The Allahabad High Court has held that no personal law, including Muslim Personal Law based on the Shariat, can override the provisions of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA), or the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).
The Division Bench of Justice JJ Munir and Justice Achal Sachdev observed that the statutory prohibition on child marriage applies uniformly to all citizens irrespective of religion and that any personal law permitting marriage upon attainment of puberty is inconsistent with the existing legislative framework.
The Court made the observations while refusing to quash an FIR registered against 19 persons accused of obstructing police and Child Line officials who had intervened to prevent the marriage of a 16-year-old Muslim girl in Bulandshahr district of Uttar Pradesh.
The Bench observed that the Shariat principle recognising puberty as the age of marriage runs contrary to the provisions of both the PCMA and the POCSO Act. It held that the legal age of marriage prescribed under the PCMA is applicable to every citizen, irrespective of religion, and no personal law can dilute the statutory safeguards enacted by Parliament for the protection of children.
The Court further observed that permitting the marriage of a girl below the age of 18 years would inevitably create the possibility of violating the POCSO Act, since sexual relations are ordinarily inseparable from the institution of marriage.
It held that the PCMA and the POCSO Act are welfare legislations founded on considerations of public health, child welfare and national policy, incorporating scientifically recognised standards for protecting children. Being later and comprehensive statutes of general application, they prevail over any inconsistent personal law or earlier statutory exceptions relating to the age of marriage.
The Bench also noted that although a child marriage may be voidable and not void under the PCMA, performing, promoting or facilitating such a marriage constitutes a punishable offence under the Act.
While examining the legal position, the High Court acknowledged that divergent judicial opinions have been expressed by different High Courts on the issue. However, it agreed with the view taken by the Kerala High Court in a 2024 judgment, which held that the prohibition on child marriage applies uniformly across all religions and cannot be overridden by personal laws.
The Court also referred to the Supreme Court’s observations made in 2024, wherein the apex court highlighted the uncertainty surrounding the interplay between personal laws and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act.
It noted that although the Prohibition of Child Marriage (Amendment) Bill, 2021 proposed to expressly give overriding effect to the PCMA over personal laws, the legislation lapsed upon the dissolution of the 17th Lok Sabha. In the absence of an authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the issue, the High Court proceeded to interpret the existing statutory framework.
The case arose from an FIR registered at Kakor Police Station in Bulandshahr on February 15, 2026. According to the prosecution, police officials and members of the Child Line team received information regarding the proposed marriage of a minor girl and reached the spot to prevent the child marriage and produce her before the Child Welfare Committee.
The FIR alleged that when the authorities attempted to discharge their statutory duties, the petitioners, along with several others, abused, threatened and obstructed the police and Child Line personnel. It was further alleged that the minor girl was forcibly taken away from the custody of a Child Line case worker before she was subsequently rescued.
The petitioners argued that under Muslim Personal Law, a girl who has attained puberty, generally presumed to be around 15 years of age, is legally competent to marry and that the provisions of the PCMA do not override their personal law governing marriage.
Rejecting the contention, the High Court held that the police and Child Line officials had acted lawfully and in discharge of their statutory obligations under the PCMA while also preventing a possible violation of the POCSO Act. The Bench found that the allegations contained in the FIR prima facie disclosed cognisable offences, including obstruction of public servants in the discharge of official duties, which warranted a thorough investigation.
Holding that the matter was not a fit case for exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction to quash the FIR at the threshold, the Court dismissed the petition and allowed the criminal investigation to proceed in accordance with law.
