Kerala High Court
Vasu vs State Of Kerala on 2 July, 2026
2026:KER:48403
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN
THURSDAY, THE 2ND DAY OF JULY 2026 / 11TH ASHADHA, 1948
CRL.A NO. 606 OF 2007
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 28.03.2007 IN SC NO.38 OF 2004 OF
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS COURT (ADHOC-1), MANJERI
APPELLANTS/ACCUSED:
1 VASU, S/O.VELU
POOLAKKAL HOUSE,
MEEZHATHOOR MULLIYAKURISSI, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT.
2 MUHAMMED RAFEEQUE, S/O.MUHAMMED ALI
KUNNANATH HOUSE,PERINTHALMANNA, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT.
3 K.MUHAMMED ALI, S/O.HASSAN, ALLUR HOUSE
VALAMBUR,MALAPPURAM DISTRICT.
BY ADV.SRI.BABU S.NAIR
RESPONDENT/STATE:
THE STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY
THE CIRCLE INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
PERINTHALMANNA POLICE STAION-THROUGH THE PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA,ERNAKULAM,COCHIN-31.
BY SR.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SAREENA GEORGE.P
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.06.2026,
THE COURT ON 02.07.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 2 2026:KER:48403
CR
JUDGMENT
Dated this the 02nd day of July, 2026
This appeal has been filed by accused Nos.1 to 3 in
S.C.No.38/2004 on the files of the Additional Sessions Court
(Adhoc-I), Manjeri, challenging the judgment, dated 28.03.2007 in
the said case.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the
learned Public Prosecutor, in detail. Perused the verdict impugned
and the records available.
3. In this matter, during pendency of this appeal, appellant
Nos.1 and 2, who were arrayed as accused Nos.1 and 2 passed away
and therefore, the conviction as against them now stands abated,
even though the sentence part survives. In view of the above, as
submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned
Public Prosecutor, the present appeal now survives only in respect of
the conviction and sentence imposed on the 3 rd appellant/3rd accused,
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 3 2026:KER:48403
and sentence of fine imposed on appellant Nos.1 and 2/accused
Nos.1 and 2.
4. The prosecution case is that, at about 8.30 p.m. on
06.03.2002, the accused persons who were four in numbers (out of
which, accused No.4 died during trial of the case), with intention to
commit murder of one Muhammedali, wrongfully restrained him
and beat him with intention to do away him when Muhammedali
refused to pay money to purchase liquor to them. Soon after the
occurrence, crime was registered based on Ext.P3 FIS given by
Muhammedali himself on 08.03.2002. Later on the same day, his dying
declaration (Ext.P9) was recorded by the Judicial First Class Magistrate –
I, Kozhikode while Muhammedali was undergoing treatment at the
Medical College Hospital, Kozhikode.
5. In this case, the learned Sessions Court recorded evidence.
PW1 to PW12 were examined, Exts.P1 to P15 and MO1 were marked on
the side of the prosecution. Ext.D1 was marked on the side of the defence
during cross examination of PW10.
6. On a meticulous analysis of evidence, the learned Sessions
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 4 2026:KER:48403
Judge found that accused Nos.1 to 3 committed offfences punishable
under Sections 341, 323 as well as 304 of the Indian Penal Code (for
short, ‘the IPC‘ hereinafter) and sentenced the appellants/accused
Nos.1 to 3 as under:
“In the result,
a) The accused 1 to 3 are sentenced to undergo simple
imprisonment for 1 month each for the conviction under
section 341 IPC;
b) The accused 1 to 3 are sentenced to undergo Rigorous
Imprisonment for 1 year each for the conviction under
section 323 IPC;
c) The accused 1 to 3 are sentenced to undergo Rigorous
Imprisonment for 10 years each and to pay fine of
Rs.10,000/- each for the conviction under section 304
IPC;
d) In case of default in payment of fine, the accused shall
undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 1 year each;
e) The substantive sentence will run concurrently.
f) The period of remand undergone, that is from 12-3-
2002 to 15-4-2002 in the case of 1st accused and from 12-
3-2002 to 12-4-2002 in the case of accused 2 and 3, the
period of imprisonment undergone from the date of
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 5 2026:KER:48403
sentence on the earlier occasion that is from 5-3-2005 till
1-2-2007 and the period of remand from 26-3-2007 till
this day (28-3-2007) are given set off.
g) M.O.1 being valueless shall be destroyed after period
of appeal.”
7. While challenging the verdict impugned, it is submitted by
the learned counsel for the appellants that in this case, the court
below mainly found commission of the above offences by the
appellants/accused Nos.1 to 3 relying on Ext.P9 dying declaration,
even though the eye witness to the occurrence, who got examined as
PW9 turned hostile to the prosecution. It is pointed out by the
learned counsel for the appellants that when the conviction is solely
relying on the dying declaration, the same should be wholly reliable.
Otherwise, the same would require corroboration. He has placed
decision of the Apex Court in K.Ramachandra Reddy & Anr v.
Public Prosecutor reported in [1976 ICO 453 : AIR 1976 SC
1994] with reference to paragraph No.6 and in the said judgment,
the Apex Court considered the law regarding dying declaration which
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 6 2026:KER:48403
is admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 with
reference to the earlier decision in Khushal Rao v. State of
Bombay reported in [AIR 1958 SC 22]. Reliance was also placed
on the decision of the Apex Court in Gopal Singh and another v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh and another reported in [AIR
1972 Supreme Court 1557] with reference to paragraph Nos.7 and
8 to contend that when the dying declaration did not contain the
complete names of the persons charged with the offence, even
though it might be held to establish their identity, it was not of such a
character as to warrant its acceptance without corroboration and,
therefore, could not form the sole basis for conviction. It is pointed
out by the learned counsel for the appellants that, even though in
Ext.P9, the deceased had disclosed the names and fathers’ names of
accused Nos.1 and 2, he had mentioned only the name of the 3 rd
accused without mentioning his father’s name and, according to him,
this omission assumes significance while considering the
involvement of the 3rd accused merely on the strength of dying
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 7 2026:KER:48403
declaration. It is further pointed out that, in the cause title, the 3 rd
accused is shown as a resident of Allur House, Valamboor Amsom,
Mele Poopalam. Therefore, the prime contention advanced by the
learned counsel is that when Ext.P9 dying declaration alone is the
sole basis for the conviction in the instant case, in the absence of
adequate particulars regarding the identity of the 3 rd accused in
Ext.P9, the same cannot be safely relied upon, without corroboration
and the conviction based thereon requires interference, enlarging
benefit of doubt on the 3rd appellant/3rd accused.
8. Repelling this contention, the learned Public Prosecutor
would submit that in this case, Ext.P9 alone is not the statement
given by the victim and this crime itself was registered on recording
the FIS given by the deceased himself, which do form part of Ext.P3
FIR. According to him, in the FIS, the victim named the accused
persons as Muhammedali, Vasu, Muhammed Rafeek and Aricha
Vishwan and reiterated the same in Ext.P9. Therefore, Exts.P3 and
P9 are admissible in evidence and, consequently, the identity of the
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 8 2026:KER:48403
3rd accused as one of the assailants is clearly established among other
accused persons. Further, the identity of the other accused also
established. In such circumstances, the argument advanced by the
learned counsel for the appellants would not sustain and Ext.P9
dying declaration read along with Ext.P3 can safely be relied upon to
find commission of the above offences by the appellants as rightly
found by the trial court.
9. Adverting to the rival arguments, the points arise for
consideration are;
(i) Whether the Sessions Court was right in
holding that the appellants committed offence punishable
under Section 341 of the IPC?
(ii) Whether the Sessions Court was right in
holding that the appellants committed offence punishable
under Section 323 of the IPC?
(iii) Whether the Sessions Court was right in
holding that the appellants committed offence punishable
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 9 2026:KER:48403
under Section 304 of the IPC?
(iv) Whether the verdict would require interference?
(v) Whether the sentence imposed on the appellants
would require interference?
(vi) The order to be passed?
Point Nos.(i) to (vi)
10. In this case, as argued by both sides, the occurrence was at
8.30 p.m. on 06.03.2002 and the FIS given by the deceased was
recorded at 17 hrs. on 08.03.2002 while he was at Medical College
Hospital, Kozhikode. Based on which, Ext.P3 FIR was registered and
investigation started. In the FIS given by the deceased do form part
of Ext.P3, the deceased mentioned the names of all the four accused
persons, as pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor.
11. Apart from this, the prosecution relied on Ext.P9 dying
declaration. It is relevant to note that on the side of the prosecution,
an eye witness to the occurrence Sri.Thankappan was examined as
PW9. He was declared hostile to the prosecution as he did not
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 10 2026:KER:48403
support the prosecution case regarding the assault on the deceased
by the accused persons. But, he fully supported the prosecution case
regarding the post events after the occurrence. According to him,
when he saw the victim, Muhammedali, he was in a tired condition
and was asking for water. He further stated that the victim had given
his phone number to PW9 so that his family could be informed of his
condition. PW9, in turn, furnished the said phone number at the
reception counter and requested the reception staff to intimate the
victim’s condition to his family members. PW9 further stated that he
gave some water to the victim, which the victim drank. Thereafter,
two ladies arrived in an autorickshaw, and he, along with some other
persons, assisted in taking Muhammedali inside the autorickshaw.
Two days after the occurrence, the police reached the place, and he
had showed them the spot where Muhammedali was found sitting.
12. As far as PW10 is concerned, she is the wife of the
deceased Muhammedali. She supported the prosecution case to the
extent that known to her, in conformity with the prosecution case.
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 11 2026:KER:48403
She deposed that she had received telephonic information at about
7.00 p.m. requesting her to go to Perinthalmanna. She further
deposed that then she travelled by bus to Perinthalmanna and hired
an autorickshaw and proceeded to Sabreena Hotel. Therefrom,
Muhammedali (deceased) was taken in an autorickshaw. According
to her, Muhammedali was not immediately admitted in the hospital
as the Doctors were on strike. On the next day, he was taken to the
hospital and it was found that her husband was sitting so tired
without having capacity to move. The victim then stated that he was
assaulted by Vasu and his friends as he had refused to give them the
money available in his pocket for consuming alcohol, despite their
demand. The further version is that her husband died on the 7 th day
of the occurrence.
13. In this case, PW1 is the Doctor, who conducted
postmortem of the deceased Muhammedali and he had issued Ext.P1
postmortem certificate. The Doctor noted the following injuries:
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 12 2026:KER:48403
“External:- 1) lacerated wound 4×0.5 cm x skull deep on
right half of top of head, Transverse, left end at midline and
9 cm. Behind the hair margin. The clot in between the edges
organized and brownish black in Colour.
Internal:- 1) Brain 1200g, Oedematous, showed patchy
subarachnoid haemorrhage Brownish over an area 7 x 3
cm. On top of left cerebral hemisphere And thin
subarchnoidal haemorrhage brownish over an area 7x 4 on
Top of right cerebral hemisphere.
2) Fracture dislocation of cervical vertebra in between C6
and C7.
CB vertebra projected interiorly over C7 with laceration
and Compression of cord.”
14. PW1 deposed that the deceased succumbed to the injuries
sustained to his neck and head, and Ext.P1 postmortem certificate
was proved through him. Although, during cross-examination, it was
suggested that external injury No.1 could have been caused by a fall,
PW1 did not agree with the said suggestion. Apart from this
evidence, the victim was initially examined by PW12, the Assistant
Surgeon, Government Hospital, Perintalmanna on 07.03.2002 at
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 13 2026:KER:48403
9.25 a.m. The doctor noticed that his both legs were paralysed, there
was absence of reflexes on his lower limbs and left arm and there was
tenderness on the back of his neck. Ext.P15 is the accident-cum-
wound certificate issued by PW12 on examining the victim. PW12
said that he found a contused lacerated wound on the vertex of the
scalp. Since PW12 felt the condition of the victim was critical he was
referred for expert treatment. Thus, it appears that this is a case
where the victim died in consequence of the injuries extracted
hereinabove as shown in Ext.P1 and as deposed by PW1 as well as
PW12 supported by Ext.P15 wound certificate. It is true that, as
argued by the learned counsel for the appellants, while stating the
names of the persons who attacked the victim on the date of
occurrence, i.e., 06.03.2002, before the learned Judicial First Class
Magistrate-I, Kozhikode, the victim stated that he had been attacked
by Vasu and his friends, namely, Kunnathanu Rafeeq, Muhammedali
Manathu Mangalam and Aricha Vishwan. In the First Information
Statement also, the deceased stated the names of the accused with
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 14 2026:KER:48403
certainty. Thus, it could be gathered from Ext.P9 read along with the
FIS do form part of Ext.P3 FIR that accused Nos.1 to 4 were the
persons who assaulted the victim, which resulted the injuries noted
in Exts.P1 and P5 and the same caused his death, as stated by PW1.
Ext.P3 FIR and the FIS attached thereto were tendered in evidence
through PW3, who supported the same without any ambiguity. Apart
from his evidence, PW8, the Judicial First Class Magistrate-I,
Kozhikode, fully supported the recording of Ext.P9 and stated that
Muhammedali was lying on the bed, was conscious, able to speak,
and was in a fit state of mind to make the declaration. He further
deposed that the Doctor had issued a certificate to the effect that the
deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the declaration. Ext.P4 is
the inquest report prepared in connection with the postmortem
proceedings of the deceased. These documents were marked in
evidence through PW4 and those were not challenged at all during
cross-examination. PW4 also supported the inquest proceedings as
an attesting witness to the inquest report.
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 15 2026:KER:48403
15. PW11 who conducted investigation prepared Ext.P6
mahazar, which was supported by the evidence of PW6 also. PW11
had taken MO1 alleged to be used by the 1 st accused and he had filed
Ext.P11 report showing the incorporation of Section 323 of the IPC
and he had arrested the accused after identifying them. Apart from
that, he had filed Ext.P12 report in order to add Section 302 IPC
instead of 307 IPC. He also stated that Ext.P14, whereby MO1
produced before the court proved the contradictions at the instance
of PW9 with Ext.P10 series.
16. The crucial question is whether the Sessions Court was
justified in relying upon Exts.P3 and P9, supported by the other
evidence on record, to hold that the appellants had committed the
offences punishable under Sections 341, 323 and 304 of the IPC.
17. As far as the acceptability of dying declaration, it is
admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the
law on the point is well settled as argued by the learned counsel for
the appellants.
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 16 2026:KER:48403
18. In the decision in Jayamma v. State of Karnataka
reported in [2021 ICO 649], the Apex Court decided the
evidentiary value of dying declaration and the ingredients necessary
to accept the same as the sole basis of conviction. Paragraph Nos.14
and 15 of the said decision are extracted as under:
“14. Before we advert to the actual admissibility and
credibility of the dying declaration (Ex.P-5), it will be
beneficial to brace ourselves of the case-law on the
evidentiary value of a dying declaration and the sustenance
of conviction solely based thereupon. We may hasten to add
that while there is huge wealth of case law, and incredible
jurisprudential contribution by this Court on this subject, we
are consciously referring to only a few decisions which are
closer to the facts of the case in hand. We may briefly notice
these judgments.
A. In P.V. Radhakrishna. v. State of Karnataka
(2003) 6 SCC 443 p. 16:: 2003 ICO 831, this Court
considered the residuary question whether the
percentage of burns suffered is a determinative
factor to affect the credibility of a dying
declaration and the probability of its recording. It
was held that there is no hard and fast Rule of
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 17 2026:KER:48403universal application in this regard and much
would depend upon the nature of the burn, part of
the body affected, impact of burn on the faculties
to think and other relevant factor.
B. In Chacko v. State of Kerala (2003) 1 SCC 112 p.
3, 4 :: 2002 ICO 658, this Court declined to accept
the prosecution case based on the dying
declaration where the deceased was about 70
years old and had suffered 80 per cent burns. It
was held that it would be difficult to accept that
the injures could make a detailed dying
declaration after a lapse of about 8 to 9 hours of
the burning, giving minute details as to the
motive and the manner in which he had suffered
the injuries. That was of course a case where
there was no certification by the doctor regarding
the mental and physical condition of the deceased
to make dying declaration. Nevertheless, this
Court opined that the manner in which the
incident was recorded in the dying declaration
created grave doubts to the genuineness of the
document. The Court went on to opine that even
though the doctor therein had recorded “patient
conscious, talking” in the wound certificate, that
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 18 2026:KER:48403
fact by itself would not further the case of the
prosecution as to the condition of the patient
making the dying declaration, nor would the oral
evidence of the doctor or the investigating officer,
made before the court for the first time, in any
manner improve the prosecution case.
C. In Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of
Maharashtra (2006) 13 SCC 165 p. 10, 11 :: 2006
ICO 11846, it was re-stated that the dying
declaration is only a piece of untested evidence and
must like any other evidence satisfy the Court that
what is stated therein is the unalloyed truth and
that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. Further,
relying upon the decision in Paniben v. State of
Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474 p. 18:: 1992 ICO 144
wherein this Court summed up several previous
judgments governing dying declaration, the Court
in Sham Shankar Kankaria (Supra) reiterated::
(i) There is neither Rule of law nor of prudence
that dying declaration cannot be acted upon
without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. State
of M.P. [(1976) 3 SCC 104]);
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying
declaration is true and voluntary it can base
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 19 2026:KER:48403conviction on it, without corroboration. (See
State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav [(1985) 1 SCC
552 :: 1985 ICO 232 and Ramawati Devi v. State
of Bihar [(1983) 1 SCC 211 :: 1983 ICO 339]);
(iii) The Court has to scrutinise the dying
declaration carefully and must ensure that the
declaration is not the result of tutoring,
prompting or imagination. The deceased had an
opportunity to observe and identify the assailants
and was in a fit state to make the declaration.
(See K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor
[(1976) 3 SCC 618 :: 1976 ICO 453]);
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it
should not be acted upon without corroborative
evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. [(1974)
4 SCC 264 :: 1973 ICO 75]);
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and
could never make any dying declaration the
evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See
Kake Singh v. State of M.P. [1981 Supp SCC 25]);
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from
infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (Sec
Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC
654 :: 1981 ICO 68]);
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 20 2026:KER:48403
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not
contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not-to
be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v.
Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu [1980 Supp SCC
455]);
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief
statement, it is not to be discarded. On the
contrary, the shortness of the statement itself
guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of
Bihar [1980 Supp SCC 769:: 1979 ICO 315]);
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether
the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make
the dying declaration look up to the medical
opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the
deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make
the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot
prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. [1988
Supp SCC 152 : 1988 ICO 429]);
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the
version as given in the dying declaration, the said
declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of
U.P. v. Madan Mohan [(1989) 3 SCC 390 : 1989
ICO 391]);
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 21 2026:KER:48403
(xi) Where there are more than one statement in
the nature of dying declaration, one first in point
of time must be preferred. Of course, if the
plurality of dying declaration could be held to be
trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted.
(See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of
Maharashtra [(1982) 1 SCC 700 :: 1982 ICO 84])
15. It goes without saying that when the dying declaration has
been recorded in accordance with law, and it gives a cogent
and plausible explanation of the occurrence, the Court can
rely upon it as the solitary piece of evidence to convict the
Accused. It is for this reason that Section 32 of the Evidence
Act, 1872 is an exception to the general Rule against the
admissibility of hearsay evidence and its Clause (1) makes the
statement of the decease admissible. Such statement, classified
as a “dying declaration” is made by a person as to the cause of
his death or as to the injuries which culminated to his death or
the circumstances under which injuries were inflicted. A dying
declaration is thus admitted in evidence on the premise that
the anticipation of brewing death breeds the same human
feelings as that of a conscientious and guiltless person under
oath. It is a statement comprising of last words of a person
before his death which are presumed to be truthful, and not
infected by any motive or malice. The dying declaration is
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 22 2026:KER:48403
therefore admissible in evidence on the principle of necessity
as there is very little hope of survival of the maker, and if
found reliable, it can certainly form the basis for conviction.”
19. In the decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v.
Chaman Lal reported in [2026 INSC 57 : 2026 KHC 6045], in
paragraph No.16.1, the Apex Court relied on a decision of the Apex
Court in Khushal Rao‘s case (supra) in the year 1958 and observed
that it could not be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying
declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is
corroborated that dying declaration as a weak piece of evidence than
other piece of evidence.
20. Reading the law settled as discussed, there is no reason to
disbelieve the reason for the death of Muhammedali and the persons
who attacked him which led to his death, as stated by him in Exts.P3
and P9. Therefore, Exts.P3 and P9 can be the sole basis of conviction.
It is relevant to note that Ext.P9 was recorded by a competent
Magistrate and the Magistrate deposed before the court fully in
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 23 2026:KER:48403
support of Ext.P9, as already narrated above. Be it so, it is held that
the prosecution successfully proved commission of offences
punishable under Sections 341, 323 and 304(I) of the IPC by the
appellants/accused Nos.1 to 3 and the said finding is only to be
confirmed.
21. As far the sentence imposed against the 3 rd appellant/3rd
accused is concerned, the Sessions Court imposed rigorous
imprisonment for a period of ten years and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/-
for the offence punishable under Section 304 of the IPC and in
default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
period of one year.
22. Coming to the sentence, the sentence imposed against
appellant Nos.1 and 2, i.e. accused Nos.1 and 2 are concerned, fine
alone would survive, since substantive sentence could not be
imposed against them. Thus, the sentence of fine imposed against
appellant Nos.1 and 2/accused Nos.1 and 2 also is confirmed, with
liberty to the prosecution to move, as per law, to recover the fine, if
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 24 2026:KER:48403
any, from the property left by appellant Nos.1 and 2/accused Nos.1
and 2 and inherited by the legal heirs of them.
23. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. Further, while
confirming the sentence imposed for the offences punishable under
Sections 341 and 323 of the IPC, the sentence imposed against the 3 rd
appellant/3rd accused for the offence punishable under Section
304(I) of the IPC is reduced to seven years while maintaining the
fine, as such, and reducing the default imprisonment for a period of
three months. The substantive sentence imposed against the 3 rd
appellant/3rd accused shall run concurrently and the default sentence
shall run separately. Set off is allowed.
The order suspending sentence and granting bail to the 3 rd
appellant/3rd accused stands cancelled and the bail bond executed by
the 3rd appellant/3rd accused also stands cancelled. The 3 rd
appellant/3rd accused is directed to surrender before the Sessions
Court, forthwith to undergo the modified sentence, failing which, the
Sessions Court is directed to execute the sentence, without fail.
CRL.A.NO.606 OF 2007 25 2026:KER:48403
Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the
Sessions Court, forthwith, without fail, for information and
compliance.
Sd/-
A. BADHARUDEEN
JUDGE
Bb
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