Punjab-Haryana High Court
Manmeet Singh vs Registrar Cooperative Societies … on 26 May, 2026
CWP-9646-2020 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CWP-9646-2020 (O&M)
Manmeet Singh
....Petitioner
Versus
Registrar Cooperative Societies, Punjab and others
....Respondents
1. Date when judgment was reserved 21.05.2026
2. Date of pronouncement of 26.05.2026
judgment
3. Date of uploading judgment 26.05.2026
4. Whether operative part or full Full
judgment is pronounced
5. Delay, if any, in pronouncing of Not Applicable
full judgment and reasons thereof
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR
Present: Mr. Akshay Bhan, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. Shiv Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Abishai A. George, Advocate
and Mr. Abhijeet Singh Rawaley, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Vikas Sonak, AAG, Punjab.
Mr. P.I.P. Singh, Advocate
for respondents No.2 and 3.
HARPREET SINGH BRAR J. (Oral)
1. The present civil writ petition has been filed under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature
of certiorari for quashing of the impugned order bearing endorsement
No.EOI/EAI-6/2018/422 dated 28.11.2018 (Annexure P-4) passed by
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respondent No.3 (Punishing Authority), order dated 27.03.2019
(Annexure P-6) passed by respondent No.2 (Appellate Authority) and
order dated 03.03.2020 (Annexure P-8) passed by respondent No.1
(Revisional Authority). Further prayer has been made to direct the
respondents to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service with
full wages and extend the accrued benefits.
BRIEF FACTS
2. Briefly the facts of the case are that the petitioner was
appointed as Field Officer in MARKFED in the year 2011 and was
lastly posted as Branch Officer at MARKFED Branch Office, Batala,
District Gurdaspur. He was the supervisor for maintenance and
preservation of wheat stocks stored in the NCDC Complex, along with
another employee namely Jaswant Singh (Custodian). A physical
verification conducted in June, 2018 showed a total wheat stock of 9575
MTs. In September 2018, a release order for 8400 MTs was received
and dispatch commenced on 22.09.2018. On 28.09.2018, the Technical
Officer, MARKFED, Gurdaspur suspected a shortage in the balance
stock. A committee was constituted which reported a shortage of 21,973
bags (10,986.04 quintals) valued at approximately Rs.2,56,77,891/-. The
petitioner and Jaswant Singh signed the physical verification report. The
Managing Director, without holding a regular inquiry, dismissed the
petitioner from service under Rule 12(ii) & (iii) and Rule 6(B) of the
MARKFED Punishment & Appeal Rules, 1990. The appeal and
revision filed by the petitioner were dismissed.
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CONTENTION
3. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner inter alia
contends that the impugned orders have been passed in gross violation
of the principles of natural justice and Article 311(2) of the Constitution
of India, as no regular inquiry was conducted, no show cause notice was
issued, and no opportunity of hearing was granted before passing the
order of dismissal. He further contends that the police investigation
report (Annexure P-10) has found the petitioner innocent of criminal
conspiracy and that the co-accused Jaswant Singh has filed an affidavit
taking full responsibility for the shortage. He argues that the punishing
authority failed to record valid reasons for dispensing with the inquiry
under Rule 12 of the MARKFED Punishment & Appeal Rules, 1990.
He places reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Union of India vs. Tulsi Ram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416, and submits
that the exception under Rule 12 must be strictly construed and reasons
must be recorded. He, therefore, prays that the impugned orders be set
aside and the petitioner be reinstated with full back wages and
consequential benefits.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits
that the petitioner, as Branch Incharge, was jointly responsible for the
custody of wheat stocks worth crores of rupees. The physical
verification report dated 03.10.2018, which was signed by the petitioner
himself, admitted a massive shortage of 21,973 bags. The Managing
Director, being the punishing authority, invoked the special procedure
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under Rule 12(iii) of the MARKFED Punishment & Appeal Rules,
1990, and recorded his satisfaction in writing that holding a regular
inquiry was not in the interest of the Federation given the clear evidence
of gross misconduct causing huge financial loss. It is further argued that
the petitioner was granted a full and fair post-decisional hearing by the
Appellate Authority (Board of Directors) on two occasions i.e.
20.03.2019 and 27.03.2019, where he was personally heard and given
an opportunity to produce documents and witnesses. The Appellate
Authority, after due consideration, upheld the order of dismissal. The
revisional authority also affirmed the same. It is further contended that
the police report (Annexure P-10) does not absolve the petitioner, as it
finds him prima facie responsible for negligence and carelessness in
performance of his duty. The counsel further submits that the scope of
judicial review in disciplinary matters is extremely limited and this
Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence or interfere with the findings of
fact recorded by the departmental authorities unless they are perverse or
based on no evidence. The respondents rely upon the judgments of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015)
2 SCC 610 and S.R. Tewari vs. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 602.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record with their able assistance.
6. Admittedly, the petitioner was the joint custodian of the
stock along with another individual named Jaswant Singh. It was the
procedure for the stock to be quarterly verified, physically. On the
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verification dated 30.06.2018 no shortage was found and all stocks were
in place, however upon verification in the next quarter on 28.09.2018 a
massive shortage of stock worth Rs.2,56,77,891 was revealed.
Indisputably, the petitioner being the joint custodian was the signatory
to the Physical verification Report prepared on both these dates. As
such, it is unequivocally established that he was aware of the shortage.
Further, it is undisputed that the petitioner being the Branch Incharge
and Joint Custodian of the Wheat Stock for the year 2017 – 18, was
responsible and accountable for the same.
7. The impugned action was taken against the petitioner vide
order dated 28.11.2018 under the provisions of Special Procedure in
Rule 12 of the MARKFED Punishment & Appeal Rules, 1990, which is
reproduced below as under:
“12. Special Procedure in Certain Cases
Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules:
(i) Where any penalty is imposed on the employees on the
ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a
criminal charge; or
(ii)Where the Punishing Authority is satisfied for reasons
to be recorded by it, that it is not reasonably practicable to
hold an enquiry in the manner provided in these rules; (or)
(iii) Where the Punishing Authority is satisfied that in the
interest of the Federation, it is not expedient to hold any
enquiry in the manner provided in these Rules, the
authority may consider the circumstances of the case and
make such orders thereon including imposition of any
penalty specified in Rule 6 as it may deem fit.”
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8. A plain reading of the above provision makes it evident that
the requirement of holding a regular inquiry under Rule 10 can be
dispensed with by the punishing authority if it is satisfied, for reasons to
be recorded in writing, that it is not expedient to hold such an inquiry in
the interest of the Federation. In the present case, the Managing
Director, while passing the order of dismissal dated 28.11.2018,
categorically recorded:
“S/Shri Manmeet Singh , F.O (P) (then B.I)(now U/S)
and Jaswant Singh, Salesman (deployed) (then
custodian) (now U/S) have also signed the P.V
Reports, which tantamount to self admission on their
part.
From the above, it is clear that S/Shri
Manmeet Singh, F.O (P) (then B.I)(now U/S) and
Jaswant Singh, Salesman (deployed) (then
custodian) (now U/S) have caused heavy losses to
Markfed on account of embezzlement in wheat stocks
crop 2017-18 valuing Rs.2,69,830/- (financially
vetted) in connivance with each other. This is a clear
cut case of criminal breach of trust and conduct of
these officials is highly irresponsible and grievous in
nature. Thus there is no need of further enquiry as
the conduct of these officials have made them liable
to be given an exemplary punishment”
9. Thus, the essential precondition for invoking Rule 12(ii)
and (iii), namely, the recording of reasons by the punishing authority for
dispensing with a regular inquiry, stands duly satisfied in the present
case. A perusal of the dismissal order dated 28.11.2018 demonstrates
that the Managing Director consciously considered the material
available on record, including the physical verification reports
admittedly signed by the petitioner himself, the nature of the allegations,
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and the financial loss caused to the Federation. Upon such
consideration, the punishing authority arrived at a categorical
satisfaction that the petitioner had caused substantial loss to MARKFED
by way of embezzlement and breach of trust, and that no further inquiry
was warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, it
cannot be said that the power under Rule 12 was exercised mechanically
or without application of mind. Rather, the order itself reflects the
reasons which weighed with the authority in concluding that holding a
regular inquiry was not expedient in the interest of the Federation.
Consequently, the satisfaction so recorded cannot be termed arbitrary,
perverse, or dehors the provisions of the Rules.
10. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel 1985 INSC 155, while dealing with
the issue of dispensing with the need to conduct enquiry before
imposing a penalty under Article 311 of the Constitution of India
observed as under:-
130. The condition precedent for the application of clause
(b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that “it is
not reasonably practicable to hold” the inquiry
contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent
to note is that the words used are “not reasonably
practicable” and not “impracticable”. According to the
Oxford English Dictionary “practicable” means “Capable
of being put into practice, carried out in action, effected,
accomplished, or done; feasible”. Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary defines the word “practicable”
inter alia as meaning “possible to practice or perform :
capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished :
feasible”. Further, the words used are not “not practicable”
but “not reasonably practicable”. Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary defines the word “reasonably” as
“in a reasonable manner : to a fairly sufficient extent”.
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Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or
not must be judged in the context of whether it was
reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or
absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b).
What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not
practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a
reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not
possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be
reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, but some
instances by way of illustration may, however, be given. It
would not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry
where the Government servant, particularly through or
together with his associates, so terrorizes, threatens or
intimidate witnesses who are going to given evidence
against him with fear of reprisal as to prevent them from
doing so or where the Government servant by himself or
together with or through other threatens, intimidates and
terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary authority or
member of his family so that he is afraid to hold the inquiry
or direct it to be held. It would also not be reasonably
practicable to hold the inquiry where an atmosphere of
violence or of general indiscipline and insubordination
prevails, and it is immaterial whether the concerned
Government servant is or is not a party to bringing about
such an atmosphere. In this connection, we must bear in
mind that numbers coerce and terrify while an individual
may not. The reasonable practicability of holding an
inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the
disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on the
spot and knows what is happening. It is because the
disciplinary authority is the best judge of this that
clause(3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the
disciplinary authority on this question final. A
disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a
disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior
motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an
inquiry or because the Department’s case against the
Government servant is weak and must fail. The finality
given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article
311(3) is not binding upon the court so far as its power of
judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court
will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as
also the order imposing penalty. The case of Arjun
Chaubey v. Union of India and others, 1984(2) S.L.R.
16 : [1984] 3 S.C.R. 302, is an instance in point. In that
case, the appellant was working as a senior clerk in the
office of the Chief Commercial Superintendent, Northern
Railway, Varanasi. The Senior Commercial Officer wrote a
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letter to the appellant calling upon him to submit his
explanation with regard to twelve charges of gross
indiscipline mostly relating to the Deputy Chief
Commercial Superintendent. The appellant submitted his
explanation and on the very next day the Deputy Chief
Commercial Superintendent served a second notice on the
appellant saying that his explanation was not convincing
and that another chance was being given to him to offer his
explanation with respect to those charges. The appellant
submitted his further explanation but on the very next day
the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent passed an
order dismissing him on the ground that he was not fit to be
retained in service. This Court struck down the order
holding that seven out of twelve charges related to the
conduct of the appellant with the Deputy Chief Commercial
Superintendent who was the disciplinary authority and that
if an inquiry were to be held, the principal witness for the
Department would have been the Deputy Chief
Commercial Superintendent himself, resulting in the same
person being the main accuser, the chief witness and also
the judge of the matter.
11. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Tulsiram Patel (supra)
has already laid out the extent to which such orders passed under the
Article 311(2)(b) or an analogous provision of the service rules shall be
open to Judicial Scrutiny,
“138. Where a Government servant is dismissed, removed
or reduced 274 in rank by applying clause (b) or an
analogous provision of the service rules and the
approaches either the High Court under Article 226 or this
Court under Article 32, the court will interfere on grounds
well established in law for the exercise of power of judicial
review in matters where administrative discretion is
exercised. It will consider whether clause (b) or an
analogous provision in the service rules was properly
applied or not. The finality given by clause (3) of Article
311 to the disciplinary authority’s decision that it was not
reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry is not binding
upon the court. The court will also examine the charge of
mala fides, if any, made in the writ petition. In examining
the relevancy of the reasons, the court will consider the
situation which according to the disciplinary authority
made it come to the conclusion that it was not reasonably
practicable to hold the inquiry. If the court finds that the
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reasons are irrelevant, then the recording of its satisfaction
by the disciplinary authority would be an abuse of power
conferred upon it by clause (b) and would take the case out
of the purview of that clause and the impugned order of
penalty would stand invalidated. In considering the
relevancy of the reasons given by the disciplinary authority
the court will not, however, sit in judgment over them like a
court of first appeal. In order to decide whether the reasons
are germane to clause (b), the Court must put itself in the
place of the disciplinary authority and consider what in
the then prevailing situation a reasonable man acting in a
reasonable way would have done. The matter will have to
be judged in the light of the then prevailing situation and
not as if the disciplinary authority was deciding the
question whether the inquiry should be dispensed with or
not in the cool and detached atmosphere of a court room,
removed in time from the situation in question. Where two
views are possible, the court will decline to interfere.”
12. As such, punishing authority, being the Managing Director,
was on the spot and best placed to assess the prevailing situation. The
record reveals that the petitioner himself had signed the physical
verification report acknowledging the shortage of 21,973 bags valued at
over Rs. 2.56 crores. This was not a case of disputed facts requiring a
long-drawn evidentiary inquiry, but rather a case of self-evident gross
misconduct and massive financial loss caused to the Federation. The
reasons recorded in the dismissal order, that the petitioner’s conduct
constituted a clear-cut case of criminal breach of trust and that
exemplary punishment was warranted, are not only relevant but are
directly germane to the satisfaction required under Rule 12(iii). These
reasons cannot be said to be arbitrary, perverse, or based on no material.
As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court must put itself in the
place of the disciplinary authority and consider what a reasonable man
would have done in the then prevailing situation. A reasonable
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employer, faced with irrefutable documentary evidence of
embezzlement and a huge shortage of public stock, would certainly
conclude that holding a regular inquiry under Rule 10 was not expedient
in the interest of the Federation, as it would only delay the inevitable
and potentially impede the process of fixing accountability.
13. Moreover, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held
that where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is
possible and no other view is legally permissible, the Court may decline
to interfere with the order on the sole ground of non-observance of
natural justice, as doing so would only result in the performance of a
useless formality.
14. Reliance in this regard may also be placed on the judgment
rendered by the three-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan 1980 INSC 184, wherein the Hon’ble Apex
Court speaking through Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy observed as under,
17. Linked with this question is the question whether the
failure to observe natural justice does at all matter if the
observance of natural justice would have made no
difference, the admitted or indisputable facts speaking for
themselves. Where on the admitted or indisputable facts
only one conclusion is possible and under the law only
one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its
writ to compel the observance of natural justice not
because it approves the non observance of natural justice
but because Courts do not issue futile writs. But it will be
a pernicious principle to apply in other situations where
conclusions are controversial however slightly, and
penalties are discretionary.
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15. Further, a Two Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan 2000 INSC 416,
speaking through Justice M. Jagannadha Rao observed as under,
“20. In M.C. Mehta it was pointed out that at one
time, it was held in Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 that
breach of principles of natural justice was in itself treated
as prejudice and that no other ‘de facto’ prejudice needed
to be proved. But, since then the rigour of the rule has been
relaxed not only in England but also in our country. In S.L.
Kapoor v. Jagmohan, 1980(4) SCC 379, Chinnappa Reddy,
J. followed Ridge v. Baldwin and set aside the order of
supersession of the New Delhi Metropolitan Committee
rejecting the argument that there was no prejudice though
notice was not given. The proceedings were quashed on the
ground of violation of principles of natural justice. But
even in that case certain exceptions were laid down to
which we shall presently refer.
21. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor‘s case, laid
two exceptions (at p. 395) namely, “if upon admitted or
indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible”,
then in such a case, the principle that breach of natural
justice was in itself prejudice, would not apply. In other
words if no other conclusion was possible on admitted or
indisputable facts, it is not necessary to quash the order
which was passed in violation of natural justice. Of
course, this being an exception, great care must be taken
in applying this exception.
23. The ‘useless formality’ theory, it must be noted,
is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of
“admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one
conclusion” referred to above, – there has been
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considerable debate of the application of that theory in
other cases. The divergent views expressed in regard to this
theory have been elaborately considered by this Court in
M.C. Mehta referred to above. This Court surveyed the
views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord
Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham,
Megarry, J. and Straughton L.J. etc. in various cases and
also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner,
Craig, De Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc. Some of them have
said that orders passed in violation must always be
quashed for otherwise the Court will be prejudging the
issue. Some others have said, that there is no such absolute
rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have
applied via-media rules. We do not think it necessary, in
this case to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate
analysis, it may depend on the facts of a particular case.
24. It will be sufficient, for the purpose of the case
of Mr. Mansoor Ali Khan to show that his case will fall
within the exceptions stated by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in
S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, namely, that on the admitted or
indisputable facts – only one view is possible. In that event
no prejudice can be said to have been caused to Mr.
Mansoor Ali Khan though notice has not been issued.”
16. The “useless formality” theory postulates that where, on
admitted or indisputable facts, only one conclusion is possible and
under the law only one consequence can follow, non-observance of the
principles of natural justice would not vitiate the action, since
compliance thereof would have made no difference whatsoever. In the
present case, the admitted facts speak for themselves. The petitioner,
being a joint custodian of the stock, had signed the physical verification
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report dated 03.10.2018, which unequivocally recorded a massive
shortage of 21,973 bags (10,986.04 quintals) valued at more than Rs.
2.56 crores. These are not disputed facts requiring adjudication through
a contested inquiry; rather, they are self-evident circumstances arising
from the physical verification conducted in the petitioner’s presence and
acknowledged by his own signatures on the verification report.
17. Consequently, even if a regular inquiry had been
conducted, the only possible conclusion, on the basis of the petitioner’s
admitted role as custodian and his presence during the stock
verification, would have been that he was responsible for the
safekeeping, storage, and maintenance of the stock. Further, the
siphoning of such an enormous quantity of stock could not reasonably
have escaped the petitioner’s notice. The movement of more than
22,000 bags of stock, weighing over 10,986 quintals, would necessarily
require transportation arrangements, labour, and systematic handling
over a considerable period of time; such large-scale movement could
neither occur silently nor overnight without the knowledge of the
custodian. As such, the petitioner was jointly responsible for the
shortage and, consequently, for the embezzlement resulting in
substantial financial loss to the Federation.
18. In these circumstances, no conclusion other than the
petitioner’s culpability was possible on the admitted and indisputable
facts of the case. Therefore, even assuming that the non-holding of a
regular inquiry amounted to a procedural violation, no real prejudice has
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been caused to the petitioner, and this Court would not be justified in
quashing the impugned orders merely to direct compliance with a
useless formality.
19. Before concluding, it must be emphasized that disciplinary
proceedings are entirely distinct and independent from criminal
proceedings. The standard of proof in a criminal trial is “proof beyond
reasonable doubt”, whereas in departmental proceedings, the standard is
the much lower threshold of “preponderance of probability”. The
petitioner, as Branch Incharge and joint custodian, cannot abdicate his
responsibility by placing the entire blame on the co-custodian, Jaswant
Singh, nor can he seek absolution on the basis of an affidavit filed by
the said co-accused assuming full responsibility. Supervisory liability is
not transferred by such self-serving documents; it is intrinsic to the
office held by the petitioner.
20. Furthermore, the timeline of events is damning against the
petitioner. The physical verification conducted in June 2018, during the
petitioner’s tenure, showed no shortage whatsoever. The shortage of
21,973 bags surfaced barely three months later, during the verification
conducted on 28.09.2018, again during the petitioner’s continuing tenure
as Branch Incharge. Most significantly, the petitioner participated in the
stock verification and signed the physical verification report dated
03.10.2018, which unequivocally recorded the massive shortage of over
Rs.2.56 crores. This signature is not a mere formality; it constitutes a
clear and binding admission of the factual position on record. No
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amount of argumentation, procedural challenge, or subsequent
explanation can erase or dilute the legal effect of this self-evident or
speaking admission. Once the facts stand admitted, there remains
nothing to be proved by way of a regular inquiry, and the invocation of
the special procedure under Rule 12(iii) stands fully justified.
21. Insofar as the quantum of punishment is concerned, this
Court finds that the penalty of dismissal from service is neither
disproportionate nor shocking to the conscience of the court. The
misconduct committed by the petitioner is extremely grave. He was
holding a position of trust and was responsible for public property
(wheat stocks) worth crores of rupees. A shortage of 21,973 bags of
wheat cannot be dismissed as a minor irregularity. It is a case of gross
negligence, if not outright embezzlement, causing immense financial
loss to the respondent/Federation. The punishing authority, after
considering the gravity of the misconduct, thought it fit to impose the
major penalty of dismissal. The Appellate Authority and the Revisional
Authority have affirmed the same. This Court is not sitting in appeal
over the decision of the departmental authorities. As held by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC
749, interference with the quantum of punishment is warranted only if
the punishment is so shockingly disproportionate as to call for no other
conclusion than that it is arbitrary and perverse. The present case does
not fall in that category.
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22. Consequently, this Court finds that the impugned orders
were passed after due application of mind, in compliance with the
relevant rules. The findings of fact recorded by the departmental
authorities are based on clear evidence on record, including the physical
verification report signed by the petitioner. There is no perversity or
arbitrariness in the conclusions drawn. The scope of judicial review
under Article 226 being limited, this Court refrains from interfering with
the well-reasoned orders passed by the respondents.
23. In view of the above discussions, the present writ petition is
found to be devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed.
24. Pending miscellaneous application, if any, also stands
disposed of.
(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)
JUDGE
26.05.2026
yakub
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
MOHD YAKUB
2026.05.26 19:13
I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of
this document
Punjab & Haryana High Court,
Chandigarh.
