Delhi District Court
Mukesh Kumar vs Ryan International School And Ors on 25 May, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. ARUN KUMAR GARG
PRESIDING OFFICER : LABOUR COURT-III
ROUSE AVENUE COURTS COMPLEX : NEW DELHI.
CNR No. DLCT13-002793-2018
LID No. 330/2018
Sh. Mukesh Kumar S/o Sh. Niwas
Mobile No. 9310341074
R/o H. No. 160, Auchandi, Delhi-110039
Through his AR Sh. Aditya Aggarwal,
Mobile No. 9891789459 ..... Workman
VERSUS
1.
Ryan International School,
Through its Principal
Education Society, A-9, Sector-25,
Rohini, Delhi-110085.
Through its AR Sh. Gaurav Bajaj,
Mobile No. 9810037684
Email ID: [email protected].
2. Jagidsh Tours and Travels
Through its Proprietor
Regd. Office:-
B-1/568, 3rd Floor, Janakpuri,
New Delhi-110058.
Through its AR Sh. Rajeev Gupta
Mobile No. 9818671765
Email ID: [email protected] ….. ManagementsDate of Institution of the case : 27.07.2018
Date on which Award is passed : 25.05.2026AWARD
1. By this award, I will dispose off the present claim of
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 1 of 35
Workman U/s 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as
introduced vide Industrial Disputes (Delhi Amendment) Act
2003.
2. Brief case of the Workman, as per his statement of claim, is
that on 01.03.2008, Management no. 1 had engaged him on the
post of driver, after taking his trial test by making him drive a bus
and that since the date of his engagement by Management no. 1,
he was working under direct control and supervision of
Management no. 1 in respect of timing of his work, uniform,
travel route and sanction/ non sanction of holidays. However, in
order to save its legal liability, Management no. 1 had shown him
as an employee of contractors despite the fact that the said
contractors had no control whatsoever over the services of
Workman.
3. In fact, according to him, Management no. 1, being a holder
of permit in respect of transport, has submitted a list of drivers,
including the present Workman, engaged by Management no. 1,
whereupon, an authorization card in the name of Workman was
issued by Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi under the
provisions of Rule 7A of Delhi Motor Vehicle Rules, 1993. In
order to deprive the Workman of statutory benefits, it is alleged
by him, Management no. 1 had not only shown him as an
employee of contractor(s), but, it has also been changing the
contractors from time to time.
4. It is further the case of Workman that Management no. 1
had engaged M/s Group 4, M/s Spark All Security & Allied
Services Pvt. Ltd., M/s Ravi Security and M/s Jagdish Tours and
Travels as contractors for the period 2005 to 2007, 2007 to 2011,
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 2 of 35
2011 to 2013 and from 2013 till date respectively and while two
of the contractors namely M/s Group 4 and M/s Ravi Security
used to pay salary of Workman in cash, remaining two
contractors used to deposit the salary of Workman in his bank
account.
5. The salary of Workman, according to him, was being paid
by Management no. 2 in collusion with Management no. 1, in as
much as, it was only a camouflage to show the Workman as an
employee of contractor and not that of Management no. 1 despite
the fact that he actually worked for Management no. 1 since the
date of his engagement. The aforesaid act of Management no. 1,
in showing the name of Workman as an employee of
contractor(s), according to him, amounts to an unfair labour
practice, in as much as, Management no. 1 has also employed
some persons at the post of driver, who were doing the same and
identical work of perennial nature, which was being done by the
Workman.
6. It has further been alleged in the statement of claim that
Workman had worked for more than 10 years serving
Management no. 1 to the entire satisfaction of supervisory and
managerial staff of Management no. 1, however, in order to
employ fresh hands on minimal wages, Managements have
joined hands in terminating/retrenching the services of Workman
and had issued advance termination/ retrenchment notice dated
18.05.2018 on the basis of absolutely vague and false ground that
for the year 2018-2019, there was shortage of students in the
buses of Management no. 1 school and accordingly, school had
decided to cut short some routes due to which the services of
Workman were no more required.
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 3 of 35
7. By serving the aforesaid notice dated 18.05.2018, according
to Workman, Management no. 2, in connivance and collusion
with Management no. 1, has attempted to violate the provisions
of Section 25F, G and H of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is
further alleged by him that though he is entitled to be regularized
into the services of Management no. 1 since the date of his
engagement and reserving his right to file an appropriate case in
this regard, however, under the aforesaid circumstances, in order
to save himself from illegal termination, he had earlier
approached Ld. Labour Court by filing LID no. 270/2018, which
was disposed of vide order dated 06.07.2018 as withdrawn with a
liberty to file a fresh claim.
8. Subsequently, according to him, he has served a demand
notice upon Management no. 1, while, sending a copy thereof to
Management no. 2, with a bonafide demand for recall of
termination/ retrenchment notice dated 18.05.2018 and seeking
his reinstatement with full back wages alongwith interest and
other consequential benefits, however, Managements have turned
down his aforesaid demands. Workman has thus filed the present
claim seeking a declaration qua termination/ retrenchment notice
dated 18.05.2018 being illegal, arbitrary and against the cannons
of law. He has also prayed for a declaration in his favour as an
employee of Management no. 1 besides a direction to
Management no. 1 to reinstate him into the job with effect from
the date of illegal termination of his services i.e. 18.06.2018 with
full back wages and other consequential benefits.
9. Both the Managements have appeared in response to notice
of statement of claim and filed their separate written statements
to the claim of Workman on 16.01.2019.
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 4 of 35
10. In its written statement, Management no. 1 has categorically
denied the existence of any employer-employee relationship
between the claimant and Management no. 1, while, alleging that
it was Management no. 2, who used to provide transport services
to Management no. 1 with its own labour force, which used to
work under direct control and supervision of Management. no. 2.
It has further been alleged in the written statement of
Management no. 1 that the claimant might have worked with
Management no. 2, however, he had no concern whatsoever with
Management no. 1. Management no. 1 has thus prayed for
dismissal of claim of Workman against Management no. 1 with
heavy cost, while, denying the receipt of legal notice dated
11.07.2018.
11. On the other hand Management no. 2, in its written
statement has objected to the maintainability of the present claim
under the provisions of Section 10(4A) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, as introduced vide Industrial Disputes (Delhi
Amendment) Act, 2003, while, alleging that the present claim
should have been filed by the Workman under the provisions of
Section 2A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which have been
given an over riding effect over the provisions of Section 10 of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
12. It has further been alleged in the written statement of
Management no. 2 that filing of the present claim directly before
this Court without first approaching the Conciliation Officer as
per the provisions of Section 2A(2) of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 renders the present claim of Workman liable to be
dismissed. In the absence of compliance of mandatory provision,
requiring the Workman to approach the Conciliation Officer prior
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 5 of 35
to filing of the present claim, according to Management no. 2,
this Court has no jurisdiction to try and adjudicate the present
claim of Workman.
13. On merits, it has been alleged by Management no. 2 that the
Workman had been in employment of Management no. 2 as a
driver since 01.07.2013 until the date of his separation from the
service and during the course of his aforesaid employment, he
had remained under direct control and supervision of
Management no. 2. Present claim of Workman against
Management no. 2, it is alleged, is not maintainable, since, the
Workman has already received a sum of Rs. 1,10,639/-, which
includes his earned wages, payment in lieu of one month’s
notice, service compensation, bonus for the financial year 2018-
2019 and gratuity etc., towards full and final settlement of his
dues, by way of direct transfer in his bank account. The
Workman, according to Management no. 2, was duly apprised of
the aforesaid fact by Management no. 2 vide letter dated
01.06.2018.
14. Having accepted the payment of his full and final dues
without any objection, according to Management no. 2, Workman
cannot be allowed to challenge his termination vide termination
notice dated 18.05.2018, in as much as, services of Workman
were lawfully terminated by Management no. 2 due to reduction
in the number of students in the school of Management no. 1
situated in Rohini, Delhi in the academic year 2018-2019 and
consequent reduction in routes of buses to be plied by
Management no. 2 for transportation of students.
15. Management no. 2 has thus prayed for dismissal of present
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 6 of 35
claim of Workman, qua Management no. 2, with exemplary cost,
while, denying the receipt of legal notice dated 11.07.2018 and
claiming the Management no. 2 be an unnecessary party in view
of averments made by Workman in his statement of claim.
16. No rejoinder to the aforesaid written statements of
Managements were filed by Workman despite opportunity and
hence, on the basis of pleadings of parties, following issues were
settled by Ld. Predecessor of this Court vide order dated
11.02.2019:-
(i) Whether there existed ’employee and employer’
relationship between the claimant and the Management
no. 1? OPW
(ii) Whether the services of the claimant were
terminated illegally or unjustifiably by the
Managements? OPW
(iii) Relief.
17. Workman has thereafter examined himself as WW-1 i.e. as
the sole witness in support of his case and tendered his evidence
by way of affidavit Ex.WW1/A along with following documents:
(i) Ex. WW1/1: Copy of aadhar card of Workman.
(ii) Ex. WW1/2: Copy of authorization card for the
driver issued in the name of Workman by the transport
department.
(iii) Ex. WW1/3: Original Passbook of bank account of
Workman with M/s Andhra Bank.
(iv) Ex. WW1/4: Copy of termination/ retrenchment
notice dated 18.05.2018.
(v) Mark-A: Copy of order dated 06.07.2018 in LID
no. 270/2018.
(vi) Ex. WW1/6: Copy of legal demand notice dated
11.07.2018.
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 7 of 35
18. WW-1 was duly cross-examined by Ld. ARs for both
Managements. During his cross-examination by Ld. AR for
Management no. 2, Workman was confronted with the
termination notice dated 18.05.2018 Mark WW1/M2A and letter
dated 01.06.2018 of Management no. 2 addressed to Workman
which is Mark WW1/M2B. No other witness was examined on
behalf of Workman despite opportunity and hence, on a statement
of Workman, Workman’s evidence was closed vide order dated
04.07.2023.
19. Management no. 1 has however chosen not to lead any
evidence in its defence and hence, on the submission of Ld. AR
for Management no. 1, evidence of Management no. 1 was
closed vide order dated 25.02.2026.
20. Management no. 2, on the other hand, has examined Sh.
Vimal Wahi, Proprietor of Management no. 2 as M2W1 i.e. as the
sole witness in support of its case and has tendered his evidence
by way of affidavit Ex.M2W1/A along with copy of transport
contract between Managements no. 1 and 2 Mark MW-1/1, copy
of termination notice dated 18.05.2018 Ex. MW-1/3 and copy of
letter dated 01.06.2018 qua full and final dues of Workman Ex.
MW-1/4.
21. M2W1 was duly cross-examined by Ld. AR of Workman
and was confronted with contract between Managements no. 1
and 2 Ex. M2W1/2. No other witness was examined on behalf of
Management no. 2 despite opportunity and hence, on the
submission of Proprietor of Management no. 2, evidence on
behalf of Management no. 2 was closed.
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 8 of 35
22. Final arguments were thereafter heard on behalf of both the
parties.
23. It is submitted by Ld. AR of Workman that from the
material available on record, Workman has been able to prove
himself to be in employment of Management no. 1, at the post of
driver, since 01.03.2008 until the date of illegal termination of his
services vide retrenchment notice dated 18.05.2018 issued by
Management no. 2. As a proof of existence of employer-
employee relationship between the Workman and Management
no. 1, Ld. AR for Workman has relied upon the authorization
card Ex.WW1/2, purportedly issued by the Transport Department
of Govt. of NCT of Delhi under the provisions of Rule 7 of Delhi
Motor Vehicles Rules, 1993, after Management no. 1, being a
permit holder in respect of school buses, had allegedly shared a
list of drivers, engaged by Management no. 1, with the Transport
Department. Besides, according to him, Workman has been able
to prove, through his un-controverted testimony, that he had all
along been working under direct supervision and control of
Management no. 1.
24. He submits that Management no. 2 has categorically
admitted the Workman to be in its continuous employment at
least since 01.07.2013 until the date of termination of his
services. Though, According to him, Management no. 2 has
alleged the Workman to be in its employment, having no
relationship whatsoever with Management no. 1, however, the
alleged contract between Management no. 1 and 2, for alleged
providing of transportation services at the school of Management
no. 1, is sham and bogus and is a camouflage merely to deprive
the Workman of his statutory benefits. Testimony of Workman,
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 9 of 35
qua he being in direct employment of Management no. 1 and the
contract between Management no. 1 and 2 being sham and
bogus, according to him, has remained un-controverted during
his cross-examination.
25. The contract between Managements no. 1 and 2, according
to Ld. AR for Workman, can very well be presumed to be sham
and bogus solely in view of the fact that admittedly, neither the
Management no. 1 was registered under the provisions of Section
7 of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, nor,
Management no. 2 was holding any license in terms of Section
12 of the aforesaid Act.
26. He submits that the Workman has also been able to prove
illegal termination of his services by Management no. 1, in
violation of provisions of Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, through a sham and bogus contractor i.e. Management no.
2, vide termination letter Ex. WW1/4, in as much as, despite
being in employment of Management no. 1 since the year 2008,
Management no. 2 has merely paid the retrenchment
compensation, to the Workman, only for a period of five years.
27. Even otherwise, according to him, admittedly, there was no
compliance by Management no. 2 with Section 25F(c) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 despite the fact that the compliance
of the aforesaid provision has been held by Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India to be mandatory for a valid retrenchment.
28. Termination of services of Workman vide retrenchment
notice dated 18.05.2018, according to him, is also in violation of
provisions of Section 25G of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in as
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 10 of 35
much as, Managements had neither displayed any seniority list in
terms of Rule 77 of Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957,
nor, have followed the principle of last come first out at the
retrenchment of Workman on account of alleged surplusage,
despite the fact that Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held the
provisions of Rule 77 of Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,
1957 to be mandatory.
29. Under the aforesaid circumstances, according to him,
workman has been able to prove himself to be in continuous
employment of Management no. 1 since March 2008 until the
date of termination of his services vide notice dated 18.05.2018
and hence, the Workman is entitled to his reinstatement with full
back wages, continuity of service and other consequential
benefits.
30. So far as the issue qua maintainability of present claim in
terms of Section 10(4A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as
introduced vide Industrial Disputes (Delhi Amendment) Act,
2003, is concerned, Ld. AR for Workman has relied upon the
judgment of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Rajendra Singh Vs.
SBI MANU/DE/1444/2017 to submit that in the State of Delhi, a
claim filed under Section 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
is still maintainable irrespective of fact whether or not the
Workman had first approached the Conciliation Officer or not.
Ld. AR for Workman has thus prayed for an award in terms of
prayer made by Workman in his statement of claim, while,
relying upon the following judgments:-
(i) Jasmer Singh Vs. State of Haryana and Anr
(2015) 4 SCC 458.
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 11 of 35
(ii) Rajendra Singh Vs. SBI 2017 SCC OnLine Del
8461.
(iii) Bhilwara Dugadh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd.
Vs. Vinod Kumar Sharma Dead by LRs and Ors.
(2011) 15 SCC 209.
(iv) Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Petroleum
Workers Union (2018) SCC Online Delhi 8383.
(v) Power Grid Corporation of India Vs. A.B. Singh
& Ors. MANU/TL/0395/2022.
(vi) Gaffar and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors.
MANU/ BH/0126/1983.
(vii) Raj Kumar Vs. Director of Education and Ors.
(2016) 6 SCC 541
31. On the other hand, it is submitted by Ld. AR for
Management no. 1 that Workman has failed to prove the
existence of employer-employee relationship between himself
and Management no. 1. He submits that Hon’ble Supreme Court
of India in Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Vs. Mahendra Prasad
Jakhmola and Ors. (2019)13 SCC 82 has laid down few
principles to determine whether there existed any employer-
employee relationship between the parties to a claim. Some of
the relevant factors to determine the existence of employer-
employee relationship between the parties to the claim, according
to him, are the authority qua appointment, dismissal and
initiation of disciplinary action against an employee, besides, the
existence of control and supervision and the identity of the party
making the payment of salary/ remuneration of the Workman.
32. In the case in hand, according to him, admittedly, not only
the salary of Workman was being paid by Management no. 2,
but, even the ESI and EPF benefits were being provided to the
Workman by Management no. 2. He submits that Management
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 12 of 35
no. 2 has also been able to prove, through the un-controverted
testimony of M2W1, that it was Management no. 2 who was
exercising direct control and supervision over Workman, during
his alleged employment with Management no. 1. On the other
hand, according to him, Workman has failed to adduce any
evidence, otherwise than his bald statement to the aforesaid
effect, to prove that he had been working under direct control and
supervision of Management no. 1.
33. He submits that Management no. 2 in the present case was
not a contractor but was a vendor who was providing
Management no. 1 with buses for transportation of school
children. In any case, according to him, onus to prove himself
to be in employment of Management no. 1 was upon the
Workman, however, Workman has failed to lead any evidence to
discharge the aforesaid onus.
34. He further submits that the Workman cannot be allowed to
agitate the issue of contract between Management no. 1 and 2
being sham and bogus in a claim filed by him under the
provisions of Section 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as
applicable in Delhi, and in case, he wanted to agitate the
aforesaid issue, he was required to approach this Court under the
provisions of Section 2A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He
further submits that mere authorization card, purportedly issued
in the name of Workman under the provisions of Rule 7A of
Delhi Motor Vehicles Rules 1993 shall not be sufficient to
presume the Workman to be in direct employment of
Management no. 1, more so, when even its authenticity is not
established by the Workman by summoning the record from the
Transport Department.
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 13 of 35
35. On the contrary, according to him, Workman, in his own
statement of claim, has alleged himself to be in employment
through various contractors. The Court, according to him, cannot
act upon the self serving statement of Workman to the aforesaid
effect, to record a finding qua existence of employer-employee
relationship between the Workman and Management no. 1, more
so, when, during his cross-examination, he has denied the
knowledge of contents of his affidavit and was found deposing
falsely qua his gainful employment. Ld. AR for Management no.
1 has thus prayed for dismissal of present claim of Workman with
heavy cost.
36. Ld. AR for Management no. 2, on the other hand, submits
that the present claim of Workman is not maintainable under the
provisions of Section 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as
applicable to Delhi. He submits that the case of Workman is
fraught with contradictions, in as much as, though, in his
statement of claim as well as evidence by way of affidavit, he has
tried to take a plea that he had been in continuous employment of
Management no. 1 since 01.03.2008, however, during his cross-
examination, he has denied having the knowledge of contents of
his affidavit. He submits that the Workman has also admitted
having received one month’s advance notice dated 18.05.2018
and retrenchment compensation, in terms of provisions of
Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, at the time of
termination of his services and hence, there is no violation by
Management no. 2 of the provisions of Section 25F of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, while, terminating his services.
37. In any case, according to him, having received, without any
objection, his full and final dues from Management no. 2 at the
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 14 of 35
time of termination of his services, Workman cannot be allowed
to pursue the present claim against Managements alleging illegal
termination of his services. In fact, according to him, Workman
has even withdrawn his EPF, meaning thereby, he has accepted
termination of his services by Management no. 2.
38. So far as the plea of Workman qua violation of provisions of
Section 25G of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is concerned, it is
submitted by Ld. AR for Management no. 2 that since all the
employees were hired by Management no. 2 with effect from the
same date i.e. w.e.f. 01.07.2013, no seniority list was required to
be prepared by Management no. 2 and hence, Workman cannot
be allowed to allege any violation of provisions of Section 25G
of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by Management no. 2 in
terminating his services. Since, according to him, Workman has
failed to seek any relief against Management no. 2, the present
claim of Workman against Management no. 2 is even otherwise
liable to be dismissed.
39. He further submits that the Court cannot pass any award in
favour of Workman, acting upon the un-controverted testimony
of Workman by way of affidavit, more so, when during his cross-
examination, he has denied the knowledge of contents of
aforesaid affidavit and was found deposing falsely qua his
gainful employment during his cross-examination. He has thus
prayed for dismissal of present claim of Workman while relying
upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
Moreshar Yadaorao Mahajan Vs. Vyankatesh Sitaram Bhedi (D)
through LRs & Ors. 2022 SCC Online 1307.
40. I have heard the submissions made on behalf of the parties
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 15 of 35
and have carefully perused the material available on record in the
light of judgments relied upon by the parties.
41. Before dealing with the issues, settled by Ld. Predecessor of
this Court vide order dated 11.02.2019, I would like to deal with
the legal issue, qua maintainability of present claim U/s 10(4A)
of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (as applicable in Delhi) without
compliance with the provisions of Section 2A(2) of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, sought to be raised by Management no. 2,
not only, in its written statement, but also, during the Course of
final arguments, though, no formal issue to the aforesaid effect
has been settled vide order dated 11.02.2019.
42. It is sought to be submitted by Ld. AR for Management no.
2 that the provisions of Section 2(A) of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 shall have the overriding effect over the provisions of
Section 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (as applicable in
Delhi) and hence, in view of omission on the part of Claimant in
approaching the Conciliation Officer before filing of the present
claim before this Court, the present claim file by him before this
Court shall not be maintainable and consequentially this Court
shall have no jurisdiction to entertain the present claim.
43. I do not find any force in the aforesaid submission made on
behalf of Management no. 2. The issue qua maintainability of
claim under Section 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as
introduced in Delhi vide Industrial Disputes (Delhi Amendment)
Act, 2003, without following the procedure contemplated under
Section 2A(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, even after
Central Amendment Act of 2010, is no longer res-integra in view
of authoritative pronouncement of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 16 of 35
Rajendra Singh Vs. SBI’s case (Supra).
44. In the aforesaid judgment, it was categorically held by
Hon’ble Delhi High Court that there is no repugnancy in
provisions of Section 10(4A) and Section 2A of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, in as much as, Section 10(4A) of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (as applicable in Delhi) and Section 2A of the
aforesaid Act provide two different remedies to a Workman, who
stands discharged/ dismissed/retrenched, for redressal of his
grievance and there is no need for a Workman, before invoking
the provisions of Section 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, to first approach the Conciliation Officer as per the
provisions of Section 2(A)(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
45. It is further held in the aforesaid judgment that even if, it is
assumed for the sake of arguments that there is any repugnancy
between the aforesaid two provisions, by virtue of operation of
proviso of Article 239AA(3)(c), Section 10(4A) of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 being a law made by legislative assembly of
Govt. of NCT of Delhi, which was reserved for consideration of
the President, having received his assent on 13.07.2003 and
stands enacted thereafter, would prevail over the Central
Legislation. Relevant observations of Hon’ble Delhi High Court
in this regard are being reproduced herein below for ready
reference:-
“28. We also note that, so far as Section 10(4A) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Section 2A of the
enactment are concerned, they provide two different
remedies to a workman who stands
discharged/dismissed/retrenched for redressal of his
grievance. Section 10(4A) enables a workman to
directly approach the Labour Court or the Industrial
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 17 of 35
Tribunal within a period of one year from the
communication of the order of
discharge/dismissal/retrenchment without taking
recourse to the procedure prescribed under Section 10.
On the other hand, by virtue of Section 2A, a
dispute/difference between a workman and his employer
connected with or arising out of discharge dismissal
retrenchment or termination of service is deemed to be
an industrial dispute. Furthermore, the workman is
enabled to approach the Conciliation Officer within a
period of three months from the occurrence and after
expiry of three months from the date of so approaching
him, the workman can make a further application
directly to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication
of the dispute. That is to say, under Section 2A, the
second option available to the workman does not have to
await the references by the Conciliation Officer.
29. In view of the above discussion, we are unable to
agree with the observations in the impugned order that
there was a repugnancy between the two statutory
provisions.
30. Even if it could be held that there was a repugnancy
between them, by virtue of the operation of the proviso
to Article 239AA(3)(c), Section 10(4A) being a law
made by the Legislative Assembly of the Government of
NCT of Delhi which was reserved for consideration of
the President and having received his assent on 13th July,
2003 and stands enacted thereafter, would prevail over
the central legislation.”
46. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of
Hon’ble Delhi High Court, in my considered opinion, there was
no requirement for the Workman, in the present case, to first
approach the Conciliation Officer, as per the provisions of
Section 2A(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before filing of
present claim under Section 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (as applicable in Delhi) directly before this Court. This
Court, thus, has the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate the present
claim of Workman on merits, even, without compliance by the
Workman of the provisions of Section 2A (2) of Industrial
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 18 of 35
Disputes Act, 1947.
47. Now, I shall proceed to decide the issues settled by Ld.
Predecessor of this Court vide order dated 11.02.2019.
Issue no. (i): Whether there existed ’employee and
employer’ relationship between the claimant and the
Management no. 1? OPW
48. Onus to prove the aforesaid issue was upon Workman. As
has already been observed herein above, Workman has alleged
himself to be in direct employment of Management no. 1, at the
post of driver, since 01.03.2008. He has also taken a plea that in
order to avoid its legal liabilities, Management no. 1 had shown
his name as an employee of different contractors from time to
time and lastly of Management no. 2, despite the fact that there
was no valid contract between the two managements for
providing of alleged transportation services by Management no.
2 to Management no. 1. Even if, according to him, there was any
such contract between two Managements, the same was sham
and bogus. It has further been alleged by him that he had all
along been working with Management no. 1 at the post of driver.
49. Workman has however failed to produce any documentary
or oral evidence in support of his aforesaid pleadings otherwise
than by way of his bald and self-serving statements to the
aforesaid effect. The sole document produced by him in support
of his plea qua his being in direct employment of Management
no. 1 is an authorization card, purportedly issued in his name, by
the Transport Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi under the
provisions of Rule 7A of Delhi Motor Vehicles Rules, 1993.
Relying upon the aforesaid document, it was submitted by his AR
that the said document, as per Rule 7A of Delhi Motor Vehicles
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 19 of 35
Rules, 1993, was issued by the Transport Department, Govt. of
NCT of Delhi, on the basis of a list of drivers engaged by
Management no. 1, which was submitted by Management no. 1,
being the permit holder in respect of school bus driven by
Workman, with the Transport Department and hence, the said
document is sufficient proof of his direct employment with
Management no. 1.
50. I do not find any force in the aforesaid submissions made on
behalf of Workman that the aforesaid document is sufficient to
prove the Workman to be in direct employment of Management
no. 1. A bare perusal of Rule 7A of Delhi Motors Vehicles Rules
1993 shows that the aforesaid Rule merely requires the holder of
a permit to furnish, within a period of 10 days from the date of
receipt of permit, a list of drivers engaged by him to drive the
aforesaid vehicle, together with their photographs and other
particulars, so that, an authorization card permitting the drivers as
per the aforesaid list may be issued by the State Transport
Authority to the permit holder.
51. A bare perusal of aforesaid Rule further shows that it
prohibits plying of transport vehicles without proper
authorization card containing the name, photographs and such
other particulars of the drivers as may be directed by the
Transport Commissioner, and makes it mandatory that the said
authorization card be displayed at some conspicuous place in the
vehicle. The aforesaid provision, in my considered opinion, was
incorporated in Delhi Motor Vehicles Rules 1993 for easy
identification of drivers of the vehicles which might involve in
any accident. Mere issuance of authorization card in the name of
Workman, in respect of a transport vehicle owned by
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 20 of 35
Management no. 1, in my considered opinion, is not sufficient to
prove the Workman to be an employee of Management no. 1, in
as much as, the aforesaid provision does not prohibit engagement
of a driver, by the permit holder, through a Contractor.
52. Even otherwise, Workman has failed to prove the issuance
of alleged authorization card, by the Transport Department, in his
name at the instance of Management no. 1 by leading any cogent
evidence, in as much as, no record qua issuance thereof was
summoned by him from the Transport Department.
53. It is next sought to be submitted by Ld. AR for Workman
that since, neither, the Management no. 1 was holding any
registration certificate under the provisions of Section 7 of
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, nor,
Management no. 2 was holding a valid license issued under the
provisions of Section 12 of the aforesaid Act, Workman should
be deemed to be in direct employment of Management no. 1,
while, holding the alleged contract between Managements no. 1
and 2 to be sham and bogus. In support of his aforesaid
submission, Ld. AR for Workman has relied upon the judgment
of Hon’ble Telangana High Court in Power Grid Corporation of
India Vs. A.B. Singh and Anr (Supra).
54. I do not find any force in the aforesaid submission made on
behalf of Workman. Issue, qua the consequences of non-
compliance of the provisions of Section 7 and 12 of Contract
Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, is no longer res-
integra in view of authoritative pronouncement of Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in Dena Nath v. National Fertilisers Ltd.,
(1992) 1 SCC 695, wherein, it was categorically held by Hon’ble
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 21 of 35
Supreme Court of India that mere absence of registration
certificate U/s 7 and the license under the provisions of Section
12 of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 shall
not have the effect of treating the employees of the contractors as
the employees of principal employer, in as much as,
consequences of non-compliance with the aforesaid provisions
are provided under Sections 23 and 25 of Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. Relevant observation of
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Dena Nath v. National
Fertilisers Ltd., (1992) 1 SCC 695 case are being reproduced
hereinbelow for ready reference:
“5. This appeal arises from the decision of a Division
Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated
February 27, 1991 passed in Writ Petition No. 8872 of
1989. The Division Bench while deciding a batch of
writ petitions followed its earlier decision in the case of
Gian Singh v. Senior Regional Manager, Food
Corporation of India [(1991) 1 Punj LR 1] (Letters
Patent Appeal No. 1215 of 1990). The Division Bench
in the aforesaid case of Gian Singh held that if the
principal employer does not get registration as required
under Section 7 of the Act and/or the contractor does
not get the licence under Section 12 of the Act for the
persons who are appointed by the principal employer
through the contractor, the only consequence is the
penal provisions contained in Sections 23 and 24 of the
Act and that the principal employer or contractor can
be prosecuted under those sections, but the Act
nowhere provides that such employees employed
through the contractor would become the employee of
the principal employer.
6. In the High Court judgment, under appeal, reliance
was placed on behalf of the workmen on the views of
the High Courts of Karnataka, Madras, Gujarat and
Bombay in the cases reported as F.C.I. Loading and
Unloading Workers Union v. Food Corporation of
India [(1986) 2 SLR 454 : (1985) 50 FLR 50 (Kant)] ,
Workmen v. Best & Crompton Engineering Ltd.,
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 22 of 35
Madras [(1985) 1 LLJ 492 (Mad)] , Food Corporation
of India Workers’ Union v. Food Corporation of India
[(1990) 61 FLR 253 (Guj)] and United Labour Union
v. Union of India [(1990) 60 FLR 686 (Bom)] , but the
High Court took the view that they were not
applicable.
XXXX
12. From the above provisions it is clear that the Act
serves twofold purposes: (1) regulation of the
conditions of service of the workers employed by the
contractor who is engaged by a principal employer
and; (2) also provides for the appropriate government
abolishing contract labour altogether, in certain
notified processes, operation or other works in any
establishment. Neither the Act nor the Rules framed by
the Central Government or by any appropriate
government provide that upon abolition of contract
labour, the said labour would be directly absorbed by
the principal employer.
13. The question arises when the Act does not provide
for such a measure, but contents itself by merely
regulating the conditions of service of the contract
labour, can the Court in proceedings under Article 226
of the Constitution, where the principal employer or
the licence contractor violates the provisions of
Section 9 (sic 7) or 12 respectively, direct that the
contract labour so employed would become directly
the employee of the principal employer.
XXXX
16. The decision of the Madras High Court in
Workmen v. Best & Crompton Engineering Ltd.,
Madras [(1985) 1 LLJ 492 (Mad)] really arose out of
an award given by the Labour Court in an industrial
dispute. The industrial dispute had been raised by the
workmen of the principal employer. They challenged
the termination of service of workmen by the
management as the management did not requisition the
service of 75 workmen after October 16, 1978 on the
ground that they were employed by the licensed
contractor. This led to an industrial dispute and on a
reference made of the said industrial dispute, the
Labour Court rejected the contention of the
management and held that the so-called contractor was
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 23 of 35
a mere name-lender and did not hold licence under the
Act and directed the reinstatement of the workmen
with back wages and other benefits. This award of the
Labour Court was challenged before the High Court by
the management by a writ petition. The learned Single
Judge of the Madras High Court took the view that the
conclusion of the Labour Court that the labour
contractor was not really a labour contractor, but he
was merely acting as a tool in the hands of the
management is not supported either by the pleadings of
the parties or by the evidence. According to the learned
Single Judge there was absolutely nothing to displace
the weighty documentary evidence in favour of the
management and therefore, he characterised the finding
entered by the Labour Court to the contrary as being
perverse and vitiated. The Division Bench in letters
patent appeal reversed this finding of the learned
Single Judge.
17. The High Court observed at page 497:
“In order to enable the Management to have the
benefit of the contract labour, the Act has now
legalised the employment of such contract labour,
provided the intermediary contractor holds a valid
licence and provided the Management also holds a
valid licence as principal employer. This is subject
to the prohibition contemplated under Section 10.
There is no need for us to examine the content of
Section 10 in this case. In order to regulate the
employment of contract labour and to provide for
abolition in certain circumstances, the said Act
came to be passed. According to Section 7:
‘(1) Every principal employer of an
establishment to which this Act applies shall,
within such period as the appropriate
Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, fix in this behalf with
respect to establishments generally or with
respect to any class of them, make an
application to the registering officer in the
prescribed manner for registration of the
establishment:
Provided that the registering officer may
entertain any such application for registration
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 24 of 35
after expiry of the period fixed in this behalf,
if the registering officer is satisfied that the
applicant was prevented by sufficient cause
from making the application in time.
(2) If the application for registration is
complete in all respects, the registering
officer shall register the establishment and
issue to the principal employer of the
establishment a certificate of registration
containing such particulars as may be
prescribed.’
Under Section 12 of the Act, no contractor to whom
this Act applies, shall undertake or execute any work
through contract labour except under and in accordance
with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing
officer. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 provides:
‘Subject to the provisions of this Act, a
licence under sub-section (1) may contain
such conditions including in particular
conditions as to hours of work, fixation of
wages and other essential amenities in
respect of contract labour as the appropriate
Government may deem fit to impose in
accordance with the rules, if any, made under
Section 35 and shall be issued on payment of
such fees and on the deposit of such sum, if
any, as security for the due performance of
the conditions as may be prescribed.’
The combined effect of these two provisions in our
view makes it clear that for a valid employment of
contract labour, two conditions should be satisfied,
viz., not only the principal employer but also the
contractor should possess the requisite licence. In other
words, the holding of licence by one alone will not
enable the management to treat the workmen as
contract labour.”
18. The High Court of Kerala in the case of P.
Karunakaran v. Chief Commercial Superintendent
[1988 Lab IC 1346 : (1988) 72 FJR 248 : (1988) 1 Ker
LJ 570] took the same view as was taken by the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in the judgment under appeal.
A similar view was expressed by the Delhi High Court
in the case of New Delhi General Mazdoor Union v.
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 25 of 35
Standing Conference of Public Enterprises (SCOPE)
[(1991) 2 Delhi Lawyer 189].
XXXX
22. It is not for the High Court to inquire into
the question and decide whether the employment of
contract labour in any process, operation or in any
other work in any establishment should be abolished or
not. It is a matter for the decision of the government
after considering the matter, as required to be
considered under Section 10 of the Act. The only
consequences provided in the Act where either the
principal employer or the labour contractor violates the
provision of Sections 9 (sic 7) and 12 respectively is
the penal provision, as envisaged under the Act for
which reference may be made to Sections 23 and 25 of
the Act. We are thus of the firm view that in
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution
merely because contractor or the employer had
violated any provision of the Act or the rules, the Court
could not issue any mandamus for deeming the
contract labour as having become the employees of the
principal employer. We would not like to express any
view on the decision of the Karnataka High Court or of
the Gujarat High Court (supra) since these decisions
are under challenge in this Court, but we would place
on record that we do not agree with the aforequoted
observations of the Madras High Court about the effect
of non-registration of the principal employer or the
non-licensing of the labour contractor nor with the
view of Bombay High Court in the aforesaid case. We
are of the view that the decisions of the Kerala High
Court and Delhi High Court are correct and we
approve the same.”(empshasis mine)
55. The aforesaid observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in Dena Nath‘s case (Supra) were quoted with approval by
Hon’ble Constitution bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
in SAIL v. National Union Waterfront Workers, (2001) 7 SCC 1
in the following manner:
“96. In Dena Nath case [(1992) 1 SCC 695 : 1992 SCC
(L&S) 349] a two-Judge Bench of this Court
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 26 of 35
considered the question, whether as a consequence of
non-compliance with Sections 7 and 12 of the CLRA
Act by the principal employer and the licensee
respectively, the contract labour employed by the
principal employer would become the employees of the
principal employer. Having noticed the observation of
the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Standard
Vacuum case [AIR 1960 SC 948 : (1960) 3 SCR 466]
and having pointed out that the guidelines enumerated
in sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act are
practically based on the guidelines given by the
Tribunal in the said case, it was held that the only
consequence was the penal provisions under Sections
23 and 25 as envisaged under the CLRA Act and that
merely because the contractor or the employer had
violated any provision of the Act or the Rules, the
High Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution could not issue any mandamus for
deeming the contract labour as having become the
employees of the principal employer. This Court thus
resolved the conflict of opinions on the said question
among various High Courts. It was further held that
neither the Act nor the Rules framed by the Central
Government or by any appropriate Government
provided that upon abolition of the contract labour, the
labourers would be directly absorbed by the principal
employer.”( emphasis mine)
56. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements, in
my considered opinion, reliance by Ld. AR for workman on the
judgment of Hon’ble Telangana High Court in Power Grid
Corporation‘s Case (Supra) is highly misplaced.
57. While relying upon the Judgment of Hon’ble Delhi High
Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd Vs. Petroleum Workers’
Union (Supra), it is next sought to be contended by Ld. AR for
Workman that the alleged contract, if any, between the
Managements, for providing of transportation services, by
Management no. 2, at the school of Management no. 1, should be
held to be sham and bogus, in view of the fact that the Workman
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 27 of 35
was doing the perennial job of driver at the school of
Management no. 1 since the year 2008 despite frequent change of
contractors.
58. I do not find any force in the aforesaid submission made on
behalf of Workman, in as much as, the fact, that the Workman
continued to work with Management no. 1 i.e. the principal
employer for over a period of 10 years despite frequent change of
contractors, is merely one of the relevant factors to determine
whether the contract between the principal employer and
contractor is sham and bogus or not, however, the aforesaid fact,
by itself, is not sufficient to arrive at conclusion that the contract
between the two Managements is sham and bogus or to hold the
Workman to be in direct employment of Management no. 1
school.
59. Ld. AR for Workman has also referred to clause 38 of the
alleged contract between Managements to indicate that the
Managements through the aforesaid contract had indulged in
unfair labour practice, in as much as, clause providing for
rotation/change of Manpower after regular intervals was
incorporated to deprive the Workman of his statutory benefits.
Even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments that clause 38 of
the Contract between two Managements smells of unfair labour
practice, however, the aforesaid fact, by itself is not sufficient to
hold the whole contract to be sham and bogus and to hold the
Workman to be an employee of Management no. 1.
60. It is further significant to note in this regard that the facts of
the case, before Hon’ble Delhi High Court, were altogether
different from the facts of the present case. In the case before
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 28 of 35
Hon’ble Delhi High Court, not only, the Workmen had been
continuously working with the principal employer despite change
of contractors after every two years, but, during continuation of
their employment, even the employment of contract labour stood
prohibited in the industry, wherein, Workmen were employed. In
fact, various factors, to be considered by the Court in
determining the existence of employer-employee relationship
between the parties, have been pointed out by Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Vs. Mahendra
Prasad Jakhmola and Ors. (Supra). Some of the relevant factors,
pointed out in the aforesaid judgment, for determination of the
aforesaid question are as follows:-
(i) Who appoints the Workman.
(ii) Who pays their salary/ remuneration
(iii) who has the authority to dismiss
(iv) Who can take disciplinary action
(v) Whether there is continuity of service
(vi) Existence of control and supervision i.e. whether
there existed control and supervision.
61. Qua the last of the aforesaid factors, it was noted by
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the aforesaid judgment that
principal employer cannot be said to control and supervise the
work of the employee, merely because, he directs the Workman
of the contractor ‘What to do’, after the Contractor assigns/allots
the employee to the principal employer, in as much as, the said
control shall be considered to be secondary control exercised by
the principal employer. Relevant observations of Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India, in the aforesaid judgment, are
reproduced herein under for ready reference:
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 29 of 35
“23. From this judgment in Bengal Nagpur Cotton
Mills case [Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills v. Bharat Lal,
(2011) 1 SCC 635 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 16] , it is
clear that Test No. 1 is not met on the facts of this case
as the contractor pays the workmen their wages.
Secondly, the principal employer cannot be said to
control and supervise the work of the employee merely
because he directs the workmen of the contractor “what
to do” after the contractor assigns/allots the employee
to the principal employer. This is precisely what para
12 of Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills case [Bengal
Nagpur Cotton Mills v. Bharat Lal, (2011) 1 SCC 635 :
(2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 16] explains as being supervision
and control of the principal employer that is secondary
in nature, as such control is exercised only after such
workman has been assigned to the principal employer
to do a particular work.
24. We may hasten to add that this view of the law has
been reiterated in Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India Ltd.
[Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC
407 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 804] , as follows: (SCC pp.
437-38, para 65)
“65. Thus, it can be concluded that the relevant
factors to be taken into consideration to establish
an employer-employee relationship would
include, inter alia:
(i) who appoints the workers;
(ii) who pays the salary/remuneration;
(iii) who has the authority to dismiss;
(iv) who can take disciplinary action;
(v) whether there is continuity of service; and
(vi) extent of control and supervision i.e. whether
there exists complete control and supervision.
As regards extent of control and supervision, we have
already taken note of the observations in Bengal
Nagpur Cotton Mills case [Bengal Nagpur Cotton
Mills v. Bharat Lal, (2011) 1 SCC 635 : (2011) 1 SCC
(L&S) 16] , International Airport Authority of India
case [International Airport Authority of India v.
International Air Cargo Workers’ Union, (2009) 13
SCC 374 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 257] and Nalco case
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 30 of 35
[NALCO Ltd. v. Ananta Kishore Rout, (2014) 6 SCC
756 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 353] .”
62. In the case in hand, admittedly, Workman was lastly not
only receiving his wages from Management no. 2, but, even the
ESI and EPF benefits to Workman were also being provided by
Management no. 2. Prior to execution of contract between
Management no. 1 and 2, admittedly, Workman used to receive
his salary as well as other benefits from other contractors and not
from Management no. 1. Even the sum of Rs. 1,10,639/-, towards
full and final settlement of his dues, was also received by
Workman from Management no. 2 and had never returned the
same before filing of the present claim, while, impleading both
the Managements.
63. No doubt, Workman in his evidence by way of affidavit has
categorically alleged that he had all along been working under
direct control and supervision of Management no. 1, however,
according to him, the said control and supervision was being
exercised by Management no. 1 only in matters of timing of
Work, driver’s uniform, route for traveling and sanctioned/non-
sanctioned holidays etc.. It is not even his case that the power to
take disciplinary action as well as to dismiss the Workman from
his services had either been vested in Management no. 1 or that
the same had ever been exercised by Management no. 1.
64. Rather, as per his own averments made in the statement of
claim, the advance notice dated 18.05.2018, qua termination of
his services, was in fact issued by Management no. 2 and not by
Management no. 1. The nature of control and supervision
allegedly exercised by Management no. 2, even as per the case of
Workman, was thus in the nature of secondary control and
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 31 of 35
supervision, as observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola‘s case supra, and the same is not
sufficient to make the Workman a direct employee of
Management no. 1.
65. Even otherwise, during his cross-examination by Ld. AR for
Management no. 1, he has denied the knowledge of contents of
his affidavit.
66. Ld. AR for Management no. 2 has also relied upon clause 4,
19 and 31 of the Contract between Managements to contend that
the aforesaid clauses are sufficient to hold the aforesaid contract
to be sham and bogus, however, I am unable to find anything in
the aforesaid clauses so as to lead to the conclusion that the said
contract between Managements was either sham and bogus, in as
much as, the aforesaid clauses merely enable the Management
no. 1 to exercise secondary control over the workers deployed by
Management no. 2 at its school.
67. Under the aforesaid circumstances, this Court finds itself
unable to record any finding in favour of Workman, qua
existence of employer-employee relationship between the
Workman and Management no. 1, merely, on the basis of bald
and self-serving statements of Workman to the effect that he was
appointed by Management no. 1 and had all along been working
under direct control and supervision of Management no. 1. In
fact, not even an iota of evidence, was led by him in the present
case, to corroborate his aforesaid plea.
68. So far as the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
in Bhilwara Dugadh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd. case supra,
relied upon by Ld. AR for Workman, is concerned, in my humble
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 32 of 35
opinion, even the aforesaid judgment is distinguishable on facts,
in as much as, in the aforesaid case before Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India, Workman were being paid their wages at the rate,
which, was more than the wages paid to the employees of the
contractors and it was under the aforesaid circumstances that the
Labour Court had come to a conclusion that Workmen therein
were the employees of principal employer and the aforesaid
finding of the Labour Court was upheld by Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India.
69. In the case in hand, it has already been observed herein
above, that admittedly the salary as well as other statutory
benefits to the Workman were being provided by Management
no. 2 and there is not even iota of evidence led on behalf of
Workman to prove that it was Management no. 1 who had the
power to appoint, take disciplinary action and/or to dismiss the
Workman. As has already been observed herein above, the
alleged termination notice in the present case had been issued by
Management no. 2 and not by Management no. 1, which,
indicates that Management no. 1 had no authority to dismiss the
Workman from his services.
70. So far as the issue of exercise of direct control and
supervision over the Workman is concerned, it has already been
observed herein above that Workman had failed to prove that
Management no. 1 used to exercise direct supervision and control
over the services of Workman and the said control, if any, was
merely secondary.
71. In view of the aforesaid discussion, issue no. (i) is hereby
decided against Workman.
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 33 of 35
Issue no. (ii): Whether the services of the claimant were
terminated illegally or unjustifiably by the
Managements? OPW
72. Onus to prove the aforesaid issue was also upon Workman.
Though, in his statement of claim, Workman has sought to
challenge the termination/ retrenchment notice dated 18.05.2018,
which, was admittedly issued by Management no. 2, however, he
has prayed for his reinstatement with Management no. 1, while,
alleging himself to be an employee of Management no. 1 and not
of Management no. 2. He has alleged that the aforesaid
retrenchment notice was issued by the Managements in collusion
with each other.
73. It has already been concluded herein above that the
Workman has failed to prove existence of any employer-
employee relationship between him and Management no. 1 and
hence, there was no occasion for Management no. 1 to terminate
the services of Workman, in collusion with Management no. 2,
much less, illegally or unjustifiably. Considering the nature of
claim of Workman, wherein, he has claimed himself to be in
direct employment of Management no. 1 and has prayed for all
the reliefs only against Management no. 1, however, has failed to
prove himself to be in employment of Management no. 1, issue,
qua legality of termination notice dated 18.05.2018, admittedly,
issued by Management no. 2, does not arise for consideration of
this Court, in as much as, even if, the aforesaid termination order
is held to be illegal, on account of violation of provisions of
Section 25F and 25G of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the
Workman shall not be entitled to any relief against Management
no. 1.
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 34 of 35
74. In fact, Workman has failed to prove that through the
aforesaid termination notice dated 18.05.2018, his services were
terminated by Management no. 1 and not by Management no. 2,
in as much as, in the absence of any employer-employee
relationship between Workman and Management no. 1, there was
no occasion for Management no. 1 to terminate the services of
Workman vide retrenchment notice dated 18.05.2018.
75. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in my considered
opinion, there is no need to deal with the submissions of Ld. AR
of Workman qua illegality of termination notice dated 18.05.2018
on account of the same being in alleged violation of provisions of
Section 25F and 25G of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
76. Issue no. (ii) is thus decided against the Workman.
Issue no. (iii): Relief.
77. In view of my findings on issues no. (i) and (ii) herein
above, Workman is not entitled to any relief.
78. Present claim of Workman, filed under the provisions of
Section 10(4A) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is thus hereby
dismissed against both the Managements.
79. Ordered accordingly.
80. Requisite number of copies of this award be sent to the
competent authority for publication as per rules.
Announced in the open Court on this 25th day of May, 2026.
This award consists of 35 number of signed pages.
Digitally signed
ARUN by ARUN
KUMAR KUMAR GARG
Date: 2026.05.25
GARG 16:29:52 +0530
(ARUN KUMAR GARG)
Presiding Officer Labour Court-III
Rouse Avenue Court, New Delhi
LID 330/2018
Mukesh Kumar Vs. M/s Ryan International School
Award dated 25.05.2026 Page 35 of 35
