Last verified: July 2026
Two people walk into the same police station on the same morning, and both are there because of the same three digits: 498A. The first is a woman who has spent two years being told she is worthless because her father could not add a car to the dowry, who has the bruises and the WhatsApp messages to prove it, and who has finally decided to file. The second is a man whose wife left after a bitter argument and who has just been handed a complaint naming him, his retired parents, and a sister who lives in another city, over demands he says were never made. One of them needs the law to work. The other needs it not to be misused. The uncomfortable truth about the cruelty provision is that both of them are right to worry, and both of them are about to discover that the section they have heard of by its old number no longer exists by that name.
On 1 July 2024, the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Section 498A, the provision that for four decades punished cruelty to a married woman by her husband or his relatives, did not vanish. It was re-enacted, almost word for word, and split across two sections. The offence and its punishment now sit in Section 85 of the BNS. The definition of “cruelty” that gives the offence its meaning sits in Section 86. If you learned this area of law as “498A,” you now have to think in terms of “85 and 86,” because that is what a new first information report will cite, what a charge sheet will carry, and what a Magistrate will try.
That renaming is not a technicality. It arrived at the exact moment the Supreme Court was sharpening its warnings about how the provision gets used, and the two developments now have to be read together. The same courts that protect a genuine victim have become far less patient with a complaint that names an entire family without saying who did what. A cruelty case in 2026 is won or lost on specifics, from either side of the table.
This guide is built for both people in that police station. It explains what Sections 85 and 86 actually say, how the offence is classified, and how it fits with dowry death, abetment of suicide, and the civil domestic violence remedy. Then it splits into two practical halves: how a woman files a genuine cruelty case so that it survives scrutiny, and how a man met with a false one defends himself without making things worse.
Cruelty to a wife, once punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, is now an offence under Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, with “cruelty” defined in Section 86. The punishment is unchanged: imprisonment of up to three years and a fine. The offence is cognizable, non-bailable, and non-compoundable, so an FIR triggers a police investigation and possible arrest. A woman files by giving information to the police under Section 173 of the BNSS (a Zero-FIR can be lodged at any station), or by complaint to a Magistrate under Section 223 if the police refuse. A man facing a false case is protected by the no-automatic-arrest rule from Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and Section 35 of the BNSS, can seek anticipatory bail under Section 482 of the BNSS, and can ask the High Court to quash a vague, omnibus FIR under Section 528.
What changed on 1 July 2024
The short answer is: the number, not the substance. Section 498A was inserted into the Indian Penal Code in 1983, after a wave of public anger over dowry deaths and the harassment of young wives. It made cruelty by a husband or his relatives a criminal offence for the first time. When the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”) replaced the Penal Code, the drafters kept that offence intact but gave it a cleaner structure, separating the punishable act from the definition that explains it.
So the single old Section 498A became two new sections. Section 85 states the offence and fixes the sentence. Section 86 defines “cruelty” for the purposes of Section 85, in language lifted almost verbatim from the old explanation to 498A. Reading one without the other is meaningless, which is why practitioners now cite them as a pair: “Section 85 read with Section 86.”
The practical question everyone asks is which law applies to their matter, and the answer turns on timing. An act of cruelty committed, and an FIR registered, on or after 1 July 2024 is charged under Section 85 of the BNS. A case where the FIR was already registered under Section 498A before that date continues under the IPC until it concludes, because the repeal does not wipe out proceedings that were already on foot. For a few years, then, courts will run 498A trials and Section 85 trials side by side, applying identical substantive law under two different numbers.
There is one more reason the change matters beyond the paperwork. Just weeks before the new code came into force, the Supreme Court used a 498A appeal to ask Parliament to look again at the very sections about to replace it. That request, and what prompted it, runs through the rest of this guide.
Section 85 of the BNS: the offence and the punishment
Section 85 of the BNS is short and blunt. Whoever, being the husband or a relative of the husband of a woman, subjects that woman to cruelty is punished with imprisonment of up to three years, and is also liable to a fine. Three elements have to be present, and each one does work.
The first is the identity of the accused. Only a husband or a “relative of the husband” can commit this offence. That phrase is wider than it looks, covering parents-in-law, brothers- and sisters-in-law, and other relatives by blood, marriage, or adoption, but it has an outer edge. Courts have repeatedly held that a person who is neither related by blood, marriage, nor adoption, such as a girlfriend or a person the husband is merely close to, falls outside the reach of a “relative of the husband.”
The second element is the victim. The section protects a woman in her capacity as a wife, and only a woman can be the aggrieved person under it. A husband who feels harassed by his wife has no case under Section 85; his remedies lie elsewhere, in cruelty as a ground for divorce or in general criminal law.
The third element is the conduct itself, “cruelty,” and this is where Section 85 hands off to Section 86. On its own, Section 85 does not tell you what cruelty means. It is a container; Section 86 fills it. The three-year ceiling and the fine are the same maximum the old Section 498A carried, so nothing about the exposure of an accused person has increased or decreased with the renumbering.
Section 86 of the BNS: what the law counts as cruelty
This is the section that decides most cruelty cases, because the fight is almost always about whether what happened crosses the line the statute draws. Section 86 defines cruelty in two limbs, and a complaint only needs to establish one of them.
The first limb is conduct aimed at the woman’s life or mind. Cruelty here means any wilful conduct of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to suicide, or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb, or health, whether that health is physical or mental. The key words are “wilful” and “likely.” The conduct has to be deliberate, not accidental or careless, and it has to be serious enough that suicide or grave injury is a foreseeable consequence. Sustained mental torture, humiliation, and cruelty that erodes a woman’s health all fall within this limb; an ordinary domestic quarrel does not.
The second limb is harassment tied to an unlawful demand. Cruelty means harassing the woman where the harassment is aimed at coercing her, or any person related to her, to meet an unlawful demand for property or valuable security, or where the harassment is because she or her relatives have failed to meet such a demand. This is the classic dowry-harassment situation: the taunts, the pressure, the withdrawal of basic dignity, all directed at extracting money, a car, jewellery, or property. The demand has to be unlawful; a legitimate financial dispute between spouses is not dowry harassment.
The distinction between the two limbs matters in practice. A woman facing dowry demands relies on the second limb and must show the demand and the harassment linked to it. A woman facing a pattern of physical or mental abuse with no dowry angle relies on the first limb and must show conduct grave enough to endanger her life or health. Understanding which limb a case rests on shapes what evidence is worth gathering, a point Part A returns to. What Section 86 does not cover is the everyday friction of a difficult marriage. The courts have been clear that not every instance of unhappiness, and not every harsh word, is criminal cruelty, and drawing that line is precisely what a trial under Section 85 is for.
The wider dowry-cruelty framework, renumbered
Section 85 does not operate alone. A matrimonial cruelty matter usually brushes against several other provisions, and every one of their numbers changed on 1 July 2024. Knowing the map prevents the common mistake of citing a repealed IPC section in a fresh complaint.
Where cruelty ends in death, the relevant offence is dowry death, which moved from Section 304B of the IPC to Section 80 of the BNS. It applies where a woman dies of burns, bodily injury, or otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of marriage, and was subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before her death. Where cruelty pushes a woman to take her own life, the charge is abetment of suicide, which moved from Section 306 of the IPC to Section 108 of the BNS, and it often runs alongside a Section 85 charge in fatal cases. The old Section 498, punishing a man who entices away or detains another man’s wife, is now Section 84.
Two evidentiary presumptions do heavy lifting in these cases, and they too were renumbered when the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (“BSA”) replaced the Evidence Act. Section 117 of the BSA (the old Section 113A of the Evidence Act) lets a court presume that a husband or his relative abetted a woman’s suicide where she died within seven years of marriage and had been subjected to cruelty. Section 118 of the BSA (the old Section 113B) goes further in dowry-death cases: where a woman was harassed for dowry soon before her death, the court “shall presume” the accused caused the dowry death, a mandatory presumption the accused must then rebut.
Two other pieces sit outside the BNS entirely and are worth flagging so they are not overlooked. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 continues in force as a separate statute; its Sections 3 and 4 punish giving, taking, or demanding dowry and are routinely charged with Section 85. And the entire civil track, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, sits parallel to the criminal law, offering protection orders, residence rights, and maintenance without any FIR at all. A cruelty matter and a domestic violence application can run at the same time, and often should; the mechanics of the civil route are set out in our guide on how to file a domestic violence case under the PWDVA.
Is it cognizable, bailable, or compoundable
Three labels decide how a Section 85 case actually behaves once it is filed, and each carries real consequences for both sides. The First Schedule of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) carries the classification over from the old code unchanged.
Section 85 is cognizable. This means the police can register an FIR and begin investigating without first obtaining a Magistrate’s permission. For a woman, that is the point: she can walk into a police station and set the criminal process in motion. For a man, it means an accusation can become an active investigation quickly, which is why the defence steps in Part B are time-sensitive.
Section 85 is non-bailable. The label is widely misunderstood. It does not mean bail is impossible; it means bail is not a matter of right and is granted at the discretion of the court rather than by the police at the station. In practice, courts grant bail in cruelty cases in the ordinary course, but the accused has to apply and the court has to be satisfied, and anticipatory bail becomes a serious option precisely because of this label.
Section 85 is non-compoundable as a general rule, which means the complainant cannot simply “withdraw” the case by agreement the way a compoundable offence allows. This has an important knock-on effect: when a couple settles, the case does not evaporate on its own, and the parties usually have to approach the High Court to have it quashed, a route the compounding section addresses later in this guide. A handful of states, Andhra Pradesh among them, have amended the position locally to make the offence compoundable, so the rule is not uniform across the country. Because the classification determines the arrest and bail dynamics that follow, it is worth reading alongside our explainer on cognizable and non-cognizable offences under the BNS.
Part A: how to file a genuine cruelty complaint
For a woman with a real case, the goal is not just to file, but to file in a way that survives the sharper scrutiny courts now apply. A vague complaint that names the whole family gets thrown out; a precise one does not. These are the steps that make the difference.
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Gather specific evidence before you go to the police. The single biggest predictor of whether a cruelty case holds is specificity, so build the record first. Collect dated records of the harassment: messages and emails demanding money or property, call recordings where they are lawful, medical records of any injury, photographs, bank statements showing money handed over, and the names of people who witnessed particular incidents. The aim is to be able to say what happened, when, where, and who did it, for each named person, rather than making a blanket allegation against a family.
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Give information to the police under Section 173 of the BNSS. A cruelty offence is set in motion by giving the police information about a cognizable offence under Section 173 of the BNSS, which is registered as an FIR. You can approach the local police station, a women’s police station where one exists, or file online where the state provides that facility. If the offence did not happen within that station’s area, insist on a Zero-FIR: the BNSS allows information about a cognizable offence to be registered at any police station regardless of jurisdiction, which is then transferred to the correct station. No one can lawfully turn a woman away for being at the “wrong” station.
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Make the FIR specific, not omnibus. When the FIR is recorded, describe concrete incidents with dates and the role of each person named. This is not a formality. The courts quash FIRs built on general, “omnibus” allegations against relatives, so naming an in-law who lives in another city without saying what that person actually did weakens the whole complaint rather than strengthening it. Name the people who genuinely participated, and say what each did.
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If the police refuse to register the FIR, go to the Magistrate under Section 223 of the BNSS. A refusal is not the end of the road. You can send the substance of the information in writing to the Superintendent of Police, and if that fails, file a complaint directly before the Magistrate under Section 223 of the BNSS, who can direct an investigation or take cognizance. Persistent refusal to register a cognizable offence is itself a serious lapse by the police.
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Use the parallel civil and maintenance remedies. A criminal case punishes; it does not put a roof over a woman’s head or food on the table while it drags on. File a domestic violence application under the PWDVA for protection, residence, and monetary relief, and claim maintenance under Section 144 of the BNSS (the old Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). These civil remedies often deliver faster, more tangible relief than the criminal case, and pursuing them does not weaken the cruelty complaint.
A genuine cruelty case, filed with specific facts and supported by the civil remedies, is exactly the kind the courts continue to protect. The precision that makes it strong for a real victim is also, not coincidentally, what makes a fabricated case fall apart.
Part B: how to defend against a false Section 85 case
An accused person’s worst instinct is to panic, to hide, or to hit back publicly. All three make things worse. The law already contains a set of safeguards built specifically because the cruelty provision is prone to misuse, and a calm, structured response uses them. These are the moves that matter.
Understand that arrest is not automatic. The most important protection came from Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273, where the Supreme Court held that in offences punishable with up to seven years, which includes cruelty, the police cannot arrest mechanically the moment an FIR is filed. Before arresting, an officer must record reasons showing the arrest is actually necessary. This safeguard is now built into Section 35 of the BNSS, which requires a notice of appearance to be served instead of an arrest in such cases. The correct response to a Section 35 notice is to appear and cooperate, not to abscond; absconding is what converts a non-necessary arrest into a necessary one.
Apply for anticipatory bail under Section 482 of the BNSS. Because Section 85 is non-bailable, an accused who genuinely fears arrest should move for anticipatory bail under Section 482 of the BNSS (the old Section 438 of the CrPC) before the Sessions Court or the High Court. A well-drafted anticipatory bail application sets out the background, points to the absence of specific allegations, and offers to cooperate with the investigation. Where the FIR reads as a counterblast to a divorce or custody dispute, saying so, with the timeline to prove it, carries weight.
Preserve the evidence that shows the real story. A false case usually has a context, and that context is your defence. Preserve everything that establishes the sequence of events: the divorce petition or notice you sent, messages and emails showing the relationship and the actual disputes, financial records that contradict the dowry allegation, travel or work records showing a named relative was nowhere near the events described. The goal is to show the FIR is vague, contradicted by the record, or filed for an ulterior motive.
Seek quashing under Section 528 of the BNSS where the FIR is vague or omnibus. The High Court’s inherent power to quash an FIR now lives in Section 528 of the BNSS (the old Section 482 of the CrPC). In Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar, (2022) 6 SCC 599, the Supreme Court quashed a cruelty case against in-laws because the allegations against them were general and omnibus, with no specific role attributed to any of them. Relatives dragged in by name alone, without any concrete allegation, are the strongest candidates for quashing, and a petition that isolates exactly which allegations are missing for each person is far more effective than a blanket denial.
Use counter-remedies with restraint. A person cleared of a false cruelty case may have remedies of their own, including a civil suit for defamation or an action for malicious prosecution, and in appropriate cases a complaint for giving false information. These are real but slow, and they should follow professional advice rather than emotion. Filing a retaliatory criminal complaint in the heat of the dispute often muddies the water and rarely helps the defence of the main case.
The misuse debate and the courts’ balancing act
No criminal provision in India is argued over as fiercely as this one, and the reason is that both things are true at once: cruelty and dowry harassment are real and widespread, and the provision is also, in a subset of cases, weaponised. The courts have spent two decades holding both truths together, and the recent judgments are the sharpest expression of that balance.
The tension was named early. In Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 281, the Supreme Court refused to strike down Section 498A as unconstitutional but warned that its misuse could unleash “a new legal terrorism,” adding that the provision is meant to be a shield, not an assassin’s weapon. Five years later, in Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667, the Court cautioned against the tendency to rope in every relative of the husband, and asked the legislature to take a serious relook at the provision.
The Court then tried to build procedural guardrails, and the attempt itself became a cautionary tale. In Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P., (2018) 10 SCC 472, a two-judge Bench directed that Family Welfare Committees screen every cruelty complaint before any arrest. The following year a three-judge Bench in Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 443, held that those committees had no basis in the Code and recalled them, redirecting aggrieved persons to the High Court’s quashing power instead. The safeguard against misuse, the Court decided, had to come from the statute and the constitutional courts, not from an extra-legal committee.
That brings the story to the eve of the new code. In Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024 INSC 369, decided on 3 May 2024, the Supreme Court quashed a cruelty case it found had been filed as a counterblast to the husband’s divorce petition, held that Section 498A cannot be applied mechanically, and took the unusual step of asking Parliament to reconsider the language of the incoming Sections 85 and 86 of the BNS before they came into force. Parliament left the wording as it was, but the signal was clear. Months later, in Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana, 2024 INSC 953, decided on 10 December 2024, the Court quashed an FIR that swept in a husband, his parents, and his sisters on vague, omnibus allegations, and repeated that naming relatives without specific allegations is an abuse the courts will nip in the bud.
None of this weakens a genuine case; every one of these rulings goes out of its way to say the provision protects real victims. What the case law does is set the standard both sides now work to. For a woman, it is a reason to plead specifics. For a man, it is the doctrine that quashes a fabricated, family-wide FIR. Our companion piece on the Supreme Court’s stand on the misuse of cruelty provisions traces this line of authority in more detail.
Compounding, settlement, and quashing
Many matrimonial disputes end not in a verdict but in a settlement, and this is where the non-compoundable label creates a practical problem people do not expect. Because Section 85 is non-compoundable as a rule, a couple who reconcile or agree to part ways cannot simply tell the court to drop the case. The prosecution, in theory, continues regardless of the complainant’s change of heart.
The way out is the High Court’s quashing power. Even for a non-compoundable offence, the Supreme Court has held that a High Court can quash criminal proceedings under its inherent jurisdiction, now Section 528 of the BNSS, where the parties have genuinely settled a private, matrimonial dispute and continuing the prosecution would serve no purpose. The court looks at whether the offence is essentially private in nature and whether the settlement is genuine and voluntary, rather than coerced. Matrimonial cruelty cases are among the clearest examples where this power is used.
Two cautions follow from this. First, a settlement should be reduced to a clear written agreement and placed before the High Court in a quashing petition; an informal understanding does not stop the trial. Second, in the states that have made the offence compoundable by local amendment, the path is simpler, but that is the exception rather than the national rule. Mediation, increasingly offered by courts in matrimonial matters, is often the bridge between a live cruelty case and a quashing petition that ends it cleanly.
Frequently asked questions
1. Is Section 498A still valid after the new criminal laws?
Section 498A of the IPC was repealed on 1 July 2024 and re-enacted as Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, read with Section 86, which defines cruelty. The wording and the three-year maximum punishment are essentially unchanged. Cases where the FIR was registered before 1 July 2024 continue under the old Section 498A.
2. What is Section 85 of the BNS?
Section 85 punishes a husband or a relative of the husband who subjects a woman to cruelty, with imprisonment of up to three years and a fine. It is the direct successor to Section 498A of the IPC. On its own it does not define cruelty; that is done by Section 86.
3. What is the punishment for cruelty to a wife under Section 85 BNS?
Imprisonment for a term that may extend to three years, and the convicted person is also liable to a fine. This is the same maximum that the old Section 498A carried, so the renumbering did not change the sentence.
4. What is the difference between Section 85 and Section 86 of the BNS?
Section 85 creates the offence and sets the punishment; Section 86 defines what “cruelty” means for that offence. They are read together, because Section 85 cannot be applied without the definition in Section 86.
5. Is Section 85 BNS a cognizable and non-bailable offence?
Yes. It is cognizable, so the police can register an FIR and investigate without a Magistrate’s prior permission, and it is non-bailable, meaning bail is at the court’s discretion rather than a matter of right. It is also non-compoundable as a general rule.
6. Can the police arrest my husband immediately in a Section 85 or 498A case?
Not automatically. Because the offence is punishable with up to seven years, the safeguards from Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and Section 35 of the BNSS apply: the police must record why an arrest is necessary and usually serve a notice of appearance first. Arrest is meant to be the exception, not the default.
7. How do I file a cruelty complaint under Section 85?
Give information about the offence to the police under Section 173 of the BNSS, which is registered as an FIR; you can use any station and insist on a Zero-FIR if it is outside the local jurisdiction. Describe specific incidents, dates, and the role of each person named. If the police refuse, file a complaint before the Magistrate under Section 223 of the BNSS.
8. What evidence do I need to prove cruelty under Section 85?
Specific, dated evidence tied to each named person: messages or emails demanding dowry, medical records of injury, photographs, bank statements, and witnesses to particular incidents. Vague, general allegations against a whole family are the main reason cruelty FIRs are quashed, so specificity is what makes a case hold.
9. Can a Section 85 case be filed against in-laws and relatives?
Yes, a “relative of the husband” can be an accused, but only where there is a specific allegation against that person. The Supreme Court has repeatedly quashed cases where in-laws were named with only general, omnibus allegations and no concrete role.
10. How do I defend a false 498A or Section 85 case?
Do not abscond; respond to any Section 35 BNSS notice and cooperate. Apply for anticipatory bail under Section 482 of the BNSS, preserve evidence showing the case is a counterblast or contradicted by the record, and seek quashing of a vague or omnibus FIR from the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS.
11. Can I get anticipatory bail in a Section 85 BNS case?
Yes. Because the offence is non-bailable, an accused who fears arrest can apply for anticipatory bail under Section 482 of the BNSS before the Sessions Court or the High Court. Courts commonly grant it in cruelty cases, especially where the allegations are general or the FIR looks like a counterblast.
12. Is Section 85 BNS compoundable, and can the case be withdrawn on settlement?
As a national rule it is non-compoundable, so a complainant cannot simply withdraw it. When parties settle, they usually approach the High Court to quash the case under Section 528 of the BNSS. A few states, such as Andhra Pradesh, have made it compoundable by local amendment.
13. Does a pending 498A case continue under the IPC or shift to the BNS?
A case where the FIR was registered before 1 July 2024 continues under Section 498A of the IPC until it concludes. Only offences committed and reported on or after that date are charged under Section 85 of the BNS. The substantive law is the same either way.
14. Can a husband take action against a false 498A or Section 85 complaint?
Once cleared, an accused may pursue civil defamation, an action for malicious prosecution, or, in appropriate cases, a complaint for giving false information. These remedies are slow and should follow legal advice; a retaliatory complaint filed in the heat of the dispute rarely helps.
15. Is there a time limit to file a cruelty case?
Cruelty is often a continuing offence, so each fresh act of cruelty can restart the clock, but delay still needs to be explained and long, unexplained delay can weaken a case. It is best to act promptly and, where a limitation question arises, to seek condonation of delay with reasons. A lawyer should assess the specific facts before you rely on timing either way.
References
Case Law
- Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024 INSC 369 – cruelty provision cannot be applied mechanically; FIR as a counterblast quashed; Supreme Court asked Parliament to reconsider Sections 85 and 86 of the BNS.
- Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273 – no automatic arrest for offences punishable up to seven years; notice procedure now in Section 35 of the BNSS.
- Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana, 2024 INSC 953 – FIR quashed for vague, omnibus allegations against relatives; caution against misuse.
- Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar, (2022) 6 SCC 599 – quashing where allegations against in-laws are general and omnibus.
- Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667 – caution against roping in distant relatives; call for a legislative relook.
- Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P., (2018) 10 SCC 472 – Family Welfare Committee directions to screen complaints.
- Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 443 – recalled the Family Welfare Committee directions; redirected parties to the High Court’s quashing power.
- Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 281 – upheld the constitutionality of Section 498A while warning of “legal terrorism” through misuse.
Statutes
- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – Sections 3 and 4; continues in force as a separate statute.
- Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – the civil track running parallel to the criminal cruelty provision.
- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – sections cited: 80, 84, 85, 86, 108.
- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – sections cited: 35, 144, 173, 223, 482, 528.
- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 – sections cited: 117, 118.
- Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 498A (repealed 1 July 2024), and Sections 304B, 306, 498 (renumbered under the BNS).
Legal disclaimer
This article is published for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and no lawyer-client relationship is created by reading it. Criminal law and its judicial interpretation change over time, and the classification or compounding position may differ by state. For advice on a specific cruelty matter, whether you are considering filing a complaint or defending one, consult a qualified advocate.
