Gauhati High Court
Crl.A./122/2021 on 25 May, 2026
Author: Sanjay Kumar Medhi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Medhi
Page 1 of 63
GAHC010100772021
2026:GAU-AS:7198-DB
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
CRL.APPEAL NO. 122 OF 2021
The State {National Investigation Agency,
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government
of India} Represented by the Superintendent
of Police, National Investigation Agency
(NIA) Branch Office, Guwahati, Assam.
........Appellant
-Versus-
1. Shri Akhil Gogoi
S/o- Late Boluram @ Bolu Gogoi,
R/o-LukrakhangaonSeinghat,
P.S. Teok, District- Jorhat, Assam.
Pin 785636
2. Shri Jagjit Gohain @ Jagajit Gohain
S/o- Ritu Gohain,
R/o-Takubam Gaon, P.S.-Chabua,
District- Dibrugarh, Assam.
Pin 786184
3. Shri Bhaskarjit Phukan @ Swagaditya Phukan @ Swargaditya
Phukan,
S/o-Uleswer Phukan,
Page 1
Page 2 of 63
R/o-Pulunga Gaon, P.S.-Chabua,
District- Dibrugarh, Assam.
Pin 786184
4. Shri Bhupen Gogoi,
S/o- Late Mohan Gogoi
R/o-RajabariPulunga Gaon,
P.S.- Chabua,District- Dibrugarh, Assam.
Pin 786184
....... Respondents
::BEFORE::
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA
For the Appellant :Mr. D. Saikia, Senior Advocate
:Mr. K. Gogoi, Special PP, NIAFor the Respondents : Mr.S. Borthakur, Advocate
Date of Hearing : 24.03.2026
Date of Judgment : 25.05.2026JUDGMENT & ORDER
(Mridul Kumar Kalita, J)
1. Heard Mr. D. Saikia, the learned senior counsel assisted
by Mr. K. Gogoi, the learned Special Public Prosecutor, National
Investigating Agency, (NIA). Also heard Mr. S. Borthakur, the
learned counsel for the respondents.
2. This appeal, under Section 21 of the National
Investigating Agency Act, 2008 has been preferred by the
Page 2
Page 3 of 63National Investigating Agency impugning the order dated
22.06.2021, passed by the learned Special Judge, Special Court,
NIA, Assam at Guwahati, in Special NIA Case No. 03/2020,
arising out of RC-01-2020/NIA-GUW, whereby, the
respondents, namely, [i] Sri Akhil Gogoi (A-1), [ii] Sri Jagjit
Gohain @ Jagajit Gohain (A-2) and [iii] Sri Bhupen Gogoi (A-4)
were discharged of offences under Sections 120B/ 143/ 147/
148/ 149/ 326/ 307/ 333/ 353 and Section 427 of the Indian
Penal Code, as well as Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967. By the impugned order, the respondent
No. 3, namely, Bhaskarjit Phukan @ Swagaditya Phukan @
Swargaditya Phukan (A-3) was also discharged of all other
offences except offences under Sections 144 & 148 of the
Indian Penal Code.
3. The facts relevant for consideration of the instant appeal,
in brief, are that on 10.12.2019, one Sri Tulumoni Duwarah, SI
of Police of Chabua Police Station, Dibrugarh, had lodged an
FIR before the Officer-in-Charge of Chabua Police Station, inter
alia, alleging that, on 09.12.2019, at about 7:00 PM, when the
first informant along with other police personnel of the Chabua
Police Station and his superior officer, namely the Additional SP
(H/Q) were performing law and order duty at Chabua town,
there was a gathering of about 6000 citizens against the
Citizenship Amendment Bill, 2016. It was alleged in the FIR that
the crowd was headed by Sri Akhil Gogoi (A-1). It was furtherPage 3
Page 4 of 63alleged that they blocked the railway track as a part of
economic blockade. It was also alleged that efforts were made
by district administration to remove the blockade but in vain. It
is further alleged that the leader of the crowd and some others
criminally conspired against police and threw stones at them. At
that time, one of the stone hit the mouth of the first informant
injuring his two teeth, upper jaw and upper limbs causing
grievous injuries. It was also alleged in the FIR that one of the
stone hit the head of the first informant. However, as he was
wearing helmet, he did not sustain any injuries by the same. It
was further stated in the FIR that immediately thereafter, the
first informant was shifted to Aditya Nursing Home, Dibrugarh
and was given stitches and other treatments. It was alleged
that there was an attempt to murder as a part of conspiracy
against police who were deployed there to maintain law and
order situation.
4. On receipt of the aforesaid FIR, the Chabua P.S. Case No.
289/2019 was registered under Sections
120B/147/148/149/336/353/326/307 of the Indian Penal Code.
Thereafter, investigation was initiated and one Sri Khagen
Laskar, SI of Police was entrusted to conduct the investigation.
It also appears that during the investigation, Sections
153A/153B of the Indian Penal Code as well as Section 15(1)(a)
of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 were added to
the aforesaid case and the investigation of the case was
Page 4
Page 5 of 63
entrusted to one Kulapradip Bhattacharyya, APS, Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Namrup.
5. Later on, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Government of
India, by its order No. 11011/34/2020/NIA, dated 04.04.2020,
in exercise of powers conferred under Section 6(5) and Section
8 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, directed the
National Investigation Agency to take up the investigation of
the aforesaid case. The FIR was renumbered at NIA Branch
Office, Guwahati as RC-01/2020/NIA-GDW dated 09.04.2020
under Sections 120B, 147, 148, 149, 336, 353, 326 with added
Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code with added Sections 153A
and 153B of the Indian Penal Code as well as Section 15(1)(a)
of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
6. All the respondents, namely, Akhil Gogoi (A-1), Jagjit
Gohain (A-2), Bhaskarjit Phukan @ Swargaditya Phukan @
Swargaditya Phukan (A-3) and Bhupen Gogoi (A-4) were
arrested on 1/4/2020, 19/2/2020, 11/5/2020 and 11/5/2020
respectively.
7. During the course of investigation, the Investigating
Agency i.e., the present appellant, found following incriminating
facts against respondent No. 1, namely Shri Akhil Gogoi (A-1):-
(1) A-1 delivered provocative speeches at the spot
in Chabua which has caused disruption of public
peace and damage/destruction of public and privatePage 5
Page 6 of 63properties and disruption of services essential for
life of community in India, and created fear in a
section of people in India, which is a terrorist act as
per Section 15(1)(a)(ii)(iii), (b) of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
(2) A-1 led a mob in violation of section 144 of CrPC
imposed at Chabua on 09.12.2019. A-1 led the mob
to cause damage to public/private properties with
intent to strike fear in a section of people in India.
(3) A-1 led the mob armed with deadly weapons
and attempted to cause death of public functionary
by show of criminal force and thus, caused grievous
injury to the Government servant on duty.
(4) The mob led by A-1 was planning to set fire on
the house of Bengali dominated area Amrawti
Colony. This establishes the fact that A-1 led a mob
with intent to strike terror in a section of people of
India. The statement of witnesses reveals that the
terrorist act of A-1 in pursuance of the conspiracy
has led to fear in a section of people in the area.
8. It found following materials against the Respondent No.2,
Shri Jagjit Gohain @ Jagajit Gohain (A-2).
(1) A-2 in association with A-1 caused and
coordinated to be caused the economic
Page 6
Page 7 of 63blockade by causing NH-37and railway lines
blockage at Chabua on 09.12.2019. A-2 thus
in association with A-1 led the blocking of
supplies essential for life of community in
India, which is a terrorist act as per Section
15(1)(a)(iii) of Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967.
(2) A-2 in association with A-1 and other accused
led a mob in violation of section 144 of CrPC.
imposed at Chabua on 09.12.2019. A-2 in
association with A-1 led the mob to cause
damage to public/private properties with
intent to strike fear in a section of people in
India.
(3) A-2 in association with A-1 led the mob armed
with weapons and attempt to cause death of
public functionary by show of criminal force
and thus, caused grievous injury to the
Government servant on duty, with intent to
strike fear in a section of people.
(4) The mob led by A-1 in association with A-2
was planning to set fire on the house of
Bengali dominated area Amrawti Colony. This
establishes the fact that A-2 in association
Page 7
Page 8 of 63
with A-1 led a mob with intent to strike terror
in a section of people.
9. As regards Respondent No. 3, namely, Bhaskarjit Phukan
@ Swagaditya Phukan @ Swargaditya Phukan (A-3) is
concerned, the investigating agency found following
incriminating facts during investigation: –
(1) A-3 in association with A-1 caused and
coordinated to cause the economic blockade by
causing NH-37 and railway lines blockade at Chabua
on 09.12.2019. A-3 thus in association with A-1 led
the blocking of supplies essential for life of
community in India, which is a terrorist act as per
section 15(1)(a)(iii) of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967.
(2) A-3 in association with A-1 and other accused
led a mob in violation of section 144 of CrPC.
imposed at Chabua on 09.12.2019. A-3 in
association with A-1 led the mob to cause damage
to public / private properties with intent to strike
fear in a section of people in India.
(3) A-3 in association with A-1 led the mob armed
with weapons and attempt to cause death of public
functionary by show of criminal force and thus,Page 8
Page 9 of 63caused grievous injury to the Government servant
on duty, with intent to strike fear in a section of
people.
(4) The mob, which A-3 was part of, and which was
led by A-1 was planning to set fire at the house of
Bengali dominated ‘Amrawati Colony’ with intent to
strike terror in a section of people.
10. As regards Respondent No.4, Bhupen Gogoi (A-4) is
concerned, the investigating agency found following
incriminating facts during investigation: –
(i) A-4 in association with A-1 caused and
coordinated to be caused the economic blockade by
causing NH-37 and railway lines blockade at Chabua
on 09.12.2019. A-4 thus in association with A-1 led
the blocking of supplies essential for life of
community in India, which is a terrorist act as per
section 15(1)(a)(iii) of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967.
(ii) A-4 in association with A-1 and other accused
led a mob in violation of section 144 of CrPC.
imposed at Chabua on 09.12.2019. A-4 in
association with A-1 led the mob to cause damage
to public / private properties with intent to strike
fear in a section of people in IndiaPage 9
Page 10 of 63
(iii) A-4 in association with A-1 led the mob armed
with weapons and attempt to cause death of public
functionary by show of criminal force and thus,
caused grievous injury to the Government servant
on duty, with intent to strike fear in a section of
people.
(iv) The mob, which A-4 was part of, and which was
led by A-1 was planning to set fire at the house of
Bengali dominated ‘Amrawatı Colony with intent to
strike terror in a section of people. The statement
of witnesses reveals that the terrorist act of A-4 in
pursuance of the conspiracy has led to fear in a
section of people.‖
11. Ultimately, on completion of investigation, Shri D. R.
Singh, the Additional Superintendent of Police and Chief
Investigating Officer, NIA, Branch Office, Guwahati, laid the
charge-sheet dated 26.06.2020 against all the four respondents
(accused persons) under Sections 120B, 143, 147, 148, 149,
326, 307, 333, 353, 427 of the Indian Penal Code as well as
under Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967, before the learned Special Judge, NIA, Assam, Guwahati.
12. On the basis of the charge-sheet, the Court of learned
Special Judge, NIA, Assam, took cognizance of aforementioned
offences against the present respondents by its order dated
29.06.2020 and Special NIA Case No. 03/2020 was registered.
Page 10
Page 11 of 63
Ultimately, after considering the materials on record and after
hearing both sides, the learned Special Judge, NIA, Assam,
Guwahati, by order dated 26/6/2020, had discharged all the
respondents in the manner as already described in Paragraph
No. 2 hereinabove.
13. Mr. D. Saikia, learned senior counsel for the appellant has
submitted that learned Special Judge, NIA, Assam, Guwahati
erred in discharging the respondents (accused persons) by
adopting an approach contrary to law as well as to the
principles laid down by the Apex Court in a catena of judgments
in respect of role of a trial court while considering the question
of framing of charges against an accused.
14. The learned senior counsel has submitted that the trial
court, while passing the impugned order, failed to consider the
following important incriminating documents against the
accused persons:
(a) D-2, i.e., the Ejahar dated 10.12.2019;
(b) D-651, i.e., the FIR prepared by NIA;
(c) D-12, i.e., the seizure list of one stone recovered from
the place of occurrence;
(d) D-15, i.e., the transcript of the telephonic
conversations of A-1 with various persons;
(e) D-29, i.e., the scrutiny report of the video seized on
29.05.2020, wherein the speeches delivered by A-1 have
been mentioned at Sl. Nos. 3, 6 and 7;
Page 11
Page 12 of 63
(f) D-33, i.e., the seizure memo of photographs of the
Mahindra Bolero vehicle in a capsized condition;
(g) D-40, i.e., the assessment report regarding the loss of
railway property during the CAB protest;
(h) D-48, i.e., the photo identification memo of Chabua
Police Station in which the photograph of A-1 has been
mentioned; and
(i) D-49, i.e., the CDR analysis report of the mobile
numbers of the accused persons.
15. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has
submitted that, at the stage of consideration of framing of
charges, the trial court, while discharging the accused persons
by the impugned order, appreciated the materials available on
record in the manner as if it was conducting a mini trial. He
submits that at this stage, in-depth appreciation of the evidence
on record is not permissible.
16. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has
submitted that the first informant, namely, Tulumoni Duara
(PW-2), in his statement recorded by the Investigating Officer
under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has
clearly implicated the A-1 and other accused persons in
entering into criminal conspiracy against police and Government
officials and also of throwing stones at police. He submits that
the statement of PW-1 clearly indicates that one of the stone
Page 12
Page 13 of 63
hit his mouth causing injury on his jaw, upper lip and also
resulted into broken teeth.
17. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has
submitted that the PW-5, namely, UBC-792, Siranjib Chetia has
also deposed in his statement before the Investigating Officer
that around 7:00 PM some agitated people led by Akhil Gogoi
(A-1) started throwing stones at police party and one of the
stones hit the officer-in-charge of Chabua Police Station
resulting into breaking of two teeth and injuries on the upper
lip.
18. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has
submitted that similarly PW-6 also deposed before the
Investigating Officer that some agitated people led by Akhil
Gogoi (A-1) started throwing stones at police. He submits that
in similar manner PW-7, PW-8 have also implicated the A-1 in
leading the mob which started throwing stones at police.
19. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has
submitted that in the statement of the PW-1, who is a
protected witness, recorded under Section 161 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, he has categorically stated that
during his speech Akhil Gogoi (A-1) provoked the people and
asked them to oppose the government using any means
whether they had to do anything for it. The said witness has
also stated that due to his provocation, some people from
Page 13
Page 14 of 63
crowd started pelting stones on security officials. One of those
stones hit on the mouth of Tulumoni Duara, OC of the Chabua
P.S. He got grievously injured and two of his teeth were broken
and he was bleeding profusely. The said witness has further
stated that even then the crowd did not stop and overturned
and damaged the Bolero vehicle on the road. He also stated
that even after the crowd turning violent, Akhil Gogoi (A-1) did
not denounce the same nor he did anything to stop them. The
learned senior counsel submits that even the statement of
protected witness, in itself, is sufficient to frame charges
against the A-1. He submits that the question as to whether the
said witness has stated truly or falsely, in his statement, before
the Investigating Officer is to be tested during trial. However,
he submits that at the stage of framing of charges or
considering the plea for discharge, the veracity of the
statements of the witnesses cannot be tested. Same can only
be done during the course of the trial.
20. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has
submitted that in Paragraph No. 46 of the impugned order, the
trial court instead of taking the statements of the witnesses
recorded during investigation, on its face value, embarked upon
a journey of considering the reliability of statement of witnesses
which is akin to mini trial and same is prohibited at the stage of
consideration of an application for discharge.
Page 14
Page 15 of 63
21. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has also
submitted that the materials collected during investigation
shows that on 31.10.2019 an order under Section 144 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, of the Additional District
Magistrate, Dibrugarh, was promulgated in entire Dibrugarh
district. He submits that during the existence of the said order,
A-1 and other accused persons along with large number of
people gathered at Chabua thereby forming an unlawful
assembly.
22. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has
submitted that the materials collected during investigation also
shows that A-1 gave provocative speech before the agitators
instigating them to carry out rail blockade program. He also
submits that the video footage (D-29) of the speech delivered
by A-1 clearly shows that he made provocative statement
against the then Chief Minister of Assam and some of his
ministerial colleagues. He submits that the statement of
witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 clearly shows that the provocative speech of
the A-1 led to destruction of public property (Bolero vehicle)
which also resulted in the mob indulging in attacking police
force with stones. He submits that the statement of PW-30,
Devarikhi Chetia also shows that A-1 delivered aggressive and
provocative speech. He further submits that the PW-30 has also
stated that Bhupen Gogoi (A-4), Bhaskarjit Phukan (A-3) and
Page 15
Page 16 of 63
Jagjit Gohain (A-2) along with other protestors were seen near
the damaged vehicle and when PW-30 tried to remove one of
the burning tyres, A-3 hit on the said tyre with a sword which
he was carrying.
23. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has also
submitted that the document D-29, which is the scrutiny report
of video seized, including the speeches delivered by A-1, as well
as a video of police officer with grievous facial injury followed
by agitated mob shouting slogans, as well as the document D-
74, which is the scrutiny report of video seized from cyber cell
of SP Office, Dibrugarh, which shows that one white gypsy
vehicle of ITBP, bearing Registration No. AS-06-N-5742 being
attacked by violent mob, are sufficient to come to prima facie
finding that violence followed after the provocative speech
given by A-1. He submits that D-74 also shows that the A-3 was
carrying a sword in his hand and leading the protesters.
24. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has
submitted that the materials on record, which were collected
during investigation, clearly shows that the agitated people who
gathered at Chabua to protest against CAB indulged in violent
activity of attacking police personnel and destruction of
government vehicle. He submits that the presence of all the
petitioners at the spot where the attack on police took place
has been established by the statements of witnesses recorded
under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as
Page 16
Page 17 of 63
well as by the documentary evidence collected during the
investigation.
25. The learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that
Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code provides that every
member of unlawful assembly shall be guilty of the offence
committed in prosecution of the common object of that
assembly by any member of the said assembly. He also submits
that the materials on record are prima facie sufficient to attract
offence under Sections 307/326/333/353/147/148/427/149 of
the Indian Penal Code against all the respondents.
26. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has also
submitted that the document (D-15), which contains the
transcript of intercepted telephonic conversations between A-1
with several other persons clearly shows that the agitation and
gathering at Chabua on 09.12.2019 as well as rail blockade
program were pre-planned. He submits that rail blockade
program was planned with an intent to threaten the economic
security of India.
27. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has
submitted that an important facet of law of conspiracy, under
Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, is that apart from it
being a distinct offence, all conspirators are liable for the acts
of each other of the crime or crimes which have been
committed as a result of such conspiracy. He, therefore,
Page 17
Page 18 of 63
submits that there are also sufficient prima facie materials to
attract offence under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code
against all the respondents.
28. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has also
submitted that since the mob, of which the respondents were
part, caused grievous injury to one of the police officer, who
was engaged in maintaining law and order duty on the date of
the alleged incident and since public property (government
vehicle) was also damaged by the said mob and since deadly
weapon (sword) was also used by one of the respondents and
since the intention of respondents in carrying out entire
exercise was to threaten the unity and economic security of
India and to strike terror in the people, the acts of the
respondents also falls within the definition of ―terrorist act‖ as
provided under Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 and thereby constituting an offence
under Section 16 of the said Act.
29. The learned senior counsel has submitted that, at the
stage of consideration of charges, the trial court is not
supposed to undertake an elaborate inquiry or delve deep into
various aspects of the matter, rather, the materials on record,
including the statements of witnesses, are required to be taken
as they are.
Page 18
Page 19 of 63
30. He further submits that, at the stage of framing of
charge, even a strong suspicion founded upon the materials on
record and a presumptive opinion would enable the court to
frame charges against the accused persons. He submits that for
framing charges, prima facie satisfaction of the court on the
basis of the materials available on record, to arrive at an
opinion that there are grounds for presuming that the accused
persons have committed the offences, is sufficient. However, he
submits that, the trial court, while discharging the respondents,
failed to consider the prima facie materials as well as the
statements of the eye-witnesses on record, which clearly make
out a case against the accused persons for the offences for
which the charge-sheet was filed.
31. In support of his submission, the learned senior counsel
for the appellant has cited following rulings:
(i) “Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kr. Samal & Another“,
reported in ―(1979) 3 SCC 4”.
(ii) “Ramdas Kachru Wadkar Vs. State of Maharashtra”,
reported in ―2006 CrLJ 1156″.
(iii)”State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh‖, reported in ―AIR
1977 4 SCC 39″
(iv) “State of West Bengal Vs. Md. Khali, reported in ―AIR
1995 SC 785″.
(v) “Arun Gulab Gawli Vs. State of Maharashtra‖,
reported in ―1988 CrLJ 4481 (BOM)”.
(vi) “Bagata Vs. State of Rajasthan” reported in”1988
Cr.LJ 702 (RJ)”
Page 19
Page 20 of 63
(vii) “State of Tamil Nadu Vs. N. Suresh Ranjan, reported
in ―(2014) 11 SCC 709”.
(viii) “State of MP Vs. SB Johari” reported in ―AIR 2000 SC
665″
(ix) “Anir Kapoor Vs. Finance cum Health Secretary‖
reported in ―1974 Cri LJ 862‖
(x) “Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad Vs. Dilip Nathumal
Chordia & Anr.” reported in “(1989) 1 SCC 715”
(xi) “State of Maharashtra Vs. Som Nath Thapa” reported
in “(1996) 4 SCC 659”
(xii)”Rajbir Singh Vs. State of UP” reported in “(2006) 4
SCC 51”
(xiii) “State of Maharashtra Vs. Priya Sharan Maharaj“
reported in “AIR 1997 SC 2041”
(xiv) “Sajjan Kumar Vs. CBI” reported in “(2010) 9 SCC
368”
(xv) “State Vs. S. Selvi” reported in “(2018) 13 SCC 455”
(xvi) “Dr. Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy Vs. State of AP“
reported in ―(2020) 12 SCC 467″
(xvii) ―SAIL Vs. Aeltemesh Rein‖ reported in ―1983 SCC
OnLine MP 71‖
(xviii) ―Satish Mehra Vs. Delhi Administration and Anr.,
reported in “(1996) 9 SCC 766‖
(xix) ―Regional Director, Employees State Insurance
Corporation, Mumbai Vs. Shyam Bhatia” reported in
“(2008) 3 AIR R 157 (Bom)”
reported in “(2023) 17 SCC 688‖
Page 20
Page 21 of 63
32. On the other hand, Mr. S. Borthakur, the learned counsel
for the respondents, has submitted that there is no infirmity or
illegality in the impugned order of discharge passed by the trial
court.
33. He submits that the trial court has rightly arrived at the
conclusion, on the basis of the materials available on record,
that no prima facie case has been made out against the
accused persons for the purpose of framing charges against
them. He further submits that, while exercising jurisdiction
under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the
trial court cannot act merely as a post office or mouthpiece of
the prosecution, but is required to consider the broad
probabilities of the case.
34. He further submits that, while considering such a
question, the trial court undoubtedly has the power to sift and
weigh the materials available on record for the limited purpose
of finding out whether or not a prima facie case has been made
out against the accused persons.
35. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted
that it is apparent from the materials on record that on
09.12.2019 a peaceful democratic protest was called by several
organizations and several leaders had addressed the gathering.
The respondent No. 1 (A-1) was only one of the speakers.
However, he submits, that the State has targeted only
Page 21
Page 22 of 63
respondent No. 1 and three others, ignoring the other
organizers and speakers.
36. He further submits that the entire thrust of the
prosecution’s case is on the speech delivered by respondent No.
1 (A-1) on 09.12.2019, terming the same to be provocative,
which allegedly led the mob to damage public and private
properties and caused injuries to government officials.
However, he submits that a bare perusal of the transcript of the
speech delivered by A-1 on 09.12.2019 would show that no
provocative statement, which could incite anyone to indulge in
violence, was made by A-1.
37. He further submits that even if the materials on record,
including the statements of witnesses, documents and video
footage relating to the accused persons, are taken at their face
value, still no offence under Section 16 of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 is made out against the
present respondents. He submits that, in order to constitute an
offence under Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967, the prosecution must be able to show that there are
prima facie materials on record to indicate that the accused
persons have committed a ―terrorist act‖ within the meaning of
the phrase as defined under Section 15 of the said Act.
38. He submits that for any act to be regarded as a ―terrorist
act‖, three components are required to be satisfied, firstly, the
Page 22
Page 23 of 63
act must have been done with the intent as indicated in Section
15(1) of the Act; secondly, the act must have been carried out
by the means as indicated in Section 15(1)(a); and thirdly, the
act must have been committed with the object of carrying out
the acts stated in Section 15 of the Act. He submits that all the
three components, i.e., the intent, means and object as
indicated in Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967, must exist together for an act to be considered as a
―terrorist act‖. However, he submits that in the instant case
neither the speech delivered by respondent No. 1 (A-1) on the
date of the alleged incident nor the other materials on record
indicate any such intent, means or object as mentioned in
Section 15 of the aforesaid Act. Hence, he submits that the trial
court has rightly held that there was no material on record
against the present respondents to indicate, even prima facie,
that they had committed any ―terrorist act‖ as defined under
Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
39. He also submits that even assuming that the participating
organizations had given a call for a ―Rail Roko‖ to protest
against the Citizenship Amendment Bill, same cannot by any
stretch of imagination be regarded as an act threatening the
economic security of India, particularly when such protest was
for a maximum duration of about four hours. He submits that
such symbolic ―Rail Roko‖ protests have been undertaken on
many occasions by social organizations. However, the same
Page 23
Page 24 of 63
cannot be equated with an act of terrorism as defined under
Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
40. The learned counsel for the respondents has also
submitted that the document (D-15), which are the transcript of
intercepted telephonic conversations between A-1 and other
persons only shows that A-1 was being informed about the
preparations in connection with peaceful protest meetings
against CAB. He submits that, in the said conversations, there is
nothing to indicate that the A-1 has incited any violence or that
the protesters had any plan to indulge in any kind of violent
activities during the meetings to protest against CAB.
41. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted
that no deadly weapon has been seized in this case except ―one
piece stone‖. He submits that though the photograph of the A-3
holding a sword has been collected by the Investigating Officer,
however, no seizure of any such sword has been made, neither
there is any evidence to show that the said sword was used for
injuring anyone or destruction of any public property. He
submits that under such circumstances the definition of
―terrorist act‖ as provided under Section 15 of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 is not applicable in the present
case.
42. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that
Section 15(1)(a) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
Page 24
Page 25 of 63
1967 describes the means by using which when any act is
committed with the intent and object mentioned in the said
section, the said act may be regarded as a ―terrorist act‖. He
submits that the phrase ―or by any other means of whatever
nature‖ has to be interpreted by applying the principle of
ejusdem generis. He further submits that the document (D-12)
i.e., the seizure list, only shows the seizure of one stone. He
submits that ―stone ―cannot be considered to be included within
the phrase ―by any other means of whatever nature‖ used in
Section 15(1)(a) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967. He submits that the word ―stone‖ cannot be regarded as
of the same nature and characteristic of the means indicated in
Section 15(1)(a) of the aforesaid Act, namely, ―bombs,
dynamite or other explosive substance or inflammable
substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisonous or
noxious gases or other chemicals or by other substances
(whether biological, radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of a
hazardous nature‖. He, therefore, submits that even if the
materials on record are taken on its face value, no offence
under Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967 is made out against the present respondents. In support
of his submission, he has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the
case of ―Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. Vs. Union of India and
Anr.” reported in “(1982) 2 SCC 458‖.
Page 25
Page 26 of 63
43. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted
that the Court ought to carefully examine every case, before
making an assessment if the provision of Section 16 of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 would apply or not to
the respondents. He submits that when the statutes have
stringent provisions, the duty of Court would be more onerous.
He submits that graver the offence, greater should be the care
to be taken to see that the offence would fall within the four
corners of the Act.
44. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the
respondents has cited following rulings: –
(i) ―Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal and Anr.‖
reported in “(1979) 3 SCC 4”.
(ii) Vernon Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr.” reported in
“(2023) 15 SCC 56‖.
(iii) ―Yogesh Alias Sachin Jagdish Joshi Vs. State of
Maharashtra‖ reported in “(2008) 10 SCC 394‖
(iv) ―Asif Iqbal Tanha Vs. State of NCT of Delhi‖ reported in
“(2021) 3 High Court Cases (Del) 106‖.
(v) ―Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. Vs. Union of India
and Anr.” reported in “(1982) 2 SCC 458‖.
(vi) ―Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors. Vs. State of
Maharashtra and Ors.” reported in “(1994) 4 SCC 602‖.
(vii) ―Zakia Ahsan Jafri Vs. State of Gujarat and Anr.‖
reported in “(2023) 13 SCC 54‖Page 26
Page 27 of 63
(viii) ―Shoma Kanti Sen Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr.”
reported in “(2024) 6 SCC 591”
45. The learned counsel for the respondents thus submits
that the trial court, after sifting and weighing the material on
record for the limited purpose of deciding the question as to
whether charges may be framed against the accused persons
or not, has rightly discharged the respondents after finding that
no prima facie case has been made out against the present
respondents. Hence, he prays for dismissing the instant appeal.
46. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsel for both sides and have gone through the materials
available on record. We have also viewed the video footages
contained in the exhibits (in form of pen drive and compact
discs), in camera, in presence of the learned counsel for both
sides. We have also gone through the rulings cited by the
learned counsel for both sides in support of their respective
submissions.
47. As discussed in the Paragraph No. 11 of this judgment
herein before, the Investigating Officer of NIA had filed the
charge-sheet against the present respondents under Sections
120B, 143, 147, 148, 149, 326, 307, 333, 353, 427 of the
Indian Penal Code as well as under Section 16 of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. It also appears that the trial
court, by the impugned order dated 26.06.2020, discharged all
the respondents, except respondent No. 4 (A-3), of all the
Page 27
Page 28 of 63
offences under which charge-sheet was filed against them. The
A-3 was also discharged of all the offences except offence
under Section 144 and Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code.
48. It appears that while discharging the respondents, in the
manner, indicated in the foregoing paragraph, the trial court, in
paragraph Nos. 46, 47 and 48 of the impugned order, discussed
the discrepancy between the testimony of witnesses and
ultimately came to a finding that no prima facie case has been
made out against any of the respondents/accused against
Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
Though, after considering the incriminating materials against
the A-3, in paragraph Nos. 65 and 66 of the impugned
judgment, it found materials against A-3, which were prima
facie sufficient for the purpose of framing charges for offences
under Sections 144 and 147 of the Indian Penal Code, however,
as regards other offences under Indian Penal Code, for which
he was charged, the trial court found no prima facie materials.
The other respondents (A-1, A-2 and A-4) were discharged of
all offences under Indian Penal Code as the trial court was of
the opinion that the materials on record were not sufficient to
frame charges against them.
49. Let us now consider as to whether the Trial Court was
correct in its approach, while arriving at the conclusion that the
materials on record were not sufficient to frame charges against
Page 28
Page 29 of 63
the accused persons and that no prima facie case has been
made out against the accused persons (present respondents).
50. Though, the learned counsel for both sides have cited a
number of rulings in support of their respective contentions as
to what approach the trial court should take while considering
the question of framing of charges and discharge under
Sections 228 and 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
respectively, however, as the principles regarding the approach
to be taken by the trial court, in this regard, are well settled, as
well as for the sake of brevity, we are not discussing each of
the rulings cited by the learned counsel for both sides. As
stated herein before, we have, however, gone through each of
the judgment cited by the learned counsel for both sides.
51. As regards, the approach to be adopted by the trial court
while considering the question of framing of charges, the
Supreme Court of India, has observed in the case of “Union of
India Vs. Prafulla Kr. Samal & Another” (supra) as follows: –
“10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned
above, the following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie
case against the accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing
a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it isPage 29
Page 30 of 63difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and
large however if two views are equally possible and the
Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him
while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion
against the accused, he will be fully within his right to
discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of
the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior
and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post Office or
a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the
broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any
basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This
however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving
enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the
evidence as if he was conducting a trial.‖
52. Similarly, in the case of ―State of Gujarat Vs. Dilipsinh
Kishorsinh Rao“(supra), the Supreme Court of India has
observed as follows: –
“10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of
considering an application for discharge the court must
proceed on an assumption that the material which has been
brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate
said material in order to determine whether the facts
emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose
the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence
alleged.
11. This Court in State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of
T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC
(Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721] adverting to the earlier
propositions of law laid down on this subject has held : (SCC
pp. 721-22, para 29)
―29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival
submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit Kumar
commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of
the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a
mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office andPage 30
Page 31 of 63may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the
allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of
discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an
application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an
assumption that the materials brought on record by the
prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and
documents with a view to find out whether the facts
emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the
existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged
offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to
be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into
the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a
conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is
whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has
been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the
accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court
thinks that the accused might have committed the offence
on the basis of the materials on record on its probative
value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the
court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has
committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial
at this stage.‖
12. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at
the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The
expression ―the record of the case‖ used in Section 227CrPC
is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any,
produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any
right to the accused to produce any document at the stage
of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to
be confined to the material produced by the investigating
agency.‖
53. From the aforesaid observations, made by the Apex
Court, it appears that the approach to be adopted by the trial
court, while considering the question of framing of
Page 31
Page 32 of 63
charges/discharge under Sections 228/227 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, has been settled and same are as
follows: –
(i) While considering the question of framing of
charges/discharge under Sections 228/227 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, the trial court has the power to
sift and weigh the materials collected during the
investigation for the limited purpose of finding out
whether or not the same are prima facie sufficient to
make out a case against the accused person.
(ii)If the materials collected during investigation which
are placed before the court, discloses grave suspicion
against the accused which has not been properly
explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a
charge against the accused.
(iii)If two views are equally possible, on the basis of
materials before the court, which give rise to some
suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused,
the Judge will be fully within his rights to discharge the
accused.
(iv) While considering the materials before it for deciding
the question of framing of charges/discharge, the court
cannot act merely as a post office or a mouth piece of the
prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities ofPage 32
Page 33 of 63the case and total effect of materials produced before it,
including any basic infirmity appearing in the case.
(v) The court must proceed on with an assumption that
the material which has been brought on record by the
prosecution is true.
(vi) The said materials are to be evaluated in order to
determine whether the facts emerging there from, taken
on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients
necessary to constitute the offence alleged in the charge-
sheet.
(vii)At the stage of consideration of the question of
framing of charges/discharge, the defence of the accused
is to be confined to the materials produced by the
Investigating Agency on completion of the investigation
along with the charge-sheet.
54. The other judgments cited by the learned counsel for
both sides, which we are refraining ourselves from discussing in
detail in this judgment, more or less reiterate the above-
mentioned principles.
55. In this case, the charge-sheet against the present
respondents was laid for offences under two separate penal
statutes, namely, the Indian Penal Code as well as the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
Page 33
Page 34 of 63
56. Let us first consider as to whether the trial court was
correct in discharging the respondents for offences which were
alleged to have been committed by them under the Indian
Penal Code.
57. On perusal of the charge-sheet laid against the present
respondents, it appears that the accusation has been made
against them under Sections 120B/ 143/ 147/ 148/ 149/ 326/
307/ 333/ 353/ 427 of the Indian Penal Code.
58. Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code prescribes
punishment for criminal conspiracy. Section 120A of the Indian
Penal Code, wherein the definition of the criminal offence of
criminal conspiracy has been provided is quoted herein below: –
―120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy. –When two or
more persons agree to do, or cause to be done, —
(1) an illegal act, or
(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an
agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit
an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some
act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to
such agreement in pursuance thereof.
Explanation.–It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the
ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to
that object.‖Page 34
Page 35 of 63
59. Section 143 of the Indian Penal Code prescribes the
punishment for being a member of unlawful assembly.
60. Section 142 of the Indian Penal Code provides that
whoever, being aware of facts which renders any assembly an
unlawful assembly, intentionally joins that assembly, or
continues in it, is said to be a member of unlawful assembly.
61. Thus, an unlawful assembly, even it may not be so when
initially, if it becomes an unlawful assembly, and any member
of it after coming to know about the fact that the assembly has
become an unlawful assembly continues to be a part of it, he
would be guilty of being a member of unlawful assembly under
Section 142 of the Indian Penal Code and punishable under
Section 143 of the said Code.
62. Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code prescribes
punishment for the offence of rioting. As per Section 146 of the
Indian Penal Code, whenever force or violence is used by an
unlawful assembly, or by any member thereof, in prosecution of
the common object of such assembly, every member of such
assembly is guilty of offence of rioting.
63. Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code prescribes
punishment for rioting armed with deadly weapon. It provides
that whoever is guilty of rioting being armed with a deadly
weapon or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence,
Page 35
Page 36 of 63
is likely to cause death, shall be imposed with the punishment
prescribed in that section.
64. Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code provides that if an
offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly
in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such
as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be
committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at
the time of the committing that offence, is a member of said
assembly, is guilty of that offence. It is to be taken note of the
fact that Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code does not create
a separate offence, but it only declares the rule of vicarious
liability of all the members of unlawful assembly for acts done
in prosecution of the common object of such assembly.
65. Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code prescribes
punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous
weapon or means.
66. Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code prescribes
punishment for attempt to murder.
67. Section 333 of the Indian Penal Code prescribes
punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt to deter public
servant from his duty.
68. Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code prescribes
punishment for assault or use of criminal force to deter public
servant from discharge of his duty.
Page 36
Page 37 of 63
69. Whereas, Section 427 of the Indian Penal Code prescribes
punishment for mischief causing damage to the amount of
rupees fifty or upwards.
70. We have seen in the foregoing paragraphs that the
approach to be adopted by the trial court while considering the
question of framing of charges/discharge under
Sections228/227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has
been settled. Though, the court should not conduct a mini trial
for the said purpose, however, it has the power to sift and
weigh the materials collected during investigation for the limited
purpose of finding out whether the facts emerging therefrom,
taken on its face value discloses the existence of the
ingredients necessary to constitute the offences alleged in the
charge-sheet.
71. On perusal of the charge-sheet laid against the present
respondents, it appears that one of the main areas of thrust of
the prosecution case is on the speech delivered by respondent
No. 1 (A-1) on 09.12.2019. Several witnesses, whose
statements were recorded under Section 161 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the Investigating Officer during the
course of investigation have termed the speech delivered by A-
1 as provocative and aggressive, which led to mob damaging
the public properties and of throwing stones at police. The trial
court in paragraph No. 49 of the impugned order have come to
a conclusion that the speeches delivered by A-1 cannot be
Page 37
Page 38 of 63
regarded to contain anything which has the potential to
instigate violence.
72. We have also viewed the video of three speeches of the
A-1, namely video bearing File No. VID-20200320-
WA0009.mp4, video bearing File No. VID-20200320-
WA0013.mp4 and video bearing File No. VID-20200320-
WA0014.mp4. We have also gone through the transcript of the
speeches given by the A-1 on the date of alleged incident. The
said transcripts are provided in document No. D-29.
73. For the sake of convenience, the transcripts of the
speeches given by A-1 are reproduced in verbatim herein
below.
(1) VID-20200320-WA0009.mp4- The speech delivered
by accused, Akhil Gogoi, translated from Assamese
to English.
―Today, the villagers from CM’s constituency, Chabua,
came out in highway, people from CM’s family come out
in highway, and very clearly tell by the people of Chabua
that we don’t accept CAB, whereas, CM tell in this day
that CAB is very good thing and to implement CAB, he
expressed his gratitude to PM and HM. At this moment, I
think he is taking position in opposite pole of people and
people of Chabua said that what CM has done, being
native of their area, they feel ashamed and there is no
Page 38
Page 39 of 63
other option left for CM to resign him from his post. I
think, today people of Chabua become example for entire
Assam, because in 2016 when the CAB came, there was
large-scale protests in Chabua, largest number of people
came out in Chabua…..this time in 2019 also ten thousand
people came out at night in the highway in Chabua area
and tell clearly that we do not accept CAB, means by
sitting in the power seat CM has given up patriotism, but
people from this area, people from his village, people
from his family said in full voice that we will not give up
patriotism, we have to save our community, we will not
give up our land in the hand of foreigner, therefore, I
think CM has no other way left except resign from his
post. I think Himanta Bishwa Sharma is the most evil
politician in Assam, and most bad person, therefore, I
don’t want to reply of the version of most wicked person,
if he want to see the movement, I wanted to invite him in
Chabua…I wanted to invite Himanta Bishwa Sharma
once… leave your Z category CISF persons and come to
Chabua to see the movement, by wearing color glass of
BJP, RSS and dreaming to get the seat of CM, what kind
of speech you delivered…Himanta Bishwa Sharma… You
betray Assamese community, therefore, Himanta Bishwa
Sharma, you Himanta Bishwa Sharma, Sarbananda
Sonowal and Ranjit Dutta has been identify as modern
Badan Barphukan by Assamese people. You called
Page 39
Page 40 of 63
Samujjal Bhattacharya, if you have courage, Himanta
Bishwa Sharma call Akhil Gogoi once. Call me once if you
have courage. I am challenging… (noise of crowd).
Himanta Bishwa Sharma has called Samujjal Bhattacharya
for debate, I am Akhil Gogoi, challenge you Himanta, you
come for debate with KMSS… with me if he wants to take
someone else, Sarbananda Sonowal, take any advocate
along with him… I am inviting him for debate in front of
public in CAB matters… If he is really one honest
politician, if he has courage, he comes out and take this
challenge.‖
(2) Transcripts of video bearing File No.VID-20200320-
WA0013.mp4:-same as above.
(3) Transcript of video bearing File No.VID-20200320-
WA0014.mp4 speech delivered by accused Akhil Gogoi
translated from Assamese to English.
―My brothers, my sisters… these people from Chabua
become example for Assam (slogan from
crowd)…therefore, I request all my volunteers, create
one human chain in front side by holding each other’s
hand, create another human chain on backside and no
one will go out from the chain even for pass urine without
asking the volunteers. What example you have shown…
Assamese national organizations could not come together
Page 40
Page 41 of 63
in anywhere in Assam but herein Chabua, We see in
Chabua the committee of AASU is here also the
committee from KMSS is present… today AASU and KMSS
could not come together in Assam but Chabua has proved
that we need to unified… KMSS, AASU, AJYCP and all
other nationalist organizations of Assam and each and
every Assam lovers of need to unified and make this
movement successful. And real key for success of our
movement, future of Assamese community is unified
movement. Yes or no…? Therefore, from this platform I
call everybody to unified AASU, KMSS, AJYCP all
nationalist organization of Assam, LEFTIST
ORGANIZATIONS of Assam and all political parties,
unified for movement against CAB. And till CAB has not
canceled, we will not spare anybody.‖
74. After viewing the video footage of the speeches of the A-
1 as well as after going through the transcripts of said speeches
as provided in D-29 along with the charge-sheet, we have no
hesitation to concur with the finding of the trial court that the
speeches given by A-1 may be in forceful tone, however, there
is nothing therein to indicate that there was any instigation to
anybody regarding any kind of violence. There is no instigation
to commit any violence by anybody or to indulge in any
destructive activities. It appears only to be a forceful and
assertive speech, which is of political nature, opposing against
Page 41
Page 42 of 63
the Citizenship Amendment Bill. Many of the witnesses whose
statements were recorded by the Investigating Officer had
termed the speeches given by A-1 as provocative and
aggressive, leading to the mob indulging in violent activities.
However, in view of the fact that the video footage of the
speech and the transcripts of the speech was also provided by
the Investigating Officer along with the charge-sheet, there was
no error in the trial court considering the same to come to a
finding with regard to broad probabilities of the case and the
basic infirmities in the testimony of the witnesses terming the
speech to be provocative and aggressive in light of the video
footage of the speeches and the transcript of the speech
delivered by A-1 available before the court. We, therefore, do
not have any hesitation in holding that the speeches of A-1 do
not contain any instigation to violence and concur with the
observations of the trial court in the impugned order.
75. Similarly, on perusal of the transcripts of telephonic
conversation between A-1 and other accused persons as well as
some other persons as contained in document D-15 and D-49,
it appears that same also only indicates that the accused
persons were preparing for protest meetings at various places
to protest against Citizenship Amendment Bill. It only indicates
about the preparations for the protest meetings against CAB at
Chabua and other places. There is no indication as to any
Page 42
Page 43 of 63
incitement of violence or any plan to indulge in violent and
destructive activities in any manner.
76. Though, on perusal of some of the transcripts of the
recorded conversation between A-1 and one Kajol Gohain, it
appears that during conversation said Kajol Gohain and A-1 also
used some rhetoric among themselves. For example, A-1 said
“I have come to give some fire to make you warm.” In reply to
that Kajol Gohain answered “I will be on fire now. Okay come,
let’s meet.” Similarly, in one of the recorded conversations,
which was for the duration of one minute thirty-one second and
was recorded at 16.46.5 hrs on 09.12.2019, the A-1 while
having conversation with one Sanjay informed him that “Sanjay
da, we have aandolans in every corner of Assam, lakhs of
people came on the street, railways have been stopped and
Assam is totally Bandh.” These conversations, prima facie, do
not indicate that there was any plan to indulge in violence or
any destructive activities by the present respondents. It only
appears to be a conversation regarding the status of the protest
programme and a call to be more assertive and impactful in
planning the protest meeting.
77. We are thus also in agreement with the finding of the trial
court to the extent that the CDR analysis reports only indicates
that the A-1 and other respondents were discussing only
regarding organizing the protest meet against Citizenship
Amendment Bill and no discussion was made as regards
Page 43
Page 44 of 63
planning any destructive activities or indulging in any kind of
violence by the protesters.
78. However, even if we ignore the speeches delivered by the
A-1, recorded version of which as well as the transcripts of
which are provided in D-29; as well as even if we ignore the
telephonic conversation between A-1 and other persons,
transcripts of which are contained in D-15 and D-49,if we
consider the statements of some of the witnesses, which were
recorded during the course of investigation, under Section 161
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, namely, PW-2, PW-5,
PW-6, PW-7 and PW-13, it appears that they have stated in
their statement that some agitated people, led by Akhil Gogoi,
started throwing stones at police parties and the officer-in-
charge of the Chabua Police Station was injured in the said
attack. The trial court did not rely on the said statements as it
find differences in the statement of two set of witnesses and
the witnesses who implicated the A-1 and other accused
persons were not corroborated by similar statements by other
witnesses.
79. We are of the considered opinion that the trial court had
erred in deciding the question of reliability of the statement of
those witnesses who have implicated the respondents including
the A-1, at the stage of consideration of charges.
Page 44
Page 45 of 63
80. As discussed herein above, while considering the question
of framing of charges though court has power to sift and weigh
the materials collected during investigation, however, unless
some basic infirmities appears from the statements of the
witnesses which makes it difficult to rely on them, same has to
be considered with an assumption that they are true and it has
to be taken on its face value without delving into the question
of reliability much less seeking any corroboration at that stage.
Apart from the fact that PW-2 i.e., the officer-in-charge of
Chabua Police Station was severely injured by stone throwing
by some of the protesters, there is also evidence on record to
indicate that the government vehicle was damaged and the said
vehicle (Bolero) was capsized by the protesters.
81. Even if it is assumed that the respondents gathered at
Chabua along with other citizens only for the purpose of
protesting against proposed Citizenship Amendment Bill, once
the incident like throwing of stones at police personnel wherein
the officer-in-charge of Chabua Police Station got injured as
well as capsizing of Bolero vehicle occurred and they became
aware of the facts which rendered the assembly as an unlawful
assembly, their continued presence in such assembly, in itself is
sufficient to prima facie make all of them to be a member of
unlawful assembly.
82. Taking the statements of PW-2, PW-5, PW-6, PW-7, PW-
13, PW-30 and PW-19 on their face value is sufficient for the
Page 45
Page 46 of 63
purpose of framing of charges against the respondents under
Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 120B,
143, 147, 148, 326, 307, 333, 353, 427 of the Indian Penal
Code. The trial court had erred in this regard in not taking the
statements of aforementioned witnesses on their face value. It
erred in seeking for corroboration and testing its reliability on
the basis of contradiction in the testimony of the
aforementioned witnesses when compared to the testimony of
other witnesses. This exercise undertaken by the trial court of
verifying the veracity, reliability and genuineness of the
testimony of aforementioned witnesses, in the considered
opinion of this court, is beyond the scope of examination, which
can be done while considering the question of framing of
charges/discharge under Sections 228/227 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973.
83. Unless there are basic infirmity in the materials before the
court at the time of consideration of the question of framing of
charges, court has to consider such materials on their face
value. For example, in the instant case, many witnesses have
stated that the speeches given by A-1 were provocative and
aggressive, which led the public protester to indulge in violent
activities of throwing stones and damaging public property.
However, as the video footage as well as transcripts of the
speeches were available before the trial court, same can be
examined to ascertain whether the statement of witnesses as
Page 46
Page 47 of 63
regards speeches delivered by the A-1 may be regarded as
provocative and whether it contained any incitement to indulge
in violent and destructive activities or not. The testimony
regarding the fact as to whether these speeches contain
anything which could have incited violence or disruptive
activities by the protesters can be verified by examining
cursorily the video footage and transcripts of the speeches. This
much of sifting of available materials on record, to find out
whether prima facie case is made out against the accused
persons or not, is permissible. Hence, unless there are any
inherent infirmities in the materials available before the court,
the court has to rely on it by taking it on its face value. When
PW-5 and PW-6 and some other witnesses have stated in their
statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure that ―some agitated people led by Akhil Gogoi started
throwing stones at police party and the officer-in-charge of
Chabua police station was struck by one of the stones on his
face and got injured.” Such statements are to be taken on its
face value and veracity of such statement could be ascertained
only during trial when the witnesses who gave such statement,
appear as witness before the trial court for the purpose of
cross-examination. If the statements of the aforementioned
witnesses are taken on their face value, it fulfills the ingredients
of the offences, for the purpose of framing of charges against
the respondents under the provisions of Indian Penal Code, as
mentioned in the charge-sheet.
Page 47
Page 48 of 63
84. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that on
consideration of the statements of aforementioned witnesses
(PW-2, PW-5, PW-6, PW-7, PW-13, PW-30 and PW-19) on their
face value, the facts which emerges therefrom, discloses the
existence of ingredients necessary to constitute offences
alleged under Indian Penal Code in the charge-sheet. Hence,
we are of the considered opinion that the trial court had erred
in discharging the respondents of the offences alleged against
them under Indian Penal Code in the charge-sheet.
85. Now, let us consider as to whether the trial court was
correct in discharging the respondents for offence under
Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 as
alleged in the charge-sheet against them.
86. While considering the question of applicability of Section
16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 to the
alleged acts committed by the present respondents, we have to
keep in mind that the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
was enacted by the Parliament mainly to comply with the
Resolution No. 1373 adopted by the Security Council of United
Nations in 4385th meeting on 28th September, 2001, requiring all
states to take measures to combat international terrorism.
Since the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 contains
very stringent penal provisions, the said statute has to be
interpreted carefully to examine the question as to whether the
said act would apply to the present respondents or not.
Page 48
Page 49 of 63
87. In this regard, the Supreme Court of India has observed
in the case of ―Vernon Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr.“,
reported in “(2023) 15 SCC 56‖
“45. In three decisions of this Court, Hitendra Vishnu
Thakur v. State of Maharashtra [Hitendra Vishnu
Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC
(Cri) 1087] , Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra
Bhimraj Bijjaya [Niranjan Singh Karam Singh
Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76 : 1991
SCC (Cri) 47] and Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of
Gujarat [Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat,
(1988) 2 SCC 271 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 318] , the manner in which
stringent provisions of a statute ought to be interpreted has
been laid down. In all the three authorities, observation of this
Court has been that the court ought to carefully examine
every case, before making an assessment if the Act would
apply or not. When the statutes have stringent provisions the
duty of the court would be more onerous. Graver the offence,
greater should be the care taken to see that the offence would
fall within the four corners of the Act. Though these
judgments were delivered while testing similar rigorous
provisions under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1987, the same principle would apply in
respect of the 1967 Act as well.‖
88. Thus, from above, it appears that since the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 is not an ordinary penal statute
and as it provides for harsher consequences, greater care shall
have to be taken to see whether the offence alleged against the
Page 49
Page 50 of 63
present respondents would fall within the four corners of the
aforesaid Act.
89. For framing charges under Section 16 of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the prosecution side has to
show materials to justify that the respondents have committed
―terrorist act‖ as defined under Section 15 of the said Act.
90. On perusal of the charge-sheet, it appears that in
paragraph No. 16.14 thereof, the prosecution side has alleged
that the present respondents have committed terrorist act as
per Section 15(1)(a)(ii), (iii), (b) of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967.
91. For the sake of convenience, Section 15 of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 is quoted herein below:-
―[15. Terrorist act.- [(1)] Whoever does any act with intent to
threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security,
[economic security,] or sovereignty of India or with intent to strike
terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the
people in India or in any foreign country,-
(a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or
inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or
poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other
substances (whether biological radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of
a hazardous nature or by any other means of whatever nature to
cause or likely to cause-
(i) death of, or injuries to, any person or persons; or
Page 50
Page 51 of 63
(ii) loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property; or
(iii) disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life
of the community in India or in any foreign country; or[(iiia) damage to, the monetary stability of India by way of
production or smuggling or circulation of high quality
counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other
material; or]
(iv) damage or destruction of any property in India or in a
foreign country used or intended to be used for the defence of
India or in connection with any other purposes of the
Government of India, any State Government or any of their
agencies; or
(b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of criminal
force or attempts to do so or causes death of any public functionary
or attempts to cause death of any public functionary; or
(c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and threatens to kill or
injure such person or does any other act in order to compel the
Government of India, any State Government or the Government of
a foreign country or [an international or inter-governmental
organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any
act; or]commits a terrorist act.
[Explanation.–For the purpose of this sub-section,
(a) “public functionary” means the constitutional authorities or
any other functionary notified in the Official Gazette by the
Central Government as public functionary;
(b) “high quality counterfeit Indian currency” means the
counterfeit currency as may be declared after examination by
Page 51
Page 52 of 63
an authorised or notified forensic authority that such currency
imitates or compromises with the key security features as
specified in the Third Schedule.]
[(2) The terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an offence
within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties specified
in the Second Schedule.]‖
92. As to what is the proper approach to interpret the
aforesaid provision has been considered by the Apex Court in
the case of “Shoma Kanti Sen Vs. State of Maharashtra“
reported in ―(2024) 6 SCC 591″. In the said judgment, the Apex
Court has observed as follows:-
“35. We are not concerned with sub-section (2) of
the said provision. In this appeal, there is no
allegation of any act of the appellant constituting an
offence within the scope of the Second Schedule to
the same statute. Sub-section (1) of Section 15 refers
to certain acts which would constitute a terrorist act
but the first part of sub-section (1) of Section 15
cannot be read in isolation. In our reading of the said
provision of the statute, to qualify for being a
terrorist act, such act must be done with intent to
threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity,
security, economic security or sovereignty of or such
act must be accompanied with an intent to strike
terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any
section of the people in India or in any foreignPage 52
Page 53 of 63country. These are initial requirements to invoke
Section 15(1) of the 1967 Act. The legislature,
however, has not left the nature of such acts
unspecified and in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the said
sub-section, the law stipulates the manner of
commission of the acts specified in first part of sub-
section (1) of said Section 15. If any offender
attempts to commit any of the acts specified in
Section 15(1), to come within the ambit of the
expression ―terrorist act‖ under the 1967 legislation,
action or intention to cause such act must be by
those means, which have been specified in clauses
(a), (b) and (c) of the said provision. This is the line
of reasoning broadly followed by this Court
in Vernon [Vernon v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 15
SCC 56: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 885: 2023 INSC 655] in
construing the applicability of the said provision. If
we examine the acts attributed to the appellant by
the various witnesses or as inferred from the
evidence relied on by the prosecution, we do not find
prima facie commission or attempt to commit any
terrorist act by the appellant applying the aforesaid
test for invoking Section 15 read with Section 16 [
―16. Punishment for terrorist act.–(1) Whoever
commits a terrorist act shall–(a) if such act has
resulted in the death of any person, be punishable
Page 53
Page 54 of 63with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be
liable to fine;(b) in any other case, be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to
fine.‖] of the 1967 Act.‖
93. From above observation of the Apex Court, it appears
that to qualify for being a ―terrorist act‖, such act must be done
with an intent as stated in Section 15(1) of the aforesaid Act. It
also appears that in addition to intention as stated in Section
15(1) of the Act, it must be done by those means, which have
been specified in clause (a), (b) and (c) of Section 15(1) of the
said Act.
94. While considering the question as to whether the charges
under Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967 may be framed against the present respondents or not, it
has to be ascertained as to whether the ingredients of offence
under Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967 are made out on the basis of materials on record,
including the statements of witnesses recorded under Section
161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as well as
documents, including the electronic evidence, collected during
the course of investigation, taken on its face value.
Page 54
Page 55 of 63
95. While considering the above question, we cannot lose
sight of the fact that the respondents as well as the other
protesters gathered at Chabua, on 09.12.2019, mainly to
protest against the Citizenship Amendment Bill to be placed
before the Parliament.
96. In this regard, the observation of Delhi High Court in the
case of ―Asif Iqbal Tanha v. State (NCT of Delhi)” reported in
―2021 SCC OnLine Del 3253″ is relevant. In the said case, the
Delhi High Court was considering the questions involving
commission of offence in connection with protest against
Citizenship Amendment Act. Same is quoted herein below:-
“Right to Protest
63. Since this matter emanates from a protest
organised by certain persons, which the State alleges,
was no ordinary protest but one that has shaken or is
likely to have shaken, the entire foundations of our
republic, we feel compelled to discuss what might be
the permissible contours of a protest that would not
threaten our nation.
64. In this context we examined, when, the
constitutionally guaranteed right to protest, which
derives from the rights under Article 19(1)(b) of the
Constitution to ―assemble peaceably and without
arms‖, crosses the line and ventures into commission of
a cognizable offence under the ordinary penal law; and
even more so, when, the right to protest further
Page 55
Page 56 of 63crosses into the territory of becoming a terrorist act or
a conspiracy or an act preparatory to commission of a
terrorist act under the UAPA.
65. The observations of the Supreme Court in Mazdoor
Kisan Shakti Sangathan case [Mazdoor Kisan Shakti
Sangathan v. Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 324]
appear to us to be the most lucid and pithy answer as
to the contours of legitimate protest and these bear
repetition. In the said decision the Supreme Court says
that legitimate dissent is a distinguishable feature of
any democracy and the question is not whether the
issue raised by the protestors is right or wrong or
whether it is justified or unjustified, people have the
right to express their views; and a particular cause,
which in the first instance, may appear to be
insignificant or irrelevant may gain momentum and
acceptability when it is duly voiced and debated. The
Supreme Court further says that a demonstration may
take various forms: it may be noisy, disorderly and
even violent, in which case it would not fall within the
permissible limits of Articles 19(1)(a) or 19(1)(b) and in
such case the Government has the power to regulate,
including prohibit, such protest or demonstration. The
Government may even prohibit public meetings,
demonstrations or protests on streets or highways to
avoid nuisance or disturbance of traffic but the
Government cannot close all streets or open areas for
Page 56
Page 57 of 63public meetings thereby defeating the fundamental
right that flows from Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of
the Constitution.
66. Assuming, without however expressing any opinion
thereon, that in the present case the protest in
question crossed the limit of what is permissible under
Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) and went into the
forbidden realm of a non-peaceful protest, first of all
there is nothing to show that the Government had
prohibited the protest at the relevant time, much less is
there anything to show that the appellant was the
perpetrator or conspirator or was involved in any illegal
protest. In any case, whatever offences are alleged to
have been committed by reason of the protests having
turned non-peaceful are subject-matter of FIR No. 298
of 2019, in which the appellant is an accused and in
which he has already been admitted to bail and will
face trial in due course. There is absolutely nothing in
the subject charge-sheet, by way of any specific or
particularised allegation that would show the possible
commission of a ―terrorist act‖ within the meaning of
Section 15 of UAPA; or an act of ―raising funds‖ to
commit a terrorist act under Section 17; or an act of
―conspiracy‖ to commit or an ―act preparatory‖ to
commit, a terrorist act within the meaning of Section
18 of UAPA. We are unable to discern in the subject
charge-sheet the elemental factual ingredients that are
Page 57
Page 58 of 63a must to found the offences defined under Sections
15, 17 or 18 of UAPA.‖
97. We have already discussed in the foregoing paragraphs
that on cursory examination of the transcripts of the speeches
given by A-1 as well as after viewing the video footage of the
said speeches, we are of the considered opinion that the
speeches of A-1 do not contain anything which can be regarded
as to have provoked the protesters to indulge in violent and
destructive activities.
98. We have already held in the foregoing paragraphs that
we do not concur with the decision of the trial court in not
finding any materials to frame charges against the present
respondents under the provisions of Indian Penal Code for
offences which were alleged against the present respondents in
the charge-sheet. However, we are also of the considered
opinion that the provisions of Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967 being a special Act containing harsher punishment, is
not required to be taken recourse to if the nature of activities
with which the present respondents are alleged to have
committed can be brought under ordinary penal law of the
land.
99. We are of the considered opinion that it is only in those
cases where the law enforcing machinery finds the ordinary law
to be inadequate or not sufficiently effective for tackling with
the menace of ―terrorist acts‖, the resort should be taken to the
Page 58
Page 59 of 63
stringent provisions of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967.
100. The question is whether the alleged act of agitated
people led by A-1 throwing stones at police party and one of
the stone hitting the officer-in-charge of Chabua police station,
causing grievous injury on his person can be regarded as
―terrorist act‖ or not. The answer lies in the means used for
committing the alleged offence. Though, we have held in the
foregoing paragraphs that the materials available on record is
sufficient to frame charges under the provisions of Indian Penal
Code. However, unless the means used for causing injury, i.e.,
stone, is regarded as the means included within the means
indicated in Section 15(1)(a) of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967, the essential ingredients to constitute
the offence under Section 15 would not be fulfilled.
101. In the instant case, there is only seizure of one piece of
stone during the course of investigation. We are of the
considered opinion that if we apply the principle of ejusdem
generis to Section 15(1)(a) of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967, it appears that ―stone‖ does not fall in
the means of same nature and characteristic as specifically
indicated in the said provision like bombs, dynamite or other
explosive substances, or inflammable substances, or firearms,
or lethal weapons, or poisonous or noxious gases, or chemicals,
or by any other substances, whether biological, radioactive,
Page 59
Page 60 of 63
nuclear, or otherwise of hazardous nature. Hence, the said act
of throwing stones and injuring police personnel, though is
sufficient to constitute offence under the provision of Indian
Penal Code, same falls short of fulfilling the ingredients of
offence of terrorist act as defined under Section 15 of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
102. Similarly, though there are materials on record to indicate
that A-3 was brandishing a sword in the protest meet, however,
there is no evidence on record to show that he used that sword
to cause injury to any person or to damage or destruction of
any property as required under Section 15 of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. It is also pertinent to mention
that the said sword was also not seized by police during
investigation.
103. Similarly, though PW-30 has stated in his statement
recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 that during the meeting period, he got information that
some protesters were planning to set fire on the houses of
Amaravati colony, which is basically a Bengali dominated area,
however, he has not indicated in his statement as to what is
the source of his information or from where he came to know
about the said fact. As such, the said information alone,
appears to be insufficient for framing charges under Section 16
of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
Page 60
Page 61 of 63
104. Similarly, there is no evidence on record to show that the
Bolero vehicle was disrupted and capsized by the protesters by
using any of the means as indicated in Section 15(1)(a) of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Therefore, the said
Act also does not fall within the meaning of ―terrorist act‖ as
defined under Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967. Though, same is sufficient to constitute offences
under Indian Penal Code as indicated by us in the foregoing
paragraphs.
105. As regards the allegation of threatening the economic
security of India by resorting to Rail Roko program is
concerned, it appears that the Rail Roko program was called by
the protester as a symbolic means to protest against CAB. It
also appears that no violent means was used to stall the rails.
Rather, the evidence of PW-34 indicates that 200 to 300 people
assembled near signal, making it difficult to operate the signal
for up trains. It also appears from the statement of PW-35, that
the A-1 asked the protester to sit and squat on the rail line to
implement Rail Roko protest program. No means as provided
for in Section 15(1)(a) like bombs, dynamite, explosive
substances, etc., were used by the protesters to implement Rail
Roko program. Hence, as indicated herein above that though
said acts may constitute offences under the Indian Penal Code,
as indicated herein before, same are not sufficient to fulfill the
ingredient necessary to constitute the offence of ―terrorist act‖
Page 61
Page 62 of 63
as defined under Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967.
106. In view of the discussions made and reasons stated in the
foregoing paragraphs, we concur with the finding of the trial
court that the materials on record, taken on their face value, do
not disclose the existence of ingredients necessary to constitute
an offence under Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 by the present respondents. We,
therefore, agree with the finding of the trial court in discharging
the present respondents of charge under Section 16 of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
107. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that though the
materials on records are insufficient to frame charges against
the present respondents under Section 16 of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, however, same are sufficient
to frame charges against the respondents under the provisions
of Indian Penal Code with which they have been charge-
sheeted.
108. As the Court of learned Special Judge, NIA, does not have
any jurisdiction to try the offences under the Indian Penal Code
with which the respondents have been charge-sheeted, it will,
therefore, transfer the aforesaid case, under Section 20 of the
National Investigation Agency Act, 2008,to the regular court
Page 62
Page 63 of 63
having jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973/BNSS, 2023.
109. Upon such transfer, the Court to which the case is
transferred shall hear both sides on the question of framing of
charges under Indian Penal Code and thereafter proceed
accordingly in light of the observations made by us in the
instant judgment.
110. Before parting, we would like to clarify that the
observations and opinion made by us in this judgment is
pertaining only to the aspect of framing of charges and must
not be construed to be any opinion on the veracity of the same
which is required to be proved in the trial in accordance with
law.
111. This appeal is accordingly partly allowed.
112. Send back the records of the trial court to the Court of
learned Special Judge, NIA with a copy of this judgment.
JUDGE JUDGE
Munmun Boruah Digitally signed by Munmun Boruah
Date: 2026.05.25 16:14:40 +05’30’
Comparing Assistant
Page 63
[ad_1]
Source link
