Orissa High Court
State Of Odisha vs Sri Anupam Pradhan on 6 July, 2026
ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK
I.A. No.1168 of 2026
in
W.A. No.435 of 2026
In the matter of an Application to condone the delay
in filing Appeal under Article 4 of
the Odisha High Court Order, 1948
read with
Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting
the High Court of Judicature at Patna
and
Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII
of the Rules of the High Court of Odisha, 1948
***
1. State of Odisha
Represented through
Commissioner-cum-Secretary
School and Mass Education Department
At: Lok Seva Bhawan, District: Khordha.
2. Director
Secondary Education, Odisha
At: Heads of Department Building
Bhubaneswar, District: Khordha.
3. District Education Officer, Balasore
At/PO/District: Balasore. … Appellants
(Opposite party Nos.1 to 3
in the Writ Petition).
-VERSUS-
Sri Anupam Pradhan
Aged about 45 years
Son of R.K. Pradhan
At: Alada, P.O.: Kharasahapur
PS: Soro, District: Balasore. … Respondent
(Petitioner in
the Writ Petition).
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 1 of 87
Counsel appeared for the parties:
For the Appellants : Mr. Debashis Tripathy,
Additional Government AdvocateFor the Respondent : M/s. Dillip Kumar Mohapatra,
Balaram Behera,
Manash Ranjan Nayak, AdvocatesP R E S E N T:
HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE
MR. HARISH TANDONAND
HONOURABLE
MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMANDate of Hearing : 06.07.2026 :: Date of Judgment : 06.07.2026
J UDGMENT
THE QUESTION FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE INTERLOCUTORY
APPLICATION FILED PRAYING THEREIN TO CONDONE THE DELAY IN
FILING THE INTRA-COURT APPEAL:
Whether this intra-Court appeal is liable to be
entertained by condoning the delay of 1237 days
(excluding the prescribed period of thirty days) in filing
the writ appeal by the functionaries of the Government
of Odisha, being aggrieved by Order dated 30th June,
2022 passed in WPC(OAC) No.3077 of 2015, wherebyW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 2 of 87
and whereunder allowing the writ petition invoking
provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, a
learned Single Judge of this Court observed that the
matter in writ petition is governed by decision of co-
ordinate Bench in Satyabrata Nayak and Others Vrs.
State of Odisha and Others, WPC(OAC) No.902 of 2016
and batch vide Judgment dated 15th September, 20211.
THE FACTS:
2. It is unfurled from the papers forming part of the record
that the respondent, claiming to be Socially and
Educationally Backward Class category offered his
candidature for the post of Hindi Teacher (Contractual)
in Government High School in pursuance of
Advertisement vide Resolution No.VIII(8)-SME-(X)-
32/2014– 23404/SME, dated 27th October, 2014
having qualification with B.A. (Honours in Hindi)2 and
1 State of Odisha having carried the matter before the Division Bench in W.A.
No.557 of 2022, the same got dismissed vide Order dated 23.02.2026 along with
batch of matters being W.A. Nos. 487 of 2024, W.A. No.818 of 2021, WA No.1137
of 2022, W.A. No.1214 of 2022, W.A. No.1600 of 2022, W.A. No.1674 of 2022,
W.A. No.89 of 2023, W.A. No.1039 of 2023, W.A. No.1154 of 2023 & W.A. No.488
of 2024. Division Bench of this Court disposed of other identical matters being
Biswaranjan Biswal and Others Vrs. State of Odisha and Others, W.A.No.102 of
2016 disposed of by Order dated 29.11.2022 and State of Odisha Vrs. Nirupama
Jena, W.A. No. 1306 of 2025, disposed of vide Judgment dated 05.02.2026.
2 Government of Odisha in School and Mass Education Department vide
Resolution No. IXSME(p)66/10– 2779, dated 09.02.2011 declared that:
“*** For all practical purpose, it has been accepted that degree obtained in Hindi
Shikshan Praveen from Kendriya Hindi Sansthan, Agra is equivalent to Teacher’s
Training Certificate/Diploma. For the above purpose, in the event the petitioners
claim such status that such degree obtained by them is equivalent to Teacher’s
Training Certificate/Diploma, the same should be held to be equivalent and the
Government should take necessary steps in that regard for declaring the same to
be equivalent in Teacher’s Training Certificate/Diploma. More so, when a clear
distinction has been made in the Resolution under Annexure-1 that Hindi
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 3 of 87
M.A. in Hindi. The respondent acquired B.Ed. having
qualified in the Examination held in the year 2013 from
Indira Gandhi Open University and also passed “Ratna”
in the examination conducted by the Rashtrabhasha
Prachar Samiti, Wardha.
2.1. In a batch of matter being Saroj Kumar Tripathy Vrs.
State of Odisha, O.A. No.1674(C) of 2015 &c. by Order
dated 16.05.2017, the learned Odisha Administrative
Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack held that:
“In view of the above discussion, as Rashtrabhasha
Ratna from Rashtrabhasha Prachar Samiti, Wardha is
one of the prescribed qualifications, which according to
the respondents is an alternative qualification come in the
second category of preference, the candidature of teh
applicants possessing the above qualification cannot be
rejected on that ground. Accordingly, the order of rejection
of candidature of the applicants who possesses
Rashtrabhasha Ratna from Rashtrabhasha Prachar
Samiti, Wardha is not maintainable and are quashed and
the respondent-Authorities are directed to consider the
candidature of the applicants for the post of contract
teacher in Hindi. Further if the applicants are otherwise
eligible and suitable, consequential action for their
appointment be taken.”
2.2. The case of the respondent in the Original Application
was that having satisfied the eligibility criteria as per
Clause 3(f) of the Resolution dated 27th October, 2014,
Shikshan Praveen is equivalent to Teacher’s Training Certificate/Diploma and
Hindi Shikshan Parangat is equivalent to B.Ed. degree.”
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 4 of 87
he is eligible to be considered for engagement as Hindi
Teacher (Contractual). In the common merit list the
name of the respondent appeared at serial No.556 and
had his candidature been considered in the second
category, he should have been appointed as Hindi
Teacher under untrained category. However, after the
decision of the Odisha Administrative Tribunal, the
Government relaxed the upper age limit and accordingly
Additional Merit List was published on 19.03.2016. It is
alleged that the candidates though secured less marks
than the respondent have been given appointed under
untrained category.
2.3. Therefore, for issue of direction to the employer to
consider the marks secured by the respondents as per
certificates enclosed with the Original Application
including the qualification acquired during the extended
period by relaxing age as was held by the learned Odisha
Administrative Tribunal in the cases of Saroj Kumar
Tripathy (supra). By way of filing Original Application the
respondent approached the learned Odisha
Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack under
Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985,
which was registered as OA No.3077(C) of 2015.
2.4. During the pendency of the matter, after abolition of the
Odisha Administrative Tribunal by virtue of Ministry of
Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 5 of 87
of Personnel and Training) Notification F. No. A-
11014/10/2015-AT [G.S.R.552(E)], dated 2nd August,
2019), the said case having been transferred to this
Court, O.A. No.3077 (C) of 2015 has been re-registered
as WPC (OAC) No.3077 of 2015.
2.5. Having heard the matter, the learned Single Judge vide
Order dated 30th June, 2022 allowed the writ petition
observing thus:
“6. Considering the submission made by learned
counsel for the parties, this Court is of the
considered view that since the order passed by this
Court in Satyabrata Nayak and Others Vrs. State of
Odisha has not been assailed, the ratio decided in
the said case is fully applicable to the present case.
7. Thus, this writ petition is disposed of in terms of the
observation/direction given in the case of
Satyabrata Nayak (supra)3.”
3 Relevant portion of Judgment dated 15th September, 2021 rendered by Single
Judge in WPC (OAC) No.902 of 2016 is quoted hereunder:
“7. Admittedly, Government of Odisha in School and Mass Education
Department issued a resolution on 27.10.2014 prescribing recruitment
procedure for teaching staff in Government Secondary Schools, wherein
clause-3 deals with Educational Qualification. So far as Hindi Teacher is
concerned, the same has been provided under Clause 3(f) which reads as
under:
‘(f) Hindi Teacher–
Bachelor’s degree from a recognized University with Hindi
as one of the elective subject with minimum 50% marks in
aggregate (45% for SC/ST/PH/OBC/SEBC candidates) or
with Rastrabhasa Ratna from Rastrabhasa Prachar Samiti,
Wardha or with Sastri from Orissa Rastrabhasa Parisada,
Puri or with Snataka (Acquired by June-2005, the date up
to which the temporary recognition has been granted) from
Hindi Sikshaya Samiti, Orissa, Cuttack or an equivalent
degree from a recognized institution with at least 50%
marks in aggregate (45% for SC/ST/PH/OBC/SEBC
candidates) and Hindi Sikshyan Parangat from Kendriya
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 6 of 87
Hindi Sansthan, Agra/B.H.Ed. (a course prescribed by
NCTE) from a Institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated
to recognized university/B.Ed. in Hindi (a course prescribed
by NCTE) from Dakhin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha,
Madas, a institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated to a
recognized university.
OR
Bachelor’s degree with Hindi as one of the optional/Hons
subject with minimum 50% of marks in aggregate (45% for
SC/ST/PH/OBC/SEBC candidates) and M.A. in Hindi with
minimum 50% marks in aggregate from a recognized
University.
(The untrained candidates shall have to undergo required
training within the timeline as prescribed by Govt.)
8. On perusal of the qualification prescribed for Hindi Teacher, as mentioned
above, it appears that only eligible candidates can make application for
consideration of Contract Teacher (Hindi) pursuant to advertisement
issued for the year 2014-15. Clause 3(f) of the advertisement which has
been placed in the bracket makes it clear that the untrained candidates
shall have to undergo required training within the timeline as prescribed
by Government. Thereby, necessary implication of incorporating this
clause clearly indicates that though training qualification has been
prescribed as eligibility criteria for making an application, the untrained
candidates can also make an application but they have to undergo
required training within the timeline as prescribed by the Government. It is
not in dispute that the petitioners have got requisite qualification for
appointment as Contract Teacher (Hindi). But only difficulty is that they
had not acquired the training qualification by the time they submitted the
application, though they had undergone training and result thereof was
not published. After submission of applications when result was
published, before their applications were taken into consideration, even
though they produced the training qualification certificates, their
applications were rejected stating that “B.Ed. after 06.04.2015” or
“certificate produced after 06.04.2015”. The grounds for rejection of their
applications cannot sustain, in view of the stipulation made in clause-3(f)
of the resolution dated 27.10.2014. If untrained candidates can have right
to make application and subsequently they can undergo required training
within the timeline as prescribed by the Government, submission of their
applications even as untrained candidates, cannot be said to be faulted
with. Rather, their applications should have been considered as untrained
candidates for selection to the post of Contract Teacher (Hindi) and they
should have been allowed to undergo required training within the timeline
as prescribed by the Government. As such, the present petitioners stand
on a better footing in accordance with the stipulation made in clause-3(f) of
the resolution dated 27.10.2014. Meaning thereby, even though they had
applied as untrained candidates and undergone training, but result
thereof was not published by the time they submitted their applications.
But before consideration of their applications, they had already acquired
the qualification of training and, thereby, their applications should not and
could not have been rejected by the authority stating “B.Ed. after
06.04.2015” or “certificate produced after 06.04.2015” and, as such,
disqualifying them from participating in the process of selection is
absolutely non-application of mind by the authority and unwarranted.
Similar view has already been taken by this Court in Nihar Ranjan
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 7 of 87
2.6. Aggrieved thereby, the State of Odisha has approached
this Court in this writ appeal; but with a delay of 1237
days (excluding thirty days of normal period allowed to
file appeal).
HEARING OF THE INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION FILED IN THE WRIT
APPEAL BY THE APPELLANTS FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY:
Sarangi (supra) [Nihar Ranjan Sarangi Vrs. State of Odisha and others,
WPC (OAC) No.1976 of 2015 vide order dated 23.07.2021].
9. In Banarasi Das Vrs. State of U.P., AIR 1956 SC 520, the apex Court held
that it is open to the appointing authority to lay down requisite
qualifications for recruitment to Government services.
10. Although a candidate must fulfil the requisite qualifications for being
considered for recruitment, difficulties often arise with regard to the
interpretation of the requisite qualifications. Since the qualifications vary
from case to case, decisions have turned upon the construction of the
specific requirements provided by the rules or administrative instructions
in the particular cases before the courts.
11. It is also brought to the notice of the Court that untrained persons have
been given engagement vide order dated 04.04.2016 in respect of
Mayurbhanj and Bolangir Education District. Thereby, it is contended that
even though trained qualification of the petitioners had not been taken into
consideration, but as untrained candidates, their cases should have been
considered and engagement order should have been issued in their
favour, as similarly situated persons have already been extended with
such benefit. As such, the entire action authority is in gross violation of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
12. In view of such position, there is no ambiguity in the qualification
prescribed under clause 3(f) of the resolution dated 27.10.2014, so far as
engagement of Contract Teacher (Hindi) is concerned. But by
misconstruing the provisions contained therein, the applications of the
petitioners have been rejected on the ground that “B.Ed. after 06.04.2015”
or “certificate produced after 06.04.2015”, though pursuant to such
clause-3(f), untrained candidates can also make application and
thereafter they shall have to undergo required training as per the
Government norms.
13. In view of the factual and legal analysis, as discussed above, this Court is
of the considered view that the draft reject list, so far as present
petitioners are concerned, cannot sustain in the eye of law and the same
is liable to be quashed and is hereby quashed. The opposite parties are
directed to take into consideration the applications filed by the petitioners
in the above mentioned writ petitions, allow them to participate in the
process of selection, consider their case for engagement as Contract
Teacher (Hindi) by re-drawing the select list and extend them all the
benefits in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, preferably
within a period of three months from the date of communication of this
judgment.
14. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed. However, there shall be no
order as to costs.”
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 8 of 87
3. This matter was taken up for hearing on 4th May, 2026
on the point of limitation and this Court issued notice to
the respondent, pursuant to which the respondent
having appeared, opposed the petition for condonation of
delay being I.A. No.1168 of 2026 by filing objection in
shape of affidavit on 22.06.2026. The matter being listed
today (6th July, 2026), on the consent of the learned
counsel for the parties, this matter is taken up for
hearing.
4. Heard Sri Debashis Tripathy, learned Additional
Government Advocate for the Appellants-State and Sri
Dillip Kumar Mohapatra, learned Advocate for the
respondent.
Cause shown by the appellants explaining the delay:
5. The explanation offered by the State of Odisha for the
inordinate delay occasioned in filing the writ appeal is
stated thus:
“3. That the above said writ petition was disposed of by
the Hon’ble Single Judge vide order dated
30.06.2022. After receipt of the above said order
dated 30.06.2022 necessary consultation were
made with the Government authorities and
accordingly the Government in School and Mass
Education Department has authorized the Director,
Secondary Education to file writ appeal against the
order dated 30.06.2022 passed in WPC(OAC)
No.3077 of 2015. The Deputy Director, Directorate ofW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 9 of 87
Secondary Education authorized the District
Education Officer, Balasore vide Letter No.26162
dated 09.10.2025 to file writ appeal in the aforesaid
case. Accordingly, this deponent moved to the office
of the Advocate General, Odisha, Cuttack, for
drafting of memorandum of appeal and after
necessary discussion the same was prepared and
filed on (left blank).
4. That, it is humbly and respectfully submitted that
the delay caused for filing of intra-court appeal is
bona fide, unintentional and not willful; on the other
hand the delay caused for filling of the memo of
appeal is due to observation of the official formalities
and due to above mentioned intervening
circumstances. It is further submitted that it is the
settled principle of law as decided by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case Sheo Raj Singh (deceased)
through LRs. & Others Vrs. Union of India & Another
in Civil Appeal No.5867 of 2015, the Hon’ble Apex
Court by distinguishing some other judicial
pronouncement with regard to condonation of delay
and held since the said issue is the discretion by the
Hon’ble High Court and the expression of sufficient
cause is elastic enough for court to do substantial
justice and when substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against one another, the
former would prevail. Hence, the delay in filing the
present appeal may be condoned for the interest of
justice.”
Objection of the respondent:
6. The respondent filed objection against the explanation of
the appellants showing cause for the inordinate delay
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 10 of 87
occurred in filing the writ appeal inter alia stating that
the application for condonation of delay is misconceived,
untenable and devoid of merit, and the same deserves to
be dismissed in limine. The appellants have failed to
disclose any sufficient cause for condonation of delay as
required under law and the reasons stated in the
paragraph 3 of Interlocutor Application are vague,
general and do not justify indulgence to be shown to
consider the merit of the matter by condoning the
inordinate delay of 1235 days. Allowing such an
application would cause serious prejudice to the
respondent and defeat the purpose of law of limitation.
CONSIDERATION OF RIVAL CONTENTIONS AND SUBMISSIONS:
7. Sri Debashis Tripathy, learned Additional Government
Advocate for the appellants placed the fact leading to
delay in preferring the appeal by stating that after
receipt of inputs from concerned authorities/
Department and upon scrutiny of record and
examination of legal position, it was decided to approach
this Court in writ appeal. The claim of the respondent
was examined at various levels and the file was
submitted before the learned Advocate General for
taking steps to file the writ appeal. After thorough
examination and necessary vetting, the appeal assigned
with D-WA/0053201/2025 could be filed on 18.12.2025
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 11 of 87
and after removal of defect the case was registered as
W.A. No.435 of 2026 on 17.03.2026.
7.1. Sri Debashis Tripathy, learned Additional Government
Advocate contended that the writ appeal is required to
be considered on merits inasmuch as the order of the
learned Single Judge is vulnerable. He further submitted
that the case of Sri Satyabrata Nayak (supra) related to
rejection of their application on the ground that the
petitioners have acquired qualification after the last date
of submission as per original advertisement. Said Order
was challenged before this Court by way of writ appeal
being W.A. No.557 of 2022. He fairly submitted that the
said writ appeal got dismissed along with other writ
appeals on the identical cases.
7.2. Nonetheless, he submitted that to test the legality of the
order of the learned Single Judge, the delay of 1237 days
occasioned due to official process and taking decision to
file writ appeal can be condoned and He fervently
requested to admit the writ appeal for hearing on merit.
8. Sri Dillip Kumar Mohapatra, learned Advocate for the
respondent vociferously argued that while exercising
power to condone the delay, the merit of the writ appeal
cannot be taken into consideration; it is only the merit
so far as the delay is concerned deserves to be
considered. The appellants have not provided any
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 12 of 87
plausible explanation. The State of Odisha in its
interlocutory application failed to demonstrate
“sufficient” and “reasonable” cause. In State of Madhya
Pradesh Vrs. Bherulal, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 849, quoting
from Chief Post Master General Vrs. Living Media India
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 in extenso, it was held that two
years delay in filing writ petition against Order of the
learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal is not liable to
be condoned. On the same analogy, in the present case,
as neither sufficient nor reasonable cause has been
shown by the appellants-functionaries of the State of
Odisha in the petition for condonation of delay, there is
no scope left than to adhere to what has been directed
by the learned Single Judge while disposing of the writ
petition.
8.1. The practice of belated filing of appeal has been
deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the
case of Israr Ahmad Khan Vrs. Amarnath Prasad, 2026
SCC OnLine SC 322 with the following observations:
“Belated/Delayed Appeals to Delay/Defeat
Implementation:
27. Delayed filing of appeals should be the exception,
but in recent times, the exception has practically
evolved to become the rule. Orders passed by the
Courts are not complied with for a long time, and
when Contempt Petitions are filed, belated appeals,
with tremendous delay, are preferred.
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 13 of 87
28. The (alleged) continuing contumacious conduct of the
defaulting party is sought to be justified on the mere
production of a Diary/Filing/Stamp Reporting
Number showing that an appeal has been preferred,
so as to obtain multiple adjournments in contempt
matters.
29. We, in no uncertain terms, deprecate these practices.
It is felt that by such modus operandi, disobedient
litigants act brazenly which has the further effect of
bringing down the authority and majesty of the
Courts and the rule of law, interfering in the
administration of justice. The same may well, in
certain situations, border on criminal contempt.
30. The High Courts should deal with such
unscrupulous litigants, moreso when they happen to
be ‘State’, within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution, or like bodies, with an iron hand.
Unless the High Courts, so also this Court deal with
these aspects firmly, we run the clear risk of erosion
of the unflinching faith that the ordinary litigants of
this country repose in the Judiciary at all levels. It is
the solemn duty of all of us manning the Courts
across the hierarchy to ensure that the public faith
never wavers.”
8.2. Sri Dillip Kumar Mohapatra, learned Advocate laying
emphasis on the fact of inordinate delay, that too
without any plausible explanation in the interlocutory
application, submitted that the appellants have not only
failed to comply with the direction of the learned Single
Judge in the Order dated 30th June, 2022, but also
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 14 of 87
overstepped the mandate envisaged under Article 14 of
the Constitution of India.
8.3. He, therefore, strenuously argued that the plea of delay
on account of official process has no foundation as such
averment made without providing any material
particulars need not be considered. Such averment
being bald, terse and unintelligible is liable to be
discarded at the threshold.
8.4. The move of the appellants is calculated only to frustrate
the effect of direction contained in the Order dated 30th
June, 2022 passed in WPC(OAC) No.3077 of 2015. It is
apparent from the contents of the writ appeal and the
averments made in the interlocutory application that the
appellants have approached this Court for thwart the
direction of the learned Single Judge.
8.5. Under such premises, Sri Dillip Kumar Mohapatra,
learned Advocate for the respondent has prayed to
dismiss the petition for condonation of delay and
consequently, urged not to entertain the writ appeal
being barred by limitation.
PROVISIONS REGARDING WRIT APPEAL AND THE PROVISIONS FOR
LIMITATION:
9. The writ appeal before this Court has been filed invoking
provisions of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 15 of 87
Constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna,
which stands thus:
“Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court
9. And We do further ordain that the High Court of
Judicature at Patna shall have power to remove and
to try and determine, as a Court of extraordinary
original Jurisdiction, any suit being or falling within
the jurisdiction of any Court subject to its
superintendence, when the said High Court may
think proper to do so, either on the agreement of the
parties to that effect, or for purposes of justice, the
reasons for so doing being recorded on the
proceedings of the said High Court.
10. And We do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to
the said High Court of Judicature at Patna from the
judgment (not being a judgment passed in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a
decree or order made in the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction by a Court subject to the
superintendence of the said High Court, and not
being an order made in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order
passed or made in the exercise of the power of
superintendence under the provisions of Section 107
of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High
Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant
to Section 108 of Government of India Act and that
notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an
appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a
judgment of one Judge of said High Court or one
Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 16 of 87
of the Government of India Act, made (on or after the
first day of February one thousand nine hundred
and twenty nine) in the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in
the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court
subject to the superintendence of the said High
Court where the Judge who passed the judgment
declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that
the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of
the said High Court or of such Division Court shall
be to us, Our Heirs or Successors in Our or Their
Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.”
9.1. Article 4 of the Orissa High Court Order, 1948 stands as
follows:
“The High Court of Orissa shall have, in respect of the
territories for the time being included in the Province of
Orissa, all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction
as under the law in force immediately before the
prescribed day is exercisable in respect of the said
territories or any part thereof by the High Court in Patna.”
9.2. Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII of the
Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948, are given
hereunder:
“Chapter-III
6. Appeals to the High Court under Article 4 of the
Orissa High Court Order, 1948 read with Clause 10
of the Letters Patent Constituting the High Court of
Judicature at Patna from the Judgment of a Bench
confirming the judgment of a lower Court under
Section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall beW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 17 of 87
heard by a Bench consisting of at least three Judges
including both or either of the Judges of the Bench
from whose Judgment the appeal is preferred and, if
from the judgment of one Judge or a Bench of two
Judges, it shall be heard by a Bench consisting of at
least two Judges other than the Judge from whose
judgment the appeal is preferred.
Chapter-VIII
2. (1) Subject to Article 12 of the Orissa High Court
Order, 1948 every appeal to the High Court
under Article 4 thereof read with Clause 10 of
the Letters Patent Constituting the High Court
of Judicature at Patna from the judgment (not
being a judgment passed in the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or
order made in the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction by a Court subject to the
Superintendence of the High Court and not
being an order made in the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction, and not being a
sentence or order passed or made in the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of
the High Court or one Judge of any Division
Court pursuant to Article 225 of the
Constitution, shall be presented to the
Registrar within thirty days from the date
of the judgment appealed from unless a
Bench in its discretion, on good cause
shown, shall grant further time. The
Registrar shall endorse on the memorandum
the date of presentation and after satisfying
himself that the appeal is in order and is within
time shall cause it to be laid before a Bench for
orders at an early date. It shall be
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 18 of 87
accompanied by a certified copy of the
judgment appealed from together with a neatly
typed second copy thereof.
(2) Subject to Article 12 of the Orissa High Court
Order, 1948 every application for a Certificate
under Article 4 thereof read with Clause 10 of
the Letters Patent Constituting the High Court
of Judicature at Patna in the case of a
judgment of a Single Judge of the Court
deciding a second appeal shall be made orally
to the Judge in question immediately after the
judgment is delivered. No subsequent
application will be entertained unless upon a
duly stamped special application supported by
affidavit filed within thirty days and not more
from the date of the judgment the Judge is
satisfied that circumstances existed rendering
an immediate application impossible.
(3) If the Judge certifies that the case is a fit one
for appeal a duly stamped memorandum of
appeal may be presented to the Registrar
within a period not exceeding sixty days from
the date of the judgment unless the Judge in
his discretion on good cause shown shall grant
further time for its presentation.
(4) The memorandum of appeal need not be
accompanied by a copy of the judgment of
decree appealed from.”
10. On conjoint reading of above provisions it is manifest
that notwithstanding unambiguous specific provisions
envisaging extension of time being postulated, the
appellants-functionaries of the State of Odisha ignored
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 19 of 87
to adhere to the recourse available therein showing
“good cause” with respect to delay caused in filing the
writ appeal.
10.1. Bearing in mind oft-quoted dicta that “a statute cannot
be used for a purpose alien to which it has been made,
and where a power is given to do a certain thing in a
certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at
all and that other methods of performance are necessarily
forbidden” [vide Taylor Vrs. Taylor, [L.R.] 1 Ch. 426, as
referred to in Sarda Mines Private Limited Vrs. State of
Odisha, 2026 SCC OnLine Ori 2303] scrutiny of I.A.
No.160 of 2026 reveals that the interlocutory application
for condonation of delay in filing writ appeal has been
filed with title “An Application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act”. The nomenclature of cause title of said
petition strictly speaking is defective and as such the
petition is not maintainable for the reason that special
provision is available under the Rules of the High Court
of Orissa, 1948.
10.2. Be that as it may, without going into the technicalities,
this Court proceeds to consider the said interlocutory
application for condonation of delay taking into account
the reason ascribed therein for ascertaining whether the
appellants have shown “good cause”/”sufficient cause”
for filing the writ appeal with an inordinate delay of 1237
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 20 of 87
days (excluding 30 days specified period for filing the
appeal) and on the basis of material available on record.
ANALYSIS:
11. Above provisions would go to indicate that the writ
appeal under Article 4 of the Odisha High Court Order,
1948 read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent
constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna is
required to be presented before this Court within thirty
days from the date of the judgment appealed from as
provided for in Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the
High Court of Orissa, 1948. In the event the appeal is
not preferred within the said stipulated period, it is the
Bench which is empowered to use its discretion to “grant
further time”, subject to, of course, appreciation of “good
cause”.
12. Nevertheless, with the contents contained in the petition,
bearing I.A. No.1168 of 2026, praying therein to condone
“the delay of 1237 days in filing of the writ appeal”, this
Court now examines whether with the available material
on record as provided by the State of Odisha in said
petition “discretion” can be exercised to condone the
delay in preferring intra-Court appeal for “good cause”
shown by the appellants. Finding good cause shown,
this Court by exercising discretion may condone the
delay in filing the writ appeal by granting “further time”.
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 21 of 87
12.1. On a conspectus catena of decisions rendered by
different Courts it emerges that “discretion” means use
of private and independent thought. When anything is
left to be done according to one’s discretion the law
intends it to be done with sound discretion and
according to law. Discretion is discerning between right
and wrong and one who has power to act at discretion is
bound by rule of reason. Discretion must not be
arbitrary. The very term itself stands unsupported by
circumstances imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom
and skill as contra-distinguished from unthinking folly,
heady violence or rash injustice. When applied to a
Court of Justice or Tribunal or quasi judicial body, it
means sound discretion guided by law. It must be
governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be
arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular.
Discretion must be exercised honestly and in the spirit
of the statute. It is the power given by a statute to make
choice among competing considerations. It implies power
to choose between alternative courses of action. It is not
unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized within banks
that keep it from overflowing.
12.2. In S.P. Road Link Vrs. State of Tripura, (2006) 144 STC
380 (Gau) reference has been made to Kumaon Mandal
Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vrs. Girja Shankar Pant, (2001) 1 SCC
182 to observe that “discretion” means when it is said
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 22 of 87
that something is to be done within the discretion of the
authorities, that something is to be done according to
the rules of reason and justice, not according to private
opinion, according to law, and not humour. It is to be,
not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular.
And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an
honest man competent to the discharge of his office
ought to confine himself.
12.3. The following observations made in Lanka
Venkateswarlu Vrs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 3
SCR 217 are pertinent to be referred to:
“21. In the case of Sardar Amarjit Singh Katra (dead) by
LRs Vrs. Pramod Gupta (dead) by LRs., (2002)
Suppl.5 SCR 350 = (2003) 3 SCC 272, this Court
again emphasized that provisions contained in the
Order 22 CPC were devised to ensure continuation
and culmination in an effective adjudication and not
to retard further progress of the proceedings. The
provisions contained in the Order 22 are not to be
construed as a rigid matter of principle, but must
ever be viewed as a flexible tool of convenience in
the administration of justice. It was further observed
that laws of procedure are meant to regulate
effectively, assist and aid the object of doing a
substantial and real justice and not to foreclose even
adjudication on merits of substantial rights of citizen
under personal, property and other laws. In the case
of Mithailal Dalsangar Singh Vrs. Annabai Devram
Kini, (2003) 10 SCC 691, this Court again reiterated
that inasmuch as abatement results in denial ofW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 23 of 87
hearing on the merits of the case, the provision of an
abatement has to be construed strictly. On the other
hand, the prayer of setting aside abatement and the
dismissal consequent upon abatement had to be
considered liberally. It was further observed as
follows:
‘The Courts have to adopt a justice oriented
approach dictated by the uppermost consideration
that ordinarily a litigant ought not to be denied an
opportunity of having a lis determined on merits
unless he has, by gross negligence, deliberate
inaction or something akin to misconduct, disentitled
himself from seeking the·indulgence of the court.’
22. The concepts of liberal approach and
reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the
Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated
by this Court in the case of Balwant Singh (dead)
Vrs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCR 597 = (2010) 8
SCC 685 as follows:
’25. We may state that even if the term ‘sufficient
cause’ has to receive liberal construction, it
must squarely fall within the concept of
reasonable time and proper conduct of the
party concerned. The purpose of introducing
liberal construction normally is to introduce the
concept of ‘reasonableness’ as it is understood
in its general connotation.
26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and
has definite consequences on the right and
obligation of party to arise. These principles
should be adhered to and applied
appropriately depending on the facts andW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 24 of 87
circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable
right has accrued in favour of one party as a
result of the failure of the other party to explain
the delay by showing sufficient cause and its
own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take
away that right on the mere asking of the
applicant, particularly when the delay is
directly a result of negligence, default or
inaction of that party. Justice must be done to
both parties equally. Then alone the ends of
justice can be achieved. If a party has been
thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights
and remedies, it will be equally unfair to
deprive the other party of a valuable right that
has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting
vigilantly.’***
24. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High
Court proceeded to condone the delay. In our
opinion, such a course was not open to the High
Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by the
respondents in the application seeking condonation
of delay.
25. This is especially so in view of the remarks made by
the High Court about the delay being caused by the
inefficiency and ineptitude of the Government
pleaders. The displeasure of the Court is patently
apparent from the impugned order ·itself. In the
opening paragraph of the impugned order the High
Court has, rather sarcastically, dubbed the
Government pleaders as without merit and ability.
Such an insinuation is clearly discernable from the
observation that ‘This is a classic case, how the
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 25 of 87
learned Government pleaders appointed on the basis
of merit and ability are discharging their function
protecting the interest of their clients.’ Having said
so, the High Court, graphically narrated the clear
dereliction of duty by the concerned Government
pleaders in not pursuing the appeal before the High
Court diligently. The High Court has set out the
different stages at which the Government pleaders
had exhibited almost culpable negligence in
performance of their duties. The High Court found
the justification given by the Government pleaders to
be unacceptable. Twice in the impugned order, it
was recorded that in the normal course, the
applications would have been thrown out without
having a second thought in the matter. Having
recorded such conclusions, inexplicably, the
High Court proceeds to condone the
unconscionable delay.
26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or
rationale, which could have impelled the High
Court to condone the delay after holding the
same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as
‘liberal approach’, ‘justice oriented approach’,
‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to
jettison the substantial law of limitation.
Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that
there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion,
the approach adopted by the High Court tends to
show the absence of judicial balance and restraint,
which a Judge is required to maintain whilst
adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are
rather pained to notice that in this case, not being
satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language,
the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 26 of 87
of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant
language in a judgment has been repeatedly
disapproved by this Court in a number of cases.
Whilst considering applications for
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy
unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers.
All discretionary powers, especially judicial
powers, have to be exercised within reasonable
bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to
be exercised in a systematic manner informed by
reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections
cannot and should not form the basis of exercising
discretionary powers.”
12.4. The discretionary exercise of power amounts to
something that is not compulsory, but it is left to the
discretion of the person or authority involved, such as a
discretionary grant. It is opposite to “mandatory”.
Therefore, “discretionary” is a term which involves an
alternative power, i.e., a power to do or refrain from
doing a certain thing. In other words, it would be power
of free decision or choice within certain legal bounds.
13. In this regard, therefore, the interpretation of the
expression “sufficient cause” as found in the provisions
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has bearing on
the question that is involved in the instant case.
13.1. The expression “satisfies the Court” employed in Section
5 of the Limitation Act has significance. “Satisfaction”
before completion of the proceedings under the Act is a
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 27 of 87
condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction. It is
the satisfaction of the Court in the course of the
proceedings regarding the delay in approaching the
Court with sufficient reason, which constitutes the basis
and foundation of the proceedings for consideration of
condonation of delay. There must be something which
shows from the record itself that in the course of the
proceedings the Court was satisfied that there was
sufficiency of reason for not approaching the Court
within stipulated period and, therefore, it is a case in
which the appeal deserves to be admitted for hearing on
merit. To be satisfied with a state of things means to be
honestly satisfied in one’s own mind. Satisfaction is
essentially a condition of the mind. It means that there
is a substantial ground for the conclusion on the
material available the phrase ‘satisfied’ means, makes
up its mind; actual persuasion; a mind not troubled by
doubt or a mind which has reached a clear conclusion.
13.2. In Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields
Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762 it has been succinctly stated:
“Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides for extension of
period in certain cases. It lays down, inter alia, that any
appeal may be admitted after the period of limitation
prescribed therefor when the appellant satisfies the Court
that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal
within such period. This section raises two questions for
consideration. First is, what is sufficient cause; andW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 28 of 87
the second, what is the meaning of the clause
‘within such period’?”
***
In construing Section 5·it is relevant to bear in mind two
important considerations. The first consideration is that
the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for
making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the
decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the
parties. In other words, when the period of limitation
prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a
benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as
beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued
to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light,
heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which
cannot be-ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing
delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone
delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been
deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial
power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to
advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the
Madras High Court in Krishna Vrs. Chattappan, 1890 ILR
13 Mad 269:
‘Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of
jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial
power and discretion ought to be exercised upon
principles which are well understood; the words
‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice when no negligence nor
inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the
appellant.’Now, what do the words ‘within such period’ denote? It is
possible that the expression ‘within such period’ mayW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 29 of 87
sometimes mean during such period. But the question is:
Does the context in. which the expression occurs in
Section 5 justify the said interpretation? If the Limitation
Act or any other appropriate statute prescribes different
periods of limitation either for appeals or applications to
which Section 5 applies that normally means that liberty
is given to the party intending to make the appeal or to file
an application to act within the period prescribed in that
behalf. It would not be reasonable to require a party to
take the necessary action on the very first day after the
cause of action accrues. In view of the period of limitation
prescribed the party would be entitled to take its time and
to file the appeal on any day during the said period and
so prima facie it appears unreasonable that when the
delay has been made by the party in filing the appeal it
should be called upon to explain its conduct during the
whole of the period of limitation prescribed. In our opinion,
it would be immaterial and even irrelevant to invoke
general considerations of diligence of parties in construing
the words of Section 5. The context seems to suggest that
‘within such period’ means within the period which ends
with the last day of limitation prescribed. In other words,
in all cases falling under Section 5 what the party has to
show is why he did not file an appeal on the last day of
limitation prescribed. That may inevitably mean that the
party will have to show sufficient cause not only for not
filing the appeal on the last day but to explain the delay
made thereafter day by day. In other words, in showing
sufficient cause for condoning the delay the party may be
called upon to explain for the whole of the delay covered
by the period between the last day prescribed for filing
the appeal and the day on which the appeal is filed. To
hold that the expression ‘within such period’ means
during such period would, in our opinion, be repugnant in
the context. We would accordingly hold that the learnedW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 30 of 87
Judicial Commissioner was in error taking the view that
the failure of the appellant to account for its non-diligence
during the whole of the period of limitation prescribed for
the appeal necessarily disqualified it from praying for the
condonation of delay, even though the delay in question
was only for one day; and that too was caused by the
party’s illness.
***
It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to
the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right.
The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for
the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the
court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved
nothing further has to be done; the application for
condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground
alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court
has to enquire whether in its discretion it should
condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally
introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is
at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides
may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry
while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient
cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such
facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify
an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all
the time available to it. In this connection we may point
out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are
always material and relevant when the court is dealing
with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation
Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called
upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of
Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion,
considerations which have been expressly made material
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 31 of 87
and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the
same extent and in the same manner be invoked in
dealing with applications which fall to be decided only
under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. ***”
13.3. It needs to be discussed the connotation of “good cause”
vis-Ã -vis “sufficient cause”. In Arjun Singh Vrs. Mohindra
Kumar, (1964) 5 SCR 946, these two terms have been
considered as follows:
“Before proceeding to deal with the arguments addressed
to us by Mr. Setalvad– learned counsel for the appellant,
it would be convenient to mention a point, not seriously
pressed before us, but which at earlier stages was
thought to have considerable significance for the decision
of this question viz., the difference between the words
‘good cause’ for non-appearance in Order IX, Rule 7 and
‘sufficient cause’ for the same purpose in Order IX, Rule
13 as pointing to different criteria of ‘goodness’ or
‘sufficiency’ for succeeding in the two proceedings, and as
therefore furnishing a ground for the inapplicability of the
rule of res judicata. As this ground was not seriously
mentioned before us, we need not examine it in any
detail, but we might observe that we do not see any
material difference between the facts to be
established for satisfying the two tests of ‘good
cause’ and ‘sufficient cause’. We are unable to
conceive of a ‘good cause’ which is not ‘sufficient’
as affording an explanation for non-appearance,
nor conversely of a ‘sufficient cause’ which is not a
good one and we would add that either of these is
not different from ‘good and sufficient cause’ which
is used in this context in other statutes. If, on the
other hand, there is any difference between the two it canW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 32 of 87
only be that the requirement of a ‘good cause’ is complied
with on a lesser degree of proof than that of ‘sufficient
cause’ and if so, this cannot help the appellant, since
assuming the applicability of the principle of res judicata
to the decisions in the two proceedings, if the court finds
in the first proceeding, the lighter burden not discharged,
it must a fortiori bar the consideration of the same matter
in the later, where the standard of proof of that matter is,
if anything, higher.”
13.4. The meaning of ‘sufficient’ is ‘adequate’ or ‘enough’,
inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose
intended. Therefore, word ‘sufficient’ embraces no more
than that which provides a platitude which when the act
done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the
facts and circumstances existing in a case and duly
examined from the view point of a reasonable standard
of a cautious man. ‘Sufficient cause’ means that the
party had not acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or the party cannot be alleged to
have been ‘not acting diligently’ or ‘remaining inactive’.
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must
afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the
Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. While deciding whether there is sufficient
cause or not, the Court must bear in mind the object of
doing substantial justice to all the parties concerned and
that the technicalities of the law should not prevent the
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 33 of 87
Court from doing substantial justice and doing away the
illegality perpetuated on the basis of the judgment
impugned before it. “Sufficient cause” is thus the cause
for which the defendant could not be blamed for his
absence. Therefore, the applicant must approach the
Court with a reasonable defence. Sufficient cause is a
question of fact and the Court has to exercise its
discretion in the varied and special circumstances in
the case at hand. There cannot be a straitjacket
formula of universal application. [Ref.: Ramlal, Motilal
and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC
361 = (1962) 2 SCR 762; Lonard Grampanchayat Vrs.
Ramgiri Gosavi, AIR 1968 SC 222; Surinder Singh Sibia
Vrs. Vijay Kumar Sood, (1992) 1 SCC 70; Orinental Aroma
Chemical Industries Ltd. Vrs. Gujarat Industrial
Development Corporation, (2010) 5 SCC 459; Parimal Vrs.
Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545; Sudarshan Sareen Vrs.
National Small Industries Corporation Ltd., 2013 SCC
OnLine Del 4412; State of Bihar Vrs. Kameshwar Prasad
Singh, (2000) 9 SCC 94; Madanlal Vrs. Shyamlal, (2002) 1
SCC 535; Davinder Pal Sehgal Vrs. Partap Steel Rolling
Mills (P) Ltd., (2002) 3 SCC 156; Ram Nath Sao Vrs.
Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195, Kaushalya Devi Vrs.
Prem Chand, (2005) 10 SCC 127, Srei International
Finance Ltd. Vrs. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd.,
(2005) 13 SCC 95; Reena Sadh Vrs. Aniana Enterprises,
(2008) 12 SCC 589].
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 34 of 87
13.5. “Sufficient cause” has to be construed as an elastic
expression for which no hard-and-fast guidelines can
be prescribed. The Courts have a wide discretion in
deciding the sufficient cause keeping in view the
peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. The
“sufficient cause” for non-appearance refers to the date
on which the absence was made a ground for proceeding
ex parte and cannot be stretched to rely upon other
circumstances anterior in time. If “sufficient cause” is
made out for non-appearance of the defendant on the
date fixed for hearing when ex parte proceedings were
initiated against him, he cannot be penalised for his
previous negligence which had been overlooked and
thereby condoned earlier. In a case where the defendant
approaches the Court immediately and within the
statutory time specified, the discretion is normally
exercised in his favour, provided the absence was not
mala fide or intentional. For the absence of a party in
the case the other side can be compensated by adequate
costs and the lis decided on merits. [Ref.: G.P. Srivastava
Vrs. R.K. Raizada, (2000) 3 SCC 54; A. Murugesan Vrs.
Jamuna Rani, (2019) 20 SCC 803]. The Court, in its
discretion, has to consider the ‘sufficient cause’ in the
facts and circumstances of every individual case.
Although in interpreting the words ‘sufficient cause’, the
Court has wide discretion but the same has to be
exercised in the particular facts of the case. See, Hira
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 35 of 87
Sweets & Confectionary Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Hira Confectioners,
2021 SCC OnLine Del 1823.
13.6. In Balwant Singh Vrs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCR 597
the ingredients of “sufficient cause” for the purpose of
condonation of delay has been discussed as follows:
“7. *** However, in terms of Section 5, the discretion is
vested in the Court to admit an appeal or an
application, after the expiry of the prescribed period
of limitation, if the appellant shows ‘sufficient cause’
for not preferring the application within the
prescribed time. The expression ‘sufficient cause’
commonly appears in the provisions of Order 22
Rule 9(2), CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
thus categorically demonstrating that they are to be
decided on similar grounds. The decision of such an
application has to be guided by similar precepts.
***
8. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vrs. State of
Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 where there was delay of
565 days in filing the first appeal by the State, and
the High Court had observed, ‘taking into
consideration the averments contained in the
affidavit filed in support of the petition to condone
the delay, we are inclined to allow the petition”.
While setting aside this order, this Court found that
the explanation rendered for condonation of delay
was neither reasonable nor satisfactory and held as
under:
‘3. It would be noticed from a perusal of the
impugned order that the court has not recordedW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 36 of 87
any satisfaction that the explanation for delay
was either reasonable or satisfactory, which is
an essential prerequisite to condonation of
delay.
4. That apart, we find that in the application filed
by the respondent seeking condonation of
delay, the thrust in explaining the delay after
12.05.1995 is:
‘*** at that time the Advocate General’s office
was fed up with so many arbitration matters
(sic) equally important to this case were
pending for consideration as per the directions
of the Advocate General on 02.09.1995.’
5. This can hardly be said to be a reasonable,
satisfactory or even a proper explanation for
seeking condonation of delay. In the reply filed
to the application seeking condonation of delay
by the appellant in the High Court, it is
asserted that after the judgment and decree
was pronounced by the learned Sub-Judge,
Kollam on 30.10.1993, the scope for filing of
the appeal was examined by the District
Government Pleader, Special Law Officer, Law
Secretary and the Advocate General and in
accordance with their opinion, it was decided
that there was no scope for filing the appeal
but later on, despite the opinion referred to
above, the appeal was filed as late as on
18.1.1996 without disclosing why it was being
filed. The High Court does not appear to have
examined the reply filed by the appellant as
reference to the same is conspicuous by its
absence from the order. We are not satisfiedW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 37 of 87
that in the facts and circumstances of this
case, any explanation, much less a reasonable
or satisfactory one had been offered by the
respondent-State for condonation of the
inordinate delay of 565 days.
6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a
particular party but it has to be applied
with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribed and the courts have no power
to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds. The discretion exercised
by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor
judicious. The order condoning the delay
cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore,
succeeds and the impugned order is set aside.
Consequently, the application for condonation
of delay filed in the High Court would stand
rejected and the miscellaneous first appeal
shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No
costs.’
***
10. Another Bench of this Court in a recent judgment of
Katari Suryanarayana Vrs. Koppisetti Subba Rao,
AIR 2009 SC 2907 again had an occasion to
construe the ambit, scope and application of the
expression ‘sufficient cause’. The application for
setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal
heirs of the deceased on record was filed in that
case after a considerable delay. The explanation
rendered regarding the delay of 2381 days in filing
the application for condonation of delay and 2601
days in bringing the legal representatives on record
was not found to be satisfactory. Declining the
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 38 of 87
application for condonation of delay, the Court, while
discussing the case of Perumon Bhagvathy
Devaswom Vrs. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321
in its para 9 held as under:
’11. The words ‘sufficient cause for not making the
application within the period of limitation’
should be understood and applied in a
reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal
manner, depending upon the facts and
circumstances of the case, and the type of
case. The words ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5
of Limitation Act should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial
justice, when the delay is not on account of any
dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate
inaction or negligence on the part of the
appellant.’***
15. We feel that it would be useful to make a reference
to the judgment of this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy
Devaswom Vrs. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321.
In this case, the Court, after discussing a number of
judgments of this Court as well as that of the High
Courts, enunciated the principles which need to be
kept in mind while dealing with applications filed
under the provisions of Order 22, CPC along with an
application under Section 5, Limitation Act for
condonation of delay in filing the application for
bringing the legal representatives on record. In
paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held as
under:
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 39 of 87
‘(i) The words ‘sufficient cause for not making the
application within the period of limitation’
should be understood and applied in a
reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal
manner, depending upon the facts and
circumstances of the case, and the type of
case. The words ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5
of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial
justice, when the delay is not on account of any
dilatory tactics, want of bona tides, deliberate
inaction or negligence on the part of the
appellant.
(ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of
delay, the courts are more liberal with
reference to applications for setting aside
abatement, than other cases. While the court
will have to keep in view that a valuable right
accrues to the legal representatives of the
deceased respondent when the appeal abates,
it will not punish an appellant with foreclosure
of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The
courts tend to set aside abatement and decided
the matter on merits. The courts tend to set
aside abatement and decide the matter on
merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the
ground of abatement.
(iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is
not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a
satisfactory explanation.
(iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by
a court depends on the nature of application
and facts and circumstances of the case. ForW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 40 of 87
example, courts view delays in making
applications in a pending appeal more leniently
than delays in the institution of an appeal. The
courts view applications relating to lawyer’s
lapses more leniently than applications relating
to litigant’s lapses. The classic example is the
difference in approach of courts to applications
for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and
applications for condonation of delay in re-filing
the appeal after rectification of defects.
(i) Want of ‘diligence’ or ‘inaction’ can be
attributed to an appellant only when something
required to be done by him, is not done. When
nothing is required to be done, courts do not
expect the appellant to be diligent. Where an
appeal is admitted by the High Court and is
not expected to be listed for final hearing for a
few years, an appellant is not expected to visit
the court or his lawyer every few weeks to
ascertain the position nor keep checking
whether the contesting respondent is alive. He
merely awaits the call or information from his
counsel about the listing of the appeal. ***
16. Above are the principles which should control the
exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court
under these provisions. The explained delay should
be clearly understood in contradistinction to
inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of
the ingredients which has to be considered by the
Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take
into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide
reasons for condonation of delay and whether such
delay could easily be avoided by the applicant
acting with normal care and caution. The statutory
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 41 of 87
provisions mandate that applications for
condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed
beyond the prescribed period of limitation for
bringing the legal representatives on record, should
be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for
condonation of delay. The larger benches as well
as equi benches of this Court have consistently
followed these principles and have either
allowed or declined to condone the delay in
filing such applications. Thus, it is the
requirement of law that these applications cannot be
allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine
manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the
above stated ingredients; then alone the Court
would be inclined to condone the delay in the filing
of such applications.”
13.7. In Pundlik Jalam Patil Vrs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon
Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448, it is observed that:
“The laws of limitation are founded on public policy.
Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as
“statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of
limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of
limitation is essential for public order. The principle is
based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there
should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of
limitation are a means to ensure private justice
suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and
preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for
litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for
legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are
meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory
tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond inW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 42 of 87
his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the
assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.”
13.8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India investigated if “to
condone, or not to condone” four days’ delay, besides
examining as to “whether or not to apply the same
standard in applying the ‘sufficient cause’ test to all the
litigants regardless of their personality” in Collector,
Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vrs. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC
107 = (1987) 2 SCR 387 and laid down the following
dicta:
“The Legislature has conferred the power to condone
delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of
1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial
justice to parties by disposing of matters on ‘merits’. The
expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the Legislature
is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law
in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of
justice– that being the life-purpose for the existence of
the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this
Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in
matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not
appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in
the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on
principle as it is realized that:
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by
lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a
meritorious matter being thrown out at the very
threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As
against this when delay is condoned the highestW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 43 of 87
that can happen is that a cause would be decided
on merits after hearing the parties.
3. ‘Every day’s delay must be explained’ does not
mean that a pedantic approach should be made.
Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay?
The doctrine must be applied in a rational common
sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other, cause
of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the
other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate
delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or
on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to
benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a
serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on
account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing
injustice and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective,
there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the
institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the ‘State’
which was seeking condonation and not a private party
was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before
law demands that all litigants, including the State as a
litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is
administered in an even handed manner. There is no
warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the
‘State’ is the applicant praying for condonation of delay.
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 44 of 87
In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal
machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or
hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal)
and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with
the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck
ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand
though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State
which represents the collective cause of the community,
does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts
therefore have to be informed with the spirit and
philosophy of the provision in the course of the
interpretation of the expression ‘sufficient cause’. So also
the same approach has to be evidenced in its application
to matters at hand with the end in view to do even
handed justice on merits in preference to the approach
which scuttles a decision on merits.”
13.9. Discussing the scope and discretion of the Court in
condoning the substantial delay caused in filing appeal
by the State in G. Ramegowda Major Vrs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, (1988) 2 SCC 142 the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India observed as follows:
“15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is
yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be
ignored. If appeals brought by Government are
lost for such defaults, no person is individually
affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis,
suffers is public interest. The decisions of
Government are collective and institutional
decisions and do not share the characteristics
of decisions of private individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for
a private citizen as for Governmental-
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 45 of 87
authorities. Government, like any other litigant
must take responsibility for the acts or
omissions of its officers. But a somewhat
different complexion is imparted to the matter
where Government makes out a case where
public interest was shown to have suffered
owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part
of its officers or agents and where the officers
were clearly at cross-purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case,
constitutes ‘sufficient cause’ for purposes of Section
5 it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to
exclude from the considerations that go into the
judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to
and characteristic of the functioning of the
Government. Governmental decisions are
proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the
process of their making. A certain amount of latitude
is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that
those who bear responsibility of Government must
have ‘a little play at the joints’. Due recognition of
these limitations on Governmental functioning– of
course, within a reasonable limits–is necessary if
the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. It
would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
Government and private parties on the same footing
in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very
nature of Governmental functioning is procedural
delay incidental to the decision making process. In
the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law-
officers of the Government placed the Government in
a predicament and that it was one of these cases
where the mala fides of the officers should not beW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 46 of 87
imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted
its law-officers. Lindley, M.R., in the In re: National
Bank of Wales Ltd., LR 1899 2 Ch. 629 @ 673
observed, though in a different context:
‘Business cannot be carried on, upon principles of
distrust. Men in responsible positions must be
trusted by those above them, as well as by those
below them, until there is reason to distrust them.’In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite
sometime for the Government to realise that the law-
officers failed that trust.
18. While a private person can take instant decision a
‘bureaucratic or democratic organ’ it is said by a
learned Judge ‘hesitates and debates, consults and
considers, speaks through paper, moves horizontally
and vertically till at last it gravitates towards a
conclusion, unmindful of time and impersonally.’ ***”
13.10. In absence of showing deliberate delay as a dilatory
tactic, the manner of use of discretion in favour of
condonation of delay in filing appeal by the State
machinery with due regard to ‘sufficient cause’ has been
enumerated in N. Balakrishnan Vrs. M. Krishnamurty,
(1998) 7 SCC 123 in the following terms:
“8. The Appellant’s conduct does not on the whole
warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant.
What he did in defending the suit was not very
much far from what a litigant would broadly do. Of
course, it may be said that he should have been
more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short
intervals to check up the progress of the litigation.
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 47 of 87
But during these days when everybody is fully
occupied with his own avocation of life an omission
to adopt such extra vigilance need not be used as a
ground to depict him as a litigant not aware of his
responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic
consequences.
9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter
of discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation
Act does not say that such discretion can be
exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit.
Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of
the explanation is the only criterion.
Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be
uncondonable due to want of acceptable
explanation whereas in certain other cases
delay of very long range can be condoned as
the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the
Court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the
result of positive exercise of discretion and normally
the superior court should not disturb such finding,
much less in reversional jurisdiction, unless the
exercise of discretion was on whole untenable
grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different
matter when the first Court refuses to condone the
delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be
free to consider the cause shown for the delay
afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come
to its own finding even untrammeled by the
conclusion of the lower Court.
10. The reason for such a different stance is thus:
The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the
dispute between the parties and to advance
substantial justice. Time limit fixed forW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 48 of 87
approaching the Court in different situations is
not because on the expiry of such time a bad
cause would transform into a good cause.
11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the
right of parties. They are meant to see that
parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but
seek their remedy promptly. The object of
providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage
caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation
fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the
redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is
precious and the wasted time would never revisit.
During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up
necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by
approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed
for each remedy. Unending period for launching the
remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and
consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is
thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined
in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis
litium (it is for the general welfare that a
period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation
are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties.
They are meant to see that parties do not resort to
dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The
idea is that every legal remedy must be kept
alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
12. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would
result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his
cause. There is no presumption that delay in
approaching the Court is always deliberate. This
Court has held that the words ‘sufficient cause’
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive
a liberal construction so as to advance substantial
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 49 of 87
justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vrs. Kuntal
Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 = (1969) 1 SCR 1006 and
State of West Bengal Vrs. The Administrator,
Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 = (1972) 1
SCC 366.
13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay
there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant
concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down
his plea and to shut the door against him. If the
explanation does not smack of mala fides or it
is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy
the Court must show utmost consideration to
the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground
to think that the delay was occasioned by the
party deliberately to gain time then the Court
should lean against acceptance of the
explanation. While condoning delay the Court
should not forget the opposite party altogether. It
must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too
would have incurred quiet a large litigation
expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that
when Courts condone the delay due to laches
on the part of the applicant the Court shall
compensate the opposite party for his loss.”
13.11. It is significant to notice the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of Sheo Raj
Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives Vrs.
Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531 wherein while
explaining the term “sufficient cause”, the nature of
approach of the Court and the methodology in deciding
the application for condonation of delay have been
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 50 of 87
discussed with reference to earlier precedents. The said
Court in the mentioned reported case held as follows:
“30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there
cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in
to ensure that substantive rights of private parties
and the State are not defeated at the threshold
simply due to technical considerations of delay.
However, these decisions notwithstanding, we
reiterate that condonation of delay being a
discretionary power available to Courts,
exercise of discretion must necessarily depend
upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and
the degree of acceptability of the explanation,
the length of delay being immaterial.
31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being
shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered,
delay of the shortest range may not be condoned
whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long
periods can be condoned if the explanation is
satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the Courts
must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and
an ‘excuse’. An ‘explanation’ is designed to give
someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for
something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a
particular event and allows the person to point out
that something that has happened is not his fault, if
it is really not his fault. Care must however be
taken to distinguish an ‘explanation’ from an
‘excuse’. Although people tend to see ‘explanation’
and ‘excuse’ as the same thing and struggle to find
out the difference between the two, there is a
distinction which, though fine, is real.
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 51 of 87
32. An ‘excuse’ is often offered by a person to deny
responsibility and consequences when under attack.
It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as
just an ‘excuse’ would imply that the explanation
proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said,
there is no formula that caters to all situations
and, therefore, each case for condonation of
delay based on existence or absence of
sufficient cause has to be decided on its own
facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is
only excuses, and not explanations, that are more
often accepted for condonation of long delays to
safeguard public interest from those hidden forces
whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious
claim does not reach the higher Courts for
adjudication.
***
34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated
21st December 2011. It was rendered at a point of
time when the decisions in Mst. Katiji (supra),
Ramegowda (supra), Chandra Mani (supra),
Tehsildar (LA) Vrs. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC
634 and State of Nagaland Vrs. Lipok AO, (2005) 3
SCC 752 were holding the field. It is not that the
said decisions do not hold the field now, having
been overruled by any subsequent decision.
Although there have been some decisions in the
recent past [State of M.P. Vrs. Bherulal, (2020) 10
SCC 654 is one such decision apart from University
of Delhi Vrs. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745]
which have not accepted governmental lethargy,
tardiness and indolence in presenting appeals
within time as sufficient cause for condonation of
delay, yet, the exercise of discretion by the High
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 52 of 87
Court has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and
justice oriented approach expounded in the
aforesaid decisions which have been referred to
above.
***
40. We can also profitably refer to State of Manipur Vrs.
Koting Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408 … where the
same Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court
which decided University of Delhi Vrs. Union of
India, (2020) 13 SCC 745 was of the view that the
impersonal nature of the State’s functioning should
be given due regard, while ensuring that individual
defaults are not nit-picked at the cost of collective
interest. The relevant paragraphs read as follows:
‘7. But while concluding as above, it was
necessary for the Court to also be
conscious of the bureaucratic delay and
the slow pace in reaching a Government
decision and the routine way of deciding
whether the State should prefer an appeal
against a judgment adverse to it. Even
while observing that the law of limitation would
harshly affect the party, the Court felt that the
delay in the appeal filed by the State, should
not be condoned.
8. Regard should be had in similar such
circumstances to the impersonal nature of the
Government’s functioning where individual
officers may fail to act responsibly. This in
turn, would result in injustice to the
institutional interest of the State. If the appeal
filed by the State are lost for individual default,W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 53 of 87
those who are at fault, will not usually be
individually affected.’
41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival
contentions, we feel that the High Court’s decision to
condone the delay on account of the first
respondent’s inability to present the appeal within
time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not
suffer from any error warranting interference. As
the aforementioned judgments have shown,
such an exercise of discretion does, at times,
call for a liberal and justice-oriented approach
by the Courts, where certain leeway could be
provided to the State. The hidden forces that
are at work in preventing an appeal by the
State being presented within the prescribed
period of limitation so as not to allow a higher
court to pronounce upon the legality and
validity of an order of a lower court and
thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be
ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand
scheme of governmental functions have to be
removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of
the competing interests.”
13.12. In Pathupati Subba Reddy (died) by Lrs. Vrs. The
Special Deputy Collector (LA), (2024) 4 SCR 241 = 2024
INSC 286, having taken review of relevant earlier
decisions, the principles for consideration of
condonation of delay have been expounded in the
following terms:
“6. The moot question before us is whether in the facts
and circumstances of the case, the High Court wasW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 54 of 87
justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the
proposed appeal and to dismiss it as barred by
limitation.
***
9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms
lays down that no suit, appeal or application
instituted, preferred or made after the period
prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed
even though limitation has not been set up as a
defence subject to the exceptions contained in
Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act.
***
12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is
preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to
be dismissed. The use of the word ‘shall’ in the
aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is
mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the
Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even
though no objection regarding limitation is taken by
the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In
other words, it casts an obligation upon the
Court to dismiss an appeal which is presented
beyond limitation. This is the general law of
limitation. The exceptions are carved out under
Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation
Act but we are concerned only with the
exception contained in Section 5 which
empowers the Courts to admit an appeal even
if it is preferred after the prescribed period
provided the proposed appellant gives
‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal
within the period prescribed. In other words, theW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 55 of 87
Courts are conferred with discretionary powers to
admit an appeal even after the expiry of the
prescribed period provided the proposed appellant is
able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it
within time. The said power to condone the
delay or to admit the appeal preferred after
the expiry of time is discretionary in nature
and may not be exercised even if sufficient
cause is shown based upon host of other
factors such as negligence, failure to exercise
due diligence etc.
13. It is very elementary and well understood that
Courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented
approach in dealing with the applications for
condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather
follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial
justice.
***
17. It must always be borne in mind that while
construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding
application under Section 5 of the Act, that on
the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed
for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour
of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought
not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder
treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time
and may proceed on such assumption creating new
rights.
***
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of
the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this
Court, it is evident that:
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 56 of 87
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy
that there should be an end to litigation by
forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the
right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been
exercised or availed of for a long time must
come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed
period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to
be construed in a strict sense whereas Section
5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though
liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or
cause of substantial justice may be kept in
mind but the same cannot be used to defeat
the substantial law of limitation contained in
Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been
explained, but that exercise of power is
discretionary in nature and may not be
exercised even if sufficient cause is established
for various factors such as, where there is
inordinate delay, negligence and want of due
diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar
matter, it does not mean that others are also
entitled to the same benefit if the Court is not
satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in
filing the appeal;
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 57 of 87
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be
decided on the parameters laid down for
condoning the delay and condoning the delay
for the reason that the conditions have been
imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the
statutory provision.”
13.13. It may be of benefit to have reference to Esha
Bhattacharjee Vrs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
Nafar Academy, (2013) 9 SCR 782, wherein the following
principles are culled out:
“15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that
can broadly be culled out are:
(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- E
oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing
with an application for condonation of delay,
for the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
(ii) The terms ‘sufficient cause’ should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy
and purpose regard being had to the fact that
these terms are basically elastic and are to be
applied in proper perspective to the obtaining
fact-situation.
(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and
pivotal the technical considerations should not
be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 58 of 87
(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the
part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note
of.
(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict
proof should not affect public justice and cause
public mischief because the courts are required
to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate
there is no real failure of justice.
(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsule the conception of reasonableness
and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered
free play.
(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay
and a delay of short duration or few days, for
to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted
whereas to the latter it may not be attracted.
That apart, the first one warrants strict
approach whereas the second calls for a liberal
delineation.
(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration.
It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of
balance of justice in respect of both parties and
the said principle cannot be given a total go by
in the name of liberal approach.
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 59 of 87
(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or
the grounds urged in the application are
fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not
to expose the other side unnecessarily to
face such a litigation.
(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away
with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation
by taking recourse to the technicalities of law
of limitation.
(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinized and the approach should be based
on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is
founded on objective reasoning and not on
individual perception.
(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given
some acceptable latitude.
16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more
guidelines taking note of the present day scenario.
They are:
(a) An application for condonation of delay should
be drafted with careful concern and not in a
half hazard manner harbouring the notion that
the courts are required to condone delay on the
bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a
lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation
system.
(b) An application for condonation of delay should
not be dealt with in a routine manner on the
base of individual philosophy which is
basically subjective.
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 60 of 87
(c) Though no precise formula can be laid down
regard being had to the concept of judicial
discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving
consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory
system should be made as that is the ultimate
institutional motto.
(d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a
non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical
propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant
manner requires to be curbed, of course, within
legal parameters.”
13.14. In Amalendu Kumar Bera Vrs. State of West Bengal,
(2013) 4 SCC 52 the consideration of “sufficient cause”
qua official business has been perceived in the following
manner:
“There is no dispute that the expression “sufficient cause”
should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented
approach rather than the technical detection of “sufficient
cause” for explaining every day’s delay. However, it is
equally well settled that the courts albeit liberally
considered the prayer for condonation of delay but in
some cases the court may refuse to condone the delay
inasmuch as the Government is not accepted to keep
watch whether the contesting respondent further put the
matter in motion. The delay in official business requires
its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. In a
recent decision in Union of India Vrs. Nripen Sarma,
(2013) 4 SCC 57 = AIR 2011 SC 1237 the matter came up
against the order passed by the High Court condoning the
delay in filing the appeal by the appellant-Union of India.
The High Court refused to condone the delay on the
ground that the appellant-Union of India took their own
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 61 of 87
sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment
should be appealed or not. The High Court also expressed
its anguish and distress with the way the State conducts
the cases regularly in filing the appeal after the same
became operational and barred by limitation.”
13.15. Having thus discussed the gamut of “sufficient
cause” vis-Ã -vis “good cause” with reference to the
parameters of consideration of germane grounds for
condonation of delay in preferring appeal, this Court
feels expedient to observe that in State of M.P. Vrs.
Pradeep Kumar, (2000) 7 SCC 372, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that if an appeal is time barred, the Court
should either return the memorandum of appeal to the
appellant to submit it along with an application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act or should provide a
chance to file application for condonation of delay. The
Court cannot, under such circumstances, dispose of the
appeal on merit. In S.V. Matha Prasad Vrs. Lalchand
Meghraj, (2007) 14 SCC 722, it has been clearly held that
while dealing with an application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, the Court cannot dispose of an appeal on
merit and such a course has been disapproved by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. However, in O.P.
Kathpalia Vrs. Lakhmir Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1744, it is
held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in
grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to
condone the delay.
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 62 of 87
13.16. The Supreme Court of India in State of Madhya
Pradesh Vrs. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, made it clear
that,
“5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be
propounded that if there is some merit in the
case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by.
If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in
any case. It is really a bar of limitation which
can even shut out good cases. This does not, of
course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court
in an appropriate case to condone the delay.
6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach
is being adopted in what we have categorised earlier
as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to
obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme
Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that
nothing could be done because the highest Court has
dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this
formality and save the skin of officers who
may be at default that such a process is
followed. We have on earlier occasions also
strongly deprecated such a practice and process.
There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of
coming to this Court is not to obtain such
certificates and if the Government suffers
losses, it is time when the officer concerned
responsible for the same bears the
consequences. The irony is that in none of the
cases any action is taken against the officers,
who sit on the files and do nothing. It is
presumed that this Court will condone the delay and
even in making submissions, straightaway the
counsel appear to address on merits without
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 63 of 87
referring even to the aspect of limitation as
happened in this case till we pointed out to the
counsel that he must first address us on the
question of limitation.
7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we
propose to do in all matters today, where there are
such inordinate delays that the Government or State
authorities coming before us must pay for wastage
of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs
can be recovered from the officers responsible.”
13.17. Taking note of State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs.
Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, in the cases of State of
Odisha Vrs. Sunanda Mahakuda, (2021) 11 SCC 560;
State of Gujarat Vrs. Tushar Jagdish Chandra Vyas,
2021 SCC OnLine SC 3517; State of U.P. Vrs. Sabha
Narain, (2022) 9 SCC 266; Union of India Vrs. Central
Tibetan Schools Admin, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 119; Union
of India Vrs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 9
SCC 263; Commissioner of Public Instruction Vrs.
Shamshuddin, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3518 identical view
has been expressed by the Supreme Court of India.
13.18. The stand taken in the interlocutory application for
condonation of delay by the State of Odisha does not
disclose any sufficient/good cause. This apart, the
appellants have not explained with material particulars
the delay in filing the writ appeal from the original
prescribed period. Noteworthy here to have regard to the
following conclusions enumerated by the Hon’ble
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 64 of 87
Supreme Court of India in the case of Shivamma Vrs.
Karnataka Housing Board, (2025) 9 SCR 1774:
“261.Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order
of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we
proceed to close this judgment, we deem it
appropriate to make it abundantly clear that
administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand
as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and
we want to convey an emphatic message to all the
High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on
frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case
of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-
machinery is able to establish that it acted with
bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout.
Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously
said. But courts, and more particularly the
constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the
procedure for a litigating State agency, who also
equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing
litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect
to such callous attitude of State authorities or its
instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious,
if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-
authority. They should not become surrogates for
State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts
ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a
private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in
situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits
of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated
at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this
everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to
notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay,W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 65 of 87
until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the
courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly
in appeals under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited
to questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a
sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More
than the importance of judicial time, what worries us
is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is
to contest against an enormous State, and its
elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such
litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very
threshold, because, say if a party litigating against
the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest
the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the
present case, it reopens the lis for another round of
litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again.
As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we
assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to
seek justice.
264. No litigant should be permitted to be so
lethargic and apathetic, much less be
permitted by the courts to misuse the process
of law.”
14. Thus being the delineated legal perspective for
consideration of petition for condonation of delay, the
decisions of the Courts as referred to supra, it is to be
seen whether the petition under consideration filed by
the State suggests sufficient cause for condonation of
delay in filing writ appeal by conscientious application of
discretion.
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 66 of 87
CONCLUSION & DECISION:
15. Cursory glance at the substance and circumstances
demonstrated in the petition with regard to the gap
between 30th June, 2022 (date of pronouncement of
order in writ petition in presence of the appellants being
represented by the Standing Counsel) to 18th December,
2025 (date of filing of the writ appeal) it is discernible
that vague explanation without material particulars save
and except “necessary consultation were made with the
Government authorities” has been proffered. No whisper
is made with respect to the fact that to take a decision it
took around 1237 + 30 days for the appellants to file
writ appeal before the learned Single Judge particularly
when identical matters, viz., Satyabrata Nayak and
Others Vrs. State of Odisha and Others, WPC(OAC)
No.902 of 2016 and batch vide Judgment dated 15th
September, 2021 being carried before the Division Bench
of this Court by the State of Odisha in W.A. No.557 of
2022, came to be dismissed vide Order dated
23.02.2026 along with the matters being W.A. Nos. 487
of 2024, W.A. No.818 of 2021, WA No.1137 of 2022,
W.A. No.1214 of 2022, W.A. No.1600 of 2022, W.A.
No.1674 of 2022, W.A. No.89 of 2023, W.A. No.1039 of
2023, W.A. No.1154 of 2023 & W.A. No.488 of 2024. A
Division Bench of this Court disposed of other matters of
similar context being Biswaranjan Biswal and Others
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 67 of 87
Vrs. State of Odisha and Others, W.A.No.102 of 2016 was
disposed of by Order dated 29.11.2022 and State of
Odisha Vrs. Nirupama Jena, W.A. No. 1306 of 2025,
disposed of vide Judgment dated 05.02.2026. Nothing is
brought on record by the learned Additional Government
Advocate to suggest that such matters have been
assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.
Therefore, it is construed that said matters attained
finality.
15.1. This Court feels it expedient to take cognizance of the
fact that such being the position it would not be
appropriate to condone the unexplained delay of 1267
(including normal specified period of 30 days) in the
petition for consideration.
15.2. Record does not reveal any alacrity is shown by any of
the authorities-functionaries of the State of Odisha
though in very many cases it is held that lackadaisical
approach and indolent attitude of the functionaries are
not to be considered with leniency by putting the
opponent-vigilant citizen (litigant) in adverse position.
15.3. This Court is apprised of the fact that a “Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP) for Ensuring Timely Filing of
Affidavits in Courts and Tribunals” has been issued by
the Government of Odisha in Law Department vide
Notification No.8292─IV/2 LR-210/26/L., dated
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 68 of 87
10.06.20264 in consequence of Order dated 24th March,
2026 passed in CONTC No 1011 of 2026 arising out of
WP(C) No 18177 of 2025 taking into account the casual
approach adopted by the State Authorities in filing
affidavits/instructions resulting in unwarranted delays
in disposal of Court Cases. It is also noticed that though
the State Litigation Policy was formulated in the State
during 2011 to reduce the State litigations basing on the
National Litigation Policy as per recommendation of the
13th Finance Commission, in its place a new State
Litigation Policy5 has been formulated to minimize the
litigations against/by the State and streamlining
consideration of the grievances to prevent avoidable
litigations keeping in view the Order dated 3rd October,
2023 passed by this Court in WPC (PIL) No.28053 of
2023 and the Guidelines of the National Litigation
Policy.
15.4. The fact pleaded does not transpire as to why the
appellants have not placed the events with material
details to demonstrate as to why the functionaries of the
State of Odisha showed lethargy. After the Order has
been passed on 30.06.2022 in the writ petition by the
learned Single Judge in open court in presence of the
learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the Standing
4 Published in the Extraordinary Issue of the Odisha Gazette No.2406, dated
10.06.2026.
5 The State Litigation Policy, 2024 is published in the Extraordinary Issue of the
Odisha Gazette No.2162, dated 18.11.2024.
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 69 of 87
Counsel for School and Mass Education Department, no
reason is ascribed by the appellants to demonstrate why
it took such a long period of time to decide whether to
approach this Court by way of writ appeal.
15.5. Though such factual aspects are glaring on the face of
the interlocutory application in the writ appeal, this
Court, being conscious of ratio of decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, is required to consider
if at all the appellants have made out a case showing
“sufficient cause”/”good cause” with respect to the delay
of 1297 days (including thirty days of normal period)
caused in filing appeal so that indulgence can be shown
to consider the merit of the matter by condoning the
delay in filing the intra-Court appeal.
15.6. This Court on careful examination of contents of the
interlocutory application praying therein for condoning
the delay found that no material particulars have been
pleaded leading to such inordinate delay. By way of
objection in shape of affidavit the respondent clearly
brought to fore the fact that in order to avoid the rigours
of directions contained in the order passed in the writ
petition, which have not been complied with, the writ
appeal has been filed.
15.7. While enunciating that pragmatism in justice oriented
approach is to be shown by the Court having regard to
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 70 of 87
the impersonal bureaucratic set up involved in red-
tapism within reasonable limits of time, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court propounded to hold officer concerned
personally responsible in the case of State of Haryana
Vrs. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132 and the
proposition of legal position stands thus:
“It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more
than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court– be it by
private party or the State– are barred by limitation and
this Court generally adopts liberal approach in
condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to
decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common
knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded
the same treatment and the law is administered in an
even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant,
praying for condonation of delay, it is common
knowledge that on account of impersonal
machinery and the inherited bureaucratic
methodology imbued with the note-making, file-
pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on
the part of the State is less difficult to understand
though more difficult to approve, but the State
represents collective cause of the community. It is
axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies
proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of
pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on
table for considerable time causing delay– intentional or
otherwise– is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural
red tape in the process of their making decision is a
common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is
not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State
are lost for such default no person is individuallyW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 71 of 87
affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers,
is public interest. The expression ‘sufficient cause’
should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in
justice-oriented approach rather than the technical
detection of sufficient cause for explaining every
day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental
conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of
pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court
should decide the matters on merits unless the case is
hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to
determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private
litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient
cause. The Government at appropriate level should
constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any
legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or
whether cases require adjustment and should authorise
the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission
for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal
needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer
responsible to file the appeal and he should be made
personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the
State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual.
The individual would always be quick in taking the
decision whether he would pursue the remedy by
way of an appeal or application since he is a person
legally injured while State is an impersonal
machinery working through its officers or servants.
Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the
delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and
that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay.”
15.8. In the considered view of this Court mere use of the
expressions like “no wilful negligence”, “no deliberate
laches”, “no deliberate” or “unintentional” in the petition
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 72 of 87
without putting forth material fact would not assist the
cause of the appellants for condoning the delay in
preferring writ appeal.
15.9. In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal
Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157, the
observation of the Supreme Court of India may deserve
to be quoted:
“What colour the expression ‘sufficient cause’ would get in
the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend
on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds
that there has been no negligence on the part of the
applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not
lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the
other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is
found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in
prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate
exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.”
15.10. Besides having taken note of the principles
enunciated by the Court(s) as referred to in foregoing
paragraphs, it is noteworthy to have regard to the
following decisions also.
The position of law as discussed with regard to
condonation of delay in Office of the Chief Post Master
General Vrs. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 1 SCR 1045 =
2012 INSC 105 may throw light on the issue at hand. In
the said case the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was
considering inordinate delay of around 427 days caused
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 73 of 87
by functionaries of the Government in filing SLPs and
the said Hon’ble Court held as follows:
“12. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were
well aware or conversant with the issues involved
including the prescribed period of limitation for
taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation when
the Department was possessed with competent
persons familiar with court proceedings. In the
absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why the
delay is to be condoned mechanically merely
because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us. Though we
are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross
negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of
bona fide, a liberal concession has to be
adopted to advance substantial justice, we are
of the view that in the facts and
circumstances, the Department cannot take
advantage of various earlier decisions. The
claim on account of impersonal machinery and
inherited bureaucratic methodology of making
several notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and available. The
law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody
including the Government.
13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
Government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable
and acceptable explanation for the delay and thereW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 74 of 87
was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the
usual explanation that the file was kept pending for
several months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red-tape in the process. The Government
departments are under a special obligation to ensure
that they perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception
and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for
government departments. The law shelters everyone
under the same light and should not be swirled for
the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that
there was no proper explanation offered by the
Department for the delay except mentioning of
various dates, according to us, the Department
has miserably failed to give any acceptable
and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such
a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to
be dismissed on the ground of delay.”
This Court in Radharaman Store Vrs. Odisha Sales Tax
Tribunal and Another, 1997 SCC OnLine Ori 98 = 85
(1998) CLT 657 = (1998) 108 STC 284 (Ori) has been
pleased to make following observation for non-furnishing
plausible explanation by the Government:
“9. The question remains whether any plausible or
acceptable reason was indicated by the Revenue
while seeking condonation, and whether the
Tribunal considered the matter in its proper
perspective. The reasons indicated in the petition
filed by the Revenue extracted in its entirety reads
as follows:
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 75 of 87
‘That the delay in filing of the appeal is non-
deliberate. The delay was due to the process of
decision-making in Government office.’The Tribunal’s order in its entirety reads as follows:
‘Heard the learned Addl. S.R. for the State and the
learned advocate for the assessee. The 1st appeal
orders were received in the office of the
Commissioner of Sales Tax on December 14, 1993
and due date of filing of the appeals was February
12, 1994, but the appeals have been filed on April 4,
1994 causing a delay of 50 days. In the petition for
condonation of delay it has been explained that the
delay in filing of the appeal was due to process of
decision-making for filing of the second appeals. On
a perusal of the administrative file it appears that
the file was endorsed to the Addl. S.R. for his
opinion on December 31, 1993 and decision was
made on March 30, 1994 for filing of the second
appeal. Thereafter the appeals were filed on April 4,
1994. So, the delay of 50 days in filing the second
appeal in decision-making which was considered
sufficient cause for not filing the second appeal in
time. Hence, the petition is allowed and the delay is
condoned. Register the appeals.’
10. The factual backdrop and few relevant facts need to
be noted. It is an accepted position that the file was
endorsed to the Addl. S.R. for opinion on December
31, 1993, and he passed an order on March 30,
1994 for filing of the second appeal. No cause has
been indicated as to why the Addl. S.R. took such a
long time, and what transpired during that period.
In fact no explanation whatsoever has been
offered. Tribunal’s reasoning is that there was
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 76 of 87
delay in decision-making process and that was
considered to be sufficient cause. The
conclusion does not stand to reason. On the
contrary, it shows non-application of mind to
the germane issue. Even though a liberal
approach has to be adopted, that does not
mean that any plea without any plausible or
acceptable basis, and not even hearing
semblance of rationality has to be accepted,
and delay has to be condoned. That shall be
against the very spirit of law. Prescription of
timelimit for filing appeals would become
meaningless in such event. Merely because State is
involved, that does not mean that any lethargic or
supine inaction has to be condoned or ignored, and
even if no reason is indicated that would be
inconsequential. The subject-matter was not very
complex and rather the grounds of appeal filed
appear to be of very routine nature. As has been
observed by this Court in Hindustan
Aeronautics Limited, Koraput Division Vrs.
State of Orissa, (1976) 38 STC 538, delay
caused by the concerned officer in giving his
opinion, without any explanation whatsoever
does not constitute sufficient ground for
condonation of delay. In the aforesaid
premises, the inevitable conclusion is that the
Tribunal has not applied its judicial mind to
the question whether delay was to be
condoned.
Certain interesting and relevant features are noticed
on perusal of the administrative file produced. Up to
end of page 2, the proposed grounds of appeal have
been written in hand. Interestingly from page 3, they
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 77 of 87
are typed. Except that portion, next are hand
written. This aspect assumes greater importance
because in the margin of page 2, the following
endorsement has been made on March 25, 1994
“signature is wanting”. Whose signature was
wanting and who detected it on March 25, 1994
remains a mystery. If the file was with the Addl.
S.R. till March 30, 1994, how another officer
handled it to notice absence of signature.
That has not been explained. If records have been
manipulated, it is a very serious matter and needs
an enquiry by the Commissioner of Sales Tax,
Orissa.”
15.11. Apparently from the explanation as found
mentioned in the interlocutory application, the
appellants have not given details of events with sufficient
reasons for the delay. Furthermore, there is no
explanation whatsoever is placed on record to show as to
why there was delay during the prescribed period of
limitation in terms of the provisions for filing writ appeal
under the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948.
15.12. Regard may also be had to State of Madhya
Pradesh Vrs. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 3612, wherein the following observations have been
made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India:
“5. The legal position is that where a case has been
presented in the Court beyond limitation, the
petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was
the “sufficient cause” which means an
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 78 of 87
adequate and enough reason which prevented
him to approach the Court within limitation. In
Majji Sannemma Vrs. Reddy Sridevi 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even
though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a
party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when
prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to
the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra Vrs. Pyare
Ram, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 92 wherein, it was held
as follows:
’13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj Vrs.
Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC
81 while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause
has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:
’15. The law on the issue can be summarised
to the effect that where a case has been
presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as
to what was the “sufficient cause” which
means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the
court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona
fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court
could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is
to be decided only within the parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to the
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 79 of 87
condonation of delay. In case there was
no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting
any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the
statutory provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the
legislature.’
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that the High Court did not commit any mistake
in dismissing the delay condonation
application of the present appellant.’Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone
the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on
facts and circumstances of each case and that, the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be liberally
interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fides is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India Vrs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy
(D) through his legal heir, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489
= 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.
Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to
various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal
terms observed by this Court that delay should not
be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the
opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is
profitably extracted below:
’24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it
very clear that we are not going to look into the
merits of the matter as long as we are notW.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 80 of 87
convinced that sufficient cause has been made
out for condonation of such a long and
inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private
party or a State or Union of India when it
comes to condoning the gross delay of more
than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to
approach the court long after the lapse of the
time prescribed under the relevant provisions of
the law, then he cannot turn around and say
that no prejudice would be caused to either
side by the delay being condoned. This
litigation between the parties started sometime
in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have
elapsed. However, till date the respondent has
not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It
would be a mockery of justice if we condone
the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once
again ask the respondent to undergo the
rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter
which the court must take into consideration
while considering whether the delay should be
condoned or not. From the tenor of the
approach of the appellants, it appears that
they want to fix their own period of limitation
for instituting the proceedings for which law
has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is
held that a party has lost his right to have the
matter considered on merits because of his
own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed
to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard
to plead that the substantial justice deserves to
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 81 of 87
be preferred as against the technical
considerations. While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the court must not start
with the merits of the main matter. The court
owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of
the explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient
cause assigned by the litigant and the
opposition of the other side is equally
balanced that the Court may bring into
aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should
not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over
the head of the respondent for indefinite period
of time to be determined at the whims and
fancies of the appellants.
***
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to
the conclusion that the High Court committed
no error much less any error of law in passing
the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High
Court was exercising its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has
been said that delay should not be excused as
a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 82 of 87
justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite
party. The appellants have failed to prove
that they were reasonably diligent in
prosecuting the matter and this vital test
for condoning the delay is not satisfied in
this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails
and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs.’
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of
the present case, we are of the opinion that the High
Court correctly refused to condone the delay and
dismissed the appeal by observing that such
inordinate delay was not explained
satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown
for the same, and no plausible reason was put
forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to
reject this petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the
delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due
to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of
the officials functioning in the State machinery.
Though the Government adopts systematic
approach in handling the legal issues and
preferring the petitions/applications/appeals
well within the time, due to the fault on the
part of the officials in merely communicating
the information on time, huge revenue loss will
be caused to the Government exchequer. The
present case is one such case, wherein, enormous
delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the
second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the
officials functioning under the State, though valuable
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 83 of 87
Government lands were involved. Therefore, we
direct the State to streamline the machinery touching
the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases
before the Tribunal/Courts, etc., fix the responsibility
on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the
officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay,
deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss
caused to the Government. Such direction will have
to be followed by all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we
must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time,
we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for
condonation of delay be it at the instance of a
private litigant or State the delay is sought to be
explained right from the time, the limitation starts
and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4
years till the end of the same. For example if the
period of limitation is 90 days then the party
seeking condonation has to explain why it was
unable to institute the proceedings within that
period of limitation. What events occurred
after the 91st day till the last is of no
consequence. The court is required to consider
what came in the way of the party that it was
unable to file it between the 1st day and the
90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait
until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal.
But when it allows the limitation to expire and
pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal
earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that
because of some event or circumstance arising
before the limitation expired it was not possible to
file the appeal within time. No event or
circumstance arising after the expiry of
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 84 of 87
limitation can constitute such sufficient cause.
There may be events or circumstances
subsequent to the expiry of limitation which
may further delay the filing of the appeal. But
that the limitation has been allowed to expire
without the appeal being filed must be traced to a
cause arising within the period of limitation. (See:
Ajit Singh Thakur Singh Vrs. State of Gujarat, (1981)
1 SCC 495 = AIR 1981 SC 733).”
15.13. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil Vrs.
Shantaram Baburao Patil, AIR 2001 SC 2582, the Hon’ble
Court observed that,
“A distinction must be made between a case where the
delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few
days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of
prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the
case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter
case no such consideration may arise and such a case
deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can
be laid down in this regard. The Court has to
exercise the discretion on the facts of each case
keeping in mind that in construing the expression
‘sufficient cause’ the principle of advancing
substantial justice is of prime importance.”
15.14. It needs to be emphasised age-old maxim
“Vigilantibus Et Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt”,
meaning thereby equity avails to the vigilant, not the
person who sleeps over his right. The Courts will not
help the persons who sleep over their rights but help
those who are aware of their rights. A person is said to
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 85 of 87
be liable for laches when he comes to the Court to affirm
rights after a reasonable delay in that respect.
15.15. This Court, therefore, comes to the irresistible
conclusion that stating simply that delay occasioned due
to movement of files for consultation at different levels
would not suffice. It cannot thus be construed that such
explanation (rather excuse) is “sufficient cause”/”good
cause” so as to warrant consideration of cause for the
delay in filing writ appeal. This Court does not find the
averments of the appellants in the application for
condonation of delay as genuine.
16. From the above discussions it is immutable that unless
“sufficient cause”/”good cause” is shown, there is little
scope for the Court to exercise the discretion in
condoning the inordinate delay in filing writ appeal by
the Government.
17. Under the above premises, the petition for condonation
of delay does not demonstrate sufficient/good cause; as
such, this Court does not deem it a fit case deserving
condonation of inordinate delay in filing writ appeal.
Having noticed want of bona fide on the part of
appellants and the inaction or negligence as is perceived
on the facts and the circumstances of the present case,
it would deprive the appellants of the protection within
ken of the connotation of the term “sufficient
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 86 of 87
cause”/”good cause”. Thus, the petition praying to
condone the delay of 1237 (plus 30 days specified
prescribed period) in filing the writ appeal cannot be
allowed. It is on threadbare discussion on the material
available on record this Court comes to hold that the
appellants were found to be negligent. The appellants
have not been diligently prosecuting cases.
18. So far as the decision relied upon by the Single Bench in
the case of Sri Satyabrata Nayak (supra) is concerned,
this Court finds that the judgment passed in the said
case has been affirmed in the intra-Court appeal by the
Division Bench. Identical cases have also been disposed
of by Division Bench(es) of this Court.
19. In the wake of aforesaid discussions and reasons
ascribed on facts and in law, the interlocutory
application, being I.A. No.1168 of 2026, is dismissed.
Consequently, the writ appeal bearing W.A. No.435 of
2026 stands dismissed. Pending interlocutory
application(s), if any, shall be deemed to have been
disposed of.
(HARISH TANDON)
CHIEF JUSTICE
Signature Not Verified (MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)
Digitally Signed
Signed by: LAXMIKANT MOHAPATRA
JUDGE
Designation: SENIOR High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
STENOGRAPHER
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa,
The 6th July, 2026//MRS/Laxmikant
Cuttack
Date: 08-Jul-2026 13:36:09
W.A. No.435 of 2026 & I.A. No.1168 of 2026 Page 87 of 87
