topic, and there is no
inconsistency between the Central legislation and
State legislation on this topic, it cannot be said that
the State Legislature had no competence to pass
the 1987 Act and the 1986 Act.
73. It may be added that the State Legislature was
also competent to enact the 1987 Act under Entry
13 read with Entry 46 of List III. Entry 13 of List III
relates to the Civil Procedure Code. The jurisdiction
of civil court, particularly pecuniary jurisdiction of
civil courts, was specially (sic specifically) covered
by the Civil Procedure code on the date of
commencement of the Constitution. Entry 46 of List
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III relates to jurisdiction and power of all courts
except the Supreme Court i.e. including the City
Civil Court and High Court with respect to any
matter in List III including the Civil Procedure Code
in Entry 13. The contention that merely constituting
and organising High Courts without conferring
jurisdiction to deal with the matters on them does
not serve any purpose, cannot be accepted. The
Constitution itself has conferred jurisdiction on High
Courts, for instance, b under Articles 226 and 227.
This apart, under various enactments, both Central
and State, certain jurisdiction is conferred on High
Courts. The High Courts have power and
jurisdiction to deal with such matters as are
conferred by the Constitution and other statutes.
This power of “administration of justice” has been
included in the Concurrent List after 3-1-1977
possibly to enable both the Centre as well as the
States to confer jurisdiction on High Courts under
various enactments passed by the Centre or the
State to meet the needs of the respective States in
relation to specific subjects. Thus, viewed from any
angle, it is not possible to agree that the 1987 Act
and the 1986 Act are beyond the competence of
the State Legislature.
74. We are, therefore, of the view that there is no
merit in the contention that the State Legislature did
not have competence to enact the two legislations,
the constitutionality of which has been challenged
before us.”
34. As noted hereinbefore, there is no serious challenge to the
competence of the State Legislature to enact the impugned
legislations. An oblique challenge is, however, raised on the ground
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that the enactment of the impugned legislations is vitiated for want
of prior consultation with the High Court.
II. Re: Lack of consultation
35. As noted above, one of the contentions as recorded in the
order dated 19.11.202529, which the learned Single Judge found
persuasive, was that the impugned legislations had been enacted
without consultation with the High Court. The learned Single Judge
referred to Section 13 of the 1964 Act, which requires the State
Government, in consultation with the High Court, to fix, and from
time to time vary, the local limits of the jurisdiction of any District
Court or Court of a Civil Judge. It is argued that the rationale
underlying Section 13 of the 1964 Act would compel the State
Legislature to consult the High Court in regard to any legislation
regarding the pecuniary jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction of the
Courts within the State.
36. Undeniably, it would be apposite to hold a wider consultation,
including with the High Court, in respect of any legislation that
affects the administration of justice in the State. However, it is
difficult to accept that the absence of such a consultation would
29
Order dated 19.11.2025 in W.P No.17588/2024 (GM-RES)
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vitiate the enactment. There is no express constitutional or statutory
requirement of prior consultation with the High Court for enacting
the impugned legislations.
37. In view of the above, and as the question of whether the State
Legislature had the legislative competence to enact the impugned
legislations is, as noticed earlier, beyond the pale of controversy
and the said issue is fully covered by the decision of the Constitution
Bench of the Supreme Court as referred above. It is also relevant to
bear in mind the reasons for the enactment of the impugned
legislation.
III. Rationale for Enacting the Impugned Legislations
38. The suggestion to confer jurisdiction to hear First Appeals on
the competent District Courts originated from the decision of this
Court in Smt. Thirakavva (supra). The Court had noted that there
were a large number of First Appeals pending in this Court and had
observed as under:
“If the jurisdiction to deal with First appeal under
Section 96 arising from the judgment and decree in
suits from Senior Civil Judges is conferred on the
District Judges, it will serve the following objectives:
The First Appeals will nearer to the parties to the
lis, which is the primary goal of the concept of
‘Justice to doorstep’.
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More courts (nearly 200 courts, excluding Judges
officiating in City Civil Courts and OOD) will be
available to decide Regular Appeals and those
courts comparatively have less number of cases to
deal with, compared to the pendency in High
courts.
The workload on the High Court gets reduced and
the High Court can focus its attention on the
matters which exclusively fall within the jurisdiction
of the High Court.
The statistics would also reveal a good number of
additional district courts have been established at
the district level and taluka level, and the number of
pending Regular Appeals under Section 96 of the
Code is also quite low or moderate and they will be
better equipped to absorb more appeals under
Section 96 of the Code.
All parties to the original suits will have an
opportunity to file a regular second appeal on a
question of law which is now denied to the parties
to the suit whose value of the suit is more than 10
lakhs. The unintended anomaly gets obliterated.
More Courts/judges at the district level adjudicating
the appeals will ensure speedy and cost-effective
justice for the parties. The existing Section 5 of the
Act of 1961 and Section 19 of the Act of 1964 stand
as a big obstacle to the concept of justice at the
doorstep. The concept of ‘justice at the doorstep’
flows from Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India and the same is not an empty formality. The
amendment to Section 5 of the Act of 1964 and
Section 19 of Act of 1961 conferring jurisdiction on
the District courts to decide all appeals under
Section 96 of the Code, from the decree passed in
Senior Civil Judges’ court, likely to be a significant
step forward in achieving the noble object of
speedy and cost-effective justice at the doorstep.
27. Though the above-suggested measures are
likely to increase the number of Regular Second
Appeals, one cannot be oblivious to the possibility
that quite a few cases may get settled or attain
finality at the District Courts level. Excluding those
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cases if all other contested matters come to the
High Court in the form of Regular Second Appeals,
given the scope of the Regular Second Appeals,
quite a few of them may not get admitted and are
likely to be decided in a comparatively less period.”
39. This Court is informed that the aforesaid judgment was
forwarded to the Chief Secretary of the State Government as well as
the Principal Secretary, Department of Law and Parliamentary
Affairs, Government of Karnataka and thereafter, draft legislations
were prepared and an opinion was sought from the Law
Commission of Karnataka. The Law Commission had opined that
the proposed amendments were a step in the right direction for a
speedy disposal. The Law Commission had opined as under:
“Taking into consideration the large pendency of
cases in the High Court and District Judiciary, the
proposed amendment to Sec. 19 appears to be
right step in the direction of the Government Policy
for speedy disposal. As such, the amendment can
be carried out. However, as the proposed
amendment will have a bearing on the present day
classification of the appeals before the High Court
of Karnataka as per the Karnataka High Court Act,
1961 and as such if the proposed amendment is
carried out, there has to be corresponding
amendments to the Karnataka High Court Act,
1961”
40. Apart from observing that the proposed statutory amendments
were a step in the right direction, the Law Commission also
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suggested that the amendment be made retrospective. The relevant
portion of the opinion reads as under:
“The proposed amendment is not clear as to
whether the amendment is retrospective or
prospective. According to the statistics there are
22698 FA’s pending in the High Court (in principal
and other two benches). It is to be noted that,
there are 336 District Judges functioning on the
judicial side. The Commission is of the view that,
the amendment if made retrospective, all old
pending Regular First Appeals (22698) can be
transferred to the Jurisdictional District Courts and
it will lessen the burden of heavy pendency in the
High Court and there will be speedy disposal.”
41. It is also relevant to refer to the statement of objects and
reasons for introducing the bill for enacting the Civil Courts
Amendment Act. The same is reproduced below:
“Amendment Act 33 of 2024: The Law Commission
of Karnataka has recommended certain
amendments to the Karnataka Civil Act, 1964
(Karnataka Act 21 of 1964).
Hence, it is considered necessary further to amend
the Karnataka Civil Courts Act, 1964 (Karnataka
Act 21 of 1964) to :-
(i) Increase the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court of
Civil Judge; and
(ii) lessen the burden of heavy pendency in the
High Court.
Hence, the Bill.”
42. We are unable to accept that the impugned legislations can
be struck down as ultra vires the Constitution of India for want of
wider consultation. Absent any procedural requirement for
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consultation, the question of wider consultation may be relevant in
the context of a challenge on the ground of manifest arbitrariness,
which we examine later in this decision.
IV. Legislative Wisdom Not Amenable to Judicial Review
43. We note that some of the contentions advanced by the
learned counsels for the writ Petitioner, including the contentions as
noted in the order dated 19.11.2025, are more in the nature of
questioning the wisdom of the State Legislature in enacting the
impugned legislations. Some of the points for consideration as
noted in the order dated 19.11.2025 also relate to the wisdom of the
Legislature in enacting the impugned legislations and seek to
articulate possible reservations as to the efficacy of the impugned
legislations. Undeniably, there are contrary opinions as to whether
the First Appeals ought to be adjudicated by District Judges. It is
earnestly contended on behalf of the Appellants that the Judges of
this Court would be better equipped to hear the First Appeals.
However, an opinion as to the wisdom of the Legislation cannot be
ground to challenge its constitutional validity. The doctrine of
Separation of Powers is firmly established in our constitutional
framework, and the question of whether a legislation should be
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enacted does not fall within the realm of examination by
constitutional courts.
44. It is relevant to refer to the following passages from the
decision of the Supreme Court in the State of A.P. v. P. Laxmi
Devi30:
“41. We have observed above that while the court
has power to declare a statute to be
unconstitutional, it should exercise great judicial
restraint in this connection. This requires
clarification, since, sometimes courts are perplexed
as to whether they should declare a statute to be
constitutional or unconstitutional.
** ** **
43. Thus, according to Prof. Thayer, a court can
declare a statute to be unconstitutional not merely
because it is possible to hold this view, but only
when that is the only possible view not open to
rational question. In other words, the court can
declare a statute to be unconstitutional only when
there can be no manner of doubt that it is flagrantly
unconstitutional, and there is no way of avoiding
such decision. The philosophy behind this view is
that there is broad separation of powers under the
Constitution, and the three organs of the State–the
legislature, the executive and the judiciary, must
respect each other and must not ordinarily
encroach into each other’s domain. Also the
judiciary must realise that the legislature is a
democratically elected body which expresses the
will of the people, and in a democracy this will is not
to be lightly frustrated or obstructed.
** ** **
56. In our opinion adjudication must be done within
the system of historically validated restraints and
conscious minimisation of the judges’ personal
preferences. The court must not invalidate a statute30
(2008) 4 SCC 720
– 36 –
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lightly, for, as observed above, invalidation of a
statute made by the legislature elected by the
people is a grave step. As observed by this Court
in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh [(1952) 1
SCC 528 : AIR 1952 SC 252] : (AIR p. 274, para
52)
“52. … The legislature is the best judge of what is
good for the community, by whose suffrage it
comes into existence….”
57. In our opinion, the court should, therefore,
ordinarily defer to the wisdom of the legislature
unless it enacts a law about which there can be no
manner of doubt about its unconstitutionality.”
45. The examination must necessarily be confined to whether the
Legislature has the competence to enact legislation; whether it falls
foul of Part III or any other provision of the Constitution of India; or
whether the statute is manifestly arbitrary. In a case involving civil
liberties, a statute may also be challenged on the ground of
proportionality; that is, it curtails liberties incommensurate with the
legislation’s objective. However, the court cannot question the
wisdom of the statute unless it crosses the threshold of
constitutional limits. We may also refer to the aforesaid principle as
articulated by the Privy Council in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal
Commr. Of Taxation31, and as noted by the Supreme Court in
State of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi (supra):
“Unless it becomes clear beyond reasonable doubt
that the legislation in question transgresses the31
1930 All ER Rep 671 (PC)
– 37 –
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limits laid down by the organic law of the
Constitution, it must be allowed to stand as the true
expression of the national will.”
46. The following passage from the decision of the Supreme
Court in Binoy Viswam v. Union of India32 is instructive:
“83. It is, thus, clear that in exercise of power of
judicial review, the Indian courts are invested with
powers to strike down primary legislation enacted
by Parliament or the State Legislatures. However,
while undertaking this exercise of judicial review,
the same is to be done at three levels. In the first
stage, the Court would examine as to whether
impugned provision in a legislation is compatible
with the fundamental rights or the constitutional
provisions (substantive judicial review) or it falls foul
of the federal distribution of powers (procedural
judicial review). If it is not found to be so, no further
exercise is needed as challenge would fail. On the
other hand, if it is found that legislature lacks
competence as the subject legislated was not
within the powers assigned in the List in Schedule
VII, no further enquiry is needed and such a law is
to be declared as ultra vires the Constitution.
However, while undertaking substantive judicial
review, if it is found that the impugned provision
appears to be violative of fundamental rights or
other constitutional rights, the Court reaches the
second stage of review. At this second phase of
enquiry, the Court is supposed to undertake the
exercise as to whether the impugned provision can
still be saved by reading it down so as to bring it in
conformity with the constitutional provisions. If that
is not achievable then the enquiry enters the third
stage. If the offending portion of the statute is
severable, it is severed and the Court strikes down
the impugned provision declaring the same as
unconstitutional.”
32
(2017) 7 SCC 59
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V. Re: Retrospectivity
47. That brings us to the principal controversy, the retrospective
operation of the impugned legislations. The Appellants’/Petitioner’s
case that the impugned legislations are manifestly arbitrary is
premised on the following propositions:
(i) Since the impugned legislations amend the provisions
of the 1961 Act and 1964 Act by substitution of those
provisions, the amended provisions would come into
force ab initio, that is, from the date the 1961 Act and
the 1964 Act came into force. Since the impugned
legislations do not contain a savings clause, the effect of
the impugned legislations is that they would nullify all
concluded appeals. Since this is ex facie unreasonable
and not an intended effect of the impugned legislations,
the same must be declared as invalid;
(ii) that the retrospective amendments take away
vested rights regarding the forum of the appellate
remedy, ergo the impugned legislations are
unreasonable and thus liable to be set aside; and
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(iii) there is no scope for interpreting Section 4 of the
Civil Courts Amendment Act restrictively to exclude
concluded appeals, as there is no ambiguity in the
language of the said section.
48. It is common ground that the concluded appeals cannot be
reopened, and it is not the legislative intent to render the decisions
delivered in Regular First Appeals a nullity or without jurisdiction.
The dispute in this regard is considerably narrowed to whether the
court can interpret or read down the provisions of the impugned
legislations, to mean that the retrospective operation of the
impugned legislations is applicable only to pending cases. It is
contended on behalf of the Appellants/Petitioner that the Court
cannot now read into a statute what is not provided. The learned
Senior Counsel had referred to the rule of casus omissus and
emphasized that what has not been provided in the statute cannot
be supplied by Courts. It is stated that since the impugned
legislations do not include a savings clause, the Courts cannot read
such a clause into the impugned legislations. It is urged that,
consequently, the impugned legislations, to the extent that they
operate retrospectively, be set aside. Resultantly, the impugned
legislations would apply prospectively and not to pending cases.
– 40 –
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The learned Senior Counsels appearing for the Appellants/Petitioner
sought to strengthen the said contention by further contending that
the right of an appeal and the forum of an appeal are matters of
substantive law, and that litigants who have already filed suits and
parties to pending suits or pending appeals, have a vested right that
their First Appeals would be heard by the High Court.
VI. Forum of Appeal – a Matter of Procedural Law
49. There is no cavil that a right of appeal is a statutory right, not
an inherent one33.
50. In Gangabai v. Vijaykumar34, the Supreme Court had
explained the distinction between original and appellate proceedings
in the following words:
“15. …There is a basic distinction between the
right of suit and the right of appeal. There is an
inherent right in every person to bring a suit of civil
nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one
may, at one’s peril, bring a suit of one’s choice. It
is no answer to a suit, howsoever frivolous to
claim, that the law confers no such right to sue. A
suit for its maintainability requires no authority of
law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit.
But the position in regard to appeals is quite the
opposite. The right of appeal inheres in no one
and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must
have the clear authority of law. That explains why33
Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad
(1999) 4 SCC 468
34
(1974) 2 SCC 393
– 41 –
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the right of appeal is described as a creature of
statute.”
51. There is also no cavil that the statutory right of appeal accrues
to the litigant on the date the original suit is instituted. In Garikapati
Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry35 the Supreme Court held as
follows:
“32. From the decisions cited above the
following principles clearly emerge:
32.1. That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit,
appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a
series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic
unity and are to be regarded as one legal
proceeding.
32.2. The right of appeal is not a mere matter of
procedure but is a substantive right.
32.3. The institution of the suit carries with it the
implication that all rights of appeal then in force are
preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the
career of the suit.
32.4. The right of appeal is a vested right and
such a right to enter the superior court accrues to
the litigant and exists as on and from the date the
lis commences and although it may be actually
exercised when the adverse judgment is
pronounced such right is to be governed by the law
prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or
proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the
date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the
appeal.
32.5. This vested right of appeal can be taken
away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so35
(1957) 1 SCC 180
– 42 –
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provides expressly or by necessary intendment and
not otherwise.”
52. It is well settled that legislation is presumed to be prospective
unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary
intendment. As explained by the Supreme Court in Commissioner
of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi v. Vatika Township Private
Limited36, “the rule against retrospective operation is a fundamental
rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective
operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in terms
of the Act or arises by necessary and distinct implication”.
53. It is also well settled that legislation would not be presumed to
apply retrospectively to take away vested rights. The
Appellants’/Petitioner’s case that the impugned legislations must be
held to apply prospectively essentially rests on the assumption that
not only the right of appeal but also the forum in which such an
appeal would lie would accrue to the litigant upon institution of the
suit or original proceeding. The principle that all statutes, other than
declaratory and procedural laws, are presumed to be prospective
unless indicated otherwise, is stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England
(3rd Edn, Vol.36), in the following words:
36
(2015) 1 SCC 1
– 43 –
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“all statutes other than those which are merely
declaratory or which relate only to matters of
procedure or of evidence are prima facie
prospective and retrospective operation should not
be given to a statute so as to affect, alter or
destroy an existing right or create a new liability or
obligation unless that effect cannot be avoided
without doing violence to the language of the
enactment. If the enactment is expressed in
language which is fairly capable of either
interpretation, it ought to be construed as
prospective only.”
54. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated in various
decisions. In Govind Das v. Income Tax Officer37, the Supreme
Court had referred to the aforesaid passage from Halsbury’s Laws
of England and observed as under:
“11. Now it is a well-settled rule of interpretation
hallowed by time and sanctified by judicial
decisions that, unless the terms of a statute
expressly so provide or necessarily require it,
retrospective operation should not be given to a
statute so as to take away or impair an existing
right or create a new obligation or impose a new
liability otherwise than as regards matters of
procedure.”
55. It is also apparent from the above that whilst statutes are
presumed to apply prospectively, the said presumption does not
hold good in respect of laws that are merely declaratory or
procedural.
37
(1976) 1 SCC 906
– 44 –
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56. This prompts us to examine whether the law governing the
forum of appeal is part of procedural law, and whether a change in
the forum of appeal affects any vested rights.
57. Mr. Phanindra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Petitioner, had earnestly contended that the forum of appeal is part
of substantive rights of a litigant and cannot be considered part of
procedural law. He advanced the said contention on the strength of
the observations made by the Supreme Court in Securities and
Exchange Board of India v. Classic Credit Limited (supra), in
paragraph 51 of the said decision. The said paragraph is set out
below:
“51. Whilst accepting the contentions advanced on
behalf of the learned counsel for SEBI pertaining
to “forum” (with reference to which inferences
have been drawn in the foregoing paragraph), it is
not possible for us to outrightly reject the
contentions advanced by Mr C.A. Sundaram,
learned Senior Advocate, while projecting the
claim of the accused. We are not oblivious of the
conclusions recorded by this Court in CIT v. Dhadi
Sahu, wherein it was held that (SCC p. 262. para
18) a law which brings about a change in the
“forum” does not affect pending actions, unless an
intention to the contrary is clearly shown. One of
the modes in which such intentions can be shown
is by making a provision for change for a
proceeding from the court or the tribunal where it
was pending, to the court or tribunal under which
the new law gets jurisdiction. In the said judgment,
this Court also observed, that it was true that no
litigant had any vested right in the matter of
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procedural law, but where the question is of the
change of “forum”, it ceases to be a question of
procedure only, with reference to pending matter.
The “forum” of appeal or proceedings, it was held,
was a vested right as opposed to pure procedure
o be followed before a particular “forum”. It was
therefore concluded that a right becomes vested
when the proceedings are initiated in spite of
change of Jurisdiction/forum by way of
amendment thereafter.”
58. It is apparent from the above that the observations of the
Supreme Court to the effect that a change in forum ceases to be a
question of procedure rest on the conclusions in an earlier decision
of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Dhadi Sahu38. However, the said
conclusions are no longer good law in view of the subsequent
decision in Neena Aneja (supra), which held that the said view had
been rendered without noticing binding precedents.
59. In Neena Aneja (supra), the Supreme Court considered
whether an amendment changing the forum would affect pending
proceedings. After referring to earlier decisions, the Court concluded
that a change in forum lies in the realm of procedure and that
repeals or amendments effecting a change of forum would ordinarily
affect pending proceedings, unless a contrary intention appears
from the repealing or amending statute. The Court found that the
38
(1994) Supp (1) SCC 257
– 46 –
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decision in Dhadi Sahu (supra), and the line of cases following it,
which suggested that the change in the forum of appeal was not a
matter of procedural law, had been rendered without considering the
binding precedents. The relevant extract of the said decision is set
out below:
“C.23. Conclusion on the position of law
72. In considering the myriad precedents that
have interpreted the impact of a change in forum
on pending proceedings and retrospectivity – a
clear position of law has emerged: a change in
forum lies in the realm of procedure. Accordingly,
in compliance with the tenets of statutory
interpretation applicable to procedural law,
amendments on matters of procedure are
retrospective, unless a contrary intention emerges
from the statute. This position emerges from the
decisions in New India Assurance, Maria Cristina,
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, Ramesh Kumar Soni and
Sudhir G. Angur. More recently, this position has
been noted in a three-Judge Bench decision of
this Court in Manish Kumar v. Union of India.
However, there was a deviation by a two-Judge
Bench decision of this Court in Dhadi Sahu, which
overlooked the decision of a larger three – Judge
Bench in New India Assurance and of a coordinate
two-Judge Bench in Maria Cristina. The decision
in Dhadi Sahu propounded a position that: (Dhadi
Sahu case, SCC p. 262, para 21)“21. … no litigant has any vested right in the
matter of procedural law but where the question is
of change of forum it ceases to be a question of
procedure only. The forum of appeal or
proceedings is a vested right as opposed to pure
procedure to be followed before a particular forum.
The right becomes vested when the proceedings
are initiated in the tribunal.”
(emphasis supplied)
– 47 –
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In taking this view, the two-Judge Bench did not
consider binding decisions. Dhadi Sahu failed to
consider that the saving of pending proceedings in
Mohd. Idris and Manujendra Dutt was a saving of
vested rights of the litigants that were being
impacted by the repealing Acts therein, and not
because a right to forum is accrued once
proceedings have been initiated. Thereafter, a line
of decisions followed Dhadi Sahu, to hold that a
litigant has a crystallised right to a forum once
proceedings have been initiated. A litigant’s vested
rights (including the right to an appeal) prior to the
amendment or repeal are undoubtedly saved, in
addition to substantive rights envisaged under
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. This
protection does not extend to pure matters of
procedure. Repeals or amendments that effect
changes in forum would ordinarily affect pending
proceedings, unless a contrary intention appears
from the repealing or amending statute.”
(emphasis added)
60. In view of the above, the question whether the forum of
appeal is a matter of procedural law is no longer res integra. Once
we find that the law regarding the forum of appeal is a matter of
procedural law, it would follow that, unless the legislation indicates
to the contrary, the law amending the forum of appeal must be
presumed to apply retrospectively. Thus, the change in the forum of
appeal would also apply to all pending appeals. It would be
incongruous that the pending appeals follow a procedure separate
from those that are preferred after the enactment of the impugned
legislations.
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VII. Express Retrospective operation – Section 4 of the
Civil Courts Amendment Act
61. Having stated the above, we also note that the language of
Section 4 of the Civil Courts Amendment Act makes it expressly
clear that it is applicable retrospectively. Even if it were accepted
that the law relating to the forum of appeal is not a procedural law –
which we cannot accept in view of the decision of the Supreme
Court in Neena Aneja (supra) – the impugned legislations are
applicable retrospectively as the language of Section 4 of the Civil
Courts Amendment Act expressly states so.
62. It is trite that the power to legislate includes the power to
legislate retrospectively, as laid down by the Supreme Court in
Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Hindustan Machine Tools
Ltd.39, wherein it was held as follows:
“10. We see no substance in the respondent’s
contention that by re-defining the term “house”
with retrospective effect and by validating the
levies imposed under the unamended Act as if
notwithstanding anything contained in any
judgment, decree or order of any court, that Act as
amended was in force on the date when the tax
was levied, the Legislature has encroached upon
a judicial function. The power of the Legislature to
pass a law postulates the power to pass it
prospectively as well as retrospectively, the one
no less than the other. Within the scope of its
legislative competence and subject to other
39
(1975) 2 SCC 274
– 49 –
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constitutional limitations, the power of the
Legislature to enact laws is plenary. In United
Provinces v. Atiqa Begum [AIR 1941 FC 16 : 1904
FCR 110] Gwyer, C.J. while repelling the
argument that Indian Legislatures had no power to
alter the existing laws retrospectively observed
that within the limits of their powers the Indian
Legislatures were as supreme and sovereign as
the British Parliament itself and that those powers
were not subject to the “strange and unusual
prohibition against retrospective legislation”. The
power to validate a law retrospectively is, subject
to the limitations aforesaid, an ancillary power to
legislate on the particular subject.”
63. In the present case, Section 4 of the Civil Courts Amendment
Act expressly provides that all amendments made to the 1964 Act
by the Civil Courts Amendment Act shall come into force
retrospectively with effect from 28.08.2007. Thus, undeniably, the
presumption that statutes operate prospectively and exclude the
pending appeals cannot apply.
VIII. Rule of Purposive Interpretation
64. The rule of purposive interpretation (also known as
‘purposivism’) requires that a statute be interpreted to further its
intent; the Court must bear in mind the underlying purpose and the
legislative intent rather than relying on the literal meaning of the
words used.
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65. Although plain language cannot be disregarded, the rule of
statutory interpretation provides sufficient play in the joints to
interpret statutes to aid and implement the legislative intent.
66. In given circumstances, the Court is not powerless to read in
words to make sense of a statutory provision in conformity with its
object, instead of adopting a literal interpretation that may lead to
absurdity or inconsistency that invalidates the statutory provision.
67. In Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla40, the
Supreme Court explained the rule of purposive interpretation as
under:
“31. … The principle of “purposive interpretation”
or “purposive construction” is based on the
understanding that the court is supposed to attach
that meaning to the provisions which serve the
“purpose” behind such a provision. The basic
approach is to ascertain what is it designed to
accomplish? To put it otherwise, by interpretative
process the court is supposed to realise the goal
that the legal text is designed to realise. As
Aharon Barak puts it:
“Purposive interpretation is based on three
components : language, purpose, and discretion.
Language shapes the range of semantic
possibilities within which the interpreter acts as a
linguist. Once the interpreter defines the range, he
or she chooses the legal meaning of the text from
among the (express or implied) semantic
possibilities. The semantic component thus sets40
(2016) 3 SCC 619
– 51 –
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the limits of interpretation by restricting the
interpreter to a legal meaning that the text can
bear in its (public or private) language.” [ Aharon
Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton
University Press, 2005).]
32. Of the aforesaid three components, namely,
language, purpose and discretion “of the court”,
insofar as purposive component is concerned, this
is the ratio juris, the purpose at the core of the
text. This purpose is the values, goals, interests,
policies and aims that the text is designed to
actualise. It is the function that the text is designed
to fulfil.
33. We may also emphasise that the statutory
interpretation of a provision is never static but is
always dynamic. Though the literal rule of
interpretation, till some time ago, was treated as
the “golden rule”, it is now the doctrine of
purposive interpretation which is predominant,
particularly in those cases where literal
interpretation may not serve the purpose or may
lead to absurdity. If it brings about an end which is
at variance with the purpose of statute, that cannot
be countenanced. Not only legal process thinkers
such as Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as
a grand strategy for statutory interpretation, and in
its place they offered purposivism, this principle is
now widely applied by the courts not only in this
country but in many other legal systems as well.
68. Francis Bennion41 explains the rule of purposive construction
as under:
“A purposive construction of an enactment is one
which gives effect to the legislative purpose by–
(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment
where that meaning is in accordance with the
legislative purpose (in this Code called a
purposive-and-literal construction), or41
Bennion F, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (6th edn) 810
– 52 –
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(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal
meaning is not in accordance with the legislative
purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-
strained construction).”
69. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Vivek Narayan
Sharma v. Union of India (Demonetisation Case – 5 J.)42, the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held as under:
“137. A statute must be construed having regard
to the legislative intent. It has to be meaningful. A
construction which leads to manifest absurdity
must not be preferred to a construction which
would fulfil the object and purport of the legislative
intent.”
70. As noted above, the bedrock of the Appellants’/Petitioner’s
contention is that the retrospective operation of the impugned
legislations is invalid, as it renders all judgments and orders in
appeals passed since 28.08.2007 without jurisdiction. It is
contended that since the impugned legislations do not contain a
savings clause, the import of the retrospective operation of the
impugned legislations is to nullify orders that have attained finality
and reopen concluded appeals.
71. There is no contest that the judgments and orders rendered
prior to the impugned legislations coming into force cannot be
nullified or declared as without jurisdiction, thus reopening
42
(2023) 3 SCC 1
– 53 –
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proceedings that may have attained finality. It is not the legislative
intent to do so. Further, it is not disputed that if the impugned
legislations are read in a manner so as to nullify past judgments and
reopen the concluded cases, the same would be harsh and
unreasonable. This would render the impugned legislations
vulnerable to challenge on the ground of manifest arbitrariness.
72. Having stated the above, we are unable to accept that the
impugned legislations cannot be interpreted or read down to
exclude the concluded appeals and orders passed in pending
proceedings. The contention that the Court is powerless to read
into provisions what is not expressly enacted is unmerited. We are
reminded of the oft-quoted decision in Seaford Court Estates Ltd
v. Asher43. In this decision, the Court of Appeal observed as under:
“When a defect appears a Judge cannot simply
fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must
set to work on the constructive task of finding the
intention of Parliament, … and then he must
supplement the written word so as to give ‘force
and life’ to the intention of the legislature. … A
Judge should ask himself the question how, if the
makers of the Act had themselves come across
the ruck in the texture of it, they would have
straightened it out? He must then do as they
would have done. A Judge must not alter the
material of which the Act is woven, but he can and
should iron out the creases.”
43
[1949] 2 All ER 155 (CA)
– 54 –
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73. Francis Bennion articulates the aforesaid principle of
statutory interpretation as under:
“Insofar as in its Act Parliament does not convey
its intention clearly, expressly and completely, it is
taken to require the enforcement agencies who
are charged with the duty of applying legislation to
spell out the detail of its legal meaning. This may
be done either — (a) by finding and declaring
implications in the words used by the legislator, or
(b) by regarding the breadth or other obscurity of
the express language as conferring a delegated
legislative power to elaborate its meaning in
accordance with public policy (including legal
policy) and the purpose of the legislation.”
74. In Bengal Secretariat Coop. Land Mortgage Bank &
Housing Society Ltd. v. Aloke Kumar44 the Supreme Court also
referred to the following passage from Bennion on statutory
interpretation:
“The truth is that courts are inescapably
possessed of some degree of legislative power.
Enacted legislation lays down rules in advance.
The commands of Parliament are deliberate
prospective commands. The very concept of
enacted legislation postulates an authoritative
interpreter who operates ex post facto. No such
interpreter can avoid legislating in the course of
exercising that function. It can be done by
regarding the breadth or other obscurity of the
express language as conferring a delegated
legislative power to elaborate its meaning in44
(2024) 14 SCC 466
– 55 –
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accordance with public policy (including legal
policy).”45
75. In M.Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa46 the Supreme
Court referred to the aforesaid passage from the decision
in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. (Supra) with approval. The Court
also observed that the principle enunciated in the following passage
from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes47 was well
established:
“27. Where the language of a statute, in its
ordinary meaning and grammatical construction,
leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent
purpose of the enactment, or to some
inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice,
presumably not intended, a construction may be
put upon it which modifies the meaning of the
words, and even the structure of the
sentence….Where the main object and intention
of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a
nullity by the draftsman’s unskilfulness or
ignorance of the law, except in a case of
necessity, or the absolute intractability of the
language used. Nevertheless, the courts are
very reluctant to substitute words in a statute, or
to add words to it, and it has been said that they
will only do so where there is a repugnancy to
good sense.”
45
Bennion (n 41) 137
46
1960 SCC OnLine SC 37
47
Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (10th edn) 229
– 56 –
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76. It is instructive to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and another v. Nilaybhai
R.Thakore and another48. In the said case, the Court considered a
challenge to the constitutional validity of Rule 6(i) and Rule 7 of the
Rules for Admission to N.H.L. Municipal Medical College (‘the said
rules’) on the ground that the said rules which define the expression
“the local student” are unreasonable, illegal, illogical, irrational and
thus violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India.
Under Rule 7 of the said rules, which was impugned in the said
case, a local student was defined as a student who had passed their
SSC/New SSC examination and the qualifying examination from
any of the high schools or colleges situated within the Ahmedabad
Municipal limits. The students, who were permanently residing in
Ahmedabad City but had obtained their qualifications from
educational institutions situated just outside the municipal limits but
within the Ahmedabad Urban Development Area, would not be
eligible for admission to the N.H.L. Municipal Medical College as
local students. The Supreme Court was of the view that confining
the definition of a local student to students who had acquired the
qualifications from educational institutions within the Ahmedabad
48
(1999)8 SCC 139
– 57 –
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Municipality created an artificial distinction amongst the students
who are residents of Ahmedabad City and those who may not be
the residents of Ahmedabad City, but had studied in educational
institutions situated within the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.
The Supreme Court held the said definition to be arbitrary and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and held that the
High Court was justified in its conclusion that Rule 7 of the said
rules suffered from the vice of arbitrariness.
77. However, the Supreme Court held that instead of striking
down the said rules, the same could be interpreted bearing in mind
the objective of providing education to local students. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court interpreted Rule 7 of the said rules to also
include a permanent resident student of the Ahmedabad
Municipality who acquires the qualifications from any high schools
or colleges situated within the Ahmedabad Urban Development
Area.
78. The relevant extract of the Supreme Court’s decision is as
under:
“10. But the question in this case is slightly
different from the law laid down in the above-cited
cases. Under Rule 7 of the impugned rules, “a
local student” is defined as a student who has
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passed SSC/New SSC Examination and the
qualifying examination from any of the high
schools or colleges situated within the
Ahmedabad municipal limits. As per this rule, it is
only those students who qualify from educational
institutions situated within the municipal limits who
will be eligible to be treated as local students.
While the permanent resident students of
Ahmedabad city who for fortuitous reasons, as
stated above, happen to acquire qualification from
educational institutions situated just outside the
municipal limits, namely, AUDA, will not be eligible
for being treated as local students. The object of
the rule is to provide medical education to the
students of Ahmedabad who have acquired the
necessary qualification, their selection being
based on merit. If that be the object, can it be said
that a classification based only on the location of
the educational institution within or outside the
municipal area is a reasonable classification? In
our opinion, the answer should be in the negative.
In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the
Ahmedabad Municipality in the writ petition, it is
stated that the Medical College in question was
established to cater to the needs of the students
of Ahmedabad city. If that be the object, in our
opinion, the same would be defeated by restricting
the definition of “local student” to those students
who have acquired their qualification from
institutions situated within the Ahmedabad
municipal area, because as has happened in this
case, the actual resident students of the
Municipality whose parents would have
contributed towards the revenue of the
Ahmedabad Municipality who for reasons beyond
their control or otherwise, had acquired their
qualification from institutions situated just outside
the Ahmedabad municipal area i.e. within AUDA,
would be denied the benefit of admission to the
College which is run by the Ahmedabad
Municipality. In our opinion, confining the
definition of “local student” to only those students
who acquired the qualification from educational
institutions situated within the local area creates
an artificial distinction from amongst the students
who are residents of Ahmedabad city and those
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who may not be the residents of Ahmedabad city
but who have studied in educational institutions
situated in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
limits. We do not find any nexus in this type of
classification with the object to be achieved. Let
us test the logic of this rule with reference to a
permanent resident of Ahmedabad who resides
within the Ahmedabad municipal limits but is
employed within AUDA. Can the Municipality
refuse the benefit of its services to such a resident
of the city only on the ground that he is employed
in AUDA? The answer again can only be no.
Similarly, if the object of the rule is to provide
medical education to the students of Ahmedabad
because of its municipal obligations then a
differentia within the class of students of
Ahmedabad on the basis of their acquiring
qualifications from schools within the Ahmedabad
municipal limits or within the limits of AUDA would
be arbitrary and violative of Article 14.
11. By this conclusion of ours we do not mean
that a student who claims to be an original
resident of Ahmedabad studying anywhere in the
State of Gujarat or outside can claim the benefit of
a “local student” because that case does not fall
within the classification discussed by us
hereinabove.
12. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the High
Court was justified in coming to the conclusion
that the classification made under Rule 7 of the
impugned rules amounts to an arbitrary
classification, hence, cannot be sustained in law.
13. Though the High Court was right in coming
to the conclusion that the rule in question does
suffer from an element of arbitrariness, we are of
the opinion that the remedy does not lie in striking
down the impugned rules the existence of which is
necessary in the larger interest of the institution as
well as the populace of the Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation. The striking down of the rule would
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mean opening the doors of the institution for
admission to all the eligible candidates in the
country which would definitely be opposed to the
very object of the establishment of the institution
by a local body. It is very rarely that a local body
considers it as its duty to provide higher and
professional education. In this case, the
Municipality of Ahmedabad should be
complimented for providing medical education to
its resident students for the last 30 years or more.
It has complied with its constitutional obligation by
providing 15% of the seats available to all-India
merit students. Its desire to provide as many seats
as possible to its students is a natural and
genuine desire emanating from its municipal
obligations which deserves to be upheld to the
extent possible. Therefore, with a view to protect
the laudable object of the Municipality, we deem it
necessary to give the impugned rule a reasonable
and practical interpretation and uphold its validity.
14. …. Thus, following the above rule of
interpretation and with a view to iron out the
creases in the impugned rule which offends Article
14, we interpret Rule 7 as follows:
“Local student means a student who has
passed HSC (sic SSC)/New SSC
Examination and the qualifying examination
from any of the high schools or colleges
situated within the Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation limits and includes a
permanent resident student of the
Ahmedabad Municipality who acquires the
above qualifications from any of the high
schools or colleges situated within the
Ahmedabad Urban Development Area.”
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79. Juxtaposing Rule 7 of the said rules as framed and as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, we find that the Supreme Court
significantly altered the literal meaning of the said Rule and
interpreted it expansively by applying the rule of purposive
interpretation. The Court added the words, “and includes a
permanent resident student of the Ahmedabad Municipality who
acquires the above qualifications from any of the high schools or
colleges situated within the Ahmedabad Urban Development Area.”
80. Thus, in cases where there appears to be an apparent lacuna
in the drafting of the legislation, the Courts are not powerless to
read in words and interpret the legislation in conformity with the
legislative intent.
81. In High Court of Judicature at Madras v. M.C.
Subramaniam and others49, the Supreme Court applied the rule of
purposive interpretation in interpreting Section 69A of the Tamil
Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 and Section 89 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC‘). Section 69A of the Tamil
Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, reads as under:
“69A. Refund on settlement of disputes under
section 89 of Code of Civil Procedure.–
49
(2021) 3 SCC 560
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Where the Court refers the parties to the suit to
any of the modes of settlement of dispute
referred to in section 89 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908), the fee
paid shall be refunded upon such reference.
Such refund need not await for settlement of the
dispute.” (emphasis supplied)
82. In view of the above, the court fee was required to be
refunded where the Court had referred the parties to any of the
modes of settlement referred to in Section 89 of the CPC. Under
Section 89(1) of CPC, the Court could refer the parties to (a)
Arbitration, (b) Conciliation (c) Judicial Settlement including
settlement through Lok Adalat or Mediation.
83. Consequently, the parties who settle the disputes privately
outside Court, would not be entitled to refund of the court fee under
Section 69A of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act,
1955.
84. In the aforesaid context, the Court observed that the
provisions of Section 89 CPC must be understood in the backdrop
of long-standing proliferation of litigation in civil courts which had
placed a new burden on the judicial system. The Supreme Court
observed that the purpose of Section 89 was clearly to facilitate
private settlements to reduce the burden on the docket.
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85. Considering the legislative policy underlying Section 69A of
the Tamil Nadu Court Fee and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, the
Supreme Court concurred with the view of the High Court in
extending the benefit to litigants who settle their disputes privately
outside the Court. It is relevant to set out the following extract from
the said decision in M.C. Subramaniam (supra).
“17. In light of these established principles of
statutory interpretation, we shall now proceed to
advert to the specific provisions that are the
subject of the present controversy. The narrow
interpretation of Section 89 CPC and Section 69-A
of the 1955 Act sought to be imposed by the
petitioner would lead to an outcome wherein the
parties who are referred to a mediation centre or
other centres by the Court will be entitled to a full
refund of their court fee; whilst the parties who
similarly save the Court’s time and resources by
privately settling their dispute themselves will be
deprived of the same benefit, simply because they
did not require the Court’s interference to seek a
settlement. Such an interpretation, in our opinion,
clearly leads to an absurd and unjust outcome,
where two classes of parties who are equally
facilitating the object and purpose of the aforesaid
provisions are treated differentially, with one class
being deprived of the benefit of Section 69-A of
the 1955 Act. A literal or technical interpretation, in
this background, would only lead to injustice and
render the purpose of the provisions nugatory —
and thus, needs to be departed from, in favour of a
purposive interpretation of the provisions.
25. Thus, even though a strict construction of the
terms of Section 89 CPC and Section 69-A of the
1955 Act may not encompass such private
negotiations and settlements between the parties,
we emphasise that the participants in such
settlements will be entitled to the same benefits as
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those who have been referred to explore alternate
dispute settlement methods under Section 89
CPC. Indeed, we find it puzzling that the petitioner
should be so vehemently opposed to granting
such benefit. Though the Registry/State
Government will be losing a one-time court fee in
the short term, they will be saved the expense and
opportunity cost of managing an endless cycle of
litigation in the long term. It is therefore in their
own interest to allow Respondent 1’s claim.”
86. We may note that the exercise of interpreting a statutory
provision in the textual context necessarily entails a determination,
with some certainty, of the legislative intent. Normally, the language
of the provision communicates the legislative intent. Therefore, any
departure from the rule of literal interpretation must be founded on a
firm determination that the unmistakable intent of the legislature is at
variance with the textual meaning, thus presenting a compelling
reason for construing the provision in aid of the legislative intent
rather than subjecting those governed by it to the consequences of
ill drafting.
87. It is apposite to refer to the following observations of the
Supreme Court from the decision in Hansoli Devi (supra):
“It is no doubt true that if on going through the
plain meaning of the language of statutes, it leads
to anomalies, injustices and absurdities, then the
Court may look into the purpose for which the
statute has been brought and would try to give a
meaning, which would adhere to the purpose of
the statute. … But before any words are read to
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repair an omission in the Act, it should be possible
to state with certainty that these words would have
been inserted by the draftsman and approved by
the legislature had their attention been drawn to
the omission before the Bill had passed into a
law.”
88. We may also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in
K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam50. In this
decision, the Supreme Court observed as under:
“6. The primary objection against the literal
construction of Section 52 sub-section (2) is that it
leads to manifestly unreasonable and absurd
consequences. It is true that the consequences of
a suggested construction cannot alter the meaning
of a statutory provision but they can certainly help
to fix its meaning. It is a well-recognised rule of
construction that a statutory provision must be so
construed, if possible, that absurdity and mischief
may be avoided. … We must therefore eschew
literalness in the interpretation of Section 52 sub-
section (2) and try to arrive at an interpretation
which avoids this absurdity and mischief and
makes the provision rational and sensible, unless
of course, our hands are tied and we cannot find
any escape from the tyranny of the literal
interpretation. It is now a well-settled rule of
construction that where the plain literal
interpretation of a statutory provision
produces a manifestly absurd and unjust
result which could never have been intended
by the legislature, the court may modify the
language used by the legislature or even ‘do
some violence’ to it, so as to achieve the
obvious intention of the legislature and
produce a rational construction (vide
Luke v. Inland Revenue Commrs. [Luke v. Inland
Revenue Commrs., 1963 AC 557 : (1963) 2 WLR
559] ). The court may also in such a case read into50
(1981) 4 SCC 173
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the statutory provision a condition which, though
not expressed, is implicit as constituting the basic
assumption underlying the statutory provision….”
[emphasis added]
89. Our jurisprudence is rich with instances where Courts have
opted not to strike down statutory provisions. Instead, judicial
interpretations have sought to align these provisions with the
legislation’s underlying objectives. This approach often involves
adding clarifying words or imposing necessary restrictions to ensure
that the law fulfils its intended purpose. By doing so, the judiciary
demonstrates a commitment to the principle of harmonious
construction, allowing the spirit of the law to prevail over its literal
wording. This practice not only preserves legislative intent but also
reinforces the role of the Courts in shaping the legal framework,
ensuring that statutory provisions serve their rightful purpose.
IX. Retrospective Operation of Section 4 Excludes Prior
Proceedings
90. It is in the light of the aforesaid principles that the
retrospective operation of Section 4 of the Civil Courts Amendment
Act falls to be examined. The contention that the Court must
examine the constitutional validity of the retrospective operation of
the impugned legislations on the basis of the literal language of
Section 4 of the Civil Courts Amendment Act and bearing in mind
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that neither of the impugned legislations contain a savings provision,
is unpersuasive. The contention that there is no scope of
interpreting the provisions of the impugned legislations to limit the
retrospective operation so as to save judgments and orders passed
in appeals prior to the impugned legislations coming into force is
equally unmerited.
91. Indisputably, the legislative intent is not to nullify the
judgments delivered and orders passed in First Appeals since
28.08.2007. As noted hereinbefore, the rationale of enacting the
impugned legislations can be ascertained from the judgment in Smt
Thirakavva (supra), the opinion of the Karnataka Law Commission,
and the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the impugned
legislations. Bearing the same in mind, Section 4 of the Civil Courts
Amendment Act must be read restrictively to exclude judgments and
orders passed prior to the impugned legislations coming into force.
92. The contention that such a restrictive reading of Section 4 of
the Civil Courts Amendment Act, so as to exclude past proceedings,
is impermissible and is unpersuasive. The rule of purposive
interpretation compels us to read Section 4 of the Civil Courts
Amendment Act restrictively.
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93. It is also necessary to note the relevance of the date of
28.08.2007. The impugned legislations are operative retrospectively
from the said date. It has been explained that Section 5 of the
Amendment Act 26 of 2007 (Second Amendment) came into force
from the said date. By virtue of the said Act, the pecuniary
jurisdiction of the Court of a Civil Judge under Section 17 of the
1964 Act was enhanced from 50,000/- to 5,00,000/-, and the limit
for appeals lying to the District Court under Section 19(1) was
enhanced from 1,00,000/- to 10,00,000/-. Act 26 of 2007 was
published in the Gazette, and Section 5 thereof came into force, on
28.08.2007. It is thus relevant to refer to Section 5 of the Act 26 of
2007 which reads as under:
“Section 5. Pending cases not to be affected. –
Notwithstanding anything containing in this Act, all
suits, appeals or revision and other proceedings
connected therewith pending before the High
Court, District Court, Court of Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Civil Judge Junior Division) and Small
Causes Court. On the date of commencement of
this Act shall be continued and disposed of by the
respective Courts in which they are pending as if
the amendment made under this Act has not been
made.”
94. As is apparent from the above, Section 5 expressly provided
that the pending cases would not be transferred on account of a
change in the pecuniary jurisdiction. The purpose and intent of
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enacting that the amendments shall apply retrospectively from
28.08.2007, is to make the impugned legislations operate
retrospectively to all appeals from the decrees and orders passed
by a Senior Civil Judge in original suits and proceedings of a civil
nature, irrespective of whether the said proceedings were pending
on the said date or instituted after the said date. These proceedings,
unlike under Section 5 of Act 26 of 2007, would be affected.
95. As noted above, it is contended on behalf of the State that the
object is to harmonise the Civil Courts Amendment Act with Act 26
of 2007. The said contention appears persuasive.
96. The principal question to be addressed is whether the
judgments and orders passed in the appeals arising from the
decrees and orders passed by a Senior Civil Judge are saved
notwithstanding that the same were passed by this Court, which has
ceased to be vested with jurisdiction. The essence of the
Appellants’/Petitioner’s contention is that the effect of Section 4 of
the Civil Courts Amendment Act is that this Court never (or at least
since 28.08.2007) had jurisdiction to adjudicate first appeals from
decrees and orders of the Senior Civil Judge and therefore all
judgments and orders passed in such proceedings are a nullity.
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However, the said interpretation militates against the legislative
intent and concededly leads to a completely unacceptable result.
This compels us to examine the legislative intent behind stipulating
that all amendments under the Civil Courts Amendment Act shall be
effective retrospectively from 28.08.2007. Plainly, it is to make it
explicit that the amendments would apply to all appeals pending as
on that date and instituted thereafter. But it is not to nullify the
orders passed in those proceedings prior to the impugned
legislations coming into force. Those orders and judgments must be
construed as saved.
97. As explained by the Supreme Court in State of
Rajasthan v. Mangilal Pindwal51, amendment of a statute by the
process of substitution of statutory provisions consists of two parts:
(i) the old rule ceases to exist; and (ii) the new rule is brought into
existence in its place.
98. The import of substituting the amended provisions (Sections
17 and 19 of the 1964 Act) by virtue of the Civil Courts Amendment
Act is to repeal those sections and replace them by the amended
provisions. By virtue of Section 6 of the Karnataka General Clauses
51
(1996) 5 SCC 60
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Act, 1899, the repeal does not affect the previous operation of the
provisions so repealed or anything duly done or suffered
thereunder. It does not affect any right, privilege, obligation or
liability acquired, accrued or incurred. All judgments and orders
passed by courts remain unaffected by the repeal of the provisions.
Thus, keeping apart the issue of the effect of the retrospective
provision, the substitution of the relevant provisions conferring
appellate jurisdiction on the district court (in place of this Court)
does not nullify the orders already passed. Plainly, the pending
proceedings would be affected by such substitution, as this Court
would cease to have jurisdiction.
99. It is relevant to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in
Gottumukkala Venkata Krishamraju v. Union of India52. In the
said case, the Supreme Court considered the amendments to the
Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act,
1993 (which was renamed as the Recovery of Debts and
Bankruptcy Act, 1993). Section 3 of the said Act provided for the
establishment of tribunals known as Debt Recovery Tribunals.
Section 6 of the Act contains provisions regarding the term of the
office of the Presiding Officer of the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The
52
(2019) 17 SCC 590
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said Section 6 as in force, prior to its substitution by Act No.44 of
2016, read as under :
“6. Term of office.–The Presiding Officer of a
Tribunal shall hold office for a term of five years
from the date on which he enters upon his office or
until he attains the age of sixty-two years,
whichever is earlier.”
100. By virtue of Act No. 44 of 2016, Section 6 of the Act was
substituted with effect from 01.09.2016, to read as under:
“6. Term of office of Presiding Officer.–The
Presiding Officer of a Tribunal shall hold office for
a term of five years from the date on which he
enters upon his office and shall be eligible for
reappointment:
Provided that no person shall hold office as the
Presiding Officer of a Tribunal after he has
attained the age of sixty-five years.”
101. Persons who had been appointed as a Presiding Officer
under the unamended provisions filed petitions. They were
appointed for a term of 5 years or till attaining the age of 62 years,
whichever is earlier. Although the said officers had not completed 5
years of service, they had either attained 62 years or were on the
verge of attaining that age.
102. In the aforesaid context, the question that fell for
consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioners
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would be entitled to complete their 5-year term by taking advantage
of the amended provision, which had raised the age bar to 65 years.
103. The Supreme Court concluded that the provision of Section 6
of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, as amended
with effect from 01.09.2016, would be applicable to the presiding
officers serving at the material time, notwithstanding that they had
been appointed prior to 01.09.2016. The Supreme Court found
strength in the said interpretation as the amended provision had
been substituted in place of the earlier one, thereby obliterating the
unamended provisions. It is relevant to refer to the following extract
from the said decision:
“18. Ordinarily wherever the word “substitute” or
“substitution” is used by the legislature, it has the
effect of deleting the old provision and make the
new provision operative. The process of
substitution consists of two steps : first, the old
rule is made to cease to exist and, next, the new
rule is brought into existence in its place. The rule
is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier
one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part
of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must
thereafter be read and construed as if the altered
words had been written into the earlier Act with
pen and ink and the old words scored out so that
thereafter there is no need to refer to the
amending Act at all. No doubt, in certain
situations, the Court having regard to the purport
and object sought to be achieved by the
legislature may construe the word “substitution” as
an “amendment” having a prospective effect.
Therefore, we do not think that it is a universal rule
that the word “substitution” necessarily or always
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connotes two severable steps, that is to say, one
of repeal and another of a fresh enactment even if
it implies two steps. However, the aforesaid
general meaning is to be given effect to, unless it
is found that the legislature intended otherwise.
Insofar as present case is concerned, as
discussed hereinafter, the legislative intent was
also to give effect to the amended provision even
in respect of those incumbents who were in
service as on 1-9-2016.
19. The effect, thus, would be to replace Section 6
as amended with the intention as if this is the only
provision which exist from the date of introduction
and the earlier provision was not there at all. The
effect of this would be that all those incumbents
who are holding the post of Presiding Officer on 1-
9-2016 would be governed by this provision.
** ** **
22. Our view is also in accord with the purport and
objective behind the amendment which were
reflected while carrying out the amendment itself.
The purpose of amending Section 6 was to reduce
the burden of pendency by enhancement of age of
the Judges concerned..
** ** **
24. In order to fulfil the aforesaid objective of
reducing the arrears and tackle the issue of
pendency of cases in various Debts Recovery
Tribunals, “purposive interpretation” is to be given.
In RBI [RBI v. Peerless General Finance &
Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424] , the
Court explained this principle in the following
manner : (SCC p. 450, para 33)“33. Interpretation must depend on the text and
the context. They are the bases of interpretation.
One may well say if the text is the texture, context
is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored.
Both are important. That interpretation is best
which makes the textual interpretation match the
contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we
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know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the
statute must be read, first as a whole and then
section by section, clause by clause, phrase by
phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at,
in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of
the statute-maker, provided by such context, its
scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words
may take colour and appear different than when
the statute is looked at without the glasses
provided by the context. With these glasses we
must look at the Act as a whole and discover what
each section, each clause, each phrase and each
word is meant and designed to say as to fit into
the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute
and no word of a statute can be construed in
isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that
every word has a place and everything is in its
place. ….” (emphasis supplied)
25. We are, thus, of the opinion that while carrying
out the aforesaid amendment with the intention to
substitute the amended provision with that of
unamended, Parliament desired that the benefit of
this provision is extended even to those who are
serving as Presiding Officers on the date when the
amendment became enforceable. This seems to
be just, reasonable and sensible outcome.”
104. The principles enunciated in the aforesaid decision are
applicable in the present case as well. The substitution of the
amended provisions would clearly apply to the pending
proceedings.
105. In the present case, the legislature has expressly provided
that the amended provisions would be retrospectively applicable.
This view clearly expresses the legislative intent that all
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amendments, as introduced by the Civil Courts Amendment Act,
would cover the pending proceedings even though the said
proceedings were instituted prior to the impugned legislations
coming into force.
106. The view that the legislative amendments introduced by
impugned legislations are applicable to the pending proceedings is
established for two reasons. First, the forum of appeal is a matter of
procedural law, and thus, unless the legislative intent appears
otherwise, the said provisions would be presumed to apply
retrospectively and govern the pending proceedings. Second, that
Section 4 of the Civil Courts Amendment Act expressly provides that
the amendments shall come into force retrospectively from
28.08.2007.
107. The High Court Amendment Act received the assent of the
Governor on 20.03.2024 and was first published in the Karnataka
Gazette Extra-ordinary on 19.06.2024. Section 1(2) of the said Act
expressly provides that it shall come into force “at once”. Unlike, the
Civil Courts Amendment Act, there is no provision in the High Court
Amendment Act that posits that it is applicable retrospectively. The
definitions of ‘First Appeal’ and ‘Second Appeal’ in the 1961 Act
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were substituted by the High Court Amendment Act. The reasoning
in Gottumukkala Venkata Krishamraju v. Union of India (supra)
is squarely applicable in this case as well. The amendment by
substitution would clearly imply that the said amendments would
also apply to pending proceedings.
108. The controversy, thus, narrows down considerably to whether
the judgments and orders passed in appeals prior to the enactment
of the impugned legislations are saved, absent any savings
provision. According to the learned Senior Counsels appearing for
the Appellants/Petitioner, the absence of a savings clause in the
Civil Courts Amendment Act is a fatal error in drafting, which is
incurable. According to them, the literal interpretation of the
impugned legislations leaves no scope for reading in a savings
provision.
X. Re: Doctrine of Reading Down
109. We are unable to concur with the aforesaid contention. It is
well settled that a legislative enactment must be presumed to be
constitutionally valid. Thus, the Courts must choose an
interpretation that sustains the legislation’s validity rather than one
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that renders it invalid. To that end, the Courts will, where possible,
read down a provision to preserve its validity.
110. In M.Rathinaswami and others v. State of T.N.53, the
appellants were persons promoted to the post of Assistant under the
Tamil Nadu Ministerial Civil Services from the post of Junior
Assistant in the Revenue Department of the State. They had joined
the services as Junior Assistants after clearing the competitive
examinations conducted by the Tamil Nadu Public Service
Commission. Their minimum educational qualification for being
eligible for the post of Junior Assistant was SSLC but, most of them
were graduates or postgraduates. Some of them had completed
their graduation after joining service. Aspirants could also be
directly recruited to the post of Assistant through a competitive
examination. The minimum qualification for a directly recruited
Assistant was Graduation. The controversy arose in the context of
further promotion to the post of Deputy Tahsildar. The Government
had issued an order placing directly recruited Assistants who had
completed five years of service above the promotee Assistants.
This order was challenged as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India. The High Court upheld the said Government
53
(2009) 5 SCC 625
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Order on the ground that there was an intelligible differentia
between graduates and non-graduates. Since the minimum
qualification for a direct recruit to the post of Junior Assistant was
SSLC and those to the post of Assistant was Graduate, placing the
directly recruited assistants above the promotee assistants, was
held to be neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.
111. The Supreme Court found no fault with according preference
to graduates over non-graduates for promotion to the posts of
Deputy Tahsildar. However, the Court found no rational basis for
giving preference to directly recruited Assistants over the promotee
Assistants. The Court applied the Doctrine of Reading Down and
read the impugned rule to apply only to non-graduate promotees,
but not to graduate promotees. The relevant extract of the said
decision is set out below:
“25. However, the question whether the difference
in the educational qualifications is sufficient to give
preferential treatment to one class of candidates
against another, should in our opinion be ordinarily
left to the executive authorities to decide. The
executive authorities have expertise in
administrative matters, and it is ordinarily not
proper for this Court to sit in appeal over their
decisions unless it is something totally arbitrary or
shocking.
26. Whether graduate degree is a sufficient basis
for classification for promotion vis-Ã -vis non-
graduates, and whether such classification has
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rational relation to the nature of duties of a Deputy
Tahsildar, is, in our opinion for the State
Government to decide, and not the Court. Hence,
we uphold the validity of the impugned Rule to the
extent that it gives preference to the directly
recruited Assistants over the promoted Assistants
who are non-graduates.
27. However, we cannot find any rational basis for
giving preference to the direct recruits over those
promotee Assistants who are graduates, since the
very basis for the distinction sought to be drawn by
the respondents is that the direct recruits are
graduates and hence intellectually superior to non-
graduates. Hence we have to read down the
impugned rule in order to save it from becoming
violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
** ** ** **
29. Sometimes to uphold the constitutional validity
the statutory provision has to be read down. Thus,
in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi [AIR 1945 FC 25
sub nom Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, In
re] , the Federal Court was considering the validity
of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937.
In order to uphold the constitutional validity of the
Act, the Federal Court held the Act intra vires by
construing the word “property” as meaning
“property other than agricultural land”. This
restricted interpretation of the word “property” had
to be given otherwise the Act would have become
unconstitutional.
30. Similarly, in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of
Bihar [AIR 1962 SC 955] this Court had to
construe Section 124-A of the Penal Code which
relates to the offence of sedition which makes a
person punishable who “by words, either spoken
or written, or by signs, or by visible representation,
or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into
hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to
excite disaffection towards, the Government
established by law”. This Court gave a restricted
interpretation to the aforesaid words so that they
apply only to acts involving intention or tendency
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to create disorder or disturbance of law and order
or incitement to violence. This was done to avoid
the provisions becoming violative of Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution which provides for
freedom of speech and expression.
31. Several other decisions on the point have
been given in Justice G.P. Singh’s Principles of
Statutory Interpretation (7th Edn., 1999, pp. 414-
17).
32. For the reasons given above these appeals
are partly allowed and the impugned judgment is
partly set aside, and it is held that the impugned
rule so far as it places directly recruited Assistants
above the promotees for promotion as Deputy
Tahsildar shall only apply to those promotees who
are non-graduates, but it is inapplicable to those
promotees who are graduates.”
112. The aforesaid decision is yet another decision where the
application of the rule had been interpreted to exclude a class of
persons in variance with its literal interpretation. The Court had
read words into an otherwise unambiguous rule to sustain its
validity.
113. In yet another instance, in State of Maharashtra and Others
v. Ravdeep Singh Sohal54, the Supreme Court upheld the reading
down of a rule. In the said case, the Court considered Rule
5.2.2.3.1 of the Rules for admission to MBBS and BDS Courses
54
(2000) 9 SCC 184
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framed by the Government of Maharashtra, which provided
reservation for the children of defence personnel and ex-defence
service personnel. The said rule, inter alia, provided that the
concerned defence personnel ought to have been transferred to
Maharashtra, in the public interest, on or after 01.07.1994 in order to
avail the benefit of the said rule. The Supreme Court upheld the
reading down of the provisions of the rule so as not to exclude
service personnel being transferred to Maharashtra prior to the cut-
off date of 01.07.1994. The relevant extract of the said decision is
set out below:
“3. ..The respondent, taking note of the prospectus
issued by Appellant 1 for admission to MBBS/BDS
courses for the year 1995-96 and finding himself
eligible, submitted his application for admission to
the MBBS course as per the prescribed
procedure. The respondent had sought admission
both in the Open Merit Category as well as in the
reserved Defence 3 Category. In the provisional
merit list, displayed on 27-6-1995 by the College,
the name of the respondent appeared at Sl. No.
517 in the Open Merit Category and at Sl. No. 1 in
Defence 3 Category. In the final merit list, which
was displayed on 3-7-1995, while the name of the
respondent was shown at Sl. No. 518 in the Open
Merit Category, it had been removed from
Defence 3 Category and another candidate was
shown at Sl. No. 1, who had less marks than the
respondent. The respondent was not apprised of
the reasons for the removal of his name from the
merit list at Sl. No. 1 reserved for Defence 3
Category. He, through his father, filed a writ
petition in the High Court and sought striking down
of the provisions of Rule 5.2.2.3.1 of the Rules for
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Admission to MBBS and BDS Courses, 1995-96
framed by the Government of Maharashtra on the
ground that the cut-off date (1-7-1994) given in
that Rule would render all other Rules
meaningless and inoperative. Rule 5.2.2.3.1 inter
alia provides that the defence service person
concerned ought to have been transferred to
Maharashtra, in public interest, on or after 1-7-
1994. The Division Bench of the High Court, after
a detailed discussion, and keeping in view the
peculiar situation in which defence personnel are
placed and the exigencies of their transfer, in
public interest, during an academic year, instead
of striking down the said Rule, read it down to
harmonise it with other Rules and opined that the
respondent having passed the qualifying
examination from a recognised school/college
situate in the State of Maharashtra itself could not
be denied admission on the ground that his father
had been transferred to the State of Maharashtra
in October 1993, i.e., before the cut-off date given
in the Rule. We agree with the opinion expressed
by the High Court that if the cut-off date of 1-7-
1994 was strictly made applicable, the object of
providing reservation to the category of students
belonging to Defence 3 Category, who come to
the State of Maharashtra from outside on account
of transfers of their parents in public interest,
would be virtually defeated because transfers of
defence personnel are made in public interest not
at any fixed period of time. The High Court, as a
matter of fact, has harmonised the Rule by reading
it down and saved it from the vice of irrationality or
arbitrariness. In our opinion, the view taken by the
High Court in the peculiar facts and circumstances
of this case is unexceptionable. We see no reason
to interfere. The appeal, therefore, fails and is
dismissed. No costs.”
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114. There are several instances where the Courts have read
down the provisions to save their validity. However, it is necessary
that the provisions as read down serve the legislative intent.
115. We find no difficulty in reading down Section 4 of the Civil
Courts Amendment Act so as to exclude from its retrospective
operation (i) all appeals that stand concluded by final judgments and
orders; and (ii) all orders passed in proceedings that are pending.
The retrospective operation of the amendments is thus confined to
pending appellate proceedings, which shall be governed by the
amended provisions from the current stage till the disposal of the
appeals. This is in conformity with the legislative intent, as is
unmistakably discernible from (i) the rationale for enacting the
impugned legislations; (ii) the opinion of the Karnataka Law
Commission; and (iii) the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
impugned legislations. Consequently, the pending proceedings will
continue from the stage at which they are transferred to the
competent court. The proceedings already conducted prior to the
enactment of the impugned legislations and as continued by virtue
of the interim order dated 03.07.2024, passed by this court, shall not
be construed as non-est, illegal or a nullity.
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XI. Re: Discrimination
116. It is contended that the impugned legislations are
discriminatory inasmuch as the First Appeals arising from the
decisions of the Bengaluru City Civil Court continue to be heard by
the High Court, while the first appeals from the decrees of Senior
Civil Judges in other districts of the State would be heard by the
competent District Court. The said contention is also unmerited.
117. There is a clear distinction between the Courts of Senior Civil
Judges functioning in the districts under the 1964 Act and the
judges functioning under the Bangalore City Civil Court Act, 1979
and the Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act, 1964. In Bengaluru, it
is Judges in the cadre of District Judges who function as the City
Civil Judges exercising original jurisdiction in the Bengaluru City
Civil Court. Thus, the High Court Amendment Act cannot be faulted
for confining the first appeals that lie to the High Court and the
appeals arising from orders, judgments and decrees passed by City
Civil Judges in exercise of original jurisdiction. It is well settled that
Article 14 of the Constitution of India permits reasonable
classification and as noted above, there is sufficient reason for
excluding appeals arising from Courts of the Bengaluru Urban
District.
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XII. Re: Order dated 24.06.2024
118. The State Government issued an order dated 24.06.2024
under Section 4 of the Civil Courts Amendment Act, declaring that
the amended provisions of the Act shall apply prospectively with
effect from 19.06.2024. The learned Single Judge had observed
that the said order would not affect the retrospective effect of the
Civil Courts Amendment Act as the power under Section 4 of the
Civil Courts Amendment Act did not empower the State Government
to amend the statutory provisions.
119. Neither of the parties contested the said conclusion. Plainly,
the State Government cannot issue an order to amend the language
of the statutory provision.
CONCLUSION
120. The learned Single Judge held that the retrospective effect
given to the amendments under the Civil Courts Amendment Act
had to be regarded as a mistake on the part of the legislature and
was arbitrary and unreasonable, leading to confusion and absurdity,
as well as being repugnant to other provisions of the Act. The
operative part of the impugned order is set out below:
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“i. The writ petition is allowed-in-part.
ii. The retrospective effect given to the amendment
from 28.08.2007 to the Karnataka Civil Courts Act
as per Karnataka Act No.33 of 2024 is hereby set
aside, and the amendment shall be given
prospective effect.
iii. All other amendments to the Karnataka Civil
Courts Act, 1964 (Karnataka Act 21 of 1964),
amended by way of Karnataka Civil Courts
(Amendment) Act, 2023 (Karnataka Act No.33 of
2024) are upheld.
iv. Amendments to the Karnataka High Court Act,
1961 (Karnataka Act No.5 of 1962) amended by
way of Karnataka High Court (Amendment) Act,
2023 (Karnataka Act No.32 of 2024) are upheld.
v. The pending first appeals shall be transferred to
the jurisdictional Court as per the Karnataka Civil
Courts (Amendment) Act, 2023 as expeditiously as
possible and the judgments rendered till then by the
Courts of competent jurisdiction as per un-
amended provisions shall be valid.
vi. Similarly, all judgments rendered by Division
Bench of the High Court of Karnataka under the un-
amended provisions shall be saved till the
Karnataka High Court (Amendment) Act, 2023, is
given effect to and acted upon.
vii. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand
disposed of.”
121. We concur with the conclusions of the learned Single Judge
in the impugned order, except to the extent that the retrospective
effect given to the amendments under Section 4 of the Civil Courts
Amendment Act has been set aside. In our view, the said provision
is required to be read down, as indicated above, to exclude the
concluded matters as well as the orders passed in the pending
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proceedings from its retrospective operation. The impugned order is
modified to the aforesaid extent.
122. We also concur with the consequential directions issued by
the learned Single Judge for the implementation of the impugned
legislations. The impugned legislations were stayed, and therefore
the matters were not transferred to the competent courts. Thus, it is
also necessary to direct that further proceedings shall be
undertaken from the stage as of the date of transfer, and all
judgments and orders passed prior to the said date are saved.
123. The writ appeal (W.A No.200260/2025) is disposed of in the
aforesaid terms. The writ petition (W.P No.17588/2024) is
dismissed.
124. The pending interlocutory applications also stand disposed of.
Sd/-
(VIBHU BAKHRU)
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
(C.M. POONACHA)
JUDGE
AHB/SD/KPS/KMV
