Delhi District Court
Mukesh Kumar vs Ryan International School And Ors on 26 May, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. ARUN KUMAR GARG
PRESIDING OFFICER : LABOUR COURT-III
ROUSE AVENUE COURTS COMPLEX : NEW DELHI.
CNR No. DLCT13-002797-2018
LID No. 334/2018
Sh. Mukesh Kumar S/o Sh. Om Prakash
Mobile No. 9953061656
R/o H. No. 2-A, Village Main Road,
Main Gali, Auchandi, Delhi-110039
Through his AR Sh. Aditya Aggarwal,
Mobile No. 9891789459 ..... Workman
VERSUS
1.
Ryan International School,
Through its Principal
Education Society, A-9, Sector-25,
Rohini, Delhi-110085.
Through its AR Sh. Gaurav Bajaj,
Mobile No. 9810037684
Email ID: [email protected].
2. Jagidsh Tours and Travels
Through its Proprietor
Regd. Office:-
B-1/568, 3rd Floor, Janakpuri,
New Delhi-110058.
Through its AR Sh. Rajeev Gupta
Mobile No. 9818671765
Email ID: [email protected] ….. ManagementsDate of Institution of the case : 27.07.2018
Date on which Award is passed : 26.05.2026AWARD
1. By this award, I will dispose off the present claim of
Workman U/s 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as
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introduced vide Industrial Disputes (Delhi Amendment) Act 2003.
2. Brief case of the Workman, as per his statement of claim, is
that in the year 2006, Management no. 1 had engaged him on the
post of driver, after taking his trial test by making him drive a bus
and that since the date of his engagement by Management no. 1,
he was working under direct control and supervision of
Management no. 1 in respect of timing of his work, uniform, travel
route and sanction/ non sanction of holidays. However, in order to
save its legal liability, Management no. 1 had shown him as an
employee of contractors despite the fact that the said contractors
had no control whatsoever over the services of Workman.
3. In fact, according to him, Management no. 1, being a holder
of permit in respect of transport, has submitted a list of drivers,
including the present Workman, engaged by Management no. 1,
whereupon, an authorization card in the name of Workman was
issued by Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi under the
provisions of Rule 7A of Delhi Motor Vehicle Rules, 1993. In
order to deprive the Workman of statutory benefits, it is alleged by
him, Management no. 1 had not only shown him as an employee
of contractor(s), but, it has also been changing the contractors from
time to time.
4. It is further the case of Workman that Management no. 1 had
engaged M/s Group 4, M/s Spark All Security & Allied Services
Pvt. Ltd., M/s Ravi Security and M/s Jagdish Tours and Travels as
contractors for the period 2005 to 2007, 2007 to 2011, 2011 to
2013 and from 2013 till date respectively and while two of the
contractors namely M/s Group 4 and M/s Ravi Security used to
pay salary of Workman in cash, remaining two contractors used to
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deposit the salary of Workman in his bank account.
5. The salary of Workman, according to him, was being paid by
Management no. 2 in collusion with Management no. 1, in as much
as, it was only a camouflage to show the Workman as an employee
of contractor and not that of Management no. 1 despite the fact
that he actually worked for Management no. 1 since the date of his
engagement. The aforesaid act of Management no. 1, in showing
the name of Workman as an employee of contractor(s), according
to him, amounts to an unfair labour practice, in as much as,
Management no. 1 has also employed some persons at the post of
driver, who were doing the same and identical work of perennial
nature, which was being done by the Workman.
6. It has further been alleged in the statement of claim that
Workman had worked for more than 10 years serving Management
no. 1 to the entire satisfaction of supervisory and managerial staff
of Management no. 1, however, in order to employ fresh hands on
minimal wages, Managements have joined hands in
terminating/retrenching the services of Workman and had issued
advance termination/ retrenchment notice dated 18.05.2018 on the
basis of absolutely vague and false ground that for the year 2018-
2019, there was shortage of students in the buses of Management
no. 1 school and accordingly, school had decided to cut short some
routes due to which the services of Workman were no more
required.
7. By serving the aforesaid notice dated 18.05.2018, according
to Workman, Management no. 2, in connivance and collusion with
Management no. 1, has attempted to violate the provisions of
Section 25F, G and H of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is further
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alleged by him that though he is entitled to be regularized into the
services of Management no. 1 since the date of his engagement
and reserving his right to file an appropriate case in this regard,
however, under the aforesaid circumstances, he has served a
demand notice upon Management no. 1, while, sending a copy
thereof to Management no. 2, with a bonafide demand for recall of
termination/ retrenchment notice dated 18.05.2018 and seeking his
reinstatement with full back wages along with interest and other
consequential benefits, however, Managements have turned down
his aforesaid demands.
8. Workman has thus filed the present claim seeking a
declaration qua termination/ retrenchment notice dated 18.05.2018
being illegal, arbitrary and against the cannons of law. He has also
prayed for a declaration in his favour as an employee of
Management no. 1 besides a direction to Management no. 1 to
reinstate him into the job with effect from the date of illegal
termination of his services i.e. 18.06.2018 with full back wages
and other consequential benefits.
9. Both the Managements have appeared in response to notice
of statement of claim and filed their separate written statements to
the claim of Workman on 16.01.2019.
10. In its written statement, Management no. 1 has categorically
denied the existence of any employer-employee relationship
between the claimant and Management no. 1, while, alleging that
it was Management no. 2, who used to provide transport services
to Management no. 1 with its own labour force, which used to
work under direct control and supervision of Management. no. 2.
It has further been alleged in the written statement of Management
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no. 1 that the claimant might have worked with Management no.
2, however, he had no concern whatsoever with Management no.
1. Management no. 1 has thus prayed for dismissal of claim of
Workman against Management no. 1 with heavy cost, while,
denying the receipt of legal notice dated 11.07.2018.
11. On the other hand Management no. 2, in its written statement
has objected to the maintainability of the present claim under the
provisions of Section 10(4A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
as introduced vide Industrial Disputes (Delhi Amendment) Act,
2003, while, alleging that the present claim should have been filed
by the Workman under the provisions of Section 2A of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 which have been given an over riding effect
over the provisions of Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
12. It has further been alleged in the written statement of
Management no. 2 that filing of the present claim directly before
this Court without first approaching the Conciliation Officer as per
the provisions of Section 2A(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
renders the present claim of Workman liable to be dismissed. In
the absence of compliance of mandatory provision, requiring the
Workman to approach the Conciliation Officer prior to filing of the
present claim, according to Management no. 2, this Court has no
jurisdiction to try and adjudicate the present claim of Workman.
13. On merits, it has been alleged by Management no. 2 that the
Workman had been in employment of Management no. 2 as a
driver since 01.07.2013 until the date of his separation from the
service and during the course of his aforesaid employment, he had
remained under direct control and supervision of Management no.
2. Present claim of Workman against Management no. 2, it is
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alleged, is not maintainable, since, the Workman has already
received a sum of Rs. 1,10,639/-, which includes his earned wages,
payment in lieu of one month’s notice, service compensation,
bonus for the financial year 2018-2019 and gratuity etc., towards
full and final settlement of his dues, by way of direct transfer in
his bank account. The Workman, according to Management no. 2,
was duly apprised of the aforesaid fact by Management no. 2 vide
letter dated 01.06.2018.
14. Having accepted the payment of his full and final dues
without any objection, according to Management no. 2, Workman
cannot be allowed to challenge his termination vide termination
notice dated 18.05.2018, in as much as, services of Workman were
lawfully terminated by Management no. 2 due to reduction in the
number of students in the school of Management no. 1 situated in
Rohini, Delhi in the academic year 2018-2019 and consequent
reduction in routes of buses to be plied by Management no. 2 for
transportation of students.
15. Management no. 2 has thus prayed for dismissal of present
claim of Workman, qua Management no. 2, with exemplary cost,
while, denying the receipt of legal notice dated 11.07.2018 and
claiming the Management no. 2 be an unnecessary party in view
of averments made by Workman in his statement of claim.
16. No rejoinder to the aforesaid written statements of
Managements were filed by Workman despite opportunity and
hence, on the basis of pleadings of parties, following issues were
settled by Ld. Predecessor of this Court vide order dated
11.02.2019:-
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(i) Whether there existed ’employee and employer’
relationship between the claimant and the Management
no. 1? OPW
(ii) Whether the services of the claimant were
terminated illegally or unjustifiably by the
Managements? OPW
(iii) Relief.
17. Workman has thereafter examined himself as WW-1 i.e. as
the sole witness in support of his case and tendered his evidence
by way of affidavit Ex.WW1/A along with following documents:
(i) Ex. WW1/1: Copy of aadhar card of Workman.
(ii) Mark WW1/2: Copy of authorization card for the
driver issued in the name of Workman by the transport
department.
(iii) Ex. WW1/3: Copy of statement of bank account of
Workman with M/s Andhra Bank.
(iv) Mark WW1/4: Copy of termination/ retrenchment
notice dated 18.05.2018.
(v) Mark WW1/5: Copy of legal demand notice dated
11.07.2018.
18. WW-1 was duly cross-examined by Ld. ARs for both
Managements. During his cross-examination by Ld. AR for
Management no. 2, Workman was confronted with the termination
notice dated 18.05.2018 Ex. MW2/W1 and letter dated 01.06.2018
of Management no. 2 addressed to Workman which is Mark
MW2/W2. No other witness was examined on behalf of Workman
despite opportunity and hence, on a separate statement of
Workman, Workman’s evidence was closed vide order dated
08.02.2024.
19. Management no. 1 has however chosen not to lead any
evidence in its defence and hence, on the submission of Ld. AR
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for Management no. 1, evidence of Management no. 1 was closed
vide order dated 25.02.2026.
20. Management no. 2, on the other hand, has examined three
witnesses in support of its case. Sh. Vimal Wahi, Proprietor of
Management no. 2 has examined himself as M2W1 and has
tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex.M2W1/A alongwith
postal receipt and internet generated delivery report qua letter
dated 01.06.2018 Ex. M2W1/1. He has also relied upon the
documents already Ex. MW-2/W1 and Mark MW-2/W2.
21. Sh. Arvind, Section Supervisor from EPFO, Regional Office,
Delhi (West), was examined by Management no. 2 as M2W2. He
has tendered the statement of Membership ledger of PF account
no. MRNOI00604540000012281 in the name of Workman Ex.
M2W2/A and KYC details of Workman Ex. M2W2/B in his
evidence.
22. Sh. Atul, Social Security Assistant, EPFO, Regional Office
Delhi(North), was examined by Management no. 2 as M2W3 and
he has tendered the following documents in his evidence:
(i) Ex. M2W3/A: Copy of membership ledger of PF
account no. DLCPM00456730000013240 in the name
of Workman.
(ii) Ex. M2W3/B: Copy of KYC details of Workman.
(iii) Ex. M2W3/C: Copy of membership ledger of PF account no.
DLCPM00451130000000034 in the name of Workman.
(iv) Ex. M2W3/D: Copy of summary details in the name
of Workman.
23. M2W1 was duly cross-examined by Ld. AR of Workman,
whereas, M2W2 and M2W3 were not cross-examined by
Workman despite opportunity. No other witness was examined on
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behalf of Management no. 2 despite opportunity and hence, on the
submission of Proprietor of Management no. 2, evidence on behalf
of Management no. 2 was closed.
24. Final arguments were thereafter heard on behalf of both the
parties.
25. It is submitted by Ld. AR of Workman that from the material
available on record, Workman has been able to prove himself to be
in employment of Management no. 1, at the post of driver, since
the year 2006 until the date of illegal termination of his services
vide retrenchment notice dated 18.05.2018 issued by Management
no. 2. As a proof of existence of employer-employee relationship
between the Workman and Management no. 1, Ld. AR for
Workman has relied upon the authorization card Mark WW1/2,
purportedly issued by the Transport Department of Govt. of NCT
of Delhi under the provisions of Rule 7 of Delhi Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1993, after Management no. 1, being a permit holder in
respect of school buses, had allegedly shared a list of drivers,
engaged by Management no. 1, with the Transport Department.
Besides, according to him, Workman has been able to prove,
through his un-controverted testimony, that he had all along been
working under direct supervision and control of Management no.
1.
26. He submits that Management no. 2 has categorically admitted
the Workman to be in its continuous employment at least since
01.07.2013 until the date of termination of his services. Though,
according to him, Management no. 2 has alleged the Workman to
be in its employment, having no relationship whatsoever with
Management no. 1, however, the alleged contract between
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Management no. 1 and 2, for alleged providing of transportation
services at the school of Management no. 1, is sham and bogus and
is a camouflage merely to deprive the Workman of his statutory
benefits. Testimony of Workman, qua he being in direct
employment of Management no. 1 and the contract between
Management no. 1 and 2 being sham and bogus, according to him,
has remained un-controverted during his cross-examination.
27. The contract between Managements no. 1 and 2, according to
Ld. AR for Workman, can very well be presumed to be sham and
bogus solely in view of the fact that admittedly, neither the
Management no. 1 was registered under the provisions of Section
7 of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, nor,
Management no. 2 was holding any license in terms of Section 12
of the aforesaid Act.
28. He submits that the Workman has also been able to prove
illegal termination of his services by Management no. 1, in
violation of provisions of Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, through a sham and bogus contractor i.e. Management no.
2, vide termination letter Mark WW1/4, in as much as, despite
being in employment of Management no. 1 since the year 2006,
Management no. 2 has merely paid the retrenchment
compensation, to the Workman, only for a period of five years.
29. Even otherwise, according to him, admittedly, there was no
compliance by Management no. 2 with Section 25F(c) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 despite the fact that the compliance
of the aforesaid provision has been held by Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India to be mandatory for a valid retrenchment.
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30. Termination of services of Workman vide retrenchment
notice dated 18.05.2018, according to him, is also in violation of
provisions of Section 25G of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in as
much as, Managements had neither displayed any seniority list in
terms of Rule 77 of Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, nor,
have followed the principle of last come first out at the
retrenchment of Workman on account of alleged surplusage,
despite the fact that Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held the
provisions of Rule 77 of Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957
to be mandatory.
31. Under the aforesaid circumstances, according to him,
workman has been able to prove himself to be in continuous
employment of Management no. 1 since 2006 until the date of
termination of his services vide notice dated 18.05.2018 and
hence, the Workman is entitled to his reinstatement with full back
wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits.
32. So far as the issue qua maintainability of present claim in
terms of Section 10(4A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as
introduced vide Industrial Disputes (Delhi Amendment) Act,
2003, is concerned, Ld. AR for Workman has relied upon the
judgment of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Rajendra Singh Vs. SBI
MANU/DE/1444/2017 to submit that in the State of Delhi, a claim
filed under Section 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is still
maintainable irrespective of fact whether or not the Workman had
first approached the Conciliation Officer or not. Ld. AR for
Workman has thus prayed for an award in terms of prayer made by
Workman in his statement of claim, while, relying upon the
following judgments:
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(i) Jasmer Singh Vs. State of Haryana and Anr (2015)
4 SCC 458.
(ii) Rajendra Singh Vs. SBI 2017 SCC OnLine Del
8461.
(iii) Bhilwara Dugadh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd.
Vs. Vinod Kumar Sharma Dead by LRs and Ors.
(2011) 15 SCC 209.
(iv) Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Petroleum
Workers Union (2018) SCC Online Delhi 8383.
(v) Power Grid Corporation of India Vs. A.B. Singh
& Ors. MANU/TL/0395/2022.
(vi) Gaffar and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors.
MANU/ BH/0126/1983.
(vii) Raj Kumar Vs. Director of Education and Ors.
(2016) 6 SCC 541
33. On the other hand, it is submitted by Ld. AR for Management
no. 1 that Workman has failed to prove the existence of employer-
employee relationship between himself and Management no. 1. He
submits that Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Bharat Heavy
Electricals Ltd. Vs. Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola and Ors.
(2019)13 SCC 82 has laid down few principles to determine
whether there existed any employer-employee relationship
between the parties to a claim. Some of the relevant factors to
determine the existence of employer-employee relationship
between the parties to the claim, according to him, are the
authority qua appointment, dismissal and initiation of disciplinary
action against an employee, besides, the existence of control and
supervision and the identity of the party making the payment of
salary/ remuneration of the Workman.
34. In the case in hand, according to him, admittedly, not only the
salary of Workman was being paid by Management no. 2, but,
even the ESI and EPF benefits were being provided to the
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Workman by Management no. 2. He submits that Management no.
2 has also been able to prove, through the un-controverted
testimony of M2W1, that it was Management no. 2 who was
exercising direct control and supervision over Workman, during
his alleged employment with Management no. 1. On the other
hand, according to him, Workman has failed to adduce any
evidence, otherwise than his bald statement to the aforesaid effect,
to prove that he had been working under direct control and
supervision of Management no. 1.
35. He submits that Management no. 2 in the present case was
not a contractor but was a vendor who was providing Management
no. 1 with buses for transportation of school children. In any
case, according to him, onus to prove himself to be in employment
of Management no. 1 was upon the Workman, however, Workman
has failed to lead any evidence to discharge the aforesaid onus.
36. He further submits that the Workman cannot be allowed to
agitate the issue of contract between Management no. 1 and 2
being sham and bogus in a claim filed by him under the provisions
of Section 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as applicable
in Delhi, and in case, he wanted to agitate the aforesaid issue, he
was required to approach this Court under the provisions of
Section 2A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He further submits
that mere authorization card, purportedly issued in the name of
Workman under the provisions of Rule 7A of Delhi Motor Vehicles
Rules 1993 shall not be sufficient to presume the Workman to be
in direct employment of Management no. 1, more so, when even
its authenticity is not established by the Workman by summoning
the record from the Transport Department.
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37. On the contrary, according to him, Workman, in his own
statement of claim, has alleged himself to be in employment
through various contractors. The Court, according to him, cannot
act upon the un-controverted testimony of Workman, to record a
finding qua existence of employer-employee relationship between
the Workman and Management no. 1 without any independent
corroboration, considering the fact that he was found deposing
falsely qua his gainful employment, which is proved by
Management no. 2 through record produced by M2W2 and
M2W3. Ld. AR for Management no. 1 has thus prayed for
dismissal of present claim of Workman with heavy cost.
38. Ld. AR for Management no. 2, on the other hand, submits
that the present claim of Workman is not maintainable under the
provisions of Section 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as
applicable to Delhi. He submits that the case of Workman is
fraught with contradictions, in as much as, though, in his statement
of claim as well as evidence by way of affidavit, he has tried to
take a plea that he had been in continuous employment of
Management no. 1 since the year 2006, however, during his cross-
examination, he has categorically admitted being in employment
of Management no. 2 since 01.07.2013. He submits that the
Workman has also admitted having received one month’s advance
notice dated 18.05.2018 and retrenchment compensation, in terms
of provisions of Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, at
the time of termination of his services and hence, there is no
violation by Management no. 2 of the provisions of Section 25F
of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, while, terminating his services.
39. In any case, according to him, having received, without any
objection, his full and final dues from Management no. 2 at the
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time of termination of his services, Workman cannot be allowed to
pursue the present claim against Managements alleging illegal
termination of his services. In fact, according to him, Workman
has even withdrawn his EPF, meaning thereby, he has accepted
termination of his services by Management no. 2.
40. So far as the plea of Workman qua violation of provisions of
Section 25G of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is concerned, it is
submitted by Ld. AR for Management no. 2 that since all the
employees were hired by Management no. 2 with effect from the
same date i.e. w.e.f. 01.07.2013, no seniority list was required to
be prepared by Management no. 2 and hence, Workman cannot be
allowed to allege any violation of provisions of Section 25G of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by Management no. 2 in terminating
his services. Since, according to him, Workman has failed to seek
any relief against Management no. 2, the present claim of
Workman against Management no. 2 is even otherwise liable to be
dismissed.
41. He further submits that the Court cannot pass any award in
favour of Workman, acting upon the un-controverted testimony of
Workman, who was found deposing falsely qua his gainful
employment during his cross-examination and his gainful
employment has been proved by Management no. 2 by examining
M2W2 and M2W3. He has thus prayed for dismissal of present
claim of Workman while relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in Moreshar Yadaorao Mahajan Vs.
Vyankatesh Sitaram Bhedi (D) through LRs & Ors. 2022 SCC
Online 1307.
42. I have heard the submissions made on behalf of the parties
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and have carefully perused the material available on record in the
light of judgments relied upon by the parties.
43. Before dealing with the issues, settled by Ld. Predecessor of
this Court vide order dated 11.02.2019, I would like to deal with
the legal issue, qua maintainability of present claim U/s 10(4A) of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (as applicable in Delhi) without
compliance with the provisions of Section 2A(2) of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, sought to be raised by Management no. 2, not
only, in its written statement, but also, during the Course of final
arguments, though, no formal issue to the aforesaid effect has been
settled vide order dated 11.02.2019.
44. It is sought to be submitted by Ld. AR for Management no. 2
that the provisions of Section 2(A) of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 shall have the overriding effect over the provisions of Section
10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (as applicable in Delhi)
and hence, in view of omission on the part of Claimant in
approaching the Conciliation Officer before filing of the present
claim before this Court, the present claim file by him before this
Court shall not be maintainable and consequentially this Court
shall have no jurisdiction to entertain the present claim.
45. I do not find any force in the aforesaid submission made on
behalf of Management no. 2. The issue qua maintainability of
claim under Section 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as
introduced in Delhi vide Industrial Disputes (Delhi Amendment)
Act, 2003, without following the procedure contemplated under
Section 2A(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, even after Central
Amendment Act of 2010, is no longer res-integra in view of
authoritative pronouncement of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in
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Rajendra Singh Vs. SBI’s case (Supra).
46. In the aforesaid judgment, it was categorically held by
Hon’ble Delhi High Court that there is no repugnancy in
provisions of Section 10(4A) and Section 2A of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, in as much as, Section 10(4A) of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (as applicable in Delhi) and Section 2A of the
aforesaid Act provide two different remedies to a Workman, who
stands discharged/ dismissed/retrenched, for redressal of his
grievance and there is no need for a Workman, before invoking the
provisions of Section 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to
first approach the Conciliation Officer as per the provisions of
Section 2(A)(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
47. It is further held in the aforesaid judgment that even if, it is
assumed for the sake of arguments that there is any repugnancy
between the aforesaid two provisions, by virtue of operation of
proviso of Article 239AA(3)(c), Section 10(4A) of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 being a law made by legislative assembly of
Govt. of NCT of Delhi, which was reserved for consideration of
the President, having received his assent on 13.07.2003 and stands
enacted thereafter, would prevail over the Central Legislation.
Relevant observations of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in this regard
are being reproduced herein below for ready reference:
“28. We also note that, so far as Section 10(4A) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Section 2A of the
enactment are concerned, they provide two different
remedies to a workman who stands
discharged/dismissed/retrenched for redressal of his
grievance. Section 10(4A) enables a workman to directly
approach the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal
within a period of one year from the communication of
the order of discharge/dismissal/retrenchment without
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taking recourse to the procedure prescribed under Section
10. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 2A, a
dispute/difference between a workman and his employer
connected with or arising out of discharge dismissal
retrenchment or termination of service is deemed to be an
industrial dispute. Furthermore, the workman is enabled
to approach the Conciliation Officer within a period of
three months from the occurrence and after expiry of
three months from the date of so approaching him, the
workman can make a further application directly to the
Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute.
That is to say, under Section 2A, the second option
available to the workman does not have to await the
references by the Conciliation Officer.
29. In view of the above discussion, we are unable to
agree with the observations in the impugned order that
there was a repugnancy between the two statutory
provisions.
30. Even if it could be held that there was a repugnancy
between them, by virtue of the operation of the proviso to
Article 239AA(3)(c), Section 10(4A) being a law made
by the Legislative Assembly of the Government of NCT
of Delhi which was reserved for consideration of the
President and having received his assent on 13th July,
2003 and stands enacted thereafter, would prevail over
the central legislation.”
48. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of
Hon’ble Delhi High Court, in my considered opinion, there was
no requirement for the Workman, in the present case, to first
approach the Conciliation Officer, as per the provisions of Section
2A(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before filing of present
claim under Section 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (as
applicable in Delhi) directly before this Court. This Court, thus,
has the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate the present claim of
Workman on merits, even, without compliance by the Workman of
the provisions of Section 2A (2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
49. Now, I shall proceed to decide the issues settled by Ld.
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Predecessor of this Court vide order dated 11.02.2019.
Issue no. (i): Whether there existed ’employee and
employer’ relationship between the claimant and the
Management no. 1? OPW
50. Onus to prove the aforesaid issue was upon Workman. As
has already been observed herein above, Workman has alleged
himself to be in direct employment of Management no. 1, at the
post of driver, since the year 2006. He has also taken a plea that in
order to avoid its legal liabilities, Management no. 1 had shown
his name as an employee of different contractors from time to time
and lastly of Management no. 2, despite the fact that there was no
valid contract between the two managements for providing of
alleged transportation services by Management no. 2 to
Management no. 1. Even if, according to him, there was any such
contract between two Managements, the same was sham and
bogus. It has further been alleged by him that he had all along been
working with Management no. 1 at the post of driver.
51. Workman has however failed to produce any documentary or
oral evidence in support of his aforesaid pleadings otherwise than
by way of his bald and self-serving statements to the aforesaid
effect. The sole document produced by him in support of his plea
qua his being in direct employment of Management no. 1 is an
authorization card, purportedly issued in his name, by the
Transport Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi under the provisions
of Rule 7A of Delhi Motor Vehicles Rules, 1993. Relying upon the
aforesaid document, it was submitted by his AR that the said
document, as per Rule 7A of Delhi Motor Vehicles Rules, 1993,
was issued by the Transport Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
on the basis of a list of drivers engaged by Management no. 1,
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which was submitted by Management no. 1, being the permit
holder in respect of school bus driven by Workman, with the
Transport Department and hence, the said document is sufficient
proof of his direct employment with Management no. 1.
52. I do not find any force in the aforesaid submissions made on
behalf of Workman that the aforesaid document is sufficient to
prove the Workman to be in direct employment of Management
no. 1. A bare perusal of Rule 7A of Delhi Motors Vehicles Rules
1993 shows that the aforesaid Rule merely requires the holder of
a permit to furnish, within a period of 10 days from the date of
receipt of permit, a list of drivers engaged by him to drive the
aforesaid vehicle, together with their photographs and other
particulars, so that, an authorization card permitting the drivers as
per the aforesaid list may be issued by the State Transport
Authority to the permit holder.
53. A bare perusal of aforesaid Rule further shows that it
prohibits plying of transport vehicles without proper authorization
card containing the name, photographs and such other particulars
of the drivers as may be directed by the Transport Commissioner,
and makes it mandatory that the said authorization card be
displayed at some conspicuous place in the vehicle. The aforesaid
provision, in my considered opinion, was incorporated in Delhi
Motor Vehicles Rules 1993 for easy identification of drivers of the
vehicles which might involve in any accident. Mere issuance of
authorization card in the name of Workman, in respect of a
transport vehicle owned by Management no. 1, in my considered
opinion, is not sufficient to prove the Workman to be an employee
of Management no. 1, in as much as, the aforesaid provision does
not prohibit engagement of a driver, by the permit holder, through
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a Contractor.
54. Even otherwise, Workman has failed to prove the issuance of
alleged authorization card, by the Transport Department, in his
name at the instance of Management no. 1 by leading any cogent
evidence, in as much as, neither the original of the aforesaid
authorization card was produced by Workman during his evidence,
nor, the record qua issuance thereof was summoned by him from
the Transport Department.
55. It is next sought to be submitted by Ld. AR for Workman that
since, neither, the Management no. 1 was holding any registration
certificate under the provisions of Section 7 of Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, nor, Management no. 2 was
holding a valid license issued under the provisions of Section 12
of the aforesaid Act, Workman should be deemed to be in direct
employment of Management no. 1, while, holding the alleged
contract between Managements no. 1 and 2 to be sham and bogus.
In support of his aforesaid submission, Ld. AR for Workman has
relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Telangana High Court in
Power Grid Corporation of India Vs. A.B. Singh and Anr
(Supra).
56. I do not find any force in the aforesaid submission made on
behalf of Workman. Issue, qua the consequences of non-
compliance of the provisions of Section 7 and 12 of Contract
Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, is no longer res-
integra in view of authoritative pronouncement of Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in Dena Nath v. National Fertilisers Ltd.,
(1992) 1 SCC 695, wherein, it was categorically held by Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India that mere absence of registration
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certificate U/s 7 and the license under the provisions of Section 12
of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 shall not
have the effect of treating the employees of the contractors as the
employees of principal employer, in as much as, consequences of
non-compliance with the aforesaid provisions are provided under
Sections 23 and 25 of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970. Relevant observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in Dena Nath v. National Fertilisers Ltd., (1992) 1 SCC 695
case are being reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:
“5. This appeal arises from the decision of a Division
Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated
February 27, 1991 passed in Writ Petition No. 8872 of
1989. The Division Bench while deciding a batch of writ
petitions followed its earlier decision in the case of Gian
Singh v. Senior Regional Manager, Food Corporation of
India [(1991) 1 Punj LR 1] (Letters Patent Appeal No.
1215 of 1990). The Division Bench in the aforesaid case
of Gian Singh held that if the principal employer does
not get registration as required under Section 7 of the
Act and/or the contractor does not get the licence under
Section 12 of the Act for the persons who are appointed
by the principal employer through the contractor, the
only consequence is the penal provisions contained in
Sections 23 and 24 of the Act and that the principal
employer or contractor can be prosecuted under those
sections, but the Act nowhere provides that such
employees employed through the contractor would
become the employee of the principal employer.
6. In the High Court judgment, under appeal, reliance
was placed on behalf of the workmen on the views of
the High Courts of Karnataka, Madras, Gujarat and
Bombay in the cases reported as F.C.I. Loading and
Unloading Workers Union v. Food Corporation of India
[(1986) 2 SLR 454 : (1985) 50 FLR 50 (Kant)] ,
Workmen v. Best & Crompton Engineering Ltd., Madras
[(1985) 1 LLJ 492 (Mad)] , Food Corporation of India
Workers’ Union v. Food Corporation of India [(1990) 61
FLR 253 (Guj)] and United Labour Union v. Union of
India [(1990) 60 FLR 686 (Bom)] , but the High Court
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took the view that they were not applicable.
XXXX
12. From the above provisions it is clear that the Act
serves twofold purposes: (1) regulation of the conditions
of service of the workers employed by the contractor
who is engaged by a principal employer and; (2) also
provides for the appropriate government abolishing
contract labour altogether, in certain notified processes,
operation or other works in any establishment. Neither
the Act nor the Rules framed by the Central Government
or by any appropriate government provide that upon
abolition of contract labour, the said labour would be
directly absorbed by the principal employer.
13. The question arises when the Act does not provide
for such a measure, but contents itself by merely
regulating the conditions of service of the contract
labour, can the Court in proceedings under Article 226
of the Constitution, where the principal employer or the
licence contractor violates the provisions of Section 9
(sic 7) or 12 respectively, direct that the contract labour
so employed would become directly the employee of the
principal employer.
XXXX
16. The decision of the Madras High Court in Workmen
v. Best & Crompton Engineering Ltd., Madras [(1985)
1 LLJ 492 (Mad)] really arose out of an award given by
the Labour Court in an industrial dispute. The industrial
dispute had been raised by the workmen of the principal
employer. They challenged the termination of service of
workmen by the management as the management did
not requisition the service of 75 workmen after October
16, 1978 on the ground that they were employed by the
licensed contractor. This led to an industrial dispute and
on a reference made of the said industrial dispute, the
Labour Court rejected the contention of the management
and held that the so-called contractor was a mere name-
lender and did not hold licence under the Act and
directed the reinstatement of the workmen with back
wages and other benefits. This award of the Labour
Court was challenged before the High Court by the
management by a writ petition. The learned Single
Judge of the Madras High Court took the view that the
conclusion of the Labour Court that the labour
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contractor was not really a labour contractor, but he was
merely acting as a tool in the hands of the management
is not supported either by the pleadings of the parties or
by the evidence. According to the learned Single Judge
there was absolutely nothing to displace the weighty
documentary evidence in favour of the management and
therefore, he characterised the finding entered by the
Labour Court to the contrary as being perverse and
vitiated. The Division Bench in letters patent appeal
reversed this finding of the learned Single Judge.
17. The High Court observed at page 497:
“In order to enable the Management to have the
benefit of the contract labour, the Act has now
legalised the employment of such contract labour,
provided the intermediary contractor holds a valid
licence and provided the Management also holds a
valid licence as principal employer. This is subject
to the prohibition contemplated under Section 10.
There is no need for us to examine the content of
Section 10 in this case. In order to regulate the
employment of contract labour and to provide for
abolition in certain circumstances, the said Act
came to be passed. According to Section 7:
‘(1) Every principal employer of an
establishment to which this Act applies shall,
within such period as the appropriate
Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, fix in this behalf with respect
to establishments generally or with respect to
any class of them, make an application to the
registering officer in the prescribed manner
for registration of the establishment:
Provided that the registering officer may
entertain any such application for registration
after expiry of the period fixed in this behalf,
if the registering officer is satisfied that the
applicant was prevented by sufficient cause
from making the application in time.
(2) If the application for registration is
complete in all respects, the registering officer
shall register the establishment and issue to
the principal employer of the establishment a
certificate of registration containing such
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particulars as may be prescribed.’
Under Section 12 of the Act, no contractor to whom this
Act applies, shall undertake or execute any work
through contract labour except under and in accordance
with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing
officer. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 provides:
‘Subject to the provisions of this Act, a
licence under sub-section (1) may contain
such conditions including in particular
conditions as to hours of work, fixation of
wages and other essential amenities in respect
of contract labour as the appropriate
Government may deem fit to impose in
accordance with the rules, if any, made under
Section 35 and shall be issued on payment of
such fees and on the deposit of such sum, if
any, as security for the due performance of the
conditions as may be prescribed.’
The combined effect of these two provisions in our view
makes it clear that for a valid employment of contract
labour, two conditions should be satisfied, viz., not only
the principal employer but also the contractor should
possess the requisite licence. In other words, the holding
of licence by one alone will not enable the management
to treat the workmen as contract labour.”
18. The High Court of Kerala in the case of P.
Karunakaran v. Chief Commercial Superintendent
[1988 Lab IC 1346 : (1988) 72 FJR 248 : (1988) 1 Ker
LJ 570] took the same view as was taken by the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in the judgment under appeal.
A similar view was expressed by the Delhi High Court
in the case of New Delhi General Mazdoor Union v.
Standing Conference of Public Enterprises (SCOPE)
[(1991) 2 Delhi Lawyer 189].
XXXX
22. It is not for the High Court to inquire into the
question and decide whether the employment of contract
labour in any process, operation or in any other work in
any establishment should be abolished or not. It is a
matter for the decision of the government after
considering the matter, as required to be considered
under Section 10 of the Act. The only consequences
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provided in the Act where either the principal employer
or the labour contractor violates the provision of
Sections 9 (sic 7) and 12 respectively is the penal
provision, as envisaged under the Act for which
reference may be made to Sections 23 and 25 of the
Act. We are thus of the firm view that in proceedings
under Article 226 of the Constitution merely because
contractor or the employer had violated any provision
of the Act or the rules, the Court could not issue any
mandamus for deeming the contract labour as having
become the employees of the principal employer. We
would not like to express any view on the decision of
the Karnataka High Court or of the Gujarat High Court
(supra) since these decisions are under challenge in this
Court, but we would place on record that we do not
agree with the aforequoted observations of the Madras
High Court about the effect of non-registration of the
principal employer or the non-licensing of the labour
contractor nor with the view of Bombay High Court in
the aforesaid case. We are of the view that the decisions
of the Kerala High Court and Delhi High Court are
correct and we approve the same.”(empshasis mine)
57. The aforesaid observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in Dena Nath‘s case (Supra) were quoted with approval by
Hon’ble Constitution bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
SAIL v. National Union Waterfront Workers, (2001) 7 SCC 1 in
the following manner:
“96. In Dena Nath case [(1992) 1 SCC 695: 1992 SCC
(L&S) 349] a two-Judge Bench of this Court considered
the question, whether as a consequence of non-
compliance with Sections 7 and 12 of the CLRA Act by
the principal employer and the licensee respectively, the
contract labour employed by the principal employer
would become the employees of the principal employer.
Having noticed the observation of the three-Judge
Bench of this Court in Standard Vacuum case [AIR 1960
SC 948 : (1960) 3 SCR 466] and having pointed out that
the guidelines enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section
10 of the Act are practically based on the guidelines
given by the Tribunal in the said case, it was held that
the only consequence was the penal provisions under
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Sections 23 and 25 as envisaged under the CLRA Act
and that merely because the contractor or the employer
had violated any provision of the Act or the Rules, the
High Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution could not issue any mandamus for deeming
the contract labour as having become the employees of
the principal employer. This Court thus resolved the
conflict of opinions on the said question among various
High Courts. It was further held that neither the Act nor
the Rules framed by the Central Government or by any
appropriate Government provided that upon abolition of
the contract labour, the labourers would be directly
absorbed by the principal employer.” (emphasis mine)
58. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements, in my
considered opinion, reliance by Ld. AR for workman on the
judgment of Hon’ble Telangana High Court in Power Grid
Corporation‘s Case (Supra) is highly misplaced.
59. While relying upon the Judgment of Hon’ble Delhi High
Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd Vs. Petroleum Workers’
Union (Supra), it is next sought to be contended by Ld. AR for
Workman that the alleged contract, if any, between the
Managements, for providing of transportation services, by
Management no. 2, at the school of Management no. 1, should be
held to be sham and bogus, in view of the fact that the Workman
was doing the perennial job of driver at the school of Management
no. 1 since the year 2006 despite frequent change of contractors.
60. I do not find any force in the aforesaid submission made on
behalf of Workman, in as much as, the fact, that the Workman
continued to work with Management no. 1 i.e. the principal
employer for over a period of 10 years despite frequent change of
contractors, is merely one of the relevant factors to determine
whether the contract between the principal employer and
contractor is sham and bogus or not, however, the aforesaid fact,
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by itself, is not sufficient to arrive at conclusion that the contract
between the two Managements is sham and bogus or to hold the
Workman to be in direct employment of Management no. 1 school.
61. It is further significant to note in this regard that the facts of
the case, before Hon’ble Delhi High Court, were altogether
different from the facts of the present case. In the case before
Hon’ble Delhi High Court, not only, the Workmen had been
continuously working with the principal employer despite change
of contractors after every two years, but, during continuation of
their employment, even the employment of contract labour stood
prohibited in the industry, wherein, Workmen were employed. In
fact, various factors, to be considered by the Court in determining
the existence of employer-employee relationship between the
parties, have been pointed out by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
in Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Vs. Mahendra Prasad
Jakhmola and Ors. (Supra). Some of the relevant factors, pointed
out in the aforesaid judgment, for determination of the aforesaid
question are as follows:
(i) Who appoints the Workman.
(ii) Who pays their salary/ remuneration
(iii) who has the authority to dismiss
(iv) Who can take disciplinary action
(v) Whether there is continuity of service
(vi) Existence of control and supervision i.e. whether
there existed control and supervision.
62. Qua the last of the aforesaid factors, it was noted by Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in the aforesaid judgment that principal
employer cannot be said to control and supervise the work of the
employee, merely because, he directs the Workman of the
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contractor ‘What to do’, after the Contractor assigns/allots the
employee to the principal employer, in as much as, the said control
shall be considered to be secondary control exercised by the
principal employer. Relevant observations of Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India, in the aforesaid judgment, are reproduced herein
under for ready reference:
“23. From this judgment in Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills
case [Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills v. Bharat Lal, (2011)
1 SCC 635: (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 16], it is clear that Test
No. 1 is not met on the facts of this case as the contractor
pays the workmen their wages. Secondly, the principal
employer cannot be said to control and supervise the
work of the employee merely because he directs the
workmen of the contractor “what to do” after the
contractor assigns/allots the employee to the principal
employer. This is precisely what para 12 of Bengal
Nagpur Cotton Mills case [Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills
v. Bharat Lal, (2011) 1 SCC 635 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S)
16] explains as being supervision and control of the
principal employer that is secondary in nature, as such
control is exercised only after such workman has been
assigned to the principal employer to do a particular
work.
24. We may hasten to add that this view of the law has
been reiterated in Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India Ltd.
[Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 407:
(2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 804], as follows: (SCC pp. 437-38,
para 65)
“65. Thus, it can be concluded that the relevant
factors to be taken into consideration to establish
an employer-employee relationship would include,
inter alia:
(i) who appoints the workers;
(ii) who pays the salary/remuneration;
(iii) who has the authority to dismiss;
(iv) who can take disciplinary action;
(v) whether there is continuity of service; and
(vi) extent of control and supervision i.e. whether
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there exists complete control and supervision.
As regards extent of control and supervision, we have
already taken note of the observations in Bengal Nagpur
Cotton Mills case [Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills v.
Bharat Lal, (2011) 1 SCC 635 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S)
16] , International Airport Authority of India case
[International Airport Authority of India v.
International Air Cargo Workers’ Union, (2009) 13 SCC
374 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 257] and Nalco case
[NALCO Ltd. v. Ananta Kishore Rout, (2014) 6 SCC 756
: (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 353] .”
63. In the case in hand, admittedly, Workman was lastly not only
receiving his wages from Management no. 2, but, even the ESI and
EPF benefits to Workman were also being provided by
Management no. 2. Prior to execution of contract between
Management no. 1 and 2, admittedly, Workman used to receive his
salary as well as other benefits from other contractors and not from
Management no. 1. Even the sum of Rs. 1,10,639/-, towards full
and final settlement of his dues, was also received by Workman
from Management no. 2 and had never returned the same before
filing of the present claim, while, impleading both the
Managements.
64. No doubt, Workman in his evidence by way of affidavit has
categorically alleged that he had all along been working under
direct control and supervision of Management no. 1, however,
according to him, the said control and supervision was being
exercised by Management no. 1 only in matters of timing of Work,
driver’s uniform, route for traveling and sanctioned/non-
sanctioned holidays etc. It is not even his case that the power to
take disciplinary action as well as to dismiss the Workman from
his services had either been vested in Management no. 1 or that
the same had ever been exercised by Management no. 1. Rather,
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as per his own averments made in the statement of claim, the
advance notice dated 18.05.2018, qua termination of his services,
was in fact issued by Management no. 2 and not by Management
no. 1. The nature of control and supervision allegedly exercised by
Management no. 2, even as per the case of Workman, was thus in
the nature of secondary control and supervision, as observed by
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola’s
case supra, and the same is not sufficient to make the Workman a
direct employee of Management no. 1.
65. Under the aforesaid circumstances, this Court finds itself
unable to record any finding in favour of Workman, qua existence
of employer-employee relationship between the Workman and
Management no. 1, merely, on the basis of bald and self-serving
statements of Workman to the effect that he was appointed by
Management no. 1 and had all along been working under direct
control and supervision of Management no. 1. In fact, not even an
iota of evidence, was led by him in the present case, to corroborate
his aforesaid plea.
66. So far as the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
Bhilwara Dugadh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd. case supra,
relied upon by Ld. AR for Workman, is concerned, in my humble
opinion, even the aforesaid judgment is distinguishable on facts,
in as much as, in the aforesaid case before Hon’ble Supreme Court
of India, Workman were being paid their wages at the rate, which,
was more than the wages paid to the employees of the contractors
and it was under the aforesaid circumstances that the Labour Court
had come to a conclusion that Workmen therein were the
employees of principal employer and the aforesaid finding of the
Labour Court was upheld by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.
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67. In the case in hand, it has already been observed herein above,
that admittedly the salary as well as other statutory benefits to the
Workman were being provided by Management no. 2 and there is
not even iota of evidence led on behalf of Workman to prove that
it was Management no. 1 who had the power to appoint, take
disciplinary action and/or to dismiss the Workman. As has already
been observed herein above, the alleged termination notice in the
present case had been issued by Management no. 2 and not by
Management no. 1, which, indicates that Management no. 1 had
no authority to dismiss the Workman from his services.
68. So far as the issue of exercise of direct control and
supervision over the Workman is concerned, it has already been
observed herein above that Workman had failed to prove that
Management no. 1 used to exercise direct supervision and control
over the services of Workman and the said control, if any, was
merely secondary.
69. In view of the aforesaid discussion, issue no. (i) is hereby
decided against Workman.
Issue no. (ii): Whether the services of the claimant were
terminated illegally or unjustifiably by the
Managements? OPW
70. Onus to prove the aforesaid issue was also upon Workman.
Though, in his statement of claim, Workman has sought to
challenge the termination/ retrenchment notice dated 18.05.2018,
which, was admittedly issued by Management no. 2, however, he
has prayed for his reinstatement with Management no. 1, while,
alleging himself to be an employee of Management no. 1 and not
of Management no. 2. He has alleged that the aforesaid
retrenchment notice was issued by the Managements in collusion
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with each other.
71. It has already been concluded herein above that the Workman
has failed to prove existence of any employer-employee
relationship between him and Management no. 1 and hence, there
was no occasion for Management no. 1 to terminate the services
of Workman, in collusion with Management no. 2, much less,
illegally or unjustifiably. Considering the nature of claim of
Workman, wherein, he has claimed himself to be in direct
employment of Management no. 1 and has prayed for all the reliefs
only against Management no. 1, however, has failed to prove
himself to be in employment of Management no. 1, issue, qua
legality of termination notice dated 18.05.2018, admittedly, issued
by Management no. 2, does not arise for consideration of this
Court, in as much as, even if, the aforesaid termination order is
held to be illegal, on account of violation of provisions of Section
25F and 25G of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Workman shall
not be entitled to any relief against Management no. 1.
72. In fact, Workman has failed to prove that through the
aforesaid termination notice dated 18.05.2018, his services were
terminated by Management no. 1 and not by Management no. 2,
in as much as, in the absence of any employer-employee
relationship between Workman and Management no. 1, there was
no occasion for Management no. 1 to terminate the services of
Workman vide retrenchment notice dated 18.05.2018.
73. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in my considered opinion,
there is no need to deal with the submissions of Ld. AR of
Workman qua illegality of termination notice dated 18.05.2018 on
account of the same being in alleged violation of provisions of
LID 334/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 26.05.2026 Page 33 of 34
Section 25F and 25G of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
74. Issue no. (ii) is thus decided against the Workman.
Issue no. (iii): Relief.
75. In view of my findings on issues no. (i) and (ii) herein above,
Workman is not entitled to any relief.
76. Present claim of Workman, filed under the provisions of
Section 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is thus hereby
dismissed against both the Managements.
77. Ordered accordingly.
78. Requisite number of copies of this award be sent to the
competent authority for publication as per rules.
Announced in the open Court on this 26th day of May, 2026.
This award consists of 34 number of signed pages. ARUN Digitally signed
by ARUN
KUMAR GARG
KUMAR Date:
2026.05.26
GARG 14:34:47 +0530
(ARUN KUMAR GARG)
Presiding Officer Labour Court-III
Rouse Avenue Court, New Delhi
LID 334/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 26.05.2026 Page 34 of 34
