Himachal Pradesh High Court
Nirmala Devi & Anr vs State Of H.P on 7 July, 2026
2026:HHC:26974
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal Nos. 475 and 476 of 2012
.
Reserved on: 20.06.2026
Date of Decision: 07.07.2026
1. Cr. Appeal No. 475 of 2012
Nirmala Devi & Anr. ...Appellants
of
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
rt
_____________________________________
2. Cr. Appeal No. 476 of 2012
Bhagat Ram ...Appellant
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the Appellants : M/s Naveen Kumar and Kiran
Kumar, Advocates, in both the
appeals.
For respondents/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General, in both the appeals.
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeals are directed against the
.
judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 03.11.2012
passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track
Court), Mandi (learned Trial Court) vide which the appellants
(accused before the learned Trial Court) were convicted and
of
sentenced as under:
Accused
rtSections SentencesBhagat Ram 304 Part-II The accused was sentenced to
of the undergo rigorous imprisonment
Indian for five years, pay a fine of
Penal Code ₹10,000/-, and, in default ofpayment of the fine, to undergo
simple imprisonment for three
months.
Nirmala Devi 323 of the The accused was sentenced to pay
Indian a fine of ₹1,000/-, and in default
Penal Code of payment of the fine, toundergo simple imprisonment for
one month.
Sanjay Kumar 323 of the The accused was sentenced to pay
Indian a fine of ₹1,000/-, and in default
Penal Code of payment of the fine, to
undergo simple imprisonment for
one month.
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(The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as
they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
.
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that the police presented a challan against the
accused for the commission of offences punishable under
of
Sections 302, 506, 323, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code (IPC). It was asserted that Lal Chand, since deceased, was
rt
reading the newspaper on 04.09.2011. Accused Bhagat Ram
started digging a drain. Lal Chand objected by saying that
Bhagat Ram should not do anything till the land was partitioned.
Bhagat Ram retorted by saying that Lal Chand had no share in
the land. Kanta Devi (PW5) came to the spot and started
throwing soil on the drain that was being dug by Bhagat Ram.
Bhagat Ram dragged Kanta Devi to the courtyard and started
beating her. The informant Vijay Kumar (PW4) and his sisters
Jyoti Devi, Anita Devi and Sunita Devi (PW1) tried to rescue
Kanta Devi. Accused Nirmala and Sanjay also came to the spot,
and they also quarrelled with the informant party. Bhagat Ram
inflicted a stick blow on the head of Lal Chand, who suffered a
bleeding injury and fell. Nirmala instigated Bhagat Ram to kill
Lal Chand. The informant tried to take away Lal Chand from the
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spot, and Bhagat Ram inflicted a blow on the informant’s head.
Sanjay Kumar gave beatings to Kanta Devi and the informant’s
.
sisters. Lal Chand was taken to the hospital, where he was
declared dead. An intimation was given to the police. The police
recorded an entry (Ext.PW6/C) in the daily diary. SI/SHO Firoz
Khan (PW10) went to the hospital, where he recorded the
of
informant’s statement (Ext.PW4/A) and sent it to the Police
Station. An FIR (Ext.PW6/B) was registered in the police station.
rt
SI/SHO Firoz Khan (PW10) conducted the inquest on the dead
body and prepared the reports (Ext.PW10/A and Ext.PW10/B). He
filed an application (Ext.PW10/C) for conducting the post-
mortem examination of Lal Chand. Dr J.S. Roodkee (PW11)
conducted the post-mortem examination and found that the
cause of death was acute coronary insufficiency in a case of
hypertrophic heart disease due to sudden fear and anxiety as a
result of assault. He issued the report (Ext.PW11/A). SI Firoz
Khan (PW10) also filed an application (Ext.PW10/D) for
conducting the medical examination of Vijay Kumar, Kanta and
Jyoti Devi. Dr J.S. Roodkee (PW11) conducted their medical
examination and found that they had sustained simple injuries
which could have been caused within 6 hours of examination. He
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issued MLCs (Ext.PW11/B to Ext.PW11/D). SI Firoz Khan (PW10)
went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW10/E). He
.
seized the stick, prepared its sketch (Ext.PW10/F), put it in a
cloth parcel, and sealed the parcel with 12 seals of seal
impression ‘K’. He also found broken pieces of bangles on the
spot, put them in a cloth parcel, and sealed the parcel with four
of
impressions of seal ‘K’. He picked up the sample of soil from the
spot, put it in a matchbox, put the matchbox in a cloth parcel,
rt
and sealed the parcel with four impressions of seal ‘K’. He
obtained a seal impression (Ext.PW2/A) on a separate piece of
cloth. He seized all the articles vide memo (Ext.PW2/B). The spot
was videographed, and the recording was transferred to the CDs
(Ext.PW7/A and Ext.PW7/B). Sita Ram (PW8) prepared the aks
tatima (Ext.PW8/A). The case property was sent to SFSL for
analysis. The results of the analysis (Ext.PX, Ext. PY, and Ext.PZ)
were issued, stating that human blood was found on the stick,
but it was insufficient for further examination, the soil attached
to the wooden log, broken bangles and a pair of bathroom
slippers matched the soil packed in the parcel, and no
alcohol/poison was found in the viscera. Statements of
witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the
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completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and
presented before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class
.
Court No. 2, Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, who committed it to
the Learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, for trial.
3. Learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, assigned the case to
of
Learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Mandi (learned
Trial Court) for trial.
4.
rt
Learned Trial Court charged the accused with the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 302, 323 and
506 read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not
guilty and claimed to be tried.
5. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses to prove its
case. Sunita (PW1), Reeta Devi (PW2), Vijay Kumar (PW4) and
Kanta Devi (PW5) are the eyewitnesses. Naveen Kumar (PW3)
did not support the prosecution’s case. HC Satya Prakash (PW6)
signed the FIR, received the case property and sent it to the SFSL
for analysis. Parma Nand (PW7) transferred the video recording
to the CDs. Sita Ram, Patwari (PW8), prepared the aks tatima.
Santosh Kumar (PW9) carried the injured to the hospital. Firoz
Khan (PW10) investigated the matter. Dr J.S. Roodkee (PW11)
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conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased and
the medical examination of the injured.
.
6. The accused, in their statements, recorded under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), denied
the prosecution’s case in its entirety. Accused Bhagat Ram
of
stated that he was digging the trench in his own land. All six
family members of the deceased’s family entered his premises
rt
and quarrelled with him. The deceased fell and sustained
injuries. The accused claimed that they were innocent. They did
not produce any evidence in their defence.
7. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. There was
nothing in their cross-examination to show that they were
making false statements or that they had any reason to falsely
depose against the accused. A related person cannot be said to be
an interested person, and there is no prohibition in acting upon
his testimony. The presence of the prosecution witnesses was
established by the injuries sustained by them. Dr J.S. Roodkee
(PW11) proved that the deceased had died due to acute coronary
insufficiency in a case of hypertrophied heart because of sudden
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fear and anxiety as a result of assault. Thus, the cause of death
was anxiety and fear, which was attributable to the act of the
.
accused. There were minor contradictions in the testimonies of
the witnesses, but these were not sufficient to doubt the
prosecution’s case. The enmity was not sufficient to discard the
prosecution’s case because the enmity is a double-edged
of
weapon and can furnish a motive for the commission of a crime.
Accused Bhagat Ram had given a single stick blow on the head
rt
without any premeditation. There was no intention to cause
death. However, Bhagat Ram was aware of the fact that the
injury caused to the head of the deceased would result in his
death, and his acts satisfied the ingredients of the commission
of an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.
Accused Sanjay Kumar and Nirmala Devi did not share the
common intention to cause the death of Lal Chand. Hence, the
learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as
mentioned above.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
the Learned Courts below, the accused have filed the present
appeal asserting that the prosecution relied upon the
testimonies of interested witnesses, which were not sufficient to
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record the conviction. The informant party was the aggressor,
and the incident would not have occurred but for Kanta Devi
.
going to the courtyard of Bhagat Ram. The Medical Officer had
noticed only simple injuries on the body of Lal Chand, and the
ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 304 Part II were not satisfied. The statements of the
of
prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material
particulars, and the learned Trial Court erred in relying upon the
rt
prosecution’s case. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal
be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned
Trial Court be set aside.
9. I have heard M/s Naveen Kumar and Kiran Kumar,
learned counsel for the appellants and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned
Deputy Advocate General for the respondents/State.
10. M/s Naveen Kumar and Kiran Kumar, learned
counsel for the appellants, submitted that the learned Trial
Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The incident
had taken place in the courtyard of Bhagat Ram, which
supported the plea taken by the accused that the informant
party was the aggressor. The accused had a right of private
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defence to protect their property. The prosecution had
implicated all members of the family because of the enmity. The
.
Medical Officer had noticed a simple injury on the head which
was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death. Learned Trial Court erred in convicting the accused of the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II.
of
The allegations made against the accused attracted the
provisions of Section 323 and not Section 304-Part II of the IPC.
rt
He relied upon the judgments in State of H.P. vs. Rakesh Kumar
2024:HHC;2620, Darshan Singh vs. State of Punjab 2010(2) SCC 333
and Vuvraj Laxmilal Kanther and another vs. State of Maharashtra
AIR 2025 SC 1515 in support of his submission. He has also filed
written arguments, which have been perused by me.
11. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the respondents/State, submitted that the accused, Bhagat Ram,
admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the
Cr.P.C. that Lal Chand was suffering from heart disease.
Therefore, he was aware of the fact that any injury caused to him
could have resulted in his death and learned Trial Court had
rightly convicted the accused of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. Minor
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contradictions are bound to come with time and are not
sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. There is no infirmity
.
in the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court.
Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
of
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
13. Informant Vijay Kumar (PW4) stated that his father,
rt
Lal Chand, was reading a newspaper in his verandah on
04.09.2011 at about 08.30 a.m. Accused Bhagat Ram started
digging a trench with a spade. Lal Chand objected to the digging.
The accused Bhagat Ram replied that the land belonged to him
and the informant’s father had no right, title or interest over it.
Kanta Devi came and tried to fill up the trench. The accused
Bhagat Ram dragged Kanta Devi to the verandah and gave her
beatings. Lal Chand tried to save Kanta Devi, and Bhagat Ram
inflicted a stick blow on Lal Chand’s head. He fell. Sunita Devi,
Anita Devi, Jyoti and the informant went to rescue Lal Chand.
Accused Bhagat Ram inflicted a blow on the informant’s head.
Sanjay Kumar and his mother gave beatings to Kanta Devi and
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her daughters. Lal Chand was taken to the hospital, where he
died.
.
14. Informant Vijay Kumar (PW4) stated in his cross-
examination that the trench being cleaned by the accused
Bhagat Ram belonged to him. The bathroom and trench were
of
constructed 5-6 years before the incident. He admitted that the
informant party consisted of six family members, whereas the
rt
family of the accused consisted of 3 persons. He admitted that
the fight could have been avoided had Kanta Devi not gone to fill
up the trench, which was being cleaned. He admitted that his
house was located on a higher elevation, and the house of the
accused was at a lower elevation. He admitted that the scuffle
had taken place in the courtyard of the house of the accused
Bhagat Ram. He admitted that there was an exchange of blows
for about 15-20 minutes. He admitted that the accused had not
trespassed into his land, and the informant party had trespassed
into the land of the accused. He admitted that when Kanta Devi
forcibly tried to fill up the trench and all the other persons
helped, the incident started. He admitted that Bhagat Ram had
not used the spade, which was kept near the bathroom. He
admitted the enmity between him and the accused. He stated
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that the incident continued for 15-20 minutes, and no person
from the vicinity came to the spot.
.
15. Kanta Devi (PW5) stated that her husband was
reading a newspaper on 04.09.2011 at about 08.30 p.m. Accused
Bhagat Ram came with a spade and started digging a trench to
of
make a passage for the bathroom water. Part of the land upon
which the trench was being dug belonged to her. Her husband
rt
objected. She went and tried to fill up the trench with mud. The
accused dragged her to the verandah and started beating her. Her
husband, son and daughters came to rescue her. Bhagat Ram
inflicted a stick blow on Lal Chand’s head. The informant tried
to rescue Lal Chand, but Bhagat Ram inflicted injuries on him.
She stated in her cross-examination that the bathroom was
already constructed by the accused. The trench, which was being
cleaned by the accused, was constructed for the passage of the
bathroom water. Her house was located on a higher elevation,
and the house of the accused was on a lower elevation. She had
tried to fill up the trench with the mud. She admitted that they
were six in number, whereas the accused were three in number.
She admitted that the incident continued for 10-15 minutes. She
went to the courtyard of the accused on her own to block the
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passage of the bathroom water. She admitted that the incident
would not have taken place, but for her going to the courtyard of
.
the house of the accused. She admitted that her husband was
suffering from acute coronary disease, and he was taken to
Chandigarh for treatment. She volunteered to say that he used to
drive a tractor and earn his livelihood after the treatment.
of
16. Sunita Devi (PW1) stated that her father, Lal Chand,
rt
was reading a newspaper in the courtyard on 04.09.2011 at about
08.30 a.m. Accused Bhagat Ram started diverting the flow of
bathroom water with the help of a spade towards her land. Lal
Chand objected. Kanta Devi came to the spot and tried to fill up
the trench. Bhagat Ram dragged Kanta Devi towards his
courtyard and started beating her. She, Lal Chand, Vijay, Anita
and Jyoti went to the courtyard of the accused to rescue Kanta
Devi. The wife and son of the accused Bhagat Ram also came to
the spot, and they started beating the informant party. Accused
Bhagat Ram picked up a stick and inflicted injury on Lal Chand’s
head. Lal Chand was taken to the hospital, where he was
declared dead. She stated in her cross-examination that her
house was located on a higher elevation, and the house of the
accused was on a lower elevation. She admitted that the scuffle
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had taken place in the courtyard of the house of the accused. She
admitted that Bhagat Ram was dressing the old trench for the
.
flow of the water because it was filled with mud during the rainy
season. She admitted that Bhagat Ram could have easily caused
injury by means of a spade, but he did not use the spade. She
admitted that the sticks were lying in the courtyard. She
of
admitted that the wife and son of the accused had not picked up
any stick. She admitted that the relationship between her and
rt
the accused was strained. She admitted that her father was a
patient with heart disease who used to take treatment from
Chandigarh. She stated that no person had visited the spot, even
though the houses of around 40 people were located adjacent to
her house.
17. It was submitted that the testimonies of the
prosecution’s witnesses show that the incident had started
when Kanta Devi went to the courtyard of the accused Bhagat
Ram and started filling up the trench. The trench was not being
freshly dug but had existed on the spot for about 5-6 years
before the incident. Therefore, Kanta Devi had no business to
enter the land of the accused and fill up the trench. The accused
had a right of private defence, and this was not considered by
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the learned Trial Court. This submission will not help the
accused. Sections 103 and 104 of the IPC deal with the right of
.
private defence. and provides the right of private defence in case
of robbery, house breaking by night, theft, mischief or house
trespass, under such circumstances that a reasonable
apprehension would arise that death or grievous hurt would be
of
the consequence. In the present case, the land was jointly
owned, and the act of Kanta Devi in going to the courtyard of the
rt
house of the accused would not constitute a trespass. Further,
the water was being diverted to the land of the accused, and
Bhagat Ram was the aggressor. Kanta Devi was filling up the
trench, and her act did not give rise to any apprehension that
death or grievous hurt would be the consequence. She did not
say anything to any person, but simply filled the trench with
mud. Therefore, the submission that the accused were entitled
to a right of private defence cannot be accepted, and the
judgments in Darshan Singh (supra) and Rakesh Kumar (supra)
will not apply to the present case.
18. It was submitted that the prosecution witnesses
admitted that the informant’s house was located on a higher
elevation than the house of the accused. Therefore, the water
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could not have moved towards the land of the informant, and
this made the prosecution’s case highly suspect that the accused
.
Bhagat Ram was diverting the flow of water towards the house
of the informant. This submission will not help the accused. No
person stated that the water was being diverted towards the
house of the informant; rather, the prosecution’s version is that
of
the water was being diverted towards the informant’s land.
Thus, the elevation of the houses would be immaterial.
rt
19. It was submitted that six members of the informant
party had entered into the courtyard, which showed that the
informant party was the aggressor. This submission will not
help the accused. It was consistently stated by the witnesses that
the accused Bhagat Ram had dragged Kanta Devi to his
courtyard, and the informant party went to the courtyard to
rescue her from Bhagat Ram. Therefore, the informant party
had not gone to the house of Bhagat Ram as aggressors but to
save Kanta Devi from the accused, Bhagat Ram, who was
dragging her towards her courtyard. Therefore, the informant
party was not the aggressor.
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20. It was submitted that no independent witness was
examined, and the prosecution relied upon the testimonies of
.
the interested witnesses. This submission will not help the
accused. All the witnesses consistently admitted that no person
from the vicinity came to the spot, and no person had raised any
hue and cry. Thus, there is no evidence of the presence of any
of
independent person, and no independent person could have
been examined. rt
21. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that a
related person cannot be called an interested person. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laltu Ghosh v. State of W.B.,
(2019) 15 SCC 344: (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 275: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 2 that a
related witness is not an interested witness and his testimony
cannot be rejected on the ground of interestedness. It was observed:
“12. As regards the contention that the eyewitnesses are
close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-settled
that a related witness cannot be said to be an “interested”
witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim.
This Court has elucidated the difference between
“interested” and “related” witnesses in a plethora of
cases, stating that a witness may be called interested only
when he or she derives some benefit from the result of
litigation, which in the context of a criminal case would
mean that the witness has a direct or indirect interest in
seeing the accused punished due to prior enmity or other
reasons, and thus has a motive to falsely implicate the
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accused (for instance, see State of Rajasthan v. Kalki,
(1981) 2 SCC 752: 1981 SCC (Cri) 593; Amit v. State of U.P.,
(2012) 4 SCC 107 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 590 and Gangabhavani
.
v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 298 : (2014) 6 SCC
(Cri) 182).
13. Recently, this difference was reiterated in Ganapathi v.
State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793, in
the following terms, by referring to the three-Judge
Bench decision in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC
752: 1981 SCC (Cri) 593 : (Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5
of
SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793), SCC p. 555, para 14)
“14. “Related” is not equivalent to “interested”. A
witness may be called “interested” only when he or
rt
she derives some benefit from the result of a
litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing
an accused person punished. A witness who is a
natural one and is the only possible eyewitness in
the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be
“interested”….
14. In criminal cases, it is often the case that the offence is
witnessed by a close relative of the victim, whose
presence on the scene of the offence would be natural.
The evidence of such a witness cannot automatically be
discarded by labelling the witness as interested. Indeed,
one of the earliest statements with respect to interested
witnesses in criminal cases was made by this Court in
Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145: AIR 1953 SC
364: 1953 Cri LJ 1465, wherein this Court observed: (AIR p.
366, para 26)
“26. A witness is normally to be considered
independent unless he or she springs from sources
which are likely to be tainted, and that usually
means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity
against the accused, to wish to implicate him
falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last
to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an
innocent person.”
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15. In the case of a related witness, the Court may not
treat his or her testimony as inherently tainted and needs
to ensure only that the evidence is inherently reliable,
.
probable, cogent and consistent. We may refer to the
observations of this Court in Jayabalan v. State (UT of
Pondicherry), (2010) 1 SCC 199: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 966):
(SCC p. 213, para 23)
“23. We are of the considered view that in cases
where the court is called upon to deal with the
evidence of the interested witnesses, the approachof
of the court, while appreciating the evidence of
such witnesses, must not be pedantic. The court
must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the
evidence given by the interested witnesses, but the
rt
court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The
primary endeavour of the court must be to look forconsistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be
ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from
the mouth of a person who is closely related to the
victim.”
22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Thoti Manohar vs State of Andhra Pradesh (2012) 7 SCC 723 that
the court cannot discard the testimony of a witness on the
ground of a relationship. It was observed:
“31. In this context, we may refer with profit to the
decision of this Court in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab AIR
1953 SC 364, wherein Vivian Bose, J., speaking for the
Court, observed as follows: –
“We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of
the High Court that the testimony of the two eye-
witnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation
for such an observation is based on the fact that the
witnesses are women and that the fate of seven
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2026:HHC:26974rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are
closely related to the deceased, we are unable to
concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal.
cases and one which another Bench of this Court
endeavoured to dispel in Rameshwar v. The State of
Rajasthan (1952) SCR 377 at p. 390 = (AIR 1952 SC 54
at page 59).”
32. In the said case, it was further observed that:
“A witness is normally to be considered
independent unless he or she springs from sourcesof
which are likely to be tainted, and that usually
means unless the witness has a cause, such as an
enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate
rt
him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the
last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate
an innocent person. It is true that when feelings runhigh, and there is a personal cause for enmity, there
is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against
whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty,but the foundation must be laid for such criticism,
and the mere fact of relationship, far from being a
foundation, is often a sure guarantee of truth.”
33. In Masalti v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 202, it has been
ruled that normally close relatives of the deceased would
not be considered to be interested witnesses who would
also mention the names of the other persons as
responsible for causing injuries to the deceased.
34. In Hari Obula Reddi and others v. State of Andhra
Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 82, a three-judge Bench has held that
evidence of interested witnesses is not necessarily
unreliable evidence. Even partisanship by itself is not a
valid ground for discrediting or rejecting sworn
testimony. It can be laid down as an invariable rule that
interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction
unless corroborated to a material extent in material
particulars by independent evidence. All that is necessary
is that the evidence of interested witnesses should be
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subjected to scrutiny and accepted with caution. If, on
such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be
intrinsically reliable or inherently probable, it may, by
.
itself, be sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular
case, to base a conviction thereon.
35. In Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar (1996) 1 SCC 614, it has
been opined that a close relative who is a natural witness
cannot be regarded as an interested witness, for the term
‘interested’ postulates that the witness must have some
interest in having the accused, somehow or other,
of
convicted for some animus or some other reason.
36. In Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy v. State of
Andhra Pradesh AIR 2006 SC 3010, while dealing with the
rt
liability of interested witnesses who are relatives, a two-
judge Bench observed that:
“It is well settled that evidence of a witness cannot
be discarded merely on the ground that he is either
partisan or interested or close relative to the
deceased if it is otherwise found to be trustworthyand credible.”
The said evidence only requires scrutiny with more care
and caution, so that neither the guilty escapes nor the
innocent is wrongly convicted. If, on such scrutiny, the
evidence is found to be reliable and probable, then it can
be acted upon.
“If it is found to be improbable or suspicious, it
ought to be rejected. Where the witness has a
motive to falsely implicate the accused, his
testimony should have corroboration in regard to
material particulars before it is accepted.”
23. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Yadav vs. State
of Bihar 2022 Cr.L.J. 2986 (SC) as under:
“28. A related witness cannot be termed as an interested
witness per se. One has to see the place of occurrence
along with other circumstances. A related witness can::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:36:54 :::CIS
23
2026:HHC:26974also be a natural witness. If an offence is committed
within the precincts of the deceased, the presence of his
family members cannot be ruled out, as they assume the.
position of natural witnesses. When their evidence is
clear, cogent and withstands the rigour of cross-
examination, it becomes sterling, not requiring further
corroboration. A related witness would become aninterested witness only when he is desirous of implicating
the accused in rendering a conviction, on purpose.
29. When the court is convinced of the quality of the evidence
of
produced, notwithstanding the classification as quoted above, it
becomes the best evidence. Such testimony being natural,
adding to the degree of probability, the court has to rely upon it
in proving a fact. The aforesaid position of law has been well
rt
laid down in Bhaskarrao v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 591:
“32. Coming back to the appreciation of the evidence at
hand, at the outset, our attention is drawn to the fact that
the witnesses were interrelated, and this Court should be
cautious in accepting their statements. It would bebeneficial to recapitulate the law concerning the
appreciation of evidence of a related witness. In Dalip
Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145: AIR 1953 SC 364: 1953Cri LJ 1465, Vivian Bose, J. for the Bench, observed the law
as under (AIR p. 366, para 26)“26. A witness is normally to be considered
independent unless he or she springs from sources
which are likely to be tainted, and that usually meansunless the witness has a cause, such as an enmity
against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely.
Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen
the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent
person. It is true when feelings run high, and there is
a personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency
to drag in an innocent person against whom a
witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but the
foundation must be laid for such a criticism, and the
mere fact of relationship, far from being a
foundation, is often a sure guarantee of truth.
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2026:HHC:26974
However, we are not attempting any sweeping
generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own
facts. Our observations are only made to combat.
what is so often put forward in cases before us as a
general rule of prudence. There is no such general
rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by
its own facts.”
33. In Masalti v. State of U.P., (1964) 8 SCR 133: AIR 1965 SC
202: (1965) 1 Cri LJ 226], a five-judge Bench of this Court
has categorically observed as under (AIR pp. 209-210,
of
para 14)
“14. … There is no doubt that when a criminal court
has to appreciate evidence given by witnesses who
rt
are partisan or interested, it has to be very careful in
weighing such evidence. Whether or not there are
discrepancies in the evidence, whether or not the
evidence strikes the court as genuine, whether or not
the story disclosed by the evidence is probable, are all
matters that must be taken into account. But it
would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that
evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only
on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or
interested witnesses. Often enough, where factions
prevail in villages and murders are committed as a
result of enmity between such factions, criminal
courts have to deal with evidence of a partisan type.
The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the
sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead
to the failure of justice. No hard-and-fast rule can be
laid down as to how much evidence should be
appreciated. The judicial approach has to be cautious
in dealing with such evidence, but the plea that such
evidence should be rejected because it is partisan
cannot be accepted as correct.”
34. In Darya Singh v. State of Punjab [(1964) 3 SCR 397: AIR
1965 SC 328: (1965) 1 Cri LJ 350], this Court held that
evidence of an eyewitness who is a near relative of the
victim should be closely scrutinised, but no
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corroboration is necessary for acceptance of his
evidence. In Harbans Kaur v. State of Haryana [(2005) 9
SCC 195: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1213: 2005 Cri LJ 2199], this Court
.
observed that: (SCC p. 227, para 6)
“6. There is no proposition in law that relatives are to
be treated as untruthful witnesses. On the contrary,
reason has to be shown when a plea of partiality is
raised to show that the witnesses had reason to
shield the actual culprit and falsely implicate the
accused.”
of
35. The last case we need to concern ourselves with is
Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 14 SCC 150: (2009)
1 SCC (Cri) 773, wherein this Court, after observing
rt
previous precedents, has summarised the law in the
following manner: (SCC p. 164, para 38)
“38. … It is clear that a close relative cannot be
characterised as an “interested” witness. He is a
“natural” witness. His evidence, however, must be
scrutinised carefully. If, on such scrutiny, his
evidence is found to be intrinsically reliable,
inherently probable and wholly trustworthy, a
conviction can be based on the “sole” testimony of
such a witness. A close relationship of the witness
with the deceased or the victim is no grounds to
reject his evidence. On the contrary, a close relative
of the deceased would normally be most reluctant to
spare the real culprit and falsely implicate an
innocent one.”
36. From the study of the aforesaid precedents of this
Court, we may note that whoever has been a witness
before the court of law, having a strong interest in the
result, if allowed to be weighed in the same scales with
those who do not have any interest in the result, would
be to open the doors of the court for perverted truth.
This sound rule, which remains the bulwark of this
system and which determines the value of evidence
derived from such sources, needs to be cautiously and
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carefully observed and enforced. There is no dispute
about the fact that the interest of the witness must
affect his testimony is a universal truth. Moreover,
.
under the influence of bias, a man may not be in a
position to judge correctly, even if they earnestly desires
to do so. Similarly, he may not be in a position to
provide evidence in an impartial manner when it
involves his interests. Under such influences, man will,
even though not consciously, suppress some facts,
soften or modify others, and provide favourable colour.
of
These are the most controlling considerations in respect
to the credibility of human testimony, and should never
be overlooked in applying the rules of evidence and
determining its weight in the scale of truth under the
rt
facts and circumstances of each case.”
30. Once again, we reiterate with a word of caution that
the trial court is the best court to decide on the aforesaid
aspect, as no mathematical calculation or straightjacket
formula can be made on the assessment of a witness, as
the journey towards the truth can be seen better through
the eyes of the trial judge. In fact, this is the real objective
behind the enactment itself, which extends the maximum
discretion to the court.”
24. Similar is the judgment in M Nageswara Reddy vs.
State of Andhra Pradesh 2022 (5) SCC 791, wherein it was
observed:
“10. Having gone through the deposition of the relevant
witnesses -eye-witnesses/injured eye-witnesses, we are
of the opinion that there are no major/material
contradictions in the deposition of the eye-witnesses and
injured eye-witnesses. All are consistent insofar as
accused Nos. 1 to 3 are concerned. As observed
hereinabove, PW6 has identified Accused Nos. 1 to 3. The
High Court has observed that PW1, PW3 & PW5 were
planted witnesses merely on the ground that they were all::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:36:54 :::CIS
27
2026:HHC:26974interested witnesses, being relatives of the deceased.
Merely because the witnesses were the relatives of the
deceased, their evidence cannot be discarded solely on the.
aforesaid ground. Therefore, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the High Court has materially
erred in discarding the deposition/evidence of PW1, PW3,
PW5 & PW6 and even PW7.”
25. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Mohd. Jabbar Ali v. State of Assam, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1440, that
of
relationship is no reason to discard the witnesses’ testimonies.
The Court is required to see their testimonies with due care and
rt
caution. It was observed:
55. It is noted that great weight has been attached to the
testimonies of the witnesses in the instant case. Having
regard to the aforesaid fact that this Court has examinedthe credibility of the witnesses to rule out any tainted
evidence given in the court of Law. It was contended by
learned counsel for the appellant that the prosecutionfailed to examine any independent witnesses in the
present case and that the witnesses were related to each
other. This Court, in a number of cases, has had the
opportunity to consider the said aspect ofrelated/interested/partisan witnesses and the credibility
of such witnesses. This Court is conscious of the well-
settled principle that just because the witnesses are
related/interested/partisan witnesses, their testimonies
cannot be disregarded; however, it is also true that when
the witnesses are related/interested, their testimonies
have to be scrutinised with greater care and
circumspection. In the case of Gangadhar Behera v. State of
Orissa, (2002) 8 SCC 381, this Court held that the
testimony of such related witnesses should be analysed
with caution for its credibility.
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56. In Raju alias Balachandran v. State of Tamil Nadu,
(2012) 12 SCC 701, this Court observed:
“29. The sum and substance is that the evidence of
.
a related or interested witness should be
meticulously and carefully examined. In a case
where the related and interested witness may have
some enmity with the assailant, the bar would needto be raised, and the evidence of the witness would
have to be examined by applying a standard of
discerning scrutiny. However, this is only a rule ofof
prudence and not one of law, as held in Dalip Singh
[AIR 1953 SC 364] and pithily reiterated in Sarwan
Singh [(1976) 4 SCC 369] in the following words:
rt
(Sarwan Singh case [(1976) 4 SCC 369, p. 376, para
10)
“10. … The evidence of an interested witness
does not suffer from any infirmity as such,
but the courts require, as a rule of prudence,
not as a rule of law, that the evidence of suchwitnesses should be scrutinised with a little
care. Once that approach is made and the
court is satisfied that the evidence ofinterested witnesses has a ring of truth, such
evidence could be relied upon even withoutcorroboration.”
57. Further delving into the same issue, it is noted that in
the case of Ganapathi v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2018) 5 SCC
549, this Court held that in several cases when only family
members are present at the time of the incident and the
case of the prosecution is based only on their evidence,
Courts have to be cautious and meticulously evaluate the
evidence in the process of trial.
26. This position was reiterated in Baban Shankar Daphal
v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 137, wherein it was
observed:
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2026:HHC:26974
“27. One of the contentions of the learned counsel for the
appellants is that the eyewitnesses to the incident were
all closely related to the deceased, and for prudence, the
.
prosecution ought to have examined some other
independent eyewitnesses as well who were present at the
time of the unfortunate incident. This was also the view
taken by the Trial Court, but the High Court has correctly
rejected such an approach and held that merely because
there were some more independent witnesses, who had
also reached the place of the incident, the evidence of the
of
relatives cannot be disbelieved. The law nowhere states
that the evidence of the interested witness should be
discarded altogether. The law only warrants that their
evidence should be scrutinised with care and caution. It
rt
has been held by this Court in the catena of judgments
that merely if a witness is a relative, their testimony
cannot be discarded on that ground alone.
28. In criminal cases, the credibility of witnesses,
particularly those who are close relatives of the victim, is
often scrutinised. However, being a relative does not
automatically render a witness “interested” or biased.
The term “interested” refers to witnesses who have a
personal stake in the outcome, such as a desire for
revenge or to falsely implicate the accused due to enmity
or personal gain. A “related” witness, on the other hand,
is someone who may be naturally present at the scene of
the crime, and their testimony should not be dismissed
simply because of their relationship to the victim. Courts
must assess the reliability, consistency, and coherence of
their statements rather than labelling them as
untrustworthy.
29. The distinction between “interested” and “related”
witnesses has been clarified in Dalip Singh v. State of
Punjab 1954 SCR 145: AIR 1953 SC 364: 1953 Cri LJ 1465,
where this Court emphasised that a close relative is
usually the last person to falsely implicate an innocent
person. Therefore, in evaluating the evidence of a related
witness, the court should focus on the consistency and
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2026:HHC:26974
credibility of their testimony. This approach ensures that
the evidence is not discarded merely due to familial ties,
but is instead assessed based on its inherent reliability
.
and consistency with other evidence in the case. This
position has been reiterated by this Court in:
i. Md. Rojali Ali v. The State of Assam, Ministry of
Home Affairs through secretary (2019) 19 SCC 567;
ii. Ganapathi v. State of T.N. (2018) 5 SCC 549;
iii. Jayabalan v. Union Territory of Pondicherry (2010)of
1 SCC 199.
30. Though the eyewitnesses who have been examined in
the present case were closely related to the deceased,
namely his wife, daughter and son, their testimonies are
rt
consistent with respect to the accused persons being the
assailants who inflicted wounds on the deceased. As is
revealed from the sequence of events that transpired, one
of the family members was subjected to an assault. It was
thus quite natural for the other family members to rush
on the spot to intervene. The presence of the family
members on the spot and thus being eyewitnesses has
been well established. In such circumstances, merely
because the eyewitnesses are family members, their
testimonies cannot be discarded solely on that ground.
27. Therefore, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
cannot be discarded on the ground that only related witnesses
were examined. They were the natural witnesses because they
were interested in trying to rescue Kanta Devi, who was being
dragged towards the courtyard. Their presence on the spot is
natural, and there is no reason to disbelieve their testimonies.
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28. Dr J.S. Roodkee (PW11) examined Jyoti Devi, Vijay
Kumar and Kanta Devi. He found that they had sustained simple
.
injuries that could have been caused in a scuffle. He was only
cross-examined regarding the injuries sustained by Lal Chand,
and no question was asked regarding the injuries sustained by
Vijay Kumar, Kanta Devi and Jyoti Devi, which means that the
of
defence has not disputed his testimony that Vijay Kumar, Kanta
Devi and Jyoti Devi had sustained injuries in the incident. It was
rt
held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeraj Sharma v. State of
Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 125: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 13 that the
testimony of the injured witness has to be accepted as correct unless
there are compelling circumstances to doubt his testimony. It was
observed:
“22. The importance of an injured witness in a criminal
trial cannot be overstated. Unless there are compelling
circumstances or evidence placed by the defence to doubtsuch a witness, this has to be accepted as extremely
valuable evidence in a criminal trial.
23. In Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra [Balu
Sudam Khalde v.State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365:
2023 SCC OnLine SC 355], this Court summed up the
principles which are to be kept in mind when appreciating
the evidence of an injured eyewitness. This Court held as
follows: (SCC para 26)
“26. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to
be appreciated, the under-noted legal principles::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:36:54 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:26974enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in
mind:
26.1. The presence of an injured eyewitness at
.
the time and place of the occurrence cannot be
doubted unless there are material contradictions
in his deposition.
26.2. Unless it is otherwise established by the
evidence, it must be believed that an injured
witness would not allow the real culprits to
escape and falsely implicate the accused.
of
26.3. The evidence of the injured witness has
greater evidentiary value, and unless compelling
rt reasons exist, their statements are not to be
discarded lightly.
26.4. The evidence of the injured witness cannot
be doubted on account of some embellishment
in natural conduct or minor contradictions.
26.5. If there be any exaggeration or immaterial
embellishment in the evidence of an injured
witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration
or embellishment should be discarded from the
evidence of the injured, but not the whole
evidence.
26.6. The broad substratum of the prosecution
version must be taken into consideration, and
discrepancies which normally creep due to loss
of memory with the passage of time should be
discarded.” (emphasis supplied)
29. This position was reiterated in Rajan v. State of
Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, wherein it was observed:
“33. When the evidence of an injured eye-witness is to be
appreciated, the undernoted legal principles enunciated
by the Courts are required to be kept in mind:
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2026:HHC:26974
“(a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the
time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted
unless there are material contradictions in his.
deposition.
(b) Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it
must be believed that an injured witness would not
allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate
the accused.
(c) The evidence of an injured witness has greater
evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist,
of
their statements are not to be discarded lightly.
(d) The evidence of an injured witness cannot be
doubted on account of some embellishment in natural
rt
conduct or minor contradictions.
(e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial
embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness,
then such contradiction, exaggeration or
embellishment should be discarded from the evidence
of the injured, but not the whole evidence.
(f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version
must be taken into consideration, and discrepancies
which normally creep due to loss of memory with
passage of time should be discarded.”
34. In assessing the value of the evidence of the
eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether,
in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe
their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such
situations as would make it possible for them to witness
the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there
is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their
evidence. In respect of both these considerations,
circumstances either elicited from those witnesses
themselves or established by other evidence tending to
improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of
their statements, will have a bearing upon the value
which a Court would attach to their evidence. Although in
cases where the plea of the accused is a mere denial yet
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2026:HHC:26974
the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be
examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a
definite plea or put forward a positive case which is
.
inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of
such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will
also have to be taken into account while assessing the
value of the prosecution evidence. (See: Balu Sudam
Khaldev.State of Maharashtra:(2023) 13 SCC 365).
30. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
of
State of Punjab vs. Hari Singh 1974 (3) SCR 725 that a person
speaking on oath should be presumed to be a truthful witness
rt
unless there is something inherently improbable in his
testimony. It was observed:
“The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking
under an oath is truthful unless and until he is shown tobe untruthful or unreliable in any particular respect. The
High Court, reversing this approach, seems to us to have
assumed that witnesses are untruthful unless it is provedthat they are telling the truth. Witnesses, solemnly
deposing on oath in the witness box during a trial upon agrave charge of murder, must be presumed to act with a
full sense of responsibility for the consequences of whatthey state. It may be that what they say is so very unlikely
or unnatural or unreasonable that it is safer not to act
upon it or even to disbelieve them.”
31. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State of U.P. Versus Smt. Noorie Alias Noor Jahan and Others, (1996)
9 SCC 104, that while assessing the evidence of an eyewitness,
the Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the
circumstances of the case, the eyewitness could be present and
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2026:HHC:26974
whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable.
It was observed: –
.
“7. The High Court having acquitted the accused persons
on appreciation of the evidence, we have ourselves
scrutinised the evidence of PWs 1, 2, and 3. The conclusionis irresistible that their evidence on material particulars
has been brushed aside by the High Court by entering into
the realm of conjecture and fanciful speculation withoutof
even discussing the evidence, more particularly the
evidence relating to the basic prosecution case. While
assessing and evaluating the evidence of eyewitnesses, the
Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the
rt
circumstances of the case, it was possible for the eyewitness to
be present at the scene, and whether there is anythinginherently improbable or unreliable. The High Court, in our
opinion, has failed to observe the aforesaid principles
and, in fact, has misappreciated the evidence, which has
caused a gross miscarriage of justice. The credibility of awitness has to be decided by referring to his evidence and
finding out how he has fared in cross-examination and
what impression is created by his evidence, taken insofaras the context of the case, and not by entering into the
realm of conjecture and speculation. On scrutinising theevidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3, we find they are consistent
with one another so far as the place of occurrence, themanner of assault, the weapon of assault used by the
accused persons, the fact of dragging of the dead body of
the deceased from the place to the grove and nothing has
been brought out in their cross-examination to impeach
their testimony. The aforesaid oral evidence fully
corroborates the medical evidence. In that view of the
matter, we unhesitatingly conclude that the prosecution
has been able to establish the charge against the accused
persons and the High Court committed an error in
acquitting the three respondents, namely Inder Dutt,
Raghu Raj, and Bikram.” (emphasis supplied).
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2026:HHC:26974
32. In the present case, the presence of the witnesses
was established by the injuries sustained by them, and the
.
learned Trial Court had rightly accepted their testimonies.
33. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court had
convicted the accused, Nirmala Devi and Sanjay Kumar, of the
of
commission of an offence punishable under Section 323 of theIPC, which suggests that the prosecution had exaggerated its
rt
version. This submission will not help the accused. The LearnedTrial Court found that Bhagat Ram had picked up a stick all of a
sudden and inflicted the injury upon Lal Chand. The stick was
lying on the spot and was not brought by the accused Bhagat
Ram with him. The other accused could not have been aware of
the fact that Bhagat Ram would be using the stick. This was an
interpretation of the evidence, which can differ from person to
person. The Learned Trial Court has not found that the
witnesses’ version was false; rather, the learned Trial Court had
accepted their version and thereafter proceeded to hold that the
statements of the witnesses were not sufficient to establish the
common intention of the accused. Thus, the finding recorded by
the learned Trial Court does not show any exaggeration on the
part of the prosecution.
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2026:HHC:26974
34. It was submitted that no specific role was attributed
to the accused Nirmala and Sanjay Kumar. This submission
.
cannot be accepted. The witnesses consistently stated that the
accused, Nirmala and Sanjay Kumar gave beatings to Jyoti,
Sunita, and Kanta Devi. This is duly corroborated by the injuries
sustained by Kanta Devi and Jyoti. No person stated that these
of
injuries were caused by Bhagat Ram. Thus, the learned TrialCourt had rightly accepted the testimonies of the witnesses that
rt
Nirmala and Sanjay Kumar had inflicted injuries to Jyoti, Sunitaand Kanta.
35. Dr J.S. Roodkee (PW1) stated that the cause of death
was acute coronary insufficiency in the case of hypertrophic
heart disease due to sudden fear and anxiety as a result of
assault. He admitted in his cross-examination that the injury
sustained by Lal Chand was simple in nature. It was a lacerated
wound deep in nature. The injury that he had found on the body
of the deceased cannot solely lead to the death. This statement
shows that the death would not have been caused by the stick
blow, and the proximate cause of the death was coronary heart
disease.
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36. It was submitted on behalf of the State that Bhagat
Ram knew that Lal Chand was suffering from heart disease, and
.
that knowledge can be attributed to him that any injury to Lal
Chand would result in his death. This submission cannot be
accepted. Kanta Devi admitted in her cross-examination that Lal
Chand had received treatment from PGI Chandigarh. She
of
claimed that Lal Chand was working normally. He used to drive atractor and earn his livelihood. Therefore, an inference could not
rt
have been drawn from the activities of Lal Chand that he had aheart disease to such an extent that any fear would result in his
death. The accused cannot be held liable for the commission of
the murder in the absence of knowledge of the medical
condition of the deceased. Illustration (b) of Clause (iv) of
Section 300 of IPC, provides that if the offender knows that the
victim is labouring under such disease that a blow is likely to
cause his death, strikes him to cause bodily injury and the victim
dies in consequence of the blow, the offender is guilty of murder
although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state
of health. But if the offender, not knowing that the victim is
labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would
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2026:HHC:26974not, in the ordinary course of nature, kill a person in a sound
state of health, and the victim dies, the offender is not guilty of
.
murder. Thus, the accused can be held liable for the murder only
if he knew that the deceased was suffering from a disease and
the blow was likely to cause his death. In Emperor Vs. Saberali
Sarkar, AIR 1920 Calcutta 401, the accused gave beatings to a
of
person by kicks and blows to teach him a lesson, which resultedin his death caused by the rupture of an enlarged spleen. It was
rt
held that the accused cannot be convicted of murder in theabsence of any evidence that he knew about the enlarged spleen
of the deceased, and he could be convicted of an offence
punishable under Section 323.
37. In Ramakrishna Panicker vs. State of Kerala (17.12.1958
– KERHC): MANU/KE/0128/1959,, the deceased died due to
rupture of an enlarged spleen. There was no evidence that the
accused was aware of this condition. It was held that he could
not be held liable for the commission of an offence punishable
under section 302 of the IPC, but only under section 323 of the
IPC. It was observed:
“8. Earlier in this judgment, we have stated that
according to the medical evidence in the case, rupture or::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:36:54 :::CIS
40
2026:HHC:26974damage to the spleen would not have occurred but for the
fact that that organ was diseased. There is no evidence
that accused 1 was aware of that diseased condition. A fist.
in the abdominal region would not ordinarily cause any
damage to a normal spleen. That is the effect of the
medical evidence in the case. Accused 1 would not have
intended to give Devassia anything more than a beatingor a thrashing to teach him a lesson, as it were, for his
impudence in using foul language against a police officer,
while they happened to meet on the public road.
of
It is in the circumstances of the case difficult to attribute
to accused 1 any intention to cause death or any intention
to cause such bodily injury as would in the ordinary
course of nature cause death. Nor could accused 1 be taken
rt
to have even intended or known it to be likely that the
hurt which he was causing would be grievous, eventhough, on account of the diseased condition of the
spleen,, it got ruptured. Explanation to Section 322, Penal
Code shows that a person cannot be said to have
voluntarily caused grievous hurt except when he bothcauses grievous hurt and intends or knows himself likely
to cause grievous hurt.
In other words, a person can be convicted of grievous hurt
only when the result and intention correspond — seeGour’s Penal Law of India (VI Edition, Vol. II, p. 1472)
From the circumstances of the case, nothing more than a
simple hurt could reasonably be thought likely to ensuefrom the fists given to Devassia and as such, even though
the spleen got ruptured, accused 1 could not be convicted
for any offence more serious than for causing simple
hurt. The law is well settled that when the injury is not
serious, and there was no intention to cause death or
grievous hurt, nor had the accused knowledge that it was
likely to cause grievous hurt or death, a man is guilty of
causing hurt and not death, even though death is caused.
At p. 701 of Ratanlal’s Law of Crimes (19th Edition), the
commentaries refer to a line of cases where death ensued
as a result of hurt caused to diseased spleen or other::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:36:54 :::CIS
41
2026:HHC:26974diseased organs, and convictions were entered for
causing simple hurt. The commentary under the heading
‘Hurt’ may usefully be quoted here:
.
“Where the accused, having received great
provocation from his wife, pushed her with both
arms so as to throw her with violence to the
ground, and after she was down, slapped her withhis open hand, and the woman died on account of
rupture of her spleen, which was diseased, it was
held that the accused was guilty of causing hurt.
of
Similarly, when a wife died from a chance kick in
the spleen inflicted by her husband on provocation
given by her, the husband not knowing that the
spleen was diseased, he was held guilty of causing
rt
hurt: The accused, dissatisfied and irritated by the
lazy and inefficient manner in which a punkahcooly was managing a punkah, went up to him and
struck him one or more blows. The cooly was
suffering from a diseased spleen and died from the
injuries he had received. It was held that theaccused was guilty of causing hurt. When the
accused threw a piece of a brick at the diseased,
which struck him in the region of the spleen andruptured it, the spleen being diseased, it was held
that he was guilty of causing hurt. The accused wascharged with having caused the death of one N by
kicking him in the region of the spleen, beingenraged at the latter having allowed his goats to
stray into his fields. The medical evidence showed
that the spleen of the deceased was enormously
large, and slight injuries over the region of the
spleen would be sufficient to cause its rupture,
which generally ended fatally. It was held that in
the absence of satisfactory evidence to prove
knowledge of the state of health of the deceased on
the part of the accused, the conviction should be for
hurt only.”
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2026:HHC:26974
The cases cited by the learned author are: Queen v. Runchanun
Tantee 5 Suth WR (Cri) 97; Queen v. Bysagoo Nosbyo 1867 8 Suth
WR (Cri) 29; Empress of India v. Fox ILR AH 522; Empress of India
.
v. Randhir Singh ILR All 597; Aiman 1 All LJ 162. To this list may
be added ‘the decisions in Emperor v. Sabarali0 AIR 1920 Cal 401:
21 Cri LJ 666; Bhajan Das v. Emperor AIR 1924 Lah 218; and In re
Marana Goundan MANU/TN/0326/1940: AIR 1941 Mad 560.
Ratanlal’s commentary at pp. 812 and 813 under the caption
‘Spleen Cases’ may also usefully be referred to in this context.
Gour deals with this topic at p. 1463 of Vol. II of the Penal Law of
of
India (VI Edition).
9. We have not, however, overlooked cases or
commentaries dealing with instances of persons causing
hurt to a diseased spleen or heart or brain and death
rt
ensuing in consequence of being convicted for causing
grievous hurt or even under Section 304(2). Ratanlal’s
commentaries at pp. 700 to 701 under the caption ‘Death
due to Diseased Spleen or Heart’ (1) ‘Grievous Hurt’ refer
to several such instances. The commentaries at p. 818
under the heading ‘Diseased Spleen or Heart’ may also be
referred to for such cases. An examination of the facts of
those cases would, however, show that those are cases
where the court was able to infer that the offender
intended to cause grievous hurt and such hurt also
resulted from the action of the offender.
Some of those are also cases where weapons such as
sticks or lathis were used, or where there have been
fractures of ribs or other bones, but which fractures did
not cause or lead to death. With a view to finding out
whether the case on hand would fall under that category
of cases, we have examined the decisions cited in the
commentaries, and we have no hesitation in holding that
the line of cases cannot be taken to govern the present
case. The decisions we have in mind and some of which
are referred to in the commentaries at the page
mentioned are Queen v. Megha Meeach 2 Suth WR Cri 39;
Empress of India v. O’Brien ILR All 766; Empress of India v.
Jdu Beg ILR All 776; Mahabir v. Emperor 19 All LJ 295; Bharat
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2026:HHC:26974
Singh v. Emperor AIR 1932 Oudh 279; Munni Lal v. Emperor
MANU/UP/0047/1943 and Basant Singh v. State
MANU/PH/0062/1953.
.
10. Conformably to the principles enunciated earlier and
following the lead of the first batch of cases referred to in
this judgment, we alter the conviction of accused 1 from
that under Section 304(2) to one under Section 323. The
sentence has necessarily to be altered, but regard being
had to the fact that accused 1 was misusing his position as
a police officer to assault a helpless person whom he had
of
taken into custody, we think it proper to sentence him to
the maximum sentence prescribed for the offence under
Section 323, namely, rigorous imprisonment for 1 year.
We award him that sentence. His appeal succeeds to the
rt
extent of mitigating the offence and reducing the
sentence as above.
38. In Putti Lal v. State, 1968 SCC OnLine All 323: 1969 Cri
LJ 531, the deceased was suffering from an enlarged heart. The
accused pushed him, due to which he (the deceased) fell and
died. There was no evidence that the accused knew about the
medical condition of the deceased. It was held that the accused
could be held liable for the commission of an offence punishable
under section 325 of the IPC. It was observed:
“13. As regards the second submission, it has some force.
The doctor (S.N. Gupta), who conducted the post-mortem
examination, in his evidence, clearly said that the heart of
the deceased was enlarged and flabby. The death had
resulted from a rupture of the heart. The injuries found
on the person of the deceased could have been caused by a
single fall. He further stated that the rupture of the heart
of the deceased on account of his old age was possible
even by an ordinary injury. He added that this, however,::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:36:54 :::CIS
44
2026:HHC:26974could not have occurred in the case of a normal, healthy
man. It was also clear from the medical evidence that the
ribs of Asharfi had been broken. There was nothing on the.
record to show that the appellant had any knowledge that
the deceased had a badly enlarged heart, on account of
which he died.
14. On behalf of the appellant, reliance has been placed on
the case reported in (1880) ILR 2 All 766, Empress of India
v. O’Brien. Their Lordships observed:
“There is no reason to doubt that the act was not done
of
with the intention of causing death, or of causing such
bodily injury as the accused knew was likely to cause the
death of the old man, nor was the act done with the
rt
intention of causing bodily injury to the man, nor was the
bodily injury intended to be inflicted sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death, nor did theaccused, when striking the man, knew that his act so
imminently dangerous that it must in all probability
cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to causedeath. The offence, therefore, of culpable homicide was
not committed. But I think that there can be no doubt that
the accused committed the offence of voluntarily causinggrievous hurt. He struck the deceased on the ribs with a
stick and inflicted a hurt which not only endangered hislife but caused his death and which he must have known
was likely to break a rib if it did no worse injury……”
15. A similar view was expressed in another case reported
in (1881) ILR 3 All 776, Empress of India v. Idu Beg.
16. In the instant case, it was clear that the appellant had
no intention or knowledge to cause the death of Asharfi.
But he caught him by his neck, bodily lifted and threw
him on the ground. He was an old man, and his ribs were
fractured. It could not be doubted that he was thrown
from some distance and with sufficient force. So, it could
be reasonably presumed that the appellant possessed the
requisite knowledge that by his act, grievous hurt could
be caused to the victim. He is only guilty of the charge
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2026:HHC:26974
under Section 325, Penal Code, 1860. His conviction under
Section 304, Part II, I.P.C., is clearly erroneous and must
be set aside. As regards the sentence, in my opinion, three
.
years’ rigorous imprisonment would amply meet the ends
of justice.”
39. In Sri Prakash Vs. State, 1990 CrLJ 486 (All.), the
accused gave a beating to a child having an enlarged spleen,
which resulted in his death. There was no evidence to prove that
of
the accused knew about the enlarged spleen of the deceased. The
accused was found guilty under Section 323 of the IPC.
rt
40. In Mahender vs. The State (N.C.T. of Delhi) (11.10.2013 –
DELHC): MANU/DE/3652/2013, the deceased suffered from
cirrhosis of the liver and jaundice. The accused gave him
beatings, leading to his death. It was held that he could not be
held liable for the commission of an offence punishable under
section 304 (2) of IPC, but section 323 of IPC in the absence of
any knowledge of the condition of the accused. It was observed:
“2.. The evidence available on record does not point out
any such injury that was so grievous as to constitute
‘knowledge’ in the mind of the accused persons that by
the infliction of such injuries they were likely to cause the
death of the deceased. True, death was the resultant, but
this resultant could not be attributed to the knowledge of
the accused persons because of the obvious fact that the
alleged injuries found on the person of the deceased were
not such as to constitute knowledge on the part of the
accused persons. In an offence punishable under Section::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:36:54 :::CIS
46
2026:HHC:26974304 Part-II IPC, ‘knowledge’ is an important element that
is missing in the instant case, and hence, it remains
simpliciter an offence of ‘voluntarily causing hurt’ as.
defined under Section 321 IPC and punishable under
Section 323 IPC. The injuries found on the body of the
deceased were neither sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to result in death nor were they likely to causedeath. The death did not take place as a result of the
injuries received by him, but took place due to the shock
consequent to cirrhosis of the liver and jaundice afterof
about ten days of the incident. The appellants can,
therefore, only be held guilty of hurt under Section 323
IPC and not under Section 304 Part-II IPC.
3. In ‘State of Karnataka vs. Shivalingaieh‘,
rt
MANU/SC/0293/1987: 1988 Crl. L.J. 394, the conviction was
ultimately maintained by the Supreme Court underSection 325 IPC on the ground that the act of the accused
in squeezing the testicles of a person would be an offence
of voluntarily causing grievous hurt under Section 325
IPC. In the said case, there was a categorical statement bythe doctor that the act was dangerous to human life and
had led to the cardiac arrest of the deceased, which was
instantaneous. In ‘Bal Krishan Sita Ram Pandit vs. State’,MANU/DE/0214/1986: 1987 Crl. L.J. 479, the cause of death
given by the autopsy surgeon was heart failure due tocoronary artery disease. He further opined that shock
could also cause death if the person has a weak heart or isan emotional type of person. The deceased has a diseased
heart, and the danda blows might have produced a shock,
aggravating the heart attack. This Court held that the
death was not necessarily caused on account of a danda
blow, and it could be a simple cause of a heart attack on
account of Mehtab Rai Jain having become emotional.
41. A similar view was taken in Balwinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, 1988 SCC OnLine P&H 838, wherein it was held:
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2026:HHC:26974
10. The question then arises as to whether, during the
course of this incident, all the accused shared the common
intention of each other to commit the murder of Bachittar
Singh or merely to give him grievous injuries. In this regard,.
it is noteworthy that the very factum of the accused having
come unarmed to the house of the deceased clearly shows
that they were intending to lodge a protest only, because in
case they had intended to kill him, they would have armed
themself with effective weapons like Gandasas, kirpan, etc.,
which are usually available with the villagers. It appears that
during the course of lodging a protest, some unbecoming
of
words or exchange of hot words took place between the
accused and Sukhdev Singh and others, which resulted in
their entering the courtyard of the house of the deceased
and hurling brick bats on them, after picking the same from
rt
near the hand-pump. Thus, at the most, it can be said that
all the accused shared the common intention of each other
to cause grievous hurt to Bachitter Singh and not to kill him,
especially when the possibility of hitting the brick bats at
the chest of the victim by his movement cannot be ruled out,
even though the accused may not have aimed at the same
target at his chest. The evidence of Dr Harmit Pal Singh (PW
1) that injury No. 2 was individually sufficient to cause death
in the ordinary course of nature is not acceptable, as he had
not ruled out the possibility of the victim being already
suffering from some heart disease. Thus, it could not be said
with certainty that the cardiac arrest was the result of injury
No. 2. Under these circumstances, even if it is taken that
Balwinder Singh appellant had caused injuries on the chest
of the victim, the offence at the most would fall under
section 325, Penal Code, 1860, as the accused never intended
to cause the death of Bachitter Singh or had the necessary
knowledge that the pelting of brick bats would result in his
death He cannot even be attributed with the remote
knowledge that pelting of brick bats would result in cardiac
arrest of the victim. Thus, he is held guilty for the offence
under section 325/34, Penal Code, 1860 and section 448,
Penal Code, 1860 and his conviction for the offence under
section 449 and 302, Penal Code, 1860, is hereby set aside,
being not legally sustainable. In view of the fact that the
State has not filed any appeal against the acquittal of the
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2026:HHC:26974
remaining two accused for the offences under section
302/34 of the Penal Code, 1860, there is no need to comment
upon their liability.
.
42. A similar view was taken by the Rajasthan High Court
in Dhula Ram v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Raj 4561, wherein it was
held:
17. In the present case, as has been noted above, all the
of
injuries caused to the deceased were superficial and
simple in nature. None of the internal organs of the
deceased were effected by the injuries. So far as the sharp
injuries are concerned, none of the prosecution’s eye-
rt
witnesses gave convincing evidence to establish that any
of the accused used a sharp weapon while assaulting
Shanker Lal. There exist grave contradictions in the
statements of the prosecution’s eye-witnesses on this
aspect of the case. Thus, none of the eight clauses of
Section 320 IPC applies to the injuries caused to the
victim of the case at hand. We, therefore, are of the firm
opinion that the trial court committed a grave factual
error while convicting the accused-appellants for the
offence under Section 302/34 IPC. The findings so
recorded in the impugned judgment are perverse on the
face of the record and cannot be sustained. As a result of
the foregoing discussion, the impugned judgment dated
16.03.2019 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge No. 2, Udaipur, in Sessions Case No. 39/2017
(387/2015) is set aside. The accused-appellants are
acquitted of the charge under Section 302 read with
Section 34 IPC, and instead, they are convicted for the
offence under Section 323 IPC and are sentenced to
imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each:
In default of payment of fine, they shall further undergo
15 days simple imprisonment. The accused-appellants
Dhula Ram and Varda Ram have been in custody for more
than five years, whereas the accused-appellant Banshi
Lal has been in custody for the last one year and ten::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:36:54 :::CIS
49
2026:HHC:26974months. They shall be released from custody forthwith
upon depositing the amount of the fine if not wanted in
any other case.
.
43. Delhi High Court in Bal Krishan Sita v. State, 1986 SCC
OnLine Del 25, that where the death was not caused by the stick
blow and could have been a case of heart attack, the accused
cannot be held liable. It was observed:
of
(C) Dr Bharat Singh (PW 14) made the following statement
on cross-examination:
“In this particular case, the cause of death was heart
rt
failure due to coronary artery disease. Shock can also
cause death if a person has a weak heart or is anemotional type of person. The deceased was having a
diseased heart, and the danda blow may have
produced a shock, aggravating the heart attack.”
It is apparent from the above that the death was not
necessarily caused on account of any danda blow, and it
could be a simple case of a heart attack on account of
Mehtab Rai Jain having become emotional. Therefore, the
medical report does not fully corroborate the version of the
prosecution that the appellant had caused the death of
Mehtab Rai Jain by causing injury with a danda.
44. In the present case, there is no evidence that the
accused Bhagat Ram was aware of the hypertrophic condition of
the heart or that death would have resulted from inflicting a
blow by means of a stick. Thus, he could not have been held
liable for the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 304 Part-II of the IPC, and the learned Trial Court erred
in holding so. Hence, the judgment in Yuvraj (supra) dealing
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2026:HHC:26974
with the ingredients of Section 304 Part-II will not apply to the
present case.
.
45. Therefore, the judgment passed by the learned Trial
Court convicting the accused Bhagat Ram for the commission of
an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC
of
cannot be sustained and is to be set aside, whereas the judgment
convicting and sentencing the accused Nirmala Devi and Sanjay
rt
Kumar for the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 323 read with Section 34 of the IPC is sustainable. Hence,
the present appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and order of
the learned Trial Court convicting and sentencing the accused
Bhagat Ram of the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 304, Part II of IPC, are ordered to be set aside, and he is
convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 323 of IPC. Subject to this modification, the rest of the
judgment and order are upheld.
44. Let the accused Bhagat Ram be produced for hearing
him on the quantum of sentence on 13.07.2026.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
7th July, 2026
(Nikita)
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