[This is a guest post by Pranav Mittal.]
On 18 April, Justice Yashwant Varma tendered his resignation while impeachment proceedings against him were underway in Parliament. His resignation letter raises serious concerns about the fairness of the proceedings, particularly with respect to the denial of an opportunity to examine witnesses in person and the redaction of portions of witness testimony.
In this blog post, I examine the fairness and natural justice concerns arising from the in-house inquiry conducted against him. I do not engage with the merits of the allegations of judicial misconduct. Rather, I adopt an administrative law lens to assess whether the procedure complied with basic procedural safeguards. I argue that the inquiry violated principles of natural justice by failing to ensure a fair hearing and by not adhering to the duty to give reasons. I first challenge the characterization of the inquiry as “preliminary, ad hoc and not final” by identifying the civil consequences that flow from it. I then apply the proportionality standard to assess whether the departures from natural justice can be justified.
A. ‘Preliminary inquiry’ and the question of civil consequences
In 2025, when the in-house inquiry was underway, the constitutionality of paragraphs 5(b) and 7(ii) of the In-house Procedure, 1999 (‘Procedure’) was assailed. Under the Procedure, once the Committee is satisfied regarding the veracity of the allegations of judicial misconduct, it has the power to report its conclusion to the Chief Justice of India (‘CJI’) [paragraph 5(b)]. Upon receiving a report confirming the allegations, the CJI must advise the judge to seek voluntary retirement [paragraph 7(i)]. Upon non-compliance, the CJI may ask the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court to not allocate any judicial work to the judge [paragraph 7(ii)]. Such withdrawal of judicial work alongside the committee’s report must also be communicated by the CJI to the Prime Minister and the President [paragraph 7(ii)]. The CJI based on the Committee report’s findings of the seriousness of judicial misconduct can also endorse the initiation of the impeachment proceedings before the Parliament [para 67].
The Court proceeded to analyse the nature of the inquiry under the in-house procedure. It held that the in-house inquiry is distinct from, and a step prior to, the impeachment proceedings for removal of a judge before Parliament under the Judges Inquiry Act, 1968. It was described as an internal self-regulatory mechanism devised by the judiciary to preserve public trust in the institution [para 83]. Relying upon Indira Jaisingh v. Supreme Court of India, the Court noted that the inquiry is fact-finding in nature, intended to enable the CJI to form his personal satisfaction under the Procedure [para 87]. It was therefore understood as a preliminary inquiry meant to assess, on a prima facie basis, whether the allegations are true before the commencement of full-fledged proceedings under the Judges Inquiry Act [para 92]. The Court thus affirmed the view that the in-house inquiry is “preliminary, ad hoc and not final” in nature.
On this understanding, the Court held that since the inquiry is merely a preliminary stage preceding the final proceedings, the judge cannot claim a lack of opportunity of a fair hearing at this stage. The principles of natural justice, it reasoned, are sufficiently guaranteed in the impeachment process under the Judges Inquiry Act. Further, since the impeachment proceedings are to be conducted independently, they cannot rely upon the evidence collected or findings recorded during the in-house inquiry. If such reliance were to occur, the judge would be entitled to challenge it at that stage. It was therefore held that a violation of the principles of natural justice could not be raised at this stage.
The Court’s likening of the in-house procedure to a preliminary inquiry without any civil consequences is, however, mistaken. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, it was held that the principles of natural justice must be complied with wherever civil consequences ensue. These were understood broadly to include any adverse effect on civil rights, including property or personal rights, civil liberties, material deprivations, and even non-pecuniary harms.
Under paragraph 7(ii) of the procedure, the CJI’s order for the withdrawal of judicial work is consequent upon the adverse findings of the committee’s report. This qualifies as an appropriate civil consequence for the judge emanating from the committee’s inquiry.
In the present case, the direction to withdraw judicial work was issued by the CJI before the Committee submitted its report. This was inconsistent with the scheme of the Procedure, as paragraph 7(ii) permits such action only upon an adverse finding by the Committee. Ordinarily, the power to assign judicial work vests exclusively with the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court as the ‘master of the roster’, a prerogative that cannot be exercised at another’s direction. Further, while High Courts exercise supervisory control under Article 227 over subordinate courts, the Supreme Court does not exercise comparable administrative control over High Courts; treating it otherwise risks implying a hierarchical relationship that does not exist.
The Committee subsequently disclosed that it had found strong evidence of judicial misconduct. In that light, although the direction was premature under paragraph 7(ii), it may be justified as a temporary measure taken to preserve institutional credibility, as suggested by the press release describing it as operative “for the time being”. On this understanding, the withdrawal of judicial work was contingent upon the Committee’s eventual findings.
It is in this context that the significance of the Committee’s report becomes apparent. The report directly affects the rights and obligations of the judge by determining whether the condition for continuation of the withdrawal of judicial work is satisfied. Had the Committee found no substance in the allegations, the earlier direction would necessarily have to be vacated, restoring the judge to his full judicial functions. Conversely, an adverse finding sustains the deprivation. The report thus alters the judge’s legal position by affecting the discharge of his judicial office. This, it is argued, entails concrete civil consequences.
B. Whether abridgement of fair process rights here permissible?
Given that the in-house inquiry has civil consequences for the judge, the minimum core of natural justice must be guaranteed. This core comprises the principle of audi alteram partem, the rule against bias, and the right to a reasoned order. While deciding the constitutional challenge to the Procedure, the Court held that a personal hearing after the Committee submitted its report was not mandatory, since it was not expressly prescribed [para 126]. However, once civil consequences are established, the application of basic principles of natural justice cannot be excluded merely by the absence of an explicit requirement in the Procedure.
In the in-house inquiry against Justice Yashwant Varma, two aspects are particularly significant. First, on 4th May 2025, the CJI granted time until 6th May 2025 for the judge to seek voluntary retirement, failing which he would communicate with the Prime Minister and the President to initiate removal proceedings. The judge’s request to submit a written representation after a thorough review of the report was not accepted, and the communication was sent on the stipulated date. He was thus afforded less than 48 hours to examine the report and respond. This falls short of the requirement of a fair hearing, which includes a meaningful opportunity to respond within a reasonable time.
Second, the CJI’s letter to the constitutional authorities was treated as confidential and not disclosed to the judge. This raises concerns regarding the duty to give reasons, as the judge was not informed of whether the CJI independently endorsed the Committee’s findings or the reasons that informed such a decision.
The Supreme Court has recognised that the content of natural justice is flexible and must be tailored to the circumstances of the case. In Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v. Union of India, the Court applied a structured four-pronged proportionality standard to assess departures from these principles. This framework provides an appropriate lens to evaluate whether the limitations on the right to a fair hearing and the duty to give reasons in the present case can be justified.
Right to Fair Hearing
The judge was not given sufficient time to examine the contents of the report and respond to the CJI’s letter, thereby violating his right to a fair hearing. As noted above, he was afforded less than 48 hours to do so, which is inadequate in the context of serious allegations supported by detailed material. Sufficient time must be granted based on the seriousness of the allegations and the nature of material placed against the person. It has been held that a mere three day period to respond to detailed material against the person was insufficient.
Applying the proportionality standard, at Prong I, protecting the image of the judiciary through swift action in cases of judicial misconduct is a legitimate goal. At Prong II, it must be shown that the two-day period to respond to the notice bears a rational connection to this goal. The credibility of the judiciary is not achieved merely through a speedy process, but also requires a fair procedure for removal. Here, a fair hearing was not meaningfully afforded in the in-house procedure conducted by the judiciary itself. A process that is speedy but procedurally unfair risks undermining, rather than enhancing, the credibility of the judiciary.
At Prong III, the means adopted must be the least restrictive alternative among those available. Here, alternative measures were available which could have achieved the stated goal in a real and substantial manner. The CJI could have furnished the report to the judge and provided a reasonable period to respond, either through a written representation or an oral hearing. However, the request for additional time was denied, and the CJI proceeded to communicate with the concerned authorities immediately upon expiry of the stipulated period. Therefore, the abridgement of the right to a fair hearing is unjustified as it fails Prongs II and III.
At Prong IV, the public interest in preserving trust in an impartial judiciary must be balanced against the public interest in the right to fair hearing. The speedy process achieve through the a restricted two days achieves very little in terms of salvaging trust in an impartial judiciary, whereas it leads to severe rights infringement. The public interest in an impartial judiciary is served not only by the removal of corrupt judges but by the procedural integrity of the removal process itself. Varma’s resignation letter damages public confidence in the judiciary’s self-regulatory capacity and therefore the weight on the restriction side is further reduced.
Duty to Give Reasons
The communication of the CJI based on the Committee report was not disclosed to the judge, and thus constituted a violation of the duty to give reasons. The judge was not informed whether the CJI had endorsed the findings of the Committee and himself recommended removal, nor of the reasons that weighed in his mind while doing so.
At Prong I, it may be argued that preserving the confidentiality of communications between constitutional functionaries is a legitimate objective. Such confidentiality is necessary to maintain the integrity of exchanges between the head of the judiciary, on the one hand, and the head of the executive and the head of the State, on the other.
However, as held in Madhyamam, this by itself is insufficient; it must also be shown that the purpose is actually served by the non-disclosure. On that basis, the Court rejected a blanket claim of confidentiality over investigative reports where the material was already in the public domain. In the present case, the CJI’s letter was based on the Committee’s report, which was itself disclosed to the judge. There was therefore no additional layer of sensitive information that necessitated complete non-disclosure.
At Prong II, it must be examined whether such non-disclosure bears a rational connection to the stated objective. In Madhyamam, the Court drew a distinction between withholding material from the public and withholding it from the affected person. It held that denying even a summary of reasons to the affected party lacks a rational nexus to any legitimate aim, since procedural guarantees are intended precisely for that individual. Here, the question is not one of public disclosure, but disclosure to the judge who was already a party to the process and aware of the contents of the report. Non-disclosure of the CJI’s reasoning to him therefore bears no rational connection to preserving institutional integrity.
At Prong III, less restrictive alternatives were clearly available. The CJI could have disclosed the contents of the letter, or at the very least provided a summary of the reasons underlying the communication.
At Prong IV, the importance of preserving the integrity of communication between constitutional functionaries may be weighed against disclosure to the judge. Here, however, the public interest underlying confidentiality is directed at restricting disclosure to the general public. That objective can be achieved while still disclosing the material, at least in a limited form, to the judge. There is therefore no real conflict requiring balancing in the first place.
C. Conclusion
The characterization of the in-house inquiry as merely “preliminary” obscures the real civil consequences it entails. Once these consequences are acknowledged, the departures from natural justice both in affording a fair hearing and in providing reasons become untenable. Tested against proportionality, these abridgements cannot be justified. Procedural safeguards, even in internal judicial processes, therefore remain indispensable to the legitimacy of institutional action.
